Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA 51 of 2025
1. National Institute of Technology Agartala, represented by the Director,
Barjala, Jirania, District-West Tripura, PIN-799046.
2. The Director, National Institute of Technology, Agartala, Barjala, Jirania,
District-West Tripura, PIN-799046.
3. The Registrar, National Institute of Technology, Agartala, Barjala, Jirania,
District-West Tripura, PIN-799046.
4. Prof. Richi Prasad Sharma, Chairman, Interview Board, National Institute
of Technology Agartala, Barjala, Jirania, District-West Tripura, PIN799046.
5. Col.(Dr.) Ashish Badola, Registrar, NIT, Agartala and Member, Interview
Board, National Institute of Technology Agartala, Barjala, Jirania, DistrictWest Tripura, PIN-799046.
6. Shri Tanmay Ghosal, Deputy Registrar, NIT, Agartala and Member,
Interview Board, National Institute of Technology, Agartala, Barjala, Jirania,
District-West Tripura.
----Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Rajib Goswami,
S/o-Sri Brajalal Goswami,
R/o-Shyamalima Apartment, New Capital Complex Block No.1, Flat
No.104, A3/A4, P.O.-Agartala Secretariat, P.S.-NCC, Dist.-West Tripura,
PIN-799006
----Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing and date of
judgment and order
Whether fit for reporting
:
:
Mr. Bidyut Majumder, Deputy SGI.
Mr. Subrata Sarkar, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. Kabrabam Dhirendra Singha, Advocate.
Ms Ayesha Saha Hirawat, Advocate.
Ms. Trishita Debnath, Advocate.
Mr. Arpan Jamatia, Advocate.
Ms. Moulika Choudhury, Advocate.
Ms. Uttara Singha, Advocate.
Mr. Dhiman Gopa, Advocate
Ms. Piyali Chakraborty, Advocate.
: 03.09.2025
: Yes.
HON’BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order (Oral)
[1]
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
[2]
This is an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule B-(A) of High Court
of Tripura Rules against the judgment and order dated 16.12.2024 passed in
WP(C) 606 of 2024 by the Learned Single Judge.
[3]
This is the case of the appellant that the respondent-petitioner
(hereinafter referred to as the Petitioner) filed a writ petition vide W.P(C)
606 of 2024 before the Hon'ble Single Judge of this High Court and the case
of the petitioner in brief is that the Appellant No. 3 has issued an
advertisement vide No. F.NITA.2(166- Estt)/Cont/Non-Teaching/2023/5091
dated 13.10.2023 for walk-in-interview fot the post of Legal Advisor on
purely contractual basis with fixed monthly consolidated salary for an initial
period of 1(one) year which may extend to 3 years subject to requirement of
the institute and satisfactory work performance. Accordingly, pursuant to the
said advertisement the petitioner has applied for the said post and appeared
before the interview board on 27.02.2024 and board members conducted the
interview and told that the result of the interview will be uploaded in the
website of the appellant. But till date select list has not been published. But
issued a fresh advertisement vide No.F.NITA.2(166-Estt)/cont/2023/174966 dated 04.09.2024 inviting application for filing up the post of Legal
advisor on contract. And the petitioner has filed the writ petition inter alia
with the prayer for completion of ongoing selection process and cancellation
of new advertisement dated 04.09.2024. The learned Single Judge after
hearing both sides by its judgment dated 16.12.2024 allowed the writ
petition and directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner and also
directed to pay a cost of Rs. 50,000.00 to the petitioner.
[4]
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment dated
16.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge the appellants herein, has
preferred the instant writ appeal.
[5]
It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is
settled law that the result of the interview test on merits cannot be
successfully challenged by a candidate who takes a chance to get selected at
the said interview and who ultimately finds himself unsuccessful, therefore
the writ petition itself is not maintainable in law. It is further contended that
the advertisement was issued for walk-in- interview and it has been stated in
the notification that appointing authority reserves the right to cancel the
interview.
