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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No.1111 of 2024
Date of Decision: 05.01.2026
_______________________________________________________
Sh. Naresh Kumar
…….Petitioner
Versus
Sh. Rakesh Kumar
…..Respondent
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Rajat Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Piyush Dhanotia, Advocate.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) read with
Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, (in short “NIA”), prayer
has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing and setting
aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
29.04.2022 passed learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Theog, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Case No.242/3
of 2013 and further upheld by this Court, vide judgment dated
26.07.2024 passed in Cr. Revision No.104 of 2023, titled as Naresh
Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar, on the basis of compromise, whereby
parties have resolved to settle the dispute amicably inter se them.
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2.
Mr. Piyush Dhanotia, Advocate, has put in appearance
on behalf of the respondent. He states that on account of amicable
settlement inter se parties, whereby sum of Rs.4,00,000/- has already
been paid to the respondent and sum of Rs.50,000/- lying deposited
with the Registry of this Court has been agreed to be released in
favour of the respondent, he has instructions to state on behalf of the
respondent that he shall have no objection in case the judgments of
conviction and order of sentence dated 29.04.2022 recorded by
learned trial Court in Criminal Case No.242/3 of 2013 and further
upheld by this Court in Cr. Revision No.104 of 2023, are quashed and
set aside.
3.
Question with regard to competence of this Court to
quash and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
recorded by learned trial Court and further upheld by this Court, while
exercising powers under Section 582 of BNSS read with Section 147
of NIA, has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court
in Cr.MMO No.188 of 2025, titled as Chune Ram Vs. Brikam Chand,
wherein Division Bench of this Court, while answering the reference
on the question “Whether the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can
be exercised to quash the conviction when no proceedings are
pending before any Court,” has held as under:“36. Hence, in view of our aforesaid discussion, we are of the firm
opinion that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of
BNSS is available to be exercised by the High Court for
compounding the offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act only with
the explicit consent of the complainant or the person aggrieved. In
our considered opinion, when parties to the offence under Section
138 of the Act enter into compromise, it should be given effect to
under Section 147 of the Act at any stage of the proceedings, even
after conviction being finalized by the High Court. The failure to give
effect to such compromise would render the import of Section 147
of the Act meaningless. If this Court does not permit compounding
of the offence under Section 138 of the Act through Section 147 of
the Act on the ground that the conviction has reached its end, it
would result in grave injustice being committed against the parties,
who would be persuaded to continue a proceeding, which neither
party intends or would benefit from. Moreover it would discourage
the parties from entering into compromise and would operate
against the intention of the Legislature to promote mutual
settlement of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions held that the
compensatory aspect of remedy shall have priority over the punitive
aspect and the courts should encourage compounding of offences
under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court also noted the situation that large number of cases
involving dishonour of cheques are choking the criminal justice
system and putting an unprecedented strain on the judicial
functioning. Therefore, in our opinion, if the parties are required to
approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court to compound the offence, it
will merely have the effect of delaying justice and incurring
unwarranted expenses upon the parties besides increasing burden
on the Supreme Court.
37. Therefore, we answer the question of law that the power
conferred under Section 528 BNSS can always be exercised by the
High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction for compounding
the offence under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
and to quash the conviction finally affirmed by the High Court under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, when no
proceedings are pending before any Court. The reference case is
accordingly directed to be placed before the appropriate Bench
after obtaining necessary orders from Hon’ble the Chief Justice.”
4.
Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No.8050 of 2025, titled as Gian Chand Garg Vs. Harpal Singh &
Anr., has held that although dishonour of cheque entails criminal
consequence, the legislature by virtue of section 147 of the NI Act has
made it compoundable notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the same can be compounded at any
stage of the proceedings, especially when the parties have
themselves arrived at a voluntary compromise. Relevant paras of the
afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:“9. In B.V. Seshaiah v. State of Telangana & Anr.
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 96 this court was of the view
that when parties enter into an agreement and
compound
the
offence,
they
do
so
to
save
themselves from the process of litigation and when
such a step is taken by the parties, the law very well
allows them to do so. Hence, the courts cannot
override such compounding and impose its will.
