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NIRMALA
RAO
2026:CGHC:4098
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPT No. 171 of 2025
1 - Nairson Multiventures Private Limited Having Its Place Of Business At Na,
Shreeja Medical Store, Pragati Naka, Behind Pragati School, Ashok Nagar,
Gudhyari, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh-492006 Through Its Director Ankit
Singh, Aged About 42 Years, Son Of Shri Banbir Singh, R/o House No. 27/125, In
Front Of New Hanuman Mandir, New Shanti Nagar, Shankar Nagar, DistrictRaipur, Chhattisgarh-492007
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Commercial Tax-Gst Department,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Assistant Commissioner Of State Tax Raipur-7 Office Of The Joint
Commissioner Of State Tax Raipur Division-Ii, 3rd Floor, Shri Krishna Glory, Sai
Nagar,
Devendra
Nagar,
Raipur,
Chhattisgarh,
492001.
3 - Commissioner Of Commercial Tax-Gst Department Office Of The Commissioner
Of Commercial Tax- Gst Department, North Block, Sector-19, Atal Nagar, Nawa
Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s)
WPT No. 172 of 2025
1 - Jaibajrang Loha Private Limited Having Its Place Of Business At 275/125,
Opposite Shri Ranvir Shastri Bungalow, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492001 Through Its Director Savitri Singh, Aged About 71 Years, W/o Shri Banbir
Singh, R/o House No. 27/125, Near New Hanuman Mandir, New Shanti Nagar,
Ward No. 31, Shankar Nagar, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh - 492007
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Commercial Tax-Gst Department,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Assistant Commissioner Of State Tax Raipur-7 Office Of The Joint
Commissioner Of State Tax Raipur Division - Ii, 3rd Flor, Shri Krishna Glory, Sai
Nagar, Devendra Nagar Raipur, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, 492001
3 - Commissioner Of Commercial Tax - Gst Department Office Of The
Commissioner Of Commercial Tax - Gst Department, North Block, Sector-19, Atal
Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioners
For State
:
:
Shri Siddharth Dubey, Advocate.
Ms. Anuradha Jain, Dy.G.A. alongwith
Ms. Pallavi Das, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
23.01.2026
1.
In both the writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the showcause notices issued by respondent No.2/ Assistant Commissioner of
State Tax and the final orders with regard to cancellation of
registration.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would argue that the petitioners are
Private Limited Companies and have been assigned GSTIN Numbers
22AAICN4812A1Z3 & 22AABCJ9662P1Z1. He would submit that both
the companies are involved in the business of trading, sale and
purchase of steel products.
He would contend that show-cause
notices dated 19.9.2025 & 21.8.2025 were issued to the petitioners by
respondent No.2 for cancellation of registration under Rule 21(a) of the
Chhattisgarh Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (herein after also
referred SGST Rules, 2017). He would state that though seven days’
time was granted to the petitioners to file reply but date and time for
personal hearing were not specifically mentioned in the said showcause notices. He would submit that in WP(T) No. 171 of 2025, one of
the directors, namely Shri Ankit Singh was arrested on 20.8.2025 and
was released on bail on 17.10.2025 and in between, respondent No.2
passed the impugned orders and canceled the GST registration of
both the companies. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further
submit that in the show-cause notices issued on 19.10.2025 &
21.8.2025 there was no whisper with regard to retrospective
cancellation of the GST registration
but in the final order the
respondent No.2, canceled the GST registration of petitioners with
retrospective effect i.e. from the date of issuance of the show-cause
notices. He would submit that the final orders passed by respondent
No.2 traveled beyond the contents of show-cause notices, therefore,
the show-cause notices and the final orders are bad in law.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the
sufficient opportunity was not afforded to the petitioners to file reply as
no specific date and time was mentioned in the show-cause notices.
He would submit that according to Form GST REG-17, which is the
prescribed format for issuance of a show-cause notice for cancellation
of registration, it is duty of the concerned authority to afford an
opportunity of personal hearing specifying date and time. It is also
contended that the decision to cancel the GST registration was taken
on the foundation of physical verification but its report was not
uploaded on the common portal, which is a mandatory requirement
according to Rule 25 of the CGST Rules, 2017.
With regard to
alternative remedy, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit
that though there is an efficacious remedy available to the petitioners
to prefer an appeal against the order impugned but the Appellate
Authority has no power to remit back the matter to the Assessing
Authority. He would argue that where the principles of natural justice
are violated at the first stage, the right of appeal is not so much a true
right of appeal as a corrected initial hearing.
In support of his
submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Institute of Chattered
Accountants vs. L.K. Ratna and Others, reported in (1986) 4 SCC
537.
4.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would oppose
the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners.
They would
submit that seven working days time was granted to the petitioners to
file reply but they failed to do so. They would contend that during
physical verification declared place of business was not found and it
was discovered that the premises was a residential house.
