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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi
WPA 24770 of 2024
Mukul Kumar Chaudhury
Vs.
The Chairman, Coal India Limited And Ors.
For the petitioner
: Mr. Abhimanyu Shandilya, Adv.
Mr. Subhendu Sengupta, Adv.
Ms. Dhanasree Biswas, Adv.
For the respondent nos. 1 & 2
: Mr. Pradip Kumar Dutta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. M. Obaidullah, Adv.
Mr. Nikhil Kr. Roy, Adv.
For the respondent nos. 3 & 4
: Mr. Kallol Ghuha Thakurta, Adv.
Mr. Dipankar Dutta, Adv.
Heard on
: 05.10.2026
Judgment on
: 05.10.2026
Uploaded on
: 06.10.2026
MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.:-
1.
The writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking the
following reliefs:“a) A Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent nos. 2
and 3 to take steps for immediate revision/re-fixation of
legitimate
pension
of
the petitioner
by
merging
the
pensionable service of the petitioner in respect of CMPF nos.
BKR/32/1876 and MGT/4/820;
b) A Writ in of Mandamus directing the respondent no. 3 to
take steps for payment of arrears of legitimate pension with
interest after adjusting the payments already made to the
petitioner;
c) A Writ of Certiorari directing the respondents to produce
all the relevant documents of the case so that conscionable
justice to be rendered to the petitioner;
d) Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a) and (b) above and make
the Rule absolute if no sufficient causes are shown;
e) To pass such other orders and further orders as may be
deemed necessary on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case.”
2.
It is submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that the
authorities have illegally forfeited the pensionable service of the
petitioner which he served prior to his removal from service. The
said period was not taken into consideration while fixing the
pension of the petitioner.
3.
Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that the
petitioner has been making contributions towards his pension as
well as the provident fund in the second tranche of his service.
Nevertheless, the contributions so made and service rendered by
the petitioner after his retirement were not taken into consideration
at the time of calculation of his pension.
4.
Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that
there was no provision in the extant service rules applicable to the
petitioner which provides that closure of the account of provident
fund would automatically result in the closure of the pension
account. He also submits that the authorities acted in an arbitrary,
whimsical
and
unreasonable
manner
in
denying
the
re-
fixed/revised pension of the petitioner. Such denial on the part of
the authorities is contrary to the provisions of Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India.
5.
Learned advocate for the petitioner also submits that the
employer authorities have ignored and violated the order passed by
the High Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in calculating
the pension of the petitioner.
6.
On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
respondent nos. 1 and 2 submits that in this case, the petitioner
was removed from service and subsequently he was reinstated into
service in terms of the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed the period when
the petitioner was not serving in the Coal Company to be treated as
dies-non.
7.
Learned Senior Advocate for respondent nos. 1 and 2 also
submits that the said period of dies-non cannot be taken into
consideration for the purpose of calculating the pensionable service
of the petitioner.
In support of his contention, learned Senior
Advocate for respondent nos. 1 and 2 relied upon 2007 SCC
OnLine MP 259 (Mahesh Kumar Shrivastava Vs. State of M.P.)
and 2005 SCC OnLine MP 676 (Battilal Vs. Union of India and
others).
8.
In Mahesh Kumar Shrivastava (supra), the Madhya
Pradesh High Court held as follows:“8. A Division Bench of this Court reported in Batiilal v.
Union of India and Ors. (supra), has held as under with
regard to dies non:
The authority imposing the punishment can direct how the
period when the employee was out of service shall be
treated. When the authority directs that the period will be
treated 'dies non', it means that continuity of service is
maintained, but the period treated 'dies non' will not count
for leave, salary, increment and pension.
9. It is clear from the judgment of this Court that dies non
means continuity of service but the period will not be
counted for leave, salary, increment and pension. It means
that due to the order of the dies non the pension of the
employee will be reduced.”
9.
In Battilal (supra), the Madhya Pradesh High Court held as
follows:“The authority imposing the punishment can direct how the
period when the employee was out of service shall be
treated. When the Authority directs that the period will be
treated 'dies-non', it means that continuity of service is
maintained, but the period treated as 'dies-non' will not
count for leave, salary, increment and pension. In fact, FR
54 (1) casts such a duty on the authority. It provides that
when a Government Servant who has been dismissed,
removed or compulsorily retired is reinstated as a result of
appeal or review,
the
authority competent to order
reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the
Government servant for the period of his absence from duty
including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be; and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a
period spent on duty.”
