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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 24.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 01.07.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 01.07.2026
FAO(OS) (COMM) 131/2025 & CM APPL. 51730/2025
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Vikas Goel, Mr. Ritesh
Sharma, Mr. Vivek Gupta &
Ms. Anisha Dahiya, Advs.
versus
M/S UNITECH-NCC JV
Through:
.....Respondent
Ms. Priya Kumar, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Ms.
Aishwarya Singh, Mr. Sarthak
Bhardwaj,
Mr.
Prateek
Srivastava & Ms. Ekaa Sharma,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1.
Through the present Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 [hereinafter referred to as „A&C Act‟], the
Appellant assails the correctness of the Judgment dated 30.05.2025
[hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Judgment‟] passed by the
learned Single Judge in Petition bearing OMP (COMM.) No.23/2017.
The said Petition had been instituted under Section 34 [hereinafter
referred to as „Section 34 Petition‟] of the A&C Act, assailing the
Arbitral Award dated 16.05.2011 [hereinafter referred to as „the
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Award‟] rendered by a three-member Arbitral Tribunal [hereinafter
referred to as „Tribunal‟]. By the Impugned Judgment, the learned
Single Judge declined interference and upheld the Award.
2.
The present Appeal is confined to Claim Nos.3, 4 and 7 of the
Award. The Appellant submits that the findings returned by the
Tribunal in respect of the said claims suffer from patent illegality and
proceed on an erroneous appreciation of the contractual provisions as
well as the material placed on record. It is contended that the claims
were either contractually impermissible or otherwise unsustainable,
and that the learned Single Judge erred in declining interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act.
3.
Since the present proceedings arise under Section 37 of the
A&C Act against an order refusing to set aside the Award, the scope
of interference is necessarily limited. The question that arises for
consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error
warranting appellate interference while declining to set aside the
Award.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
4.
Before examining the rival submissions advanced on behalf of
the parties, it would be appropriate to briefly notice the factual
background giving rise to the present Appeal.
5.
The disputes between the parties arise out of a Contract
Agreement dated 25.05.2001 [hereinafter referred to as the „Contract
Agreement‟] executed between the Appellant and the Respondent for
the widening and upgradation of the existing two-lane carriageway of
National Highway-5 in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The project
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pertained to the stretch between Vishakhapatnam and Ichapuram and
formed part of the National Highway Development Programme.
6.
In terms of the Contract Agreement, the stipulated date for
commencement of the work was 08.06.2001 and the scheduled date
for completion was 07.02.2004. It is not in dispute that the execution
of the works did not conclude within the original contractual period
and the project was ultimately completed on 20.03.2005.
7.
Certain disputes thereafter arose between the parties in relation
to the execution of the contract and the financial consequences
flowing therefrom. The Respondent invoked the arbitration clause
contained in the Contract Agreement and raised various claims against
the Appellant. As the disputes remained unresolved, they were
referred to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement contained
in the Contract Agreement.
8.
A three-member Tribunal came to be constituted to adjudicate
the disputes between the parties. The parties placed their respective
pleadings, documents and evidence before the Tribunal. Upon
consideration of the material on record as well as the submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties, the Tribunal rendered its Award
dated 16.05.2011 determining the claims and counter-claims of the
parties. Since the present Appeal concerns only certain claims
adjudicated by the Tribunal, the outcome of Claim Nos.3, 4 and 7 is
tabulated below for ready reference:
Claim
Nature of Claim
No.
Amount
Amount
Claimed
Awarded
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Loss suffered due to Rs.17,23,41,950 Rs.3,59,78,180
additional mobilization
and deployment of plant
and
machinery,
allegedly
necessitated
by
lapses
of
the
Appellant in handing
over the project site in
accordance
with
the
Contract Agreement.
4(a)
Compensation for idling Rs.12,73,36,568 Rs.3,29,95,870
of
machinery
workforce
and
during
prolonged
the
contract
period allegedly caused
by breaches on the part
of the Appellant.
4(b)
Compensation
towards Rs.50,72,089
Nil
idling of materials.
4(c)
Compensation
idle
towards Rs.2,47,93,302
overheads
establishment
during
the
Rs.1,70,98,829
and
costs
extended
period of the contract.
Claim relating to the Rs.8,81,80,046
Rs.3,87,01,242*
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extension of the contract
period and entitlement to
bonus under the contract.
* The Tribunal adjusted the amount awarded under Claim 3, while
carrying the computation under Claim 7 to avoid duplication,
effectively resulting in the net figure awarded under Claim 7.
9.
Aggrieved by the Award, the Appellant instituted the Section 34
Petition before this Court seeking setting aside of the Award. The said
Petition
was
initially
registered
as
O.M.P.
No.715/2011.
Subsequently, by Order dated 12.01.2017, this Court directed that the
Petition be treated as a commercial matter. Pursuant thereto, the
Petition came to be renumbered on 17.01.2017 as O.M.P.(COMM.)
No.23/2017.
10.
The learned Single Judge, vide the Impugned Judgment dated
30.05.2025, declined to interfere with the Award and dismissed the
Section 34 Petition, primarily on the following grounds:
i.