5.
In the second case, there was a dispute with regard to execution of the
rent agreement as the property was sold two years back. They would
submit that there was no need to specify date and time in show cause
notices and sufficient time was granted to the petitioners. They would
submit that the petitioners never approached the authorities seeking
specific date and time for personal hearing. Ms. Anuradha Jain would
submit that only one of the directors was arrested and the others could
have challenged the show cause notice.
It is contended that the
decision was taken by respondent No.2 strictly in accordance with law.
It is also argued that there is efficacious alternative remedy to prefer
an appeal according to provisions of Section 107 of the CGST Act,
2017. They would submit that the petitioners also have the remedy to
prefer an application for revocation of cancellation of registration
before respondent No.2.
It is also argued that the writ petitions are
not maintainable. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Commissioner of Income
Tax and Others, vs. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, reported in (2014) 1
SCC 603. Reliance has also placed on the judgment of this Court in
the matter of M/s Shubham Sales Through Proprietor vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and Ors., in WPT No. 130 of 2025, wherein writ petition
challenging cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect
was dismissed and the petitioner was directed to prefer an appeal to
take recourse to law.
6.
In the matter of Viswaat Chemicals Ltd. And Another vs. Union of
India and Others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3355,
it is
held that the petitioner company failed to challenge the show-cause
notice at the earliest instance and filed writ petition after passing of
final order, which was held an attempt to circumvent the alternate
remedy and to take a chance to see whether any relief can be wriggled
out.
7.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents present on record.
8.
The petitioners have been assigned GSTIN numbers by the
department and were engaged in the business of sale and purchase of
steel products.
Show-cause notices were issued according to
provisions of Rule 21(a)1 of SGST Rules, 2017 on the ground that the
business was not being operated from declared place.
In WP(T)
No.172 of 2025 also the show-cause notice was issued under Rule
21(a) of the Rules, 2017.
9.
Perusal of show-cause notice dated 21.8.2025 would reveal that the
authority concerned has not specified date and time granting
opportunity to appear personally before the concerned authority rather
he was granted seven days’ time to file reply. The petitioner could not
file reply and finally his GST registration was canceled.
In both the
cases, the petitioners could not file reply and later on, final orders with
regard to cancellation of registration were passed. Rule 22(1) read
with Form GST REG-17 deals with show cause notice for cancellation
of registration. The Form GST REG-17 is reproduced herein below:
FORM GST REG-17
[See rule 22(1)]
Reference No. ………………………….
><Date>>
To
Registration Number (GSTIN/Unique ID)
(Name)
(Address)
SHOW CAUSE NOTICE FOR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION
Whereas on the basis of information which has come to my notice, it
appears that your registration is liable to be cancelled for the following
reasons:—
1.
2.
3.
….
□You are hereby directed to furnish a reply to this notice within
seven working days from the date of service of this notice.
□You are hereby directed to appear before the undersigned on
DD/MM/YYYY at HH/MM.
If you fail to furnish a reply within the stipulated date or fail to appear
for personal hearing on the appointed date and time, the case will be
decided ex parte on the basis of available records and on merits.
Place: ……………….
Date: ……………….
Signature
<Name of the Officer>
Designation
Jurisdiction
[Note.—Your registration
…………….. (date).]
10.
stands
suspended
with
effect
from
A bare reading of above quoted provision would make it clear that the
authority concern has to assign reasons for cancellation of registration.
Further, the authority has to grant seven working days time to file a
reply to show-cause and at the same time, is under obligation to afford
an opportunity of personal hearing by specifying date and time. In the
show-cause notices issued by respondent No.2 dated 19.10.2025 and
21.8.2025, though seven days’ time was granted to file reply but date
and time granting opportunity of personal hearing was not specified
and thus, show-cause notices were issued in contravention to the
provisions of REG-17.
11.
According to Rule 25 of Rules, 2017, it is necessary to upload the
physical verification report alongwith other documents including
photographs on the common portal within a period of 15 working days
following the date of such verification.
12.
Rule 25 is reproduced herein below:
“25. Physical verification of business premises in certain
cases.—Where the proper officer is satisfied that the physical
verification of the place of business of a person is required
due to failure of Aadhaar authentication [or due to not opting
for Aadhaar authentication] before the grant of registration, or
due to any other reason after the grant of registration, he may
get such verification of the place of business, in the presence
of the said person, done and the verification report along with
the other documents, including photographs, shall be
uploaded in FORM GST REG-30 on the common portal within
a period of fifteen working days following the date of such
verification.]”
In both the cases, the physical verification was carried out on
21.8.2025 and 19.8.2025, however, the documents were not uploaded
till passing of final orders. Therefore the show cause notice and finnal
orders are in contrary to provisions of Rul1 25 of Rules, 2017.
