The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
15. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the expression sufficient cause as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides are in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there are several laches on the part of the petitioners and there is clear negligence and inaction in pursuing the matter. In such circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned liberally. The application is devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.
16. In the result, I.A.No. 1 of 2018 is dismissed. Consequently, S.A.No. 1503 of 2018 stands rejected. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand dismissed in consequence. No costs. 12th March, 2026. Note: L.R. copy to be marked. B/O
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
I.A.No. 1 OF 2018
IN/AND
SECOND APPEAL No. 1503 OF 2018
Between:
N.Srinivasa Rao,
S/o late N.Chandrasekhar Rao,
Hindu, 54 years, Advocate,
R/o 281, New Street, Tirupati,
Chittoor District, and another
AND
P.Chandrasekharaiah (Died),
S/o C.Krishnaiah, and others
Date of Order Pronounced
:
…
Petitioners/Appellants
…
Respondents/Respondents
12-03-2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
1.
2.
3.
Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the order?
Yes/No
Whether the copy of order may
be marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
Yes/No
Whether His Lordship wishes to see the
fair copy of the order?
Yes/No
_________________________
V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
+I.A.No. 1 OF 2018
IN/AND
SECOND APPEAL No. 1503 OF 2018
%Dated: 12-03-2026
#N.Srinivasa Rao,
S/o late N.Chandrasekhar Rao,
Hindu, 54 years, Advocate,
R/o 281, New Street, Tirupati,
Chittoor District, and another
…
Petitioners/Appellants
…
Respondents/Respondents
VERSUS
$P.Chandrasekharaiah (Died),
S/o C.Krishnaiah, and others
!Counsel for the petitioners
:
Sri Srinivasulu Kurra
^Counsel for respondent No. 5
:
Sri K.Chenna Reddy
^Counsel for respondent No. 6
:
Sri Satish Sandu
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1.
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339
2.
(2025) 1 SCC 625
COMMON JUDGMENT:
The petitioners/appellants are the appellants in A.S.No. 74 of 2011 on
the file of the Court of learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati (for short,
'the first appellate Court') and they filed execution application in E.A.No. 184
of 2009 in E.P.No. 150 of 2005 in O.S.No. 155 of 1980 on the file of the Court
of learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati (for short, 'the executing
Court').
After inquiry, the executing Court dismissed the said execution
application, against which appeal suit in A.S.No. 74 of 2011 was preferred
before the first appellate Court and the said appeal suit was also dismissed by
confirming the decree and judgment passed by the executing Court, against
which the instant second appeal in S.A.No. 1503 of 2018 has been filed
before this Court with a delay of 277 days and that the petitioners filed this
application to condone the delay of 277 days in filing the second appeal.
2.
The case of the petitioners as per the recitals of affidavit of petitioner
No. 1, in brief, is as follows:
The petitioner pleaded that immediately on obtaining copies of decree
and judgment, his advocate at Tirupati forwarded the same to one S.A.Chari,
advocate in Hyderabad to prefer appeal but unfortunately the said S.A.Chari
died due to cardiac arrest before its filing and it was not aware to the
petitioners till recently when it was informed that the advocate in Hyderabad
was no more and then, the petitioners went to Hyderabad and took the case
file back for engaging another advocate. Thus, there is delay in preferring the
present second appeal.
3.
Respondent No. 5 filed counter affidavit. The brief averments are as
follows:
After examining the documents filed and evidence recorded, the
executing Court had given detailed and reasoned findings holding that E.A.No.
184 of 2009 was not maintainable. In the appeal suit also, the first appellate
Court concurred with the findings of the executing Court holding that the
petitioners' alleged title or interest does not require consideration since the
properties are entirely different.
The petitioners seek condonation of an
inordinate and unexplained delay of 277 days beyond the statutory period of
90 days prescribed for filing the second appeal. Such delay is neither bona
fide nor supported by any convincing or acceptable explanation.
The
explanation offered by the petitioners that he entrusted the papers to one
S.A.Chari, advocate in Hyderabad, and that he did not verify whether the
second appeal has been filed or not for nearly more than one year is false,
improbable and wholly unacceptable, particularly in view of the admitted fact
that petitioner No. 1 himself is a practicing advocate at Tirupati, fully
conversant with the law of limitation, procedural requirements and statutory
timelines.
The further claim that the petitioners came to know about the
demise of the said advocate only through third parties is equally unbelievable.
Being a practicing advocate, petitioner No. 1 was expected to exercise due
diligence, reasonable care and professional responsibility, especially in
respect of his personal litigation. His complete inaction for more than one
year clearly amounts to gross negligence and lack of bona fides. Ignorance of
law is no excuse, more so when the litigant himself is a member of the legal
profession. The petitioners have sufficient opportunity, knowledge and means
to inquire about the filing of the appeal but failed to do so and is therefore not
entitled to any discretionary relief.
4.
Respondent No. 6 filed counter affidavit inter alia contending that the
petitioners failed to establish sufficient cause, absence of negligence or bona
fides which are mandatory requirements for condonation of delay and granting
condonation in such circumstances would cause serious prejudice to the
respondents and defeat the very object of the law of limitation. Respondent
No. 6 further pleaded that the delay petition filed by the petitioners is a clear
abuse of process of law, filed only to protract the litigation and unsettle the
final and concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below.
5.
Heard Sri Kurra Srinivasulu, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Sri K.Chenna Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No. 5, and Sri Satish Sandu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6.
6.
Now, the point that arises for consideration is
"Whether the petitioners have shown any sufficient cause to condone
the delay of 277 days in filing the second appeal?"
7.