The findings returned by the Tribunal in respect of the claims
under challenge were based on the material placed on record and did
not disclose any perversity or patent illegality warranting interference
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
ii.
Insofar as Claim No. 3 was concerned, the learned Single Judge
noted that the delay in handing over the project site in the manner
contemplated under the Contract Agreement stood established on the
record, including from the correspondence of the Project Engineer.
The Tribunal‟s conclusion that such delay had financial implications
for the Respondent was therefore found to be a plausible view based
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on evidence.
iii.
With regard to Claim No.4, the Tribunal had interpreted the
relevant contractual provisions and the material placed before it in
arriving at its conclusion. Such interpretation of the contract and
appreciation of evidence being within the domain of the Tribunal was
found not to call for interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
iv.
The objections raised by the Appellant essentially invited the
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own view for that
taken by the Tribunal, which is impermissible within the limited scope
of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
v.
In respect of Claim No.7, the grant of bonus by the Tribunal
was within its jurisdiction under the A&C Act and did not suffer from
any infirmity warranting interference.
11.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the Section 34 Petition, the
Appellant has preferred the present Appeal under Section 37 of the
A&C Act.
12.
In the aforesaid backdrop, we proceed to notice the submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties.
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES:
13.
Heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent and
learned
Counsel
appearing
for the Appellant. The Written
Submissions filed by the parties in the present Appeal have also been
perused.
14.
Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submits as under:
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i.
Though the grounds of challenge under Section 34 of the A&C
Act are limited, the Court‟s scrutiny of whether such grounds are
made out cannot be superficial. Reliance is placed upon the judgment
of this Court in NHAI v. IRB Pathan Kot Amritsar Toll Road Ltd.1
ii.
The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the Tribunal
awarded compensation despite the absence of evidence showing that
the Respondent incurred any additional expenditure towards
mobilisation of plant and machinery [hereinafter referred to as
„P&M‟]. The claims were quantified mainly on the basis of computergenerated worksheets and paper calculations, which is impermissible
in law as held in Jaiprakash Hyundai Consortium v. Satluj Jal
Vidyut Nigam Ltd. & Anr.2
iii.
Due to elapse of more than 8 months between the date when the
final arguments were heard and the date of the Impugned Order, the
true challenge to the Award lost substratum and the attention of the
learned Single Judge. Delay in pronouncement of judgment is fatal.
Reliance is placed upon Anil Rai v. State of Bihar3.
iv.
Not only breach but the causal injury arising from such breach
has also to be established by the aggrieved party to be entitled to
damages. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of Kailash Nath v.
DDA4.
In Re Claim No.3
2023 SCC OnLine Del 3789
2024 SCC OnLine Del 1237
(2001) 7 SCC 318
(2015) 4 SCC 137
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v.
During the arbitral proceedings, the Appellant had placed on
record detailed calculations (Annexures A, B and C) to demonstrate
flaws in the Respondent‟s computation. These calculations were
furnished strictly on a “without prejudice” basis to expose defects in
the methodology and were never intended as an admission of
quantification. However, the Tribunal selectively relied on Annexure
A and adopted the figures therein for quantifying Claim No.3 while
ignoring the Appellant‟s other objections demonstrating that the claim
lacked evidentiary support.
vi.
The learned Single Judge further erred in treating the Chartered
Accountant‟s („CA‟s‟) certificate relied upon by the Respondent as
corroborative evidence of additional costs. The Tribunal itself had
rejected the certificate for failing to account for several elements of
machinery charges, including ownership charges. Despite this, the
learned Single Judge relied upon it to support the Respondent‟s claim.
vii.
The learned Single Judge failed to address the Appellant‟s
contentions regarding the irrelevance and correctness of the figures of
Rs.8,17,61,247/- and Rs.23,30,71,813/- as set out in its synopsis dated
23.09.2024.
viii. The learned Single Judge also failed to deal with the
Appellant‟s contention that incurring additional deployment costs
equivalent to Rs.3.87 crore merely to earn a bonus of the same value is
commercially implausible.
In Re Claim No.4
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ix.
The Award under Claim No.4 relating to alleged prolongation
costs suffers from similar infirmities. Claim No.4(a) was entirely
hypothetical as the Respondent failed to produce any material showing
that the P&M had actually remained idle during the contract period.
x.
Claim No.4(a) also overlapped with Claim No.3. While
asserting that additional P&M had been deployed from the beginning
and remained deployed during the extended period, the Respondent
simultaneously claimed compensation for deemed idling of the same
machinery during the scheduled contract period.
xi.
The Award contains no independent reasoning. The Tribunal
merely narrated the rival submissions and reduced the alleged idling
period from twelve months to ten months without addressing the
Appellant‟s objections.
xii.
The learned Single Judge further erred in treating Claim No.4(a)
as compensation for continued mobilisation during the extended
period, whereas the claim itself was premised on deemed idling during
the original contract period.
xiii. Claim No.4(a) was not based on Monthly Progress Reports
[hereinafter referred to as „MPRs‟] but on the assertion that the
minimum P&M required under the Contract during the extended
period remained idle for twelve months during the original contract
period.
xiv.
The learned Single Judge also failed to address the Appellant‟s
contentions regarding Claim No.4(c), which was awarded without
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reasoning and merely on a comparison of figures derived from
different calculation methods.