13.
With regard to alternative remedy as argued by the respondents, it is
true that there is efficacious statutory remedy available in favour of the
petitioners to prefer an appeal but the petitioners have been denied
their right to file a response to the show-cause notice and to submit
relevant documents before the Assessing Authority.
Further, the
Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to remit back the matter to the
Assessing Authority as provided under Section 107(11) of CGST Act,
2017.
14.
In the matter of L.K. Ratna (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
categorically held that if natural justice is violated at the first stage, the
right of appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a corrected
initial hearing, instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the procedure is
reduced to unfair trial followed by fair trial. The relevant para 17 is
reproduced herein below:
“17. It is then urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the
provision of an appeal under Section 22-A of the Act is a
complete safeguard against any insufficiency in the original
proceeding before the Council, and it is not mandatory that the
member should be heard by the Council before it proceeds to
record its finding. Section 22-A of the Act entitles a member to
prefer an appeal to the High Court against an order of the
Council imposing a penalty under Section 21(4) of the Act. It is
pointed out that no limitation has been imposed on the scope of
the appeal, and that an appellant is entitled to urge before the
High Court every ground which was available to him before the
Council. Any insufficiency, it is said, can be cured by resort to
such appeal. Learned counsel apparently has in mind the view
taken in some cases that an appeal provides an adequate
remedy for a defect in procedure during the original proceeding.
Some of those cases are mentioned in Sir William Wades
erudite and classic work on "Administrative Law". But as that
learned author observes, "in principle there ought to be an
observance of natural justice equally at both stages", and
If natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of
appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a
corrected initial hearing: instead of fair trial followed by
appeal, the procedure is reduced to unfair trial followed
by fair trial.
And he makes reference to the observations of Megarry J. in
Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, [1971] 1 Ch.
Treating with another aspect of the point, that learned Judge
said:
"If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural
justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of
natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result of
depriving the member of his right of appeal from the
expelling body. If the rules and the law combine to give
the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal,
why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with
an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is
treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being
stripped of his right to appeal to another body from the
effective decision to expel him. I cannot think that natural
justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial,
though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless
have the effect of depriving the member of his right of
appeal
when
a
valid
decision
to
expel
him
is
subsequently made. Such a deprivation would be a
powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere
nullity; and it is no mere triviality that might be justified on
the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect
justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a
failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured
by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body."
The view taken by Megarry, J. was followed by the Ontario High
Court in Canada in Re Cardinal and Board of Commissioners of
Police of City of Cornwall, [1974] 42 D.L.R. (3d) 323. The
Supreme Court of New Zealand was similarly inclined in Wislang
v. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R.
29 and so was the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reid v.
Rowley, [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 472.”
15.
In the matter of Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra), cited by Ms. Anuradha
Jain, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that non-entertainment of
petition under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is
further held that it is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion rather than a rule of law.
Para 11 is reproduced herein
below:
“11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice
the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law
that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by
the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is
available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a
rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of
law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court
to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an
alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not
interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the High
Court without availing the same unless he has made out an
exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist
sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226. (See: State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh,
AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of
Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; State of H.P. vs. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499).”
16.
Thus, there is no bar to entertain a writ petition where there is violation
of principle of natural justice or the order passed by the authority
concerned is ultra vires as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation Officercum-Assessing Authority and Others, reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 95. Para 6 is reproduced herein below:
“6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15
of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool
Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and
Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof
a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition
despite the party approaching it not having availed the
alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read
as under:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of
the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural
justice;
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.”
17.
In the matter of Viswaat Chemicals Limited (supra), the High Court of
Bombay dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner
did not challenge the show-cause notice though a detailed reply was
filed and later on, they challenged the final order, therefore, it was held
that it was an attempt to circumvent the alternate remedy and to take a
chance to see whether any relief can be wriggled out.
18.
In the present case, show-cause notices were issued to the petitioners
in contravention to the provisions of Rule 25 and REG-17 of CGST
Rules, 2017 and in between, one of the directors of the company was
arrested and reply could not be filed by the petitioners. Further
opportunity of personal hearing was also not afforded. Thus, the facts
of these cases are distinguishable from the facts of cited case.
19.
In the matter of M/s Shubham Sales (supra), the provisions of Rule 25
and REG-17 of CGST Rules, 2017 were not considered and the
petition was dismissed solely on the ground that an efficacious
alternative remedy is available.
20.
In the result, both the petitions are allowed. Show cause notices and
the subsequent final orders passed by respondent No.2 are hereby
quashed.
Respondent No.2 shall be at liberty to initiate fresh
proceedings against the petitioners strictly in accordance with REG-17,
Rule 25 of CGST Rules, 2017.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi
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