The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. For the foregoing discussion, the instant bail petition is dismissed as being not maintainable. However, the petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal in terms of provisions of Section 14-A of the Act against the order dated
16. 12.2025 of the learned Special Court before this Court if she so chooses. At the same time, in view of ensuing winter vacations, the petitioner in the ends of justice is being insulated from her arrest in the case FIR in question for a period of 16 days from the date the order is uploaded within which period she shall prefer the requisite appeal if she so requires. If the petitioner chooses to file an appeal within the above time, the special protection order shall be substituted by the order passed in such appeal. However, if the petitioner does not prefer an appeal within the period allowed, the special protection shall automatically stand vacated without further reference to the Court.
17. Disposed of. (Mohd. Yousuf Wani) Judge Jammu
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Sr. No. 85
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Bail App No.371/2025
…..Petitioner(s)
Mussarat Naz
Through: Mr. Sunil Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Paras Gupta, Advocate
Vs
Union Territory of J&K and others
.…. Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Pawan Dev Singh, Dy. AG for R-1.
Mr. Irfan Khan, Advocate with
Mr. Mohd. Azam, Advocate for R-2 & 3.
Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD. YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
ORDER
27.12.2025
1.
Heard further arguments on both the sides.
2.
Through the medium of the instant bail application having been filed in
terms of the provisions of Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’ for short), pre-arrest bail on
behalf of the petitioner in case FIR bearing No.329/2025 dated 22.11.2025
registered with the Police Station, Bahu Fort, Jammu under Sections143(5)(7),
304, 127(2), 115(2), 352, 3(5) BNS 3(r)(s)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Act’ for short) has been sought on the grounds inter alia that she is a law
abiding and peace loving citizen of the country presently residing at Sunjawan
Bathindi Jammu and has not committed the alleged offences. That she has been
implicated in the case FIR in question on the basis of a false and frivolous
complaint of the respondent No.2. That the respondent No.2 being the alleged
Bail App No.371/2025
complainant in the case FIR has actually filed the false and frivolous complaint
resulting in the registration of the case FIR in question with a view to hide his
own misdeeds as he trespassed into the house of the applicant and assaulted her.
That initially, the FIR was registered by the respondent No.1 under Sections
304(2), 115(2), 126(2), 352 and 3(5) of the BNS whereafter the petitioner along
with her husband sought interim anticipatory bail order dated 24.11.2025 in their
favour from the Court of learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. That
however, the respondent No.1 with the sole intention to defeat the said bail
order, added Section 143(4)(5)(7) BNS relating to Trafficking of Persons and
arrested her husband namely, Rifat Hussain Malik. That pursuant to the arrest of
her husband, the anticipatory bail application was withdrawn from the Court of
learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. That thereafter, the Court of
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu vide his order dated 02.12.2025
passed on the application of her husband granted interim bail in his favour after
perusing the objections of the respondents as well as the CD file. That the
respondent No.1 again added the offences under Section 3(r)(s)(u) of the Act
regardless of the fact that no such allegation was reflected in the basic
complaint. That she approached the Court of learned Principal Sessions Judge,
Jammu (Special Court under the Act) seeking pre-arrest bail which however
was declined vide order dated 16.12.2025 of the said Court. That actually on
22.11.2025 at around 7:00 pm the respondent No.2 with criminal intention and
for oblique motive trespassed into the house of the petitioner in her absence.
That when she reached home, the respondent No.2 i.e. the alleged complainant
started abusing and assaulting her. That she approached the police concerned
with her grievance against the respondent No.2 but no action was taken by the
Bail App No.371/2025
police concerned. That the special offences came to be added in the case FIR
just to prevent her as well as her husband from obtaining the bail from the Court
of the law. That she being a teacher has not committed the alleged offences.
That she is presumed to be innocent under law and the burden of proving her
guilt lies on the prosecution. That she is deeply rooted in the society being a
teacher and as such, she shall be highly disreputed in the society in case of her
arrest on false and frivolous allegations. That she shall abide by any conditions
that may be imposed by this Court. That there is no question of her misusing the
concession of her bail by her non-cooperation during investigation. That she has
no criminal antecedents and has been falsely implicated in the case FIR.
3.
