Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 1347/2019
In
D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 2016/2018
In
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 663/2025
Nirmala Runthla W/o Late Shri G.R. Runthala, Aged About 59
Years, Resident Of Near Dalmiya School, Station Road, Chidawa,
District Jhunjhunu (Raj)
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
State Of Rajasthan Through Its Principal Secretary, Higher
Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur
2.
Shri Vaibhav Galriya, Principal Secretary, Higher Education
Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
2/1.
Dr.
Arushi
Ajey
Malik,
Principal
Secretary,
Higher
Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
3.
Dr. Om Prakash Bairwa, Commissioner, College Education,
Rajasthan, Srk Shiksha Sankul, Jln Marg, Jaipur.
4.
Shri A.k. Mohanti, Secretary, Management Committee,
Chirawa College, Chirawa, Distt. Jhunjhunu
5.
Dr. Richa Kulshresth, Principal, Chirawa College, Chirawa,
Distt. Jhunjhunu
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Tanveer Ahamad
Mr. Iliyas Khan
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. G.S. Gill, AAG with
Ms. Shikha Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP TANEJA
Order
29/01/2026
1.
Petitioner’s husband-Late Shri G.R. Runthala was stated to be
a Lecturer in private aided College viz. Chidawa College, District
Jhunjhunu and after his death, petitioner preferred this contempt
(2 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
[CCP-1347/2019]
petition alleging disobedience of the directions in rem issued in
D.B.
Special
Appeal
(Writ)
No.
663/2015:
State
of
Rajasthan & Anr. v. The Management Committee Sh.
Bhagwan Das Todi College & two other connected appeals
decided on 06.11.2015.
2.
Counsel
for
the
petitioner
does
not
dispute
that
no
independent and separate appeal or petition, in respect of not
granting benefits to deceased- Late Shri G.R. Runthala in terms of
directions issued under Bhagwan Das Todi (supra), was ever
instituted and the contempt petition has been filed directly,
alleging disobedience of such directions qua Late Shri G.R.
Runthala.
3.
Having heard learned counsels for both the parties, both the
counsels do not dispute that the identical issue, which has arisen
in this contempt petition, has already been dealt with in detail by
the Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of D.B. Civil Contempt
Petition No. 1666/2018: Dr. Anil Kumar Mathur and ors. Vs.
Mr. Ashutosh A.T. Pednekar and ors. and other connected
matters, decided vide judgment dated 21.08.2025 and the present
contempt petition may also be disposed of in terms of the
judgment dated 21.08.2025.
4.
For ready reference, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the
relevant portion of the judgment dated 21.08.2025:
“12. We are reminded of the judgment passed by the
Supreme Court in the case of J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat
Duggar and Others-(1996) 6 SCC 291, wherein three
Judges bench of the Supreme Court has observed as
under:-
(3 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
“6.
[CCP-1347/2019]
The question then is whether the Division
Bench) was right in setting aside the direction
issued by the learned single Judge to redraw the
seniority list. It is contended by Mr. S.K. Jain,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that
unless
the
correctness
learned
Judge
goes
into
the
of
decision
taken
by
the
the
Government in preparation of the seniority list in
the light of the law laid down by three Benches,
the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion
whether or not the respondent had wilfully or
deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Court as
defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore,
the learned single Judge of the High Court
necessarily has to go into the merits of that
question. We do not find that the contention is
well founded. It is seen that, admittedly, the
respondents had prepared the seniority list on
2.7.1991 Subsequently promotions came to be
made. The question is whether seniority list is
open to review in the contempt proceedings to
find out, whether it is in conformity with the
directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is
seen that once there is an order passed by the
Government on the basis of the directions issued
by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action
to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The
preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or
may be right or may or may not be in conformity
with the directions. But that would be a fresh
cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of
the opportunity of judicial review. But that
cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of
the order. After re-exercising the judicial review
in contempt proceedings, afresh direction by the
learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw
(4 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
[CCP-1347/2019]
the seniority list. In other words, the learned
Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider
the
matter
on
merits
in
the
contempt
proceedings. It would not be permissible under
Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division
Bench has exercised the power under Section 18
of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a
judgment or order of the single Judge; the
Division Bench corrected the mistake committed
by the learned single Judge. Therefore, it may
not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in
this Court against the judgment of the learned
single Judge when the matter was already seized
of the Division Bench.
7.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed. It
may be open to the aggrieved party to assail the
correctness of the seniority list prepared by the
State Government, if it is not in comformity with
the directions issued by the High Court, if they so
advised, in an appropriate forum. No costs.”