[6]
Moreover, it is argued that the petitioner had secured 45 marks
out of 100 marks in the interview and for the said reason he was found not
eligible by the Selection Committee. It is also contended that the learned
writ court without any reason directed the respondents to pay a cost of
Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner. To support his case, learned Deputy SGI placed
his reliance on a judgment of the apex court in Jai Singh Dalal and Others
vs State of Haryana and another reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 600
where the apex court has observed as follows:
9. It was then argued that the State Government had no power to
withdraw or rescind the earlier notifications of December 20, 1990 and
January 25, 1991. On behalf of the Slate Government counsel submitted
that the State Government had inherent power to withdraw, rescind or
cancel the notifications it had issued on the principle that the authority in
whom the power to create is vested has that power to destroy or mould
its creation. Reliance was also placed on Section 19 of the Punjab
General Clauses Act, 1898, which reads as under:
19. Power to make, to include power to add to, amend, vary, or
rescind orders, rules or bye-laws- Where, by any Punjab Act, a
power to issue notifications or make orders, rules or bye-laws is
conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the
like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions (if any)
to add, to amend, Vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules
or bye-laws so issued or made.
Counsel for the appellants argued that since the notifications were issued
under the Rules and not any statute the said provision would not be
applicable. It was further submitted that the power, even if exercisable,
could be exercised 'in the like manner and subject to like sanction and
conditions', which necessitated consultation with the HPSC before the
issuance of the notification dated December 30, 1991, by which the
earlier two notifications were cancelled or withdrawn. We see no merit
in these submissions.
10. Assuming (without deciding) that the withdrawal of the earlier
notifications by the subsequent notification dated December 30, 1991
docs not, stricto sensu, attract the provision of Section 19 extracted
above, counsel for the appellants overlooks the fact that since the
appellants have no legal right to insist on their selection and
appointment to the vacant posts in question, the mode of arresting the
process recedes in the background as the State Government could have
informed the HPSC not to proceed with the selection process as it
desired to revise the norm for appointment. Once it is realised that
merely because the State Government had sent a requisition to the HPSC
to select candidates for appointment did not create any vested right in
the candidates called for interviews, regardless of the fact that the
selection process had reached an advanced stage, it docs not matter
whether the selection process is arrested by cancelling the earlier
notifications by another notification or by a mere communication
addressed to the HPSC. Even if the HPSC were to complete the process
and select candidates, such selection by itself would not confer a right to
appointment and the Government may refuse to make the appointment
for valid reasons. At best the Government may be required to justify its
action on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present
case the pleadings do not show that the subsequent notification dated
December 30, 1991 is specifically put in issue in the memo of appeal nor
is there material placed on record to so hold. Besides, the proviso to rule
5 requires the method for recruitment to be specified by notification after
consultation with the HPSC. The consultation with the HPSC has to be in
regard to the positive act of specifying the method for recruitment and
not in regard to the decision whether or not to resort to special
recruitment. The proviso enables the making of special recruitment but
the method of such recruitment has to be specified by notification. It is,
therefore, obvious that even after the State Government has decided to
resort to special recruitment, it may for valid reasons change its mind
and one of the reasons could be that it desires to revise the extant
eligibility criteria or substitute the same. This can be communicated to
the HPSC for arresting the selection process which need not be done by
a notification nor does it require consultation with the HPSC. Prior
consultation with the HPSC is required before the issuance of a
notification specifying the method of recruitment which was done when
the notification of March 9, 1992, was issued. Therefore, counsel's
submission that if Section 19 applied, the notification of December 30,
1991 would be rendered invalid for want of prior consultation on the
thrust of the words 'in the like manner' employed therein, is clearly
misconceived. Even if Section 19 does not apply, stricto sensu, we see no
reason to hold that a State Government which has the power to specify
the method of special recruitment by notification has no inherent power
to revise the same if it for good reasons considers the same necessary. To
so hold would mean that even if the State Government has committed a
mistake it has no power to rectify or correct the same. The authority
which has power to specify the method of recruitment must be deemed to
have the power to revise and substitute the same in the same manner. On
the analogy of Section 19 such an inherent power always exists in the
authority to alter, vary, change or replace its creation.