In Re Claim No.7
xv.
Clause 47.3 of the Contract Agreement expressly prohibits
payment of bonus if the contract period stands extended, and Clause
44.1 permits extension only where the Contractor is not at fault.
Despite this, the Tribunal held the clause inconsistent with Section 73
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 [hereinafter referred to as „Contract
Act‟], and awarded Rs.3,87,01,242/- as bonus.
xvi.
Clause 42.2 of the Contract permits only actual costs incurred
due to delay to be payable. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Plus
91 Security Solution v. NEC Corporation India Pvt. Ltd.5 to submit
that when parties agree that a particular type of damage shall not be
payable, such agreement must be enforced.
xvii. The Tribunal simultaneously rejected the Respondent‟s claim
for loss of profit by giving effect to the contractual definition of
“cost”, thereby adopting an inconsistent interpretation of the
contractual framework.
xviii. The learned Single Judge also recorded that the Tribunal had
not found that the Respondent completed the project ahead of
schedule, an essential condition for claiming bonus. This is contrary to
the Tribunal‟s own finding awarding bonus for alleged early
completion by 79 days.
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5114
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15.
Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Respondent submits as under:
i.
The scope of interference under Section 37 of the A&C Act is
extremely limited. This Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or
substitute its own view for a plausible interpretation adopted by the
Tribunal.
In Re Claim No.3
ii.
There is no dispute that the Appellant failed to hand over land
in the manner stipulated under the Contract Agreement, compelling
the Respondent to execute work on fragmented portions of the site, as
recorded in the Engineer‟s letter dated 05.12.2003. The learned Single
Judge also noted that the Appellant failed to dislodge this finding.
iii.
No delay was attributable to the Respondent, as the Appellant
itself granted extension of time without levying liquidated damages
under the Contract Agreement. The learned Single Judge also rightly
rejected the Appellant‟s contention that Annexure-I was merely
indicative.
iv.
Though
the
Respondent
had
originally
claimed
Rs.17,23,41,950/- towards additional mobilisation of P&M, the
Tribunal, upon scrutiny of the material on record, awarded only Rs.
3,59,78,180/-, demonstrating careful evaluation of the claim.
v.
The Tribunal did not blindly accept the Respondent‟s
calculations but relied upon the computation in Annexure A filed by
the Appellant itself. Having placed the same on record, the Appellant
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cannot now contend that the Tribunal could not rely upon it. Further,
the deployment of additional machinery was reflected in the MPRs,
which the Appellant failed to discredit.
In Re Claim No.4
vi.
The contention that Claim No.4 was allowed without evidence
is incorrect, as the MPRs constituted contemporaneous records under
the Contract Agreement. The amount awarded was also based on the
„Hire Charges‟ prescribed in the Data Book of the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways.
vii.
Claim No.4 related to idling of machinery and manpower,
whereas Claim No.3 concerned additional P&M deployed over and
above the minimum requirement under Annexure-I to the Contract
Agreement.
viii. The Tribunal‟s reliance on Section 73 of the Contract Act was
justified in view of the delays attributable to the Appellant‟s breaches
of the Contract Agreement, which the Appellant failed to effectively
rebut.
In Re Claim No.7
ix.
Claim No.7 was advanced not to claim bonus per se, but as
compensation for the Respondent being deprived of the opportunity to
earn bonus due to the Appellant‟s breaches.
x.
The Tribunal rightly held that the contractual provisions relied
upon by the Appellant could not defeat the Respondent‟s entitlement
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to compensation otherwise recoverable under Section 73 of the
Contract Act.
xi.
The amounts awarded under Claim Nos.7 and 3 were essentially
two components of a composite calculation. In any event, the effective
grant under Claim No.7 was „NIL‟ as the amount awarded under
Claim No.3 was correspondingly reduced.
16.
No other submissions have been advanced by the learned
counsel representing the parties.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
17.
This Court has analysed the submissions advanced by the
learned Counsel for the parties.
18.
It would be apposite to set out herein the scrutiny permissible
by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 37. It is now
well-settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court under Section
37 is to be exercised with due restraint, ensuring that it does not
traverse beyond the statutory confines delineated under Section 34.
The Supreme Court in the judgment of MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.6
contemplated upon the limited and supervisory nature of an appeal
under Section 37 and has observed that:
“14. As far as interference with an order made Under Section 34,
as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such
interference Under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions
laid down Under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot
undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award,
and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court
Under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.
Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been
confirmed by the court Under Section 34 and by the court in an
(2019) 4 SCC 163.
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appeal Under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious
and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19.
Similar observations have been made by the Supreme Court in
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills7,
which reads as follows:
“20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope
of the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually
prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the interference is
confined only to the extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act.
The appellate power of Section 37 of the Act is limited within the
domain of Section 34 of the Act. It is exercisable only to find out
if the court, exercising power under Section 34 of the Act, has
acted within its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or
failed to exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court has
no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute before the
arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether the
decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon
reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary court of
appeal. It is only where the court exercising power under Section
34 has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34
or has travelled beyond its jurisdiction that the appellate court
can step in and set aside the order passed under Section 34 of the
Act. Its power is more akin to that superintendence as is vested in
civil courts while exercising revisionary powers. The arbitral
award is not liable to be interfered unless a case for interference as
set out in the earlier part of the decision, is made out. It cannot be
disturbed only for the reason that instead of the view taken by the
arbitral tribunal, the other view which is also a possible view is a
better view according to the appellate court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20.