The respondents 2 and 3 including the complainant filed their detailed
objections in respect of the bail petition. They have resisted the bail application
on the grounds that the petitioner is involved in the commission of heinous non
bailable offences, who does not deserve any concession of bail. That two minor
daughters of the respondent No.3-Mohd. Shafi were taken by the petitioner and
her husband through the hands of the Nambardar of the village Mori Banjor
Tehsil Bounjwah, District Kisthwar on the pretext of providing them better
education. That however, instead of enrolling the minors at Bounjwah as
assured, she and her husband clandestinely shifted the minor girls to their home
at Jammu without the consent or information of their parents. That whenever the
respondent No.3 i.e. father of the minor girls used to talk the husband of the
petitioner regarding the welfare of her minor daughters, he was always being
asked that they are fine and studying so he should not call unnecessarily. That
none of the minor girls was admitted to any school at Kishtwar or at Jammu as
enquired by the police during the investigation of the case. That it has surfaced
Bail App No.371/2025
during investigation of the case that the minor girls of the respondent No.3 were
brought with fraudulent intention and were illegally detained for the purpose of
extracting household labour especially doing of manual scavenging. That during
the entire period, the petitioner and her husband intentionally and willfully
prevented the minor daughters of the respondent No.3 from communicating with
him or any other family member. That one day prior to the incident, the elder
minor daughter of the respondent No.3 managed to contact her father from an
unknown mobile number, which later transpired to belong to a labourer working
at the residence of the petitioner. That during the said call, the minor narrated
the entire ordeal and disclosed the inhuman treatment meted out to her and her
sister. That alarmed by the said disclosure, the respondent No.3 immediately
rushed to Jammu on 22.11.2025 to take his daughters back and reached the
petitioner’s house with the assistance of respondent No.2___an auto driver. That
upon reaching the spot, it was found that the house was locked from the outside
and only the two minor daughters were confined inside. That when the
respondent No.3 contacted Rifat Hussain____the husband of the petitioner, he
falsely claimed that he was a Kishtwar and the minors were also with him there.
That astonishingly, the petitioner arrived at the spot shortly and in a fit of rage
started physically assaulting the respondent No.2 while uttering insulting and
humiliating words i.e. ‘Tu Is Ko Yahan Kyon Laya’ . That minutes thereafter
Rifat Hussain, husband of the petitioner also arrived along with some unknown
persons and collectively assaulted and abused the respondent No.3 in filthy,
derogatory and caste-based language humiliating him in public view. That the
entire incident occurred on the public road outside the petitioner’s residence.
That during that scuffle some army personnel from Sunjawan Military Station
Bail App No.371/2025
located merely a few meters away, intervened and restrained the petitioner and
her husband from further assaulting the private respondents. That during
investigation it came to be unequivocally revealed that both the minor daughters
of the respondent No.3 were subjected to brutal physical torture and continuous
abuse. That the acts committed by the petitioner and her husband, who is coaccused in the case, are grave, heinous and have shaken the conscience of the
society in general and the SC/ST category in particular.
4.
The learned counsel for the petitioner during his arguments submitted that
petitioner being a lady and a teacher deserves to be granted the concession of
pre-arrest bail in the case FIR as she is innocent and has not committed the
alleged offences. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that it
is the respondent No.2 some auto driver, who actually committed the offences of
house trespassed and criminal intimidation as regards, the petitioner and her
husband. That the petitioner also approached the concerned police station with
her grievance but she was turned a deaf ear. That the commission of the alleged
offence under Section 3(r)(s)(u) of the Act is not attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the prosecution case itself because firstly it is revealed from
the basic complaint filed by the respondent No.2 first in point of time with the
police station concerned that the alleged derogatory words were uttered by the
husband of the petitioner and that too inside the house premises and not in the
public view. He contended that the provisions of Section 18 of the Act are not
attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case as no offence at all under the
Act prima facie appears to have been committed by the petitioner or even by her
husband. The learned senior counsel further contended that since the
commission of the alleged offence under Section 3(r)(s)(u) of the Act does not
Bail App No.371/2025
seem prima facie committed by the petitioner in the light of the case of the
complainant/respondent No.2 himself, as such, the petitioner is not needed to
file an appeal before this Court in terms of provisions of Section 14-A of the
Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that even if for arguments sake, the
petitioner was needed to prefer an appeal against the order of the rejection of
bail dated 16.12.2025 of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Jammu in terms
of Section 14-A of the Act yet this Court is within its competence to treat the
present application as an appeal. He submitted that no format is provided under
the Act for preferring an appeal.
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments placed
reliance on the authoritiave judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
cited as ‘Kiran Vs. Raj Kumar Jivraj Jain & Anr.’ 2025 Live Law (SC) 869 and
‘M/S Pepsi Foods Limited Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate’, 1998 AIR SC 128.
6.
Per contra, the learned counsels for the respondents vehemently
contended that the present bail application is not maintainable in view of the
provisions of Section 14-A read with Section 18 of the Act. They contended that
the petitioner had earlier approached the Special Court under the Act with an
application for grant of anticipatory bail in her favour which came to be
dismissed vide order dated 16.12.2025 of the said Court. That as per the
provisions of Section 14-A of the Act, the petitioner was required to prefer an
appeal to this Court against the order of the learned Special Court dated
16.12.2025. That petitioner instead has preferred a successive bail petition under
the same provisions of Section 482 BNSS which is not maintainable. The
learned counsel also contended that the Section 18 of the Act bars grant of
anticipatory in the offences under the Act.
7.
Bail App No.371/2025
The learned counsels in support of their contentions placed reliance on the
judgments of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh respectively cited as ‘Sunil Dutt Sharma Vs.