[7]
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-petitioner contends National Institute of Technology(for short,
NIT), Agartala had issued an advertisement dated 13.10.2023 for filling up
the post of Legal Advisor on contract basis where essential qualifications
were mentioned in the advertisement and a format which a candidate must
fill up was also mentioned in the said advertisement. In terms of the
advertisement, the petitioner submitted his application and duly filled up all
the columns in the format for the said post. Having satisfied with the
essential qualifications as mentioned in the advertisement, the respondentNIT called him to appear before the Interview Board. The Interview Board
was constituted by a number of experts. The petitioner appeared before the
Selection Committee on the stipulated date and time. The Selection
Committee interviewed him on 27.02.2024. All on a sudden, the petitioner
had noticed that the respondent-NIT issued another advertisement for filling
up of the same post of Legal Advisor on contract basis vide Advertisement
dated 04.09.2024 without publishing the result of the interview. The
petitioner submitted a representation on 11.09.2024 to the Director, NIT
Agartala stating inter alia that the issuance of a new advertisement for the
same post on similar and identical terms without cancelling the earlier one
created procedural irregularities. The previous process of selection was not
cancelled at all before the publication of new advertisement inviting
applications from willing candidates for filling up the same post of Legal
Advisor. It is further stated in his representation that one of the fundamental
principles of public administration is transparency.
[8]
From a bare perusal of the record, it unmistakably transpires that the
recruitment process initiated by Advertisement dated 13.10.2023 for “Walk in
interview” and the subsequent recruitment pursuant to Advertisement dated
04.09.2024 also for “Walk in interview” are independent and distinct exercises,
each having its own legal sanctity and procedural framework. The two
advertisements cannot be said to be part of a continuous or composite process, but
rather represent two separate avenues of selection. The materials placed on record
clearly indicate that the process initiated on 13.10.2023 stood concluded with the
Selection Committee completing its assessment and recording the petitioner as
“Not recommended.” Once such a conclusion was arrived at, the said recruitment
process attained finality in the eyes of law. On the other hand, the advertisement
dated 04.09.2024 was a fresh exercise initiated by the Institute to meet its
manpower requirements and bore no nexus, continuity, or interdependence with
the earlier selection process. It is further recorded that under the Advertisement
dated 13.10.2023, the remuneration attached to the post was fixed at ₹50,000/- per
month, whereas under the subsequent Advertisement dated 04.09.2024, the
remuneration was ₹75,000/- per month, thereby further demonstrating the distinct
nature of the two recruitment exercises by way of walk in interviews.
[9]
The record further demonstrates, beyond any shadow of doubt, that
the petitioner was evaluated by the duly constituted Selection Committee and
secured only 45 marks out of 100. On such assessment, the Committee
categorically opined that the petitioner was “Not recommended.” In service
jurisprudence, it is a settled principle that unless a candidate is expressly
recommended for appointment, no right whether vested, accrued, or enforceable
arises in his favour. A person who has merely participated in a recruitment process
but has failed to obtain recommendation cannot, under any legal theory, claim a
right to be appointed. Accordingly, in absence of any recommendation, the
petitioner acquires no vested right to appointment and cannot demand the
continuation, publication, or revival of the earlier process as if it were a matter of
entitlement.