10. Therefore, it is very clear that although dishonour of
cheque entails criminal consequence, the legislature by virtue of
section 147 of the NI Act has made it compoundable
notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and the same can be compounded at any
stage of the proceedings especially when the parties have
themselves arrived at a voluntary compromise.
11. In the present case, the compromise deed dated
06.04.2025 and the Affidavit on behalf of the
Respondent No.1 dated 16.04.2025 is annexed to
the present petition as Annexure P3 and P6,
respectively. Upon careful perusal of the recitals
contained in the said documents, it clearly emerges
that the Respondent No.1 in consideration of Two
Demand
Drafts
bearing
no(s).
004348
dated
04.04.2025 and 004303 dated 11.02.2025 for Rs. 2.5
lakhs each along with three cheques bearing no(s).
354412 dated 10.05.2025, 354413 dated 10.06.2025
and 354414 dated 10.07.2025 of Rs. 1 lakh each has
arrived at a compromise with appellant without any
coercion and at his own will and voluntarily. Once the
complainant has signed the compromise deed
accepting the amount in full and final settlement of
the default sum the proceedings under Section 138
of the NI Act cannot hold water, therefore, the
concurrent conviction rendered by the Courts below
has to be set-aside.
12. Therefore, in the light of aforesaid discussion, we
are of the considered view that the present appeal
deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the same
stands Allowed and consequently the impugned
order dated 27.03.2025 in CRR 2563 of 2025 is set
aside and the order of conviction and sentence
imposed on appellant is quashed.”
5.
vide
No doubt, in the case at hand, petitioner was convicted
judgment
of
conviction
and
order
of
sentence
dated
02.12.2021/04.12.2021 in Criminal Case No.4-3 of 2018, titled as
Rajesh Pathania Vs. Satvir Singh, for having committed an offence
punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and such
judgment was further upheld by this Court Cr. Revision No.104 of
2023, titled as Rakesh Vs. Rajesh, decided on 26.10.2024, but once
parties have resolved to settle the dispute mater inter se them and in
terms
of
compromise,
petitioner
has
already
paid
sum
of
Rs.4,00,000/- to the respondent and remaining amount of Rs.50,000/lying deposited with the Registry of this Court has been agreed to be
released in favour of the respondent, coupled with the fact that this
Court, while exercising powers under Section 528 of BNSS read with
Section 147 of NIA, can proceed to quash the criminal proceedings as
has been held by Division Bench of this Court as well as Hon’ble
Apex Court in the cases detailed herein above, this Court sees no
impediment in accepting the prayer made in the instant petition.
Besides above, this Court vide judgment passed in Cr.MP No. 1197 of
2017 in Cr. Revision No. 394 of 2015 titled Gulab Singh v. Vidya
Sagar Sharma, while relying upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court as
well as other Constitutional Courts has already held that court, while
exercising power under Section 147 of Act can proceed to compound
offence even in those cases, where accused stands convicted.
Relevant portion of the order passed by this Court in case (supra) is
reproduced as under:
“8. Before acceding to aforesaid joint request having been
made by learned counsel for the respective parties, moot
question arise for determination of this Court is whether it
has power to review/recall its own order/judgment passed in
Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015, wherein judgment of
conviction recorded by both the Courts below came to be
upheld. 9. Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, learned counsel
representing the petitioner, has invited attention of this Court
to the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan
in Naresh Kumar Sharma versus State of Rajasthan &
another, Criminal Misc. Application No.371 of 2016 in
Criminal Revision Petition No.1267 of 2016, to suggests that
in view of amicable settlement arrived inter se the parties,
this Court has power to recall its judgment in the light of the
provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act, which permits
compounding of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. At
this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce the judgment
passed by Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan hereinbelow:“The accused-petitioner has field this criminal misc.
application under section 482 Cr.P.C read with
section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act( for short
the ‘Act’) with a prayer to review/recall the order
dated 6.10.2016 passed by this Court in SB Criminal
Revision Petition No.1267/2016 in the light of
compromise dated 4.11.2016 subsequently entered
between the parties and as a consequences thereof to
acquit the accused petitioner for the offence under
Section 138 of N.I. Act.