Further, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in UHL
Power Co. Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh8 held the following:
“15. This Court also accepts as correct, the view expressed by the
appellate court that the learned Single Judge committed a gross
error in reappreciating the findings returned by the Arbitral
Tribunal and taking an entirely different view in respect of the
interpretation of the relevant clauses of the implementation
agreement governing the parties inasmuch as it was not open to the
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632.
(2022) 4 SCC 116.
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said court to do so in proceedings Under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, by virtually acting as a court of appeal.
16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts Under Section 34
of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope
of an appeal Under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the
jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting
aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more
circumscribed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed his reliance
upon the judgment rendered by the two-judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in McDermott International (supra), where the Court has taken
a similar view. The relevant extracts of the same are extracted
hereunder:
“52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of
courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness.
Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only,
like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of
natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the
arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to
begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the
provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at
minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the
agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's
jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency
and finality offered by it.
***
112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or
implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor
in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the
contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators
having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the
arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected
themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the
conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences
exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into
consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract.
Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to
determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of
law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC 593]
and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325] .)
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113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction,
no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise
its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the
face of the award.
114. The above principles have been reiterated in Chairman and
MD, NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders &
Contractors [(2004) 2 SCC 663] , Union of India v. Banwari Lal &
Sons (P) Ltd. [(2004) 5 SCC 304] , Continental Construction
Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2003) 8 SCC 4] and State of U.P. v. Allied
Constructions [(2003) 7 SCC 396] .”
(Emphasis supplied)
22.
The Courts have adopted the same consistent view in a catena
of decisions, a few of which may be adverted to, namely, Vedanta
Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd.9;
ONGC Ltd. Western Geco International Ltd.10; Numaligarh
Refinery Ltd. v. Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd.11; Tata Hydro-Electric
Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. Union of India12; Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI13; and, NHAI v. M. Hakeem14.
23.
Thus, it is a well-embedded principle in arbitration
jurisprudence that the scope of interference under Section 37 is even
narrower than that contemplated under Section 34. The appellate
court, while examining an order passed under Section 34, does not sit
in substantive review of the Award, nor does it reassess or reappreciate the evidence underlying the Arbitrator‟s findings. Thus, the
enquiry under Section 37 is confined to testing whether the court
below has acted within the statutory boundaries prescribed under
(2019) 11 SCC 465.
(2014) 9 SCC 263.
(2007) 8 SCC 466.
(2003) 4 SCC 172.
(2019) 15 SCC 131.
(2021) 9 SCC 1.
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Section 34, and whether its decision suffers from patent illegality,
perversity, or a jurisdictional infirmity warranting correction.
24.
Consistent with this framework, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly underscored that an appeal under Section 37 is supervisory
and not corrective in the ordinary appellate sense. The appellate court
is not empowered to expand the permissible grounds of challenge,
revisit factual determinations, or substitute its own view for that of
either the Arbitral Tribunal or the Section 34 Court. Its remit is limited
to ascertaining whether the lower court has applied the correct legal
standards and whether its interference with, or refusal to interfere
with, the Award aligns with the restrictive contours of Section 34.
25.
At the outset, it is also pertinent to deal with the Appellant‟s
contention that the delay of approximately eight months in
pronouncement of the Impugned Judgment vitiates the decision. This
Court is of the considered opinion that this contention of the Appellant
is without merit. While reliance has been placed on Anil Rai (supra),
the said decision does not lay down that delay, by itself, renders a
judgment invalid. As noticed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
M/s Dhir International Pvt. Ltd. v. Karnataka Bank Ltd.15, delay in
pronouncement is undoubtedly undesirable, but it is not ipso facto
fatal unless it is shown that such delay has caused prejudice or has
affected the reasoning of the judgment.
26.
In the present case, the Impugned Judgment reflects due
consideration of the material on record and deals with the contentions
of the parties with cogent reasoning. Moreover, the Appellant did not
W.P.(C) 8071/2025
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avail the remedies contemplated in Anil Rai (supra) for seeking
expeditious pronouncement at the relevant stage. Having failed to do
so, the Appellant cannot now assail the Impugned Judgment on this
ground alone.
27.
We now proceed to examine the Impugned Order, materials
placed on record and the rival submissions within the contours of
Section 37 of the A&C Act.
In Re Claim No.3
28.
Claim No.3 relates to the Respondent‟s claim for compensation
on account of additional mobilisation of P&M necessitated by the
Appellant‟s failure to hand over the project site in the manner
envisaged under the Contract Agreement.
29.
Upon consideration of the record, this Court finds that the
Tribunal had returned a categorical finding that the project site was
not made available in the staged manner envisaged under the Contract
Agreement. The materials before the Tribunal, particularly the
Engineer‟s Letter dated 05.12.2003, indicated that the land was made
available in thirty-six (36) fragments across the project stretch,
thereby compelling the contractor to execute work simultaneously
across scattered locations.
