The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
10. In the case at hand, a careful perusal of the record would show that that the learned trial Court after conducting full-fledged trial, Page No.7 of 7 CRR-1518-2025 came to the conclusion that though the complainant/applicant has alleged that the accused has encroached upon her land illegally, constructed a house on it and has also prepared a false sale-deed with respect to the said land, but neither any document nor any witness has been be led by her in support of her allegation. Consequently, in absence of any evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No.01 for the aforesaid offences, which findings have also been affirmed by the learned appellate Court vide impugned order dated 26.04.2024. Even otherwise, it is settled that the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate Court may be the more probable one, and unless the view taken by the trial Court is perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The concurrent findings recorded by tbe two Courts below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such, we do not find any merit in this revision and same is liable to be dismissed.
11. In view of aforesaid discussion, we do not find any good ground to invoke our revisional jurisdiction against the impugned orders. Accordingly, this revision is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost. sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge s@if sd/(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.1 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
Digitally
2026:CGHC:22580-DB
SAIFAN signed by
KHAN SAIFAN
KHAN
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Revision No. 1518 of 2025
Najma Begum W/o Mushtaq Ali Aged About 52 Years R/o Arjun
Nagar, Rickshaw Colony, Near Rai Kirana Stores, Ward No. 19,
Police Station Supela, Bhilai, District Bhilai Chhattisgarh
... Applicant
Versus
1 - Raghunath Prasad S/o Late Shri Balak Prasad Aged About 72
Years R/o Anand Chowk, 5 Rasta Ward No. 6, Supela, Bhilai, District
Durg Chhattisgarh
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Collector Durg, District
Durg Chhattisgarh
... Non-applicants
[Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Applicant
:
Mr. Jitendra Gupta, Advocate
For Respondent-State
:
Dr. S.K. Dewangan, Panel Lawyer
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Order on Board
(12.05.2026)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
1.
Heard on IA No.01, which is an application seeking
condonation of delay in filing this revision.
2.
For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed.
Delay of 495 days in filing this revision is hereby condoned.
3.
Heard on admission.
Page No.2 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
4.
In this revision, the applicant is challenging order dated
26.04.2024, passed by the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Durg, in Cr. Appeal No.125/2023, whereby the appeal preferred by
the applicant against order dt. 22.03.2023, passed by the learned
JMFC, Durg in Complaint Case No.25840/2012, has been dismissed
and the order of learned JMFC dt. 22.03.2023, by which the
accused/respondent No.01 herein has been acquitted from the the
charges under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of IPC, has been
affirmed.
5.
Facts of the case, in short, are that the applicant herein filed a
complaint against the respondent No.01 herein before the Court of
learned JMFC, Durg, inter-alia, stating that the respondent No.01
herein/accused has firstly encroached upon her land illegally and,
thereafter, constructed a house on it and has also prepared a forged
sale agreement with regard to the said land. Thereafter, the learned
JMFC though firstly took cognizance of the matter, but after
conducting full-fledged trial acquitted the accused/respondent No.01
herein vide order dated 22.03.2023 on the ground that no charges
under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of IPC were found proved
against him. Against which, the applicant herein preferred appeal
before the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Durg, which was
also dismissed vide impugned order dated 26.04.2024. Feeling
aggrieved by the said orders, this revision has been filed before this
Court.
Page No.3 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
6.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that both the Courts
below
were
absolutely
unjustified
in
acquitting
the
accused/respondents for the aforesaid offences by recording findings
which are perverse and contrary to the record and, therefore, the
same are liable to be set aside. Thus, this revision be allowed.
7.
Learned counsel for the State supported the impugned orders
and prays for dismissal of this revision.
8.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record
with utmost circumspection.
9.
At the very outset, it would be profitable to notice relevant
decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907
Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1, whereby in
Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the scope of interference in an
order of acquittal is very limited and observed as under:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8
SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
legal position with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the
principles laid down by this Court governing the
scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal
filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the
accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar
1 2025 INSC 114
Page No.4 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
[Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal
position covering the field after considering various
earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 48283, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
in the following words : (Chandrappa case
[Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC
415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42)
‘42. From the above decisions, in our
considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an
order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and
an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as,
“substantial and compelling reasons”,
“good and sufficient grounds”, “very
strong
circumstances”,
“distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are
not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies
are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasise the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come
Page No.5 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however,must
bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption
of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are
possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court.’ ”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka
[H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC
581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised
the principles governing the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against
acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p.
584, para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an
appeal against acquittal, is entitled to
reappreciate the oral and documentary
evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an
appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating
the evidence, is required to consider whether
the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view which could have been taken on the
basis of the evidence on record;
Page No.6 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was
also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the
order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding
that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on
record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no
other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the
scope of interference by an appellate court for
reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the
trial court in favour of the accused has to be
exercised within the four corners of the following
principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
41.2.
That
the
same
is
based
on
a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence
on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused
is possible from the evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal
position that the interference with the finding of
acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be
warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same
is based on a misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views
are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt
of the accused is possible from the evidence available
on record.”
10.
In the case at hand, a careful perusal of the record would show
that that the learned trial Court after conducting full-fledged trial,
Page No.7 of 7
IN
CRR-1518-2025
came to the conclusion that though the complainant/applicant has
alleged that the accused has encroached upon her land illegally,
constructed a house on it and has also prepared a false sale-deed
with respect to the said land, but neither any document nor any
witness has been be led by her in support of her allegation.
Consequently, in absence of any evidence, the learned trial Court
acquitted the accused/respondent No.01 for the aforesaid offences,
which findings have also been affirmed by the learned appellate
Court vide impugned order dated 26.04.2024. Even otherwise, it is
settled that the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a
judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though
the view of the appellate Court may be the more probable one, and
unless the view taken by the trial Court is perverse or otherwise
unsustainable. The concurrent findings recorded by tbe two Courts
below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such, we do
not find any merit in this revision and same is liable to be dismissed.
11.
In view of aforesaid discussion, we do not find any good ground
to invoke our revisional jurisdiction against the impugned orders.
Accordingly, this revision is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No
cost.
sd/(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
s@if
sd/(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Judge
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