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2026:CGHC:6453-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 108 of 2026
Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (Original
Respondent No. 2 In Wps No. 4546 Of 2019)
... Appellant
versus
1 - Dushyant Singh S/o Late Mahesh Singh Aged About 46 Years Working As
Pump Operator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o Gondpara Bilaspur,
District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Petitioner No. 1 In Wps No. 4546 Of
2019)
2 - Mahesh Soni S/o Late Gopi Soni Aged About 42 Years Working As Pump
Operator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o Gondpara Bilaspur, DistrictBilaspur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Petitioner No. 2 In Wps No. 4546 Of 2019)
3 - Dharmendra Dubey S/o Late Ganesh Dubey Aged About 47 Years
Working As Helper, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o Gondpara Bilaspur,
District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Petitioner No. 3 In Wps No. 4546 Of
2019)
4 - Ajay Soni S/o Late Jainarayan Soni Aged About 44 Years Working As
VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2026.02.07
11:39:08 +0530
Pump Operator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o Gondpara Bilaspur,
District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Petitioner No. 4 In Wps No. 4546 Of
2019)
5 - Laxmi Narayan S/o Late Dayaram Kaushik Aged About 49 Years Working
As Kuli, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, R/o Salampur, Bilaspur, DistrictBilaspur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Petitioner No. 5 In Wps No. 4546 Of 2019)
6 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Urban Administration And
Development Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar,
Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.(Original Respondent No.1, In Wps
Of
2019)
7 - Director Office Of Directorate, Urban Administration And Development
Department, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh (Original Respondent No. 3, In Wps 4546 Of 2019)
8 - Joint Director, Office Of Directorate, Urban Administration And
Development Department, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar Raipur, District
Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Original Respondent No. 4, In Wps 4546 Of 2019)
9 - Joint Director, Regional Office, Urban Administration And Development
Department, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Original Respondent
No. 5, In Wps 4546 Of 2019)
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
:
Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Advocate
For Respondents No. 1 to 5
:
Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate
For Respondents/State
:
Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
05/02/2026
1.
Heard Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents No. 1 to 5 and Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned
Deputy Advocate General for the State on I.A. No. 1, which is an
application for condonation of delay of 767 days in preferring the
instant appeal.
2.
The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated
21.08.2023, passed by learned Single Judge, in WPS No. 4546 of
2019 (Dushyant Singh and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others),
by which the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition
filed by the writ petitioners with the following observations:“5. In view of the above submission, considering
the facts and circumstances and also considering
that the case of other petitioners have been
considered and granted benefit of regularization
and the petitioners rights have been curtailed
therefore this Court is of the opinion that the
petitioners are also entitled for benefit of
regularization. The impugned order therefore, is
set aside and the respondent authorities shall
consider
the
case
of
the
petitioners
in
consonance with the case of the other petitioners
namely Shiv Gupta, Dilip Yadav, Mahboob Khan
and Prem Sonwani, within a period of eight
weeks from the date of production of copy of this
order.
6. With the above observation, the petition stands
disposed of.”
3.
On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the
appellant, as to why he has approached this Court against the
impugned order dated 21.08.2023, after an inordinate delay of 767
days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent
reason for delay in filing the writ appeal. He would submit that the
delay in filing the present writ appeal is neither intentional nor
deliberate, but has occurred due to bona fide administrative and
procedural reasons beyond the control of the appellant, including late
communication of the impugned order, constitution of a committee for
compliance, seeking and receipt of legal opinion from the Office, and
obtaining requisite sanction to file the appeal, all of which consumed
considerable time in the normal course of official functioning; it is
further submitted that the appellant has a strong and arguable case on
merits and no prejudice would be caused to the respondents, if the
delay is condoned, whereas grave and irreparable loss would be
caused to the appellant, if the appeal is dismissed on the ground of
limitation alone, and therefore, in the interest of justice, equity and fair
play, the delay deserves to be condoned.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that
the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no
cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches
application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not
liable to be entertained.
5.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant writ appeal.
6.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is
whether the delay of about 767 days in preferring the present writ
appeal deserves to be condoned or not.
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as
follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the Court within limitation. In
Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC
Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect the
rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its
rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference
was also made to the decision of this Court in
Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his
part
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay
by
imposing
any
condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the
court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the
statutory
provisions
tantamounts
to
and
showing
it
utter
disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously
based
on
facts
and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC
262,
wherein,
one
of
us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue,
it was in unequivocal terms observed by
this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances,
we made it very clear that we are not
going to look into the merits of the
matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of
such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a
litigant is a private party or a State or
Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the
lapse of the time prescribed under
the relevant provisions of the law,
then he cannot turn around and say
that no prejudice would be caused to
either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981.
We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would
be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and
158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole
of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a
relevant matter which the court must
take
into
consideration
while
considering whether the delay should
be condoned or not. From the tenor
of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting
the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost
his
right
to
have
the
matter
considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead
that the substantial justice deserves
to be preferred as against the
technical
considerations.
While
considering the plea for condonation
of delay, the court must not start with
the merits of the main matter. The
court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation
offered
by
the
party
seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and
the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the
question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles
of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over
the head of the respondent for
indefinite
period
of
time
to
be
determined at the whims and fancies
of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the
High Court committed no error much
less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the
High
Court
was
exercising
its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity.
Rendering
substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants
have failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter
and
this
vital
test
for
condoning the delay is not satisfied
in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly
refused
to
condone
the
delay
and
dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily,
no
sufficient
cause
was
shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was
put forth by
the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude
on the part of the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government adopts
systematic approach in handling the legal issues
and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the part of
the
officials
in
merely
communicating
the
information on time, huge revenue loss will be
caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on
the part of the officials functioning under the
State, though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value
of the loss caused to the Government. Such
direction will have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the delay
is sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2
years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90
days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of
no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it
was unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file
the
appeal
within
time.
No
event
or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation
can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being
filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh
and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case,
in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the
discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and
only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.”
The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves,
do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of
advancing substantial justice.
9.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
767 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the appellant, cannot be treated as “sufficient
cause” in the eye of law.
10.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances
which prevented timely action. Such explanation cannot be construed
as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when the
delay is prolonged and unexplained for a substantial period.
11.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ
appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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