30.
The Tribunal further recorded that the minimum machinery
specified in Annexure-I to the Contract Agreement represented only
the baseline deployment necessary for execution of the work within
the stipulated schedule and that additional machinery had to be
deployed to ensure productivity in the fragmented working conditions
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that arose on account of the manner in which the site was handed
over.
31.
The details regarding the machinery actually deployed were
drawn from the MPRs maintained by the Engineer supervising the
project. The Tribunal treated these reports as contemporaneous
records of the project and pertinently, the Appellant was unable to
produce any evidence to discredit the accuracy of the said records.
32.
It is also significant that the Tribunal did not accept the
Respondent‟s computation of loss in its entirety. On the contrary, the
Tribunal rejected the Respondent‟s worksheets and adopted the
working placed on record by the Appellant itself, which reflected the
actual deployment of machinery. This exercise resulted in a
substantial reduction of the claim from Rs.17.23 cr to Rs.3.59 cr.
33.
The contention of the Appellant that Annexure-A was produced
merely for illustrative purposes was also examined by the learned
Single Judge, who noted that the Tribunal had utilised the said
working only as a basis for arriving at a conservative estimate of the
actual deployment rather than as an admission of liability.
34.
Similarly, the reliance placed by the Appellant on the CA‟s
certificate was found to be misplaced. The certificate reflected
expenditure inclusive of certain components such as petroleum oil and
lubricants and inherent idling expenses, which were subsequently
excluded by the Tribunal while computing the admissible claim.
35.
Having examined the reasoning of the Tribunal and the findings
recorded by the learned Single Judge, this Court is of the view that the
core issue arising under Claim No.3 is whether the Tribunal‟s
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conclusion regarding additional deployment of machinery is
unsupported by evidence or suffers from perversity.
36.
The Appellant has contended that no causal nexus between the
alleged breach and the claimed expenditure was established and that
the Respondent relied upon hypothetical calculations rather than proof
of actual expenditure. However, the record indicates that the Tribunal
relied upon contemporaneous project records, including the MPRs and
correspondence exchanged during execution of the work, to ascertain
the actual deployment of machinery and the working conditions at
site. Once the Tribunal found that the project site was handed over in
thirty-two (32) fragmented stretches, the inference that the contractor
was compelled to mobilise additional machinery in order to maintain
progress of work cannot be said to be either illogical or unsupported
by the material on record.
37.
The Appellant has also contended that the learned Single Judge
failed to address its submissions regarding the figures of
Rs.8,17,61,247/- and Rs.23,30,71,813/- referred to in its synopsis
dated 23.09.2024. A perusal of the record, however, indicates that
these figures formed part of alternative calculations presented by the
Appellant to dispute the Respondent‟s methodology. The Tribunal
ultimately did not adopt either of these figures as the basis for
quantification of damages. Instead, the Tribunal independently
assessed the deployment reflected in the contemporaneous records and
arrived at a much lower figure of Rs.3.59 crores. In these
circumstances, the mere reference to alternative figures in the
Appellant‟s submissions cannot by itself render the Tribunal‟s
reasoning unsustainable.
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38.
The Appellant has further argued that it would be commercially
implausible for the Respondent to incur additional mobilisation
expenditure of approximately Rs.3.87 cr merely to earn a contractual
bonus of a comparable value. This submission, in the view of this
Court, proceeds on an incorrect premise.
39.
The Tribunal did not conclude that the additional machinery
was deployed for the purpose of earning bonus. Rather, the Tribunal
found that the fragmented handing over of the project site compelled
the contractor to mobilise additional resources in order to execute the
work efficiently and adhere, as far as possible, to the contractual
timeline. The possibility that such deployment may also have enabled
the contractor to accelerate progress of work or avail contractual
incentives does not detract from the finding that the underlying cause
of such deployment was the manner in which the site was made
available.
40.
The Appellant has also reiterated its contention that Annexure-I
to the Contract Agreement was merely indicative and could not be
treated as prescribing the minimum machinery required for execution
of the project. The Tribunal rejected this contention on the ground that
Annexure-I formed part of the contractual framework governing the
project
and
represented
the baseline machinery deployment
contemplated at the time of execution of the contract. The learned
Single Judge affirmed this interpretation, noting that the machinery
indicated therein constituted the minimum resources required for
completion of the project within the stipulated schedule. Having
considered the contractual provisions, this Court finds no reason to
take a different view.
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41.
In the ultimate analysis, the challenge raised by the Appellant
essentially invites this Court to re-examine the factual findings of the
Tribunal regarding deployment of machinery, interpretation of the
contractual documents and quantification of damages. These are
matters which fall squarely within the domain of the Tribunal. The
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 37 does not extend to
reassessment of the evidentiary material or substitution of the
Tribunal‟s findings with an alternative view merely because such a
view may also be possible.
42.
Further, the reliance placed by the Appellant on IRB Pathankot
Amritsar Toll Road Ltd. (supra) and Jaiprakash Hyundai
Consortium (supra) does not advance its case. There can be no
dispute with the principle that while the scope of interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act is limited, the Court must nonetheless
examine whether the statutory grounds of challenge are made out and
such scrutiny cannot be superficial. However, the said principle does
not imply that the Court is required to reappreciate the entire
evidentiary record or substitute its own assessment for that of the
Arbitral Tribunal.
