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Digitally
signed
by
SHAYNA
KADRI
2026:CGHC:4258
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 9195 of 2023
1 - Natthulal Vastrakar S/o. Ramu Vastrakar, Aged About 80 Years R/o.
Village Parsada, Post Office Bharni, Via Ganiyari District - Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary School Education
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - District Education Officer Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title is taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate
For State
: Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer
SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
23/01/2026
1.
The present writ petition is being filed seeking following reliefs:-
“(i)
That, this Hon'ble Court Court may kindly be
pleased to quash the order dated 05.12.2022
and dated 30.01.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed
by respondent no. 1 and also directed to the
respondent no. 1 should be passed an order
in favour of the petitioner to granted two
increment from the date of revoking the
suspension order and given payment to the
petitioner within specific time.
2.
(ii)
Cost of the petition may to also be granted to
the petitioner.
(iii)
That, any other relief, which the petitioner is
entitled and this Hon'ble court deems it fit may
kindly, be granted to the petitioner.”
Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was
appointed in the Education Department of the State and served
on the post of Upper Division Teacher. During the course of his
service, he was subsequently promoted and ultimately served on
the post of Principal. Upon attaining the age of superannuation,
the petitioner retired from service on 30.06.2005 from the post of
Principal, having rendered long and unblemished service except
for the incident referred to hereinbelow. During his service tenure,
the petitioner was placed under suspension in March, 2000.
Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were concluded and vide
order dated 11.06.2003, the suspension of the petitioner was
revoked and a minor penalty of withholding two annual increments
with cumulative effect was imposed upon him. Against the said
order, no departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner.
The alleged misappropriation of an amount of Rs.1,59,000/- was
committed by the Accountant, namely Karimulla Khan, who has
already deposited the entire said amount on 02.08.2005. After
such deposit, the petitioner was reinstated in service. However,
despite the petitioner having already retired from service, the
effect of the punishment of withholding increments with
cumulative effect has continued and is adversely affecting the
pensionary benefits payable to the petitioner. After retirement, the
petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(S) No. 8300/2018,
seeking restoration of the two increments withheld with cumulative
effect by order dated 11.06.2003. The said writ petition was
considered by this Court and vide order dated 11.07.2022, this
Court directed the respondent authorities to decide the pending
representation of the petitioner in accordance with law within a
period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the
order. In compliance with the aforesaid order of this Court, the
petitioner submitted a detailed representation before respondent
No.1 on 12.01.2023, seeking restoration of the withheld
increments and for converting the punishment from cumulative
effect to non-cumulative effect, keeping in view the fact that the
petitioner had already retired from service. Respondent No.1
decided the representation of the petitioner and rejected the same
by order dated 30.01.2023, which was communicated to the
petitioner on 22.02.2023. The representation was rejected
primarily on the ground that the punishment order dated
11.06.2003 had attained finality as no appeal was preferred at the
relevant time and that the petitioner, being the Drawing and
Disbursing Officer, could not escape responsibility for the alleged
misappropriation. The respondent authorities failed to appreciate
that the entire misappropriated amount of Rs.1,59,000/- had
already been deposited by the Accountant, Karimulla Khan, on
02.08.2005 and that the petitioner had no direct role in the alleged
misappropriation. The respondents have also failed to consider
the fact that the petitioner has been retired since 30.06.2005 and
is facing serious financial hardship due to continued reduction in
pension on account of the punishment imposed more than two
decades ago.
The impugned order rejecting the petitioner’s
representation is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the
principles of fairness and proportionality, thereby giving rise to the
present writ petition.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
action and order passed by the respondents are illegal, arbitrary,
unreasonable and tainted with mala fides. The respondents have
failed to exercise their statutory powers in a fair and judicious
manner, thereby violating the rights of the petitioner guaranteed
under the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that the
impugned order has been passed without affording any
reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The denial of
opportunity to place his case amounts to violation of the principles
of natural justice and is also contrary to the applicable service
rules and settled principles of law. On this ground alone, the
impugned order deserves to be set aside.
Learned counsel
submits that the respondent No.1 has failed to consider the
material and undisputed fact that the Accountant, namely
Karimulla Khan, has already deposited the entire amount of
Rs.1,59,000/-
on
02.08.2005,
which
was
allegedly
misappropriated. In spite of full recovery having been effected
from the concerned employee, the respondents have unjustly
continued
the
punishment
against
the
petitioner,
thereby
adversely affecting his pensionary benefits. Consequently, the
petitioner is entitled to restoration of the increments from the date
of revocation of suspension.