Vide order dated 6.10.2016, the aforesaid revision
petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by this
Court while upholding and affirming the judgment
and order of conviction and sentence passed by the
trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court. It was
jointly submitted by the learned counsel for the
parties that after the order dated 6.10.2016 the
parties have amicably settled their dispute and
entered into compromise and the amount in the
dispute has been paid by the petitioner to the
respondent-complainant.
It was further submitted that although the revision
petition has been dismissed by this Court on merits
vide order dated 6.10.2016, but even then that order
can be recalled in the light of provisions of Section
147 of N.I.Act which permits compound of the offence
under Section 138 of the Act at any stage and the
accused can be acquitted.
In support of their submissions, they relied upon the
case of K. Subramanian Vs. R.Rajathi reported in
(2010) 15 SCC 352 and order dated 7.7.2015 passed
by a Single Bench of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in
S.B.
Criminal
Misc.
Application
(Recall)
No.10232/2015 filed in Special Criminal Application
No.3026/2014.
On consideration of submissions jointly made on
behalf of the respective parties and the material
including the compromise entered into between the
parties and the fact that the amount in dispute has
been
paid
by
the
accused-petitioner
to
the
respondent- complainant and the principles of law
laid down in the aforesaid decisions, I find it a fit
case in the criminal misc. application is to be allowed
and the order dated 6.10.2016 is to be recalled.
Consequently,
the
criminal
misc.
application
is
allowed and the order dated 6.10.2016 is recalled
and all the orders whereby the accused-petitioner
was convicted and sentenced for the offence under
Section 138 of N.I. Act are set aside and as a
consequence thereof he is acquitted therefrom.”
10. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, wherein similar application came
to be filed for recalling the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Gujarat. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court, has reiterated that judgment passed by
the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction recorded
under Section 138 of the Act, can be recalled in view of the
specific provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act, which
provides for compounding of offence allegedly committed
under Section 138 of the Act.
11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Subramanian Vs. R.Rajathi;
(2010)15 Supreme Court Cases 352, also in similar situation
ordered for compounding of offence after recording of
conviction by the courts below, wherein it has been held as
under:“6. Thereafter a compromise was entered into and the
petitioner claims that he has paid Rs. 4,52,289 to the
respondent. In support of this claim, the petitioner has
produced an affidavit sworn by him on 1.12.2008.
The petitioner has also produced an affidavit sworn
by P. Kaliappan, Power of attorney holder of R.
Rajathi on 1.12.2008 mentioning that he has received
a sum of Rs. 4,52,289 due under the dishonoured
cheques in full discharge of the value of cheques and
he is not willing to prosecute the petitioner.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner states at the
Bar that the petitioner was arrested on 30.7.2008
and has undergone the sentence imposed on him by
the trial Court and confirmed by the Sessions Court,
the High Court as well as by this Court. The two
affidavits sought to be produced by the petitioner as
additional documents would indicate that indeed a
compromise has taken place between the petitioner
and the respondent and the respondent has accepted
the compromise offered by the petitioner pursuant to
which he has received a sum of Rs.4,52,289. In the
affidavit filed by the respondent a prayer is made to
permit the petitioner to compound the offence and
close the proceedings.
8. Having regard to the salutary provisions of Section
147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this
Court is of the opinion that in view of the compromise
arrived at between the parties, the petitioner should
be permitted to compound the offence committed by
him under Section 138 of the Code.”
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has
categorically held that in view of the provisions contained
under Section 147 of the Act, read with Section 320 of
Cr.P.C, compromise arrived inter se the parties, can be
accepted and offence committed under Section 138 of the
Act, can be ordered to be compounded.
13.
Another
question
which
arise
for
determination/
adjudication of this Court is with regard to maintainability of
present review petition. Admittedly, instant review petition
has been filed after withdrawal of Special Leave Petition,
preferred by the applicant/ petitioner against the judgment
passed by this Court in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015,
wherein conviction/ sentence awarded by the Court below
came to be upheld. In the case at hand, Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) filed by the applicant/petitioner was dismissed
as withdrawn vide order dated 18.08.2017. Subsequent to
passing
of
aforesaid
order
by
Hon’ble
Apex
Court,
petitioner/applicant has approached this Court, praying
therein for modification/recalling of its judgment dated
10.3.2017, passed in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015 on
the ground that parties have amicably settled the matter and
entire amount stands paid to the respondent/complainant in
terms of judgment passed by the learned trial Court.
