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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP No. 109/2025
Reserved on: 12.05.2026
Pronounced on: 18.05.2026
Uploaded on: 19.05.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced- Full
Nazir Ahmad Chak
S/O Late Ab. Salam Chak,
R/O Odura,
Tehsil & District Kulgam.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Zahid Hussain Dar.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K through
Principal Secretary to Govt.,
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate, Kulgam.
3. Senior Superintendent of Police, Kulgam.
…Respondent(s)
Through: GA Zahid Qais Noor.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A.CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Through the present petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks quashment of Detention
Order No. 01/DMK/PSA/2025 dated 30.04.2025 passed by
respondent No.2- District Magistrate Kulgam, under Section 8 of
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the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, whereby he
has been placed under preventive detention in order to deter him
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the ‘security of the State’.
2. The main grounds urged by learned counsel for the petitioner are
that the detenue is already facing trial in FIR No. 61/2019 under
section 143, 153 RPC and 13 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act registered at Police Station Kulgam and has
been enlarged on bail by the competent Court of law; that the
respondents have not challenged the said bail order and,
therefore, the impugned detention order is unsustainable; that the
detenue has already been taken into preventive measures on six
earlier occasions i.e., on 27.01.2023, 18.05.2023, 04.04.2024,
23.04.2024, 01.08.2024 and 23.04.2025, and despite that no
fresh prejudicial activity has been specifically attributed to him;
that whole of the material relied upon by the detaining authority
was not supplied to the detenue, thereby disabling him from
making an effective and meaningful representation against the
order of detention; that the grounds of detention are vague and
bereft of particulars.
3. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
submits that the detention order has been passed, strictly in
accordance with law, after the detaining authority derived
subjective satisfaction from the material placed before it; that the
detenue has remained continuously involved in activities
prejudicial to the security of the State; that the detenue has been
bound down on six occasions but despite preventive measures
taken earlier, he did not mend his activities; that the detenue has
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been working as an Over Ground Worker (OGW) of ‘HM’ and
‘LeT’ banned terrorist outfits and has been providing logistic
support and assistance to them; that all the material relied upon,
including dossier, grounds of detention and other relevant
documents, were supplied to the detenue against proper receipt
and explained to him in the language understood by him.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the detention
record produced by the respondents and considered the matter.
5. The first contention raised by the petitioner is that since the
detenue has been granted bail in FIR No. 61/2019 and the said
order has not been challenged by the respondents, the
preventive detention could not have been ordered. The argument
is devoid of merit. Preventive detention and criminal prosecution
operate in different fields. Acquittal or grant of bail in a criminal
case does not ipso facto debar the competent authority from
passing an order of preventive detention if the authority is
satisfied that the activities of a person are prejudicial to the
security of the State or maintenance of public order. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal &
Ors. reported in (1975) 3 SCC 198 has categorically held that
prosecution in a criminal case and preventive detention are not
synonymous and that an order of detention can validly be passed
even when prosecution is pending. Relevant portion in Paras 32
to 34 of the judgment for the ease of reference is extracted
below:"32. The power of preventive detention is
qualitatively
different
from
punitive
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detention.
The
detention
is
power
a
of
preventive
precautionary
power
exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may
or may not relate to an offence. It is not a
parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with
prosecution even if it relies on certain facts
for which prosecution may be launched or
may have been launched. An order of
preventive detention may be, made before
or
during
prosecution.
An
order
of
preventive detention may be made with or
without prosecution and in anticipation or
after discharge or even acquittal. The
pendency of prosecution is no bar to an
order of preventive detention. An order of
preventive detention is also not a bar to
prosecution.
33. Article
14 is
inapplicable
because
preventive detention and prosecution are not
synonymous. The purposes are different. The
authorities
are
different.
The
nature
of
proceedings is different. In a prosecution an
accused is sought to be punished for a past
act. In preventive detention, the past act is
merely the material for inference about the
future course of probable conduct on the part
of the detenu.
34. The recent decisions of this Court on this
subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan
Gorey v. State of W. B., Ashim Kumar Ray V.
State
of
W.
B.; Abdul
Aziz
V.
District
Magistrate, Burdwan and Debu Mahato V.
State
of
W.