It is further submitted that the
respondent
rejected
No.1
has
the
petitioner’s
appeal/representation solely on the technical ground that no
appeal was preferred against the punishment order dated
11.06.2003 within the prescribed period. Such an approach is
mechanical, hyper-technical and contrary to the spirit of service
jurisprudence, particularly when the petitioner had already retired
and had approached this Court, which directed consideration of
his representation on merits.
Learned counsel further submits
that the respondents have completely ignored the fact that the
petitioner is a senior citizen, who has been retired from service
since 30.06.2005 and is facing severe financial hardship due to
continuous reduction in his pension on account of the impugned
punishment. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from nonapplication of mind and disproportionality and is liable to be set
aside in the interest of justice.
4.
Learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced on
behalf of the petitioner and submits that the impugned order has
been passed in accordance with law after due consideration of the
relevant records. It is submitted that the punishment imposed
upon the petitioner attained finality in the year 2003 and was
never challenged within the prescribed period, and therefore no
vested right survives in favour of the petitioner to seek restoration
of increments at this belated stage. It is further submitted that the
petitioner, being the Drawing and Disbursing Officer, was
responsible for proper disbursement of Government funds and
cannot absolve himself of accountability merely because the
amount was later deposited by the Accountant. The plea of
violation of natural justice is misconceived, as the petitioner was
afforded adequate opportunity during the disciplinary proceedings.
Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner has
approached this Court after an inordinate delay and that no
arbitrariness or illegality can be attributed to the respondents. The
petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also
perused the documents enclosed along with the petition.
6.
In the present case, the punishment order dated 11.06.2003 was
admittedly not challenged by the petitioner by way of appeal or
otherwise at the relevant time. The petitioner continued in service
and ultimately retired in the year 2005. The subsequent recovery
of the misappropriated amount from the Accountant does not
automatically efface the misconduct or supervisory lapse
attributed to the petitioner, who was holding the position of
Drawing and Disbursing Officer.
The contention regarding
violation of principles of natural justice is also devoid of
substance. The disciplinary proceedings culminating in the
punishment order were conducted during the service tenure of the
petitioner, and no grievance regarding denial of opportunity was
raised at that stage. The representation submitted pursuant to the
order of this Court was duly considered and rejected by a
reasoned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned
order suffers from violation of natural justice. It is a settled position
of law that once a punishment order has attained finality, it cannot
be reopened or indirectly challenged after an inordinate lapse of
time, particularly after retirement, unless the same is shown to be
without jurisdiction or passed in gross violation of statutory rules.
7.
This Court is also of the view that the direction issued earlier by
this Court in W.P.(S) No. 8300/2018 was limited to consideration
of the representation in accordance with law. The said direction
did not confer any substantive right upon the petitioner nor did it
require the respondents to grant the relief sought. The
respondents have complied with the said direction by passing a
reasoned order, which cannot be interfered with merely because
the decision is not favourable to the petitioner.
The plea of
financial hardship and old age, though sympathetic, cannot be a
ground to reopen concluded disciplinary proceedings or to grant
relief contrary to settled principles of service jurisprudence.
Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
confined to examining the decision-making process and not the
merits of the decision itself.
8.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Board of Directors,
Himachal Pradesh Transport Corpn. v. K.C. Rahi, reported in
(2008) 11 SCC 502 has held as under :
“6. That the respondent was served
with a notice recorded by the Tribunal is
finding of fact. In our view, therefore,
the High Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by reversing the fact
recorded by the Tribunal in exercise of
its power under Article 226. Power
under Article 226 is to interfere only
when there is miscarriage of justice or
an error of law on the face of the record
but not to reappreciate the evidence
recorded by the court of first instance.”
9.
Further in the matter of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, reported
in (2015) 2 SCC 610, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it
is painfully disturbing to note that the
High Court has acted as an appellate
authority
in
the
disciplinary
proceedings, reappreciating even the
evidence before the enquiry officer. The
finding on Charge I was accepted by
the disciplinary authority and was also
endorsed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings,
the High Court is not and cannot act as
a second court of first appeal. The High
Court, in exercise of its powers under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India,
shall
not
venture
into
reappreciation of the evidence. The
High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a
competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according
to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the
principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion
by
some
considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed
themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant
or
extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very
face of it, is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had
erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had
erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which influenced the
finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on
no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions
in the enquiry, in case the same
has
been
conducted
in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the
evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the
evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some
legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact
however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
10.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the light of the rulings of
Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court finds that the impugned order
dated 30.01.2023 does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness
or perversity warranting interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
11.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Shayna
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
JUDGE
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