43.
In the present case, the findings of the Tribunal are not founded
upon bare assertions or mere computer-generated worksheets. The
Tribunal has relied upon contemporaneous project records, including
the MPRs and other contractual documentation maintained during
execution of the works, to determine the deployment of P&M and the
consequences of the delay attributable to the Appellant. These records
formed part of the contractual reporting mechanism and were
examined by the Tribunal while quantifying the claims.
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44.
Further, the Appellant‟s reliance on Kailash Nath (supra) is
equally misplaced. The principle enunciated therein, that damages
cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of loss, is not in dispute.
However, the factual foundation of the present case is materially
distinct. The Tribunal has not proceeded on the basis of presumed or
notional loss, rather, it has returned a clear and reasoned finding,
based on the Engineer‟s contemporaneous records, that the Appellant
committed a breach by failing to hand over the project site in the
contractually stipulated phased manner, instead releasing the land in
thirty-two (32) fragmented stretches. This finding of breach is not
only supported by documentary evidence, including the Engineer‟s
letter dated 05.12.2003, but has also not been successfully dislodged
by the Appellant.
45.
Once such breach stood established, the Tribunal proceeded to
examine the financial consequences flowing therefrom. For this
purpose, it relied upon contemporaneous material forming part of the
contractual record, including the MPRs, which reflected the actual
deployment of plant and machinery at site. These records were
maintained in the ordinary course of execution of the project and were
neither shown to be fabricated nor unreliable. On the basis of these
documents, the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent was
compelled to deploy machinery in excess of the contractual baseline
in order to maintain progress across multiple fragmented work fronts.
46.
Significantly, the Tribunal did not accept the Respondent‟s
claim at face value. It undertook an independent scrutiny of the
competing computations and, in fact, discarded the Respondent‟s
worksheets. Instead, it adopted the Appellant‟s own data regarding
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machinery deployment and applied a conservative methodology to
quantify the admissible claim. This exercise led to a substantial
reduction of the claim from Rs.17.23 crores to Rs.3.59 crores, thereby
demonstrating that the damages awarded were not the result of
conjecture, but of a calibrated assessment grounded in record
evidence.
47.
Further, while computing the loss, the Tribunal excluded
components such as POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants), thereby
ensuring that only those costs which bore a direct nexus with the
additional deployment necessitated by the Appellant‟s breach were
taken into account. The approach adopted thus satisfies the
requirement of causality as well as reasonable certainty in
quantification of damages.
48.
In this backdrop, the ratio of Kailash Nath (supra), which
cautions against grant of damages in the absence of proof of actual
loss, has no application to the present case, where both the occurrence
of loss and its quantification stand established on the basis of
contemporaneous and reliable evidence. The damages awarded by the
Tribunal are therefore compensatory in nature, directly attributable to
the breach, and cannot be characterised as speculative or unsupported.
49.
The Award, therefore, cannot be characterised as resting on
speculative or unsupported calculations. Consequently, the decisions
relied upon by the Appellant, which caution against superficial
judicial scrutiny or awards based solely on unsubstantiated
computations, are clearly distinguishable on facts.
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50.
This Court is therefore satisfied that the Tribunal‟s conclusion
that the Respondent incurred additional mobilisation costs owing to
the fragmented handing over of the project site represents a plausible
view based on the material placed before it. The learned Single Judge
was consequently justified in declining to interfere with the Award
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
In Re Claim No.4
51.
Claim No.4 pertains to compensation awarded to the
Respondent on account of the prolongation of the contract period and
the costs incurred in maintaining machinery, manpower and site
infrastructure during the extended period of the project.
52.
The Appellant has assailed the Award under this claim
primarily on the ground that the claim was based on the concept of
“deemed idling” rather than actual idling of machinery. It is further
contended that the Tribunal failed to record adequate reasoning and
merely reduced the period of idling from twelve months to ten months
without examining the Appellant‟s objections.
53.
The Appellant has also argued that Claim No.4 overlaps with
Claim No.3, as the Respondent simultaneously claimed additional
deployment of machinery while asserting that the minimum
machinery remained idle during the same period.
54.
The Tribunal, however, addressed this aspect and distinguished
the two claims. Claim No.3 pertains to the deployment of additional
P&M beyond the minimum contractual requirement, whereas Claim
No.4 relates to the expenditure incurred in maintaining the minimum
machinery during the prolonged period of execution of the contract.
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55.
The Tribunal further examined the actual value of work
executed during the project and concluded that the delay attributable
to the Appellant resulted in an additional period of approximately ten
months beyond the scheduled completion period. The claim was
accordingly restricted to the said period rather than the twelve months
originally claimed by the Respondent.
56.
In quantifying the claim, the Tribunal relied upon the „Hire
Charges‟ prescribed in the Data Book issued by the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways, which constitutes a recognised benchmark
for determining equipment costs in infrastructure projects.
57.
The Tribunal also relied upon the MPRs to determine the
machinery deployed at the site and treated these records as
contemporaneous documentation under the Contract Agreement.
58.