B. correctly
lay
down
the
principles to be followed as to whether a
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detention order is valid or not. The decision
in Biram Chand v. State of U. P. which is a
Division Bench decision of two learned
Judges is contrary to the other Bench
decisions consisting in each case of three
learned Judges. The principles which can be
broadly
stated
are
these.
First,
merely
because a detenu is liable to be tried in a
criminal court for the commission of a
criminal offence or to be proceeded against
for preventing him from committing offences
dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of
Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar
the Government from taking action for his
detention under the Act. Second, the fact that
the Police arrests a person and later on
enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to
prosecute him under the Code of Criminal
Procedure and
even
lodges
a
first
information report may be no bar against the
District Magistrate issuing an order under the
preventive
detention.
Third,
where
the
concerned person is actually in jail custody
at the time when an order of detention is
passed against him and is not likely to be
released for a fair length of time, it may be
possible to contend that there could be
no satisfaction on the part of the detaining
authority as to the likelihood of such a
person indulging in activities which would
jeopardise the security of the State or the
public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance
that a detention order is passed during the
pendency of the prosecution will not violate
the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a
precautionary measure. It is based on a
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reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour
of a person based on his past conduct in the
light of the surrounding circumstances."
Similarly, in Union of India v. Paul Manickam reported in (2003)
8 SCC 342, it has been held that merely because a person is in
custody or has been granted bail does not preclude the detaining
authority from invoking preventive detention laws if there exists
compelling necessity for doing so.
6. A perusal of the grounds of detention reveals that the detaining
authority has specifically referred to the involvement of the
detenue in FIR No. 61/2019 and has also noticed the factum of
grant of bail in his favour. Thus, the relevant circumstance
regarding bail was very much within the consideration of the
detaining authority while arriving at subjective satisfaction. Once
the authority has taken note of the bail order and still found the
detenue’s activities prejudicial, non-challenge to the bail order by
the respondents would not render the detention illegal.
7. The record further demonstrates that the detenue has repeatedly
come to the notice of law enforcement agencies and has been
subjected to preventive measures on several occasions. The
respondents have specifically stated that the detenue was bound
down six times, however, despite such preventive action, he
continued to indulge himself in activities aimed at supporting
terrorist elements by providing logistic assistance and acting as
an ‘OGW’. Preventive detention laws are intended to prevent
recurrence of prejudicial activities and the past conduct of a
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detenue constitutes a relevant factor for drawing subjective
satisfaction.
8. The contention that the grounds of detention are vague also does
not merit acceptance. The grounds supplied to the detenue
contain sufficient particulars relating to his activities, association
and role in facilitating militant activities. The detaining authority
has narrated the manner in which the detenue remained involved
in extending support to terrorist elements and how his activities
were considered detrimental to security and public order. It is well
settled that sufficiency or adequacy of material cannot be gone
into by the Court exercising writ jurisdiction in preventive
detention matters, once subjective satisfaction is based on
relevant material.
9. So far as the plea regarding non-supply of material is concerned,
the detention record produced before the Court contains the
execution report and receipts bearing signatures of the detenue
acknowledging receipt of the grounds of detention and the
material relied upon by the detaining authority. The record further
indicates that the contents were explained to the detenue in the
language understood by him i.e., Urdu/Kashmiri language. No
specific document which was allegedly withheld has been
identified by the petitioner. A vague assertion regarding nonsupply of material, in the face of official record, cannot be
accepted.
10. The scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is
limited. The Court is not required to sit in appeal over the
subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority.
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Interference is warranted only when procedural safeguards are
violated or the order suffers from non-application of mind, mala
fides or absence of material. In the present case, none of these
infirmities are made out.
11. From the material placed on record, this Court is satisfied that the
detaining authority has passed the detention order after due
application of mind and on the basis of relevant material
indicating that the activities of the detenue were prejudicial to the
‘security of the State’. Procedural safeguards envisaged under
law have also substantially been complied with.
12. Accordingly, finding no merit in the petition, the same is
dismissed and the impugned detention order is upheld.
13. Scanned detention record is directed to be sent back.
( M. A. CHOWDHARY )
JUDGE
Srinagar
18.05.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable:
Yes / No
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