Learned
counsel
representing
the
petitioner/applicant,
contended that once the Supreme Court permits withdrawal
of a Special Leave Petition without recording reasons, it is as
if no appeal was ever filed or entertained, since in the
absence of grant of special leave, there is no appeal in
existence. Learned counsel further contended that where a
Special Leave Petition is permitted to be withdrawn and
equally when it is dismissed in limine without recording
reasons, the High Court judgment neither merges into any
proceedings before the Supreme Court nor is it in any
manner affected by the filing and subsequent withdrawal or
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. In support of
aforesaid contentions, learned counsel representing the
applicant/ petitioner also invited attention of this Court to
the judgment passed by the three Judges Bench of the
Supreme Court in Kunhayammed Vs. State of Keral (2000) 6
SCC 359, wherein it has been held that after dismissal of
SLP in limine, review petition can be filed because at the
stage of dismissal of SLP, there exists no appeal in the eyes
of law.
14.
Before
submissions
ascertaining
having
been
the
correctness
made
by
of
aforesaid
learned
counsel
representing the applicant/petitioner, it would be profitable
to take note of judgment passed by Hon’ble Delhi High Court
in Kanoria Industries Limited & ors. Versus Union of India &
Ors on 27th February, 2017, wherein it has been held as
under:“8. We are in the factual situation of the present case
concerned not with a case of dismissal in limine by a
nonspeaking order of an SLP preferred against the
judgment of which review is sought but with
dismissal as withdrawn of the SLP. Though the
review petitioners, while seeking to withdraw the SLP
also sought liberty to move this Court in review
petition but the Supreme Court merely dismissed the
SLP as withdrawn and has not stated that the liberty
sought had been granted.
9. The question which arises is, whether the
dismissal as withdrawn of the SLP, even in the
absence of the words "with liberty sought" is to be
read as grant of liberty.
10. The review petitioners obviously were of the
opinion that without the aforesaid words, they did not
have liberty to approach this Court by way of review
and claim to have made an application to the
Supreme Court in this regard but which application is
stated to have been refused to be listed.
11. In our opinion, it is not for us to venture into,
whether
the
order,
notwithstanding
having
not
provided that the review petitioners had been granted
liberty, grants liberty or not. It cannot be lost sight of
that it is not as if the counsel for the review
petitioners, when the SLP came up before the Court,
stated that the filing of SLP was misconceived and
withdrew the same. The order records that it was
"after some arguments" that the counsel for the
review petitioners sought permission to withdraw the
SLP. It is also not as if the Supreme Court is not
known to, while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn,
grant such liberty. The order thus has to be read as it
is i.e., of dismissal of SLP as withdrawn.
12. Rule 9 of Order XV titled "Petitions Generally" of
the
Supreme
Court
Rules,
provides
for
withdrawal of the petition. Once a proceeding /
petition is permitted to be withdrawn, the effect of
such withdrawal is as if, it had not been preferred. It
is a different matter that the Rules may prohibit the
petitioner who so withdraws his petition from refiling
the same or even in the absence of such Rules, such
refiling may be treated as an abuse of the process or
by way of re-litigation. But in law a dismissal of the
petition as withdrawn cannot be at par with the
dismissal of the petition.
13. Neither counsel has however addressed us on
this aspect and has proceeded on the premise as if
dismissal as withdrawn is the same as dismissal of
the petition.
14. As far as the effects, if any, of dismissal in limine
of a SLP on a subsequent review petition before the
High
Court
is
concerned,
which
arise
for
consideration are firstly whether, Abbai Maligai
Partnership Firm and Kunhayammed (supra), both of
three Judges Bench hold differently and secondly
whether the two deal with different factual situations
i.e. of a review having been preferred before the
dismissal of SLP or after the dismissal of SLP. We
have studied the two judgments in this light.