The learned Single Judge examined these findings and
concluded that the Tribunal had applied Section 73 of the Contract
Act in awarding compensation for the additional expenditure incurred
due to the delay attributable to the Appellant‟s breaches of the
contract.
59.
Having considered the rival submissions, this Court is unable to
accept the Appellant‟s contention that Claim No.4 was purely
hypothetical or unsupported by evidence. The Respondent‟s case was
that due to the fragmented handing over of the project site and the
resulting disruption in the sequence of work, the contractor was
compelled to retain the minimum P&M as well as manpower at the
project site for a longer period than originally contemplated.
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60.
Further, the MPRs maintained during the execution of the
project constituted contemporaneous records reflecting the machinery
deployed at the site. The Tribunal relied upon these records along with
the contractual requirement of maintaining minimum resources under
Annexure-I while determining the extent of prolongation costs.
61.
The Appellant has emphasised that Claim No.4(a) was
premised on “deemed idling” during the original contract period and
that the learned Single Judge erred in characterising the claim as
compensation for continued mobilisation during the extended period.
In our view, this submission proceeds on a narrow reading of the
Award. The Tribunal‟s reasoning indicates that the claim was
examined in the broader context of the financial consequences of
prolongation of the project arising from the manner in which the site
was handed over. The reference to idling was essentially reflective of
the contractor‟s inability to utilise the deployed resources optimally
during the disrupted execution of the project.
62.
The learned Single Judge‟s observation that the claim
represented
compensation
for
maintaining
machinery
and
infrastructure during the extended period is therefore consistent with
the substance of the Tribunal‟s reasoning.
63.
The Appellant‟s further submission that Claim No.4 overlaps
with Claim No.3 also does not merit acceptance. As noted earlier,
Claim No.3 concerned additional P&M deployed over and above the
contractual baseline in order to execute work across fragmented
locations. Claim No.4, on the other hand, addressed the cost incurred
in maintaining the minimum contractual resources at site during the
prolonged duration of the project. These claims relate to distinct
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financial consequences arising from the same underlying breach. The
mere fact that both claims arise from delays in execution of the project
does not render them mutually inconsistent.
64.
The Appellant has also contended that Claim No.4(a) was not
based on the MPRs but on an assumption that the minimum
machinery remained idle during the original contract period. This
argument overlooks that the Tribunal did not accept the Respondent‟s
computation in its entirety. Instead, the Tribunal examined the
progress of work and the value of work executed during the project
and reduced the claimed period of idling from twelve months to ten
months. The reduction itself demonstrates that the Tribunal undertook
an independent evaluation of the material rather than mechanically
accepting the Respondent‟s calculations.
65.
The Appellant has further urged that the learned Single Judge
failed to deal with its objections to Claim No.4(c), which was
allegedly awarded without adequate reasoning and merely on a
comparison of figures derived from different calculation methods. A
perusal of the Award, however, indicates that the Tribunal considered
alternative methods of computation placed on record by the parties
and adopted a figure which it considered reasonable in the
circumstances. The exercise undertaken by the Tribunal reflects an
assessment of competing calculations rather than an absence of
reasoning. The learned Single Judge, upon examining the Award,
found no perversity in the approach adopted by the Tribunal and
declined to interfere.
66.
The Respondent has also rightly pointed out that the Tribunal
relied upon the „Hire Charges‟ prescribed in the Data Book issued by
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the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways while determining the
cost of machinery. These benchmark rates are widely recognised in
infrastructure projects and provide an objective basis for estimating
equipment costs where precise accounting records may not be
available for each item of machinery deployed during execution of the
project.
67.
Once the breach on the part of the Appellant in handing over
the project site in the agreed manner stood established, the Tribunal
was justified in awarding compensation for the additional expenditure
incurred by the contractor in maintaining machinery, manpower and
site infrastructure during the prolonged period of execution of the
project. Such compensation falls squarely within the ambit of
damages contemplated under Section 73 of the Contract Act.
68.
In the ultimate analysis, the Appellant‟s challenge essentially
invites this Court to reappreciate the evidence regarding deployment
of machinery, the duration of delay and the methodology adopted by
the Tribunal in quantifying prolongation costs. These are matters
which fall within the domain of the Tribunal. The jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 37 of the A&C Act does not extend to
substituting the Tribunal‟s assessment with an alternative evaluation
merely because another view may also be possible.
69.
This Court therefore finds no perversity or patent illegality in
the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal or in the conclusion of the
learned Single Judge in upholding the Award under Claim No.4.
In Re Claim No.7
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70.
Claim No. 7 concerns the Respondent‟s claim relating to bonus
under the contractual framework.
71.
The Appellant contends that the Award under this claim is
contrary to Clause 47.3 of the Contract Agreement which governs the
grant of bonus for early completion of the project. It is also argued
that under Clause 2.1(d) the Project Engineer could not grant
extension of time without the approval of the Appellant.
72.
The Tribunal examined the contractual provisions governing
extension of time and noted that the Project Engineer had determined
the extension of time up to 20.04.2005. The Tribunal also recorded
that the Respondent had substantially completed the work well before
the extended completion date.
73.
The Tribunal therefore held that the Respondent had been
deprived of the opportunity to earn contractual bonus on account of
the delays attributable to the Appellant in handing over the project
site.