[10]
It is, however, equally important to observe that while the writ
petitioner cannot derive any enforceable right from the process dated 13.10.2023,
the conduct of the officers of the Institute entrusted with the duty of conducting
the interview on 27.02.2024 leaves much to be desired. The record makes it
evident that the said officers failed to discharge their responsibility of publishing
the result of the earlier process before embarking upon and issuing a fresh
advertisement dated 04.09.2024. This omission, though it may not create any right
in favour of the petitioner, is nevertheless a matter of serious concern for the
Court. The principles of transparency, fairness, and accountability demand that
every recruitment process, once initiated, must culminate with a declaration of its
result. Non-publication of the result, pertaining to 13.10.2023 advertisement
followed by 04.09.2024 advertisement, creates an impression of arbitrariness and
undermines public confidence in the fairness of public employment. Once a
selection process concludes, result needs to be declared. Such lapses strike at the
root of the credibility of recruitment mechanisms in public institutions and must be
viewed with utmost seriousness.
[11]
This Court also records its strong disapproval of the manner in
which the result of the 13.10.2023 recruitment process was sought to be disclosed
only in the counter affidavit filed by NIT stating only writ petitioner was sole
candidate appeared and rejected. The action of appellate authorities in not
declaring interview results is wholly unacceptable and cannot be treated as
compliance with the duty to publish results in a transparent and timely manner.
Results
of
recruitment
processes
must
be
published
publicly
and
contemporaneously, and disclosure in a pleading before the Court cannot
substitute for such mandatory publication.
[12]
Since the petitioner had already been declared “Not recommended,”
he had no locus standi to stall, interdict, or challenge the subsequent recruitment
process initiated under the 04.09.2024 advertisement. His attempt to derive benefit
from the procedural lapse of the officers cannot be legally sustained, for the law
does not confer rights on a candidate who has failed in the selection process. The
interim protection that was secured by the petitioner was thus erroneously obtained
and cannot be continued in the absence of any substantive legal right in his favour.
[13]
Although the writ petition itself is liable to be dismissed for want of
locus, the failure to publish the result of the earlier recruitment before initiating a
fresh advertisement constitutes a serious procedural irregularity. Such conduct is
directly attributable to the officers responsible for conducting the walk-ininterview, and it is necessary for this Court to mark its disapproval of such lapses
by fixing personal accountability. It is well settled that public officials involved in
recruitment carry a higher duty to uphold fairness and transparency. Any breach of
such duty erodes public confidence and tarnishes the institutional integrity of the
recruiting authority. Hence, this Court deems it appropriate and necessary to
impose personal accountability upon those officers who conducted the interview
under Advertisement dated 13.10.2023 and who, despite concluding the process,
failed to publish the result without any delay. Their omission, whether by
negligence or indifference, cannot be condoned. They shall accordingly be held
personally responsible for this lapse.
[14]
Accordingly, it is directed that a sum of ₹50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
Thousand only) be deposited before the Tripura High Court Bar Association by
the said officers, within a period of one month from today towards cost cum
penalty. The imposition of this cost is intended not merely as a penalty but also as
a measure to remind public functionaries that recruitment to public posts is a
matter of public trust and that even seemingly minor lapses can have significant
consequences on the perception of fairness and credibility in governance.
[15]
In the wake of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed in part
in the manner indicated above. The judgment and order passed by the learned Writ
court in W.P.(C) No. 606 of 2024 are hereby set aside. It is specifically declared
that the recruitment processes under Advertisement dated 13.10.2023 and
Advertisement dated 04.09.2024 are separate, distinct, and unconnected in nature.
The petitioner, having secured 45 out of 100 marks and having been assessed with
the remark “Not recommended,” has no enforceable right either to claim
appointment or to seek interference with the subsequent recruitment exercise.
[16]
Consequently, the interim protection earlier granted in favour of the
petitioner shall stand vacated forthwith. The appellant–NIT shall be at full liberty
to proceed with and complete the selection process pursuant to the advertisement
dated 04.09.2024 or any other advertisement of similar nature, provided the same
is conducted strictly in accordance with law, established procedures, and
principles of fairness and transparency.
B.Palit, J
Dipak
DIPAK DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2025.09.11
16:46:56 +05'30'
Dr. T. Amarnath Goud, J
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review