15. We find that in Kunhayammed (supra) the review
petition was filed after the dismissal of SLP. The
Supreme Court was approached aggrieved from the
order of the High Court overruling the preliminary
objection as to the maintainability of the review
petition on the ground of the SLP having been
dismissed. Supreme Court held that where the
judgment of the High Court has come up to the
Supreme Court by SLP and the SLP is dismissed, the
judgment of the High Court does not merge in the
order of dismissal of SLP and the aggrieved party is
not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was
available and he can pursue it; it may be that the
review Court may interfere or it may not interfere
depending upon the law and principles applicable to
interference in review; but the High Court, if it
exercises a power of review or deals with the review
application on merits, cannot be said to be wrong in
exercising statutory jurisdiction or power vested in it.
It was expressly held that review can be filed even
after SLP is dismissed and as also before special
leave is granted but not after it is granted. It was held
that once special leave is granted, the jurisdiction to
consider the validity of the High Court’s order vested
in the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot
entertain a review thereafter unless such a review
application was preferred in the High Court before the
SLP was granted. With respect to Abbai Maligai
Partnership Firm (supra) it was observed that the
facts and circumstances of the case persuaded the
Supreme Court to form an opinion that the tenants
were abusing the process of the Court by approaching
the High Court and the very entertainment of review
petition and then reversing the earlier order was an
affront of the order of the Supreme Court. It was
explained that the three Judges Bench in Abbai
Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) nowhere in the
course of judgment relied on the doctrine of merger for
taking the view they had taken and rather a careful
reading of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra)
also fortified the view taken in Kunhayammed
(supra).
16. It would thus be seen that Kunhayammed
(supra), though of a Bench of the same strength as
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra), did not read
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) as laying
down anything to the contrary than what was held in
Kunhayammed (supra). The Supreme Court having
expressly held so, it is not open today to the
respondent UOI to contend or for us to hold that there
is a conflict in the two.
17. We now proceed to analyze whether Sunil Kumar
(supra) carves out any different factual scenario in
which
Abbai
Maligai
Partnership
Firm
and
Kunhayammed (supra) operate.
18. Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar (supra) was
concerned with a petitioner who was held to be a
blackmarketer exploiting helplessness of the poor
people of the society and capable of engaging lawyers
and found to be abusing the process of the Court and
wanting to use the Courts as a safe haven. The
subject matter of Sunil Kumar (supra) was a
transaction
under
Section
of
the
Essential
Commodities Act, 1955. The petitioner therein was
found to have approached the High Court for
modifying the order of his conviction after the SLP
against the order of conviction had been dismissed
and had again preferred the SLP to the Supreme
Court against the order of the High Court refusing to
modify the order of conviction. It was held that
Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
puts a complete embargo on the Criminal Court to
reconsider after the delivery of judgment as the Court
becomes functus officio. In this background when the
petitioner relied on Kunhayammed (supra), it was
observed that Kunhayammed (supra) has been
explained
in
various
subsequent
judgments
as
holding that review petition filed before the High
Court after approaching the Supreme Court amounts
to abuse of the process of the Court. Reference in this
regard was made to Meghmala (supra). However,
after holding so, it was further held that the ratio of
Kunhayammed (supra) has no application to Sunil
Kumar (supra) as Kunhayammed (supra) was dealing
with civil cases.
19.
We
have
already
noticed
above
that
in
Kunhayammed (supra) the review petition was filed
after the order of dismissal of the SLP.
20. What we find is that the observations, of
preferring review petition after the dismissal of SLP
amounting to abuse of the process of the Court, in
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra) as well as in
Sunil Kumar (supra) are on a factual finding of the
petitioners therein abusing the process of the Court
and not on the maintainability of the review petition.
Certainly, if we are to find the review petitioners
herein also to be abusing the process of the Court by
preferring this review petition after withdrawal of the
SLP preferred against the judgment of which review
is sought, the review petition of the review petitioners
would also suffer the same fate. However it would
not make the review not maintainable.”
15. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in Kunha Yammed and others versus State of Kerala and
others; (2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 359, wherein it has been held
as under:“22. We may refer to a recent decision, by Two-Judges
Bench, of this Court in V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax 2000 (3) Scale 240, holding that
when a special leave petition is dismissed, this Court does
not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from
which leave to appeal is sought. What the Court means is
that it does not consider it to be a fit case for exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. That
certainly could not be so when appeal is dismissed though by
a nonspeaking order. Here the doctrine of merger applies. In
that case the Supreme Court upholds the decision of the High
Court or of the Tribunal. This doctrine of merger does not
apply in the case of dismissal of special leave petition under
Article 136. When appeal is dismissed, order of the High
Court is merged with that of the Supreme Court. We find
ourselves in entire agreement with the law so stated. We are
clear in our mind that an order dismissing a special leave
petition, more so when it is by a non-speaking order, does not
result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the
Supreme Court.
27.A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be
dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order
Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order of
dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order, i.e. it does not assign
reasons for dismissing the special leave petition, it would
neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand
substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor
would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under
Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has
been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by
reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not be
attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not an
appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction
refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with
this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court
would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if
there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which
obviously would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in
India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement
contained in the order other than on points of law would be
binding on the parties and the court or tribunal, whose order
was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline,
this Court being the Apex court of the country. No court or
tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or
canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this
Court. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has
declared the law and in that light the case was considered
not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be
governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one
where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not
apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open.
Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be,
contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet
would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given
are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so done
because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave
petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in
the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood
as not to have differed in law with the High Court.
16. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that doctrine of merger
does not apply in the case of dismissal of special leave
petition. In the case at hand, special leave to appeal having
been filed by the petitioner/applicant has been dismissed as
withdrawn by non-speaking order and as such, does not
result in the merger of impugned order in the order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
17. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made
hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, this Court holds that review petition filed after
dismissal of Special Leave Petition, praying therein for
recalling/modification of judgment dated 10.3.2017, passed
by this Court in Criminal Revision No.394 of 2015, is
maintainable and as such, parties are permitted to get the
matter compounded in the light of the compromise arrived
inter se them. Accordingly, judgment of conviction and
sentence recorded by the learned trial court is quashed and
set-aside and petitioner is acquitted of the charge framed
against
him.
His
bail
bonds
are
discharged.
Since,
respondent/complainant is/was unnecessarily dragged into
litigation for realization of his own money, this Court deems it
fit to direct the petitioner/accused to pay an amount of
`50,000/- to the respondent/complainant in addition of the
amount already paid. At this stage, it may be noticed that
learned counsel representing the petitioner has handed over
the demand draft of 50,000/- to the complainant in the Court
towards litigation charges. Needless to say, amount lying
deposited with the learned trial Court shall be released
forthwith in favour of the respondent/complainant on his
making formal application.”
8. Since in the case at hand, petitioner after being convicted under
Section 138 of the Act has compromised the matter with the
respondent complainant and in terms thereof has already paid sum
of Rs.1,20,000/- to the complainant, prayer for compounding the
offence can be accepted in terms of judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5
SCC 663, wherein it has been categorically held that court, while
exercising power under Section 147 of the Act, can proceed to
compound the offence even after recording of conviction by the
Courts below. Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Subramanian v. R.
Rajathi represented by P.O.A.P. Kaliappan, 2010 (15) SCC 352,
has held that in view of the provisions contained under Section 147
of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.PC, compromise arrived can be
accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.
6.
Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made
hereinabove as well as law taken into consideration, this Court, while
exercising powers under Section 528 BNSS read with Section 147 of
NIA, quash and set aside the judgments of conviction and order of
sentence dated 29.04.2022 recorded by learned trial Court in Criminal
Case No.242/3 of 2013 and further upheld by this Court in Cr.
Revision No.104 of 2023. Petitioner is acquitted of the charge framed
against him Section 528 of BNSS read with Section 147 NIA. Bail
bonds, if any, discharged. Sum of Rs.50,000/- lying deposited with the
Registry of this Court is ordered to be released in favour of the
respondent by remitting the same in his bank account, detail whereof,
is given in para No.10 of the petition. Petitioner is directed to deposit
5% of the Cheque amount with the H.P. State Legal Service Authority
as compounding fee, within the six weeks from today, failing which,
he shall render himself liable for penal consequences as well as
contempt of Court.
The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms,
alongwith all pending applications.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
January 05, 2026
(sunil)
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