74.
Significantly, the Tribunal did not treat Claim No.7 as an
independent contractual claim for bonus. Rather, the claim was
considered as compensation for the loss of opportunity to earn bonus
owing to the Appellant‟s breach of the Contract Agreement.
75.
The Tribunal further ensured that there was no duplication of
recovery by adjusting the amount awarded under Claim No.7 against
the amount awarded under Claim No.3. Consequently, the effective
grant under this claim did not result in any additional monetary benefit
beyond what had already been awarded.
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76.
The learned Single Judge, while examining this aspect,
observed that Claim Nos.3, 4 and 7 essentially represented different
facets of the financial consequences arising from the same breaches
committed by the Appellant.
77.
Once the foundational finding regarding breach of the Contract
Agreement by the Appellant had been upheld, the Tribunal‟s approach
in compensating the Respondent for the resulting financial impact
cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the contractual
framework.
78.
The Appellant has nevertheless contended that Clause 47.3 of
the Contract Agreement expressly prohibits payment of bonus where
the contract period stands extended and that the Tribunal erred in
disregarding this contractual stipulation by invoking Section 73 of the
Contract Act. It is further argued that Clause 42.2 restricts recoverable
damages to actual costs incurred due to delay and that the Award of
bonus would therefore run contrary to the contractual allocation of
risk between the parties.
79.
In the considered view of this Court, the submission proceeds
on an incorrect characterisation of the Award. The Tribunal did not
award bonus as a contractual entitlement under Clause 47.3. Rather,
the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the Respondent had been
deprived of the opportunity to earn such bonus on account of the
Appellant‟s breaches in handing over the project site in the manner
contemplated under the Contract Agreement. The compensation
awarded was therefore treated as damages arising from breach rather
than as enforcement of the bonus clause itself.
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80.
The distinction between enforcement of a contractual incentive
and compensation for loss occasioned by breach is significant.
Contractual clauses restricting payment of bonus or other incentives
ordinarily operate within the framework of performance of the
contract. However, where a party‟s breach deprives the other party of
the opportunity to earn such contractual benefit, the resulting loss may
legitimately fall within the ambit of damages recoverable under
Section 73 of the Contract Act. The Tribunal‟s reasoning proceeds on
this principle.
81.
The reliance placed by the Appellant on the decision in Plus 91
Security Solutions (supra) does not materially advance its case. That
decision reiterates the settled principle that contractual stipulations
governing the measure of damages are ordinarily binding between the
parties. In the present case, however, the Tribunal did not disregard
the contractual framework. Instead, it interpreted the relevant clauses
in the context of the breach found to have been committed by the
Appellant and assessed the consequential financial impact on the
Respondent.
82.
The Appellant has also argued that the Tribunal adopted an
inconsistent approach by rejecting the Respondent‟s claim for loss of
profit while simultaneously awarding compensation equivalent to
bonus. This contention again overlooks the distinct conceptual basis
of the claims. Loss of profit represents a speculative measure of
expected gains from performance of the contract, whereas the bonus
contemplated under the contractual framework represented a
specifically quantifiable incentive linked to timely completion of the
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project. The Tribunal was therefore justified in treating these claims
differently.
83.
The Appellant has further relied upon an observation in the
Impugned Judgment to contend that the Tribunal had not recorded a
finding that the Respondent completed the project ahead of schedule,
which according to the Appellant constituted an essential precondition
for grant of bonus. A careful reading of the Award, however, indicates
that the Tribunal recorded that the Respondent completed the works
substantially ahead of the extended completion date determined by the
Engineer. The reference to early completion by seventy-nine days was
made in that context.
84.
It is also relevant that the Tribunal ultimately adjusted the
amount computed under Claim No.7 against the amount awarded
under Claim No.3. As a result, the effective monetary benefit flowing
from Claim No.7 stood neutralised. The adjustment undertaken by the
Tribunal indicates that Claim No.7 formed part of the overall exercise
undertaken by the Tribunal to quantify the financial consequences of
the breaches committed by the Appellant, rather than constituting a
separate and independent monetary award.
85.
In these circumstances, the challenge raised by the Appellant
essentially invites this Court to undertake a fresh interpretation of the
contractual provisions and the methodology adopted by the Tribunal
in assessing the financial consequences of the Appellant‟s breach.
Such an exercise would fall beyond the limited scope of interference
available under Section 37 of the A&C Act.
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86.
This Court therefore finds no perversity or patent illegality in
the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal or in the conclusion of the
learned Single Judge in declining to interfere with the Award under
Claim No.7.
CONCLUSION:
87.
Keeping in view the aforegoing dicussion, the Appellant‟s
challenge essentially invites this Court to re-examine the factual
findings of the Tribunal and to undertake a fresh evaluation of the
evidence on record.
88.
Such an exercise is impermissible within the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon this Court under Section 37 of the A&C Act.
89.
The learned Single Judge has carefully examined the Award
and has rightly concluded that the findings of the Tribunal represent a
plausible view based on the contractual provisions and the material
placed on record.
90.
No patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error has been
demonstrated that would justify interference with the Impugned
Judgment.
91.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
JULY 01, 2026
jai/shah
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