The undisputed facts are that the petitioners herein are the petitioners in
E.A.No. 184 of 2009 in E.P.No. 150 of 2005 in O.S.No. 155 of 1980 on the file
of the executing Court. The petitioners filed E.A.No. 184 of 2009 under Order
XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure to inquire into their right, title or
interest over the petition schedule property and to pass a decree in their
favour. The said E.A.No. 184 of 2009 was dismissed, on contest by both the
parties, by the executing Court on 15-03-2011 which was confirmed by the
first appellate Court by decree and judgment dated 11-09-2017 on contest by
both the parties. The petitioners herein filed the present second appeal along
with I.A.No. 1 of 2018 to condone the delay of 277 days i.e. more than 9
months in filing the present second appeal.
8.
The petitioners contended that immediately on obtaining the copies of
decree and judgment, their advocate at Tirupati forwarded the same to one Sri
S.A.Chari, advocate in Hyderabad, to prefer an appeal. As seen from the
material on record, the copy application, for obtaining certified copies of
decree and judgment in A.S.No. 74 of 2011, was filed on 12-09-2017, it was
returned on 09-10-2017 and it was represented by the petitioners on
01-12-202 and the copies were delivered on 06-12-2017. There is no whisper
in the affidavit of the petitioners with regard to the date when they forwarded
the copies of decree and judgment to the advocate at Hyderabad to prefer an
appeal. There is also no whisper in the affidavit of the petitioners with regard
to the date when the advocate in Hyderabad has died. There is no mention in
the affidavit of the petitioners with regard to the date or month or at least
through whom the petitioners came to know about the death of the advocate
in Hyderabad.
9.
As stated supra, the first appellate Court delivered judgment on
11-09-2017.
The petitioners filed copy application on 12-09-2017, it was
returned on 09-10-2017 and it was represented by the petitioners on
01-12-2017 and obtained certified copies on 06-12-2017 but the instant
second appeal was filed on 20-09-2018. The petitioners are not illiterates.
Petitioner No. 1 is an advocate, well versed with legal knowledge, and
petitioner No. 2 is none other than younger brother of petitioner No. 1. The
material on record including the affidavit of petitioner No. 1 would reveal that
petitioner No. 1 is a practicing advocate at Tirupati. It is brought to the notice
of this Court by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that petitioner
No. 1 herein is practicing as an advocate having considerable practice of 20
years standing in Tirupati and the same is not denied by the petitioners. It is
therefore evident that petitioner No. 1 is fully conversant with the law of
limitation, procedural requirements and the statutory time limit to file a second
appeal.
10.
It is contended by the petitioners that because of communication gap,
they were under the impression that the appeal was filed within time.
As
noticed supra, petitioner No. 1 herein is a practicing advocate at Tirupati and
he is not an illiterate and petitioner No. 1 is fully conversant with the law of
limitation, procedural requirements and the statutory time limit for filing the
second appeal. Being a practicing advocate, petitioner No. 1 was expected to
exercise due diligence, reasonable care and professional responsibility,
especially in respect of his personal litigation.
Therefore, the complete
inaction on the part of the petitioners is nothing but a gross negligence.
11.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Inder Singh Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh1. The facts in the aforesaid case law are that a suit was
filed before the trial Court by the appellants seeking the relief of declaration of
title and permanent injunction in respect of immovable property. After full1
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339
fledged trial, the said suit was dismissed by the trial Court and thereupon, the
appellants filed a civil appeal before learned Additional District Court and the
same was allowed by judgment dated 01-10-2015 by setting aside the
judgment of the trial Court dated 16-08-2013. The respondent therein filed a
review petition viz., Review Petition No. 92 of 2018 before the first appellate
Court which was dismissed on the ground of delay in filing review petition.
The facts in the present case are that the petitioners filed E.A.No. 184 of 2009
before the executing Court and after full-fledged inquiry, the same was
dismissed on merits by the executing Court and the same was confirmed by
the first appellate Court and the instant second appeal has been filed by the
petitioners with a delay of 277 days. As noticed supra, petitioner No. 1 herein
is not an illiterate and he is a practicing advocate at Tirupati. Therefore, the
facts and circumstances in the aforesaid case law relied upon by learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners are not at all applicable to the facts and
circumstances in the present case. In the case at hand, petitioner No. 1 is not
an illiterate and he is a legal practitioner having considerable practice at
Tirupati and he is well conversant with legal knowledge, law of limitation,
procedural requirements and the statutory time limit for filing the second
appeal.
12.
It is well settled that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also
equally well settled that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the
statute as the Courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
13.
In Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. and others Vs. Special
Deputy Collector (L.A.)2, the Apex Court held as follows:
"26.
On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that
(2025) 1 SCC 625
(i)
Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii)
A right or the remedy that has not been exercise or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist
after a fixed period of time;
(iii)
The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv)
In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section
3 of the Limitation Act;
(v)
Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone
the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various
factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence
and want of due diligence;
(vi)
Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same
benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause sown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii)
Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have
been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory
provision."
14.
In the case at hand, the second appeal has been filed with a delay of
277 days. The law on this issue is very much clear that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case,
or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by the Apex Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
15.
Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law and
considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of
the considered view that the expression sufficient cause as occurring in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides are in favour of the petitioner. In the
present case, there are several laches on the part of the petitioners and there
is clear negligence and inaction in pursuing the matter.
In such
circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned liberally. The application is
devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.
16.
In the result, I.A.No. 1 of 2018 is dismissed. Consequently, S.A.No.
1503 of 2018 stands rejected. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any,
shall stand dismissed in consequence. No costs.
12th March, 2026.
Note: L.R. copy to be marked.
B/O
JSK
__________________________
V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
I.A.No. 1 OF 2018
IN/AND
S.A.No. 1503 OF 2018
12th March, 2026
(JSK)
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