12.1.The
view
taken
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
J.S.Parihar (supra) has been reiterated in Snehasis Giri
Vs. Subhasis Mitra-(2023) 18 SCC 529. In Snehasis
Giri (supra), it was held that in contempt proceedings of
almost like persons, interim orders were passed on the
basis that benefits were not confined and relief not
granted only to the parties to the litigation but that the
directions had the effect of in rem adjudication. The
Court, therefore, directed the respondent contemnors to
verify from the record with respect to entitlement of all
the contempt petitioners but urged that there are express
directions of this Court to release salaries of the contempt
petitioners without insisting on verifying genuineness of
their claims. Considering all the aspects, Hon'ble the
Supreme Court has held as under:-
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
(5 of 13)
[CCP-1347/2019]
“10. Furthermore, there is merit in the respondents’ submission that the court, in contempt
proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examine
matters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction or orders contained in the
judgement of which contempt is being alleged. In
fact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra),
it was held as follows:
“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well
as this Court to punish for contempt is a special
and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected,
could even curb the liberty of the individual
charged with commission of contempt. The very
nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the
Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of
care and caution. This is also necessary as, more
often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea
involves a process of self-determination of the
sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The
Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the
four corners of the order which is alleged to have
been flouted or enter into questions that have
not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or
the order violation of which is alleged. Only such
directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken
into account for the purpose of consideration as
to whether there has been any disobedience or
wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be
considered. The Courts must also ensure that
while considering a contempt plea the power
(6 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
[CCP-1347/2019]
available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon.
No order or direction supplemental to what has
been already expressed should be issued by the
Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain
of the contempt law; such an exercise is more
appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the
Court, as noticed above. The above principles
would appear to be the cumulative outcome of
the
precedents
Jhareswar
cited
Prasad
at
the
v.
Tarak
Paul
Bar,
namely,
Nath
Gan-
guly[(2002) 5 SCC 352] , V.M. Manohar Prasad
v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610], Bihar
Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008) 5 SCC 339]
and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV
[(2006) 1 SCC 613].”
11. In the present case too, this court is of the
opinion that the respondents’ stand that without
verification of the petitioners' appointment and
whether the procedures prescribed were duly followed in respect of matters such as fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications and relevant experience); availability of vacancy; staff
pattern in respect of madrasas where recognition
was granted and if so for what period; whether
the institution was aided and recognized or not or
recognized and non-aided, and if so for what duration; whether a duly empowered selection body
or bodies considered the candidature of the
claimant
before
he/she
was
appointed
and
whether the committee or body selecting the individual/claimant was constituted in accordance
with the rules or guidelines, etc is justified. In
these circumstances, this court is of the opinion
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
(7 of 13)
[CCP-1347/2019]
that further proceedings cannot be continued as
no determination can be made unless there is a
due verification in regard to the employment of
each of the petitioners.
12. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of
contempt jurisdiction, cannot examine the merits
of a decision, whether the state or the madrasa’s
stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the
benefits of being treated as an employee, having
regard to the concerned rules and regulations. In
J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar this court explained the limited scope of contempt proceedings, as follows, in the facts of the case:
“6. The question then is whether the Division
Bench was right in setting aside the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to redraw the
seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K. Jain, the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that
unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the decision taken by the Government in
preparation of the seniority list in the light of the
law laid down by three Benches, the learned
Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether or
not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately
disobeyed the orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court necessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We
do not find that the contention is well founded. It
is seen that, admittedly, the respondents had
prepared the seniority list on 2-7-1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made. The question is whether seniority list is open to review in
the contempt proceedings to find out whether it
is in conformity with the directions issued by the
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
(8 of 13)
[CCP-1347/2019]
earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an
order passed by the Government on the basis of
the directions issued by the court, there arises a
fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority
list may be wrong or may be right or may or may
not be in conformity with the directions. But that
would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be
the wilful violation of the order. After re- exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a
fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other
words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the
contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the
Division Bench has exercised the power under
Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment or order of the Single
Judge; the Division Bench corrected the mistake
committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary for the State to file
an appeal in this Court against the judgment of
the learned Single Judge when the matter was already seized of the Division Bench.”
12.2.
The Supreme Court exercising its powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, thereafter
constituted a Committee to examine the claims of the
petitioners.
13.
We noticed that in none of the orders passed by the
Court, the question regarding maintainability of the
contempt petition was examined.
(9 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
14.
[CCP-1347/2019]
It would be apposite to notice the provisions of
Section 2 (b) of Contempt of Court’s Act, 1971 (for short ‘
the Act of 1971’):-
“2. Definitions……...
(a)-------------(b)
"civil contempt" means willful disobedience
to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or
other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;”
14.1. Section 12 of the Act of 1971 reads as under:-
“12. Punishment for contempt of court.—
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may
be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees, or
with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or
the punishment awarded may be remitted on
apology being made to the satisfaction of the
court.
Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected
merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, no court
shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in
respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section, where a person is found guilty of a civil
contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will
not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
(10 of 13)
[CCP-1347/2019]
of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of
sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct
that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of
court in respect of any undertaking given to a
court is a company, every person who, at the
time the contempt was committed, was in charge
of, and was responsible to, the company for the
conduct of business of the company, as well as
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be enforced,
with the leave of the court, by the detention in
civil prison of each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to
such punishment if he proves that the contempt
was committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (4), where the contempt of court referred
to therein has been committed by a company and
it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the
company, such director, manager, secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of
the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
(11 of 13)
[CCP-1347/2019]
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-sections
(4) and (5),_
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals;
and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”
14.2. Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the law as laid down
in J.S. Parihar (supra) and Snehasis Giris (supra).
15.
The petitioners’ contention of the judgment in the
case of Bhagwan Das Todi (supra) being in rem and,
therefore, no separate petition/application would require
to be filed is found to be misconceived. The claims of the
contempt petitioners are based upon separate set of fact
with regard to the period of engagement, the institutes
are different, the question as to when the employee was
posted on the aided post and what aid was being received
against their posts are all facts for which, finding is
required to be given in each individual case.
findings cannot be given in contempt proceedings.
Such
No
reply can be received on facts in contempt proceedings.
The nature of their termination/retirement/disengagement
from such institution would also be looked into.
16.
A close reading of the concluding para of the
judgment passed in Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra), clearly
shows that the Hon’ble Division Bench has held that the
said judgment is not confined to the employees therein
but also applies to several other employees who have
either filed the writ petition or raised objections before
the learned Tribunal. In the said context the Hon’ble
Division Bench has held that the principle laid down in the
said case would also be applicable in case of other
similarly situated persons. The ‘term similarly situated’
used in the said para cannot be read in isolation but the
same is required to be read in the context, which clearly
(12 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
[CCP-1347/2019]
shows that the intention of the Hon’ble Division Bench is
to make the principle laid down in the said case applicable
also with regard to the petitioners who have already
raised their grievance and submitted their independent
claims before this Hon’ble Court or before the learned
Tribunal. The intention of the Hon’ble Division Bench
emerging of the said judgment read in its entirety is very
clear that although the individual employee was required
to establish their entitlement with regard to the benefits
arising
from
their
services
rendered
in
the
aided
institution, however the said entitlement was to be
adjudicated in view of the principles laid down in the case
of Bhagwan Das Todi’ (supra). In our opinion the
contempt petitioners have misconstrued the intention of
the Hon’ble Division Bench and without first getting their
entitlement / claim independently adjudicated before this
Hon’ble Court or before the learned Tribunal have
straightway proceeded to file the contempt petition before
this
Hon’ble
Division
Bench
meaning
thereby
the
contempt of Court is alleged without there being any
adjudication of their independent entitlement, which is not
permissible in the eye of law.
16.1.
We have also noticed that in respect of most of
the contempt petitioners, the compliance / compliance in
part has already been made, however, looking to the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the individual cases,
some benefits have not been extended to some of the
contempt petitioners; which in our view, this gives rise to
a separate cause of action to the petitioners, however
they have contended that the complete compliance of the
judgment passed in the case of Bhagwan Das Todi’
(supra) has not been made.
17.
It is reiterated that the scope of interference by this
Court in contempt proceedings are very limited and the
fresh
adjudication
of
the
claims
of
the
contempt
petitioners with regard to the part of benefits not allowed
(13 of 13)
[2026:RJ-JP:4026-DB]
[CCP-1347/2019]
by the State Government / Educational Institution looking
to their peculiar facts cannot be done in the contempt
proceedings.
Since
the
respondents
herein
have
considered the claim of the contempt petitioners and have
already passed respective orders in the individual cases.
The grievance, if any, left can be adjudicated before the
appropriate authority / Court / Tribunal, however the
same
would
not
amount
to
wilful
and
deliberate
disobedience of the order passed by this Hon’ble Court
and, therefore, also the present contempt proceedings are
not maintainable.
18.
We are also aware of the limited power of the Court
while deciding the contempt proceedings and we refrain
from enlarging the scope of contempt petition, especially
when there is an availability of statutory forum of
Rajasthan
Non-Government
Educational
Institutional
Tribunal (for short ‘ the Tribunal’), which is competent to
examine the claim of the individuals and pass orders
relying upon the orders passed in the case of Bhagwan
Das Todi (supra). The directions issued by the Tribunal
are akin to a decree passed by the civil Court and is
executable in terms of Section 27 of the Rajasthan NonGovernment Educational Institutions Act, 1989.
19.
We, therefore, find that there is no deliberate or
willful non-compliance of Court's order on behalf of the
respondents.
The
contempt
petitions
are
wholly
misconceived and the same are accordingly, dismissed.”
5.
Accordingly, the instant contempt petition does not survive
further and the same is hereby dismissed, in terms of the
judgment dated 21.08.2025 (supra).
6.
Notice(s) of contempt, if any, also stands discharged.
(SANDEEP TANEJA),J
pcg/20
(SUDESH BANSAL),J
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review