State of U.P. & Anr.’ 438 CR.P.C. No.9396 of 2022 decided on 30.09.2022 and
‘Sukhdeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab’ CRM-M No.27873/2022 decided on
01.07.2022.
8.
Since, the learned counsels for the respondents have resisted the instant
bail petition on the legal ground of being not maintainable in its present form as
such, this Court is required to address the said issue in the first instance.
9.
Admittedly, the provisions of Section 18 of the Act bar the grant of
anticipatory bail to any person accused of having committed an offence under
the Act. However, this Court is in full agreement with the contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the bar under Section 18 of
the Act which excludes the application of Section 438 Cr.P.C. corresponding to
Section 482 BNSS is not absolute. Admittedly, court is required to verify the
complainants averments and determine if a prima facie case is established. This
Court is also in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that for an alleged act of a person to constitute the offence’s under
Section 3(r)(s) of the Act there should be intentional insult or intimidation or
abuse uttered to a member of a Scheduled castes or Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also laid down the same
proposition of the law in its judgment citied as ‘Kiran Vs. Raj Kumar Jivraj Jain
& Anr.’ 2025 Live Law (SC) 869 relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner.
10.
Bail App No.371/2025
The learned counsel for the petitioner during his arguments while placing
reliance on the authoritative judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
citied as ‘M/S Pepsi Foods Limited Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate’, 1998 AIR
SC 128 contended that nomenclature under which a petition is filed is not quite
relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which
otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which
procedure is mandatory.
11.
On the other side, it has also been held by the Hon’ble High Courts of
Allahabad and Punjab and Haryana in the judgments hereinbefore referred to
that order granting or rejecting the anticipatory bail under the provisions of the
Act shall be amenable to appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
14-A of the Act and not under Section 438 Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 482
BNSS.
12.
It is profitable to reproduce the provisions of Sections 14-A and 18 of the
Act for the sake of convenience:“14-A. Appeals___(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 92 of 1974) , an
appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not
being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an
Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts
and on law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(3) of
Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order
of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting
or refusing bail.
Bail App No.371/2025
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being inforce, every appeal under this section shall
be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of
the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after
the expirty of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within the period of ninety days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the
expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days.
(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far
as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months
from the date of admission of the appeal].
18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons
committing an offence under the Act. Nothing in section
438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving
the arrest of any person on an accusation of having
committed an offence under this Act.”
13.
The provisions contained under the Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 providing for bar of
anticipatory bail in respect to the apprehended arrest of a person accused of
commission of offences under the Act and under Section 14-A of the Act
regarding filing of an appeal to this Court against an order of the Special Court
granting or refusing bail, are intended to uphold the Act’s objective of protecting
vulnerable SC/ST communities and ensuring social justice.
14.
Although a Special Court can consider the grant of anticipatory bail
to a person accused of commission of the offences under the SC/ST Act if
prima facie ground is made out for presuming that he or she has not
Bail App No.371/2025
committed such offences yet a person aggrieved of the finding of the Special
Court by way of grant or refusal of such pre-arrest bail concession cannot
file a successive application before this Court in terms of the similar
provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 482 BNSS but
has necessarily to prefer an appeal to the High Court if he or she so chooses.
The filling of an appeal is mandatory as per provisions of the Section 14-A
of the Act.
15.
This Court in the facts and circumstances of the instant case
involving the applicability of a special legislation i.e. Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not convinced to
agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that his
application may be treated as an appeal. By filing a memorandum of appeal
an appellant assails the finding of a Court below on some facto legal
grounds but in a successive application the prayer is made for grant of
relief without assailing the findings and appreciations of the Court below.
Special procedures are often provided in sensitive matters for upholding the
aim and objective of any special legislation. Treating the successive bail
petition of the petitioner as an appeal against the order of the Special Court
dated 16.12.2025 will amount to overriding the special legislation.
16.
For the foregoing discussion, the instant bail petition is dismissed as being
not maintainable. However, the petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal in
terms of provisions of Section 14-A of the Act against the order dated
16.12.2025 of the learned Special Court before this Court if she so chooses. At
the same time, in view of ensuing winter vacations, the petitioner in the ends of
justice is being insulated from her arrest in the case FIR in question for a period
Bail App No.371/2025
of 16 days from the date the order is uploaded within which period she shall
prefer the requisite appeal if she so requires. If the petitioner chooses to file an
appeal within the above time, the special protection order shall be substituted by
the order passed in such appeal. However, if the petitioner does not prefer an
appeal within the period allowed, the special protection shall automatically stand
vacated without further reference to the Court.
17.
Disposed of.
(Mohd. Yousuf Wani)
Judge
Jammu
27.12.2025
Shammi
Whether the order is speaking:
Whether the order is reportable:
SHAMMI KUMAR
2025.12.29 19:49
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Yes
Yes
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review