10.
The said judgment also held as follows:“The petitioner next contended that if the period between
2.7.1994 and 20.2.2003 was treated as dies-non, it would
mean that he will not get any salary for the said period and
the said period will also not be treated as qualifying service
for purposes of pension, and that would cause hardship to
him. The petitioner was earlier compulsorily retired. He
should Count himself lucky that in spite of the charge of
production of fake documents for claiming benefit of LTC
being proved, the Tribunal was kind enough to direct lesser
punishment
than
compulsory
retirement
resulting
in
reinstatement. The petitioner should not expect more.”
11.
Learned advocate for the respondent nos. 3 and 4 has
submitted that they are ready and willing to own up to the
decisions taken by respondent nos. 1 and 2 in respect of calculation
of pension of the petitioner.
12.
The petitioner joined Coal India Limited on September 24,
1982. Subsequently, he became a member of Coal Mines Provident
Fund, was allotted with a provident fund account and has been
contributing to such provident fund.
13.
Subsequently, the petitioner was removed from service of Coal
India Limited for misconduct on account of unauthorized absence
on November 29, 2000. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner was
paid in respect of provident fund.
However, his pension was not
settled.
14.
Subsequently, the petitioner was reinstated into service in
terms of an order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on
November 9, 2009.
15.
The pension of the petitioner was released by issuance of a
pension payment order for his services rendered prior to his
removal on September 3, 2016.
superannuated
from
service
upon
Ultimately, the petitioner
attaining
the
age
of
superannuation on February 28, 2017. A revised pension payment
order was issued in respect of the petitioner taking into account the
pensionable service rendered by the petitioner after retirement,
without taking into consideration the period of service rendered by
the petitioner before his reinstatement.
16.
The petitioner withdrew his entire amount of provident fund
as well as pension without raising any objection.
17.
From the materials on record, it transpires that the petitioner
joined service of Coal India Limited on September 24, 1982 and he
served until November 29, 2000. Thereafter, he was removed from
service on account of misconduct. In a departmental proceeding he
was found to be guilty of an unauthorized absence.
18.
The petitioner challenged the order passed by the disciplinary
authority which went up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal Nos. 5762 and 5763 of 2009. By its judgment and order
passed on August 24, 2009, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
pleased to hold to be following:“26. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized
concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is
otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power
of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the
charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary
power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a
manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of
punishment which is grossly in access to the allegations
cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference
under limited scope of judicial review. One of the tests to be
applied while dealing with the question of quantum of
punishment would be : would any reasonable employer
have imposed such punishment in like circumstances?
Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into
consideration
measure,
magnitude
and
degree
of
misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and
exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. In a
case like the present one where the misconduct of the
delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six
months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he
fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his
absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor
desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate
any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason
was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a
matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not
accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be
justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer
would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like
circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh
but grossly in excess to the allegations. Ordinarily, we
would have sent the matter back to the appropriate
authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment
but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this
exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of
justice would be met if the Respondent No. 1 is denied back
wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the
proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months.
27. Consequently, both these appeals are allowed in part.
The appellants shall reinstate Respondent No. 1 forthwith
but he will not be entitled to any back wages from the date
of his removal until reinstatement. Parties will bear their
own costs.”
19.
Pursuant to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
on August 24, 2009 the petitioner was reinstated into service by an
order passed on October 28, 2009 by the Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, Coal India Limited. Such order directed as under :
“NOW,
therefore,
pursuant
to
the
judgement
dated
24.8.2009 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India Shri Mukul
Kumar
Chaudhuri
Ex-
Manager
(System),
is
hereby
reinstated in his service of the Company with immediate
effect. Shri Chaudhuri shall not be entitled for any back
wages for the intervening period from the date of removal
from service till the date of joining on reinstatement. The
intervening period from the date of removal of his service
until reinstatement of his service shall be treated as "Diesnon”. Dies-non does not constitute break in service but only
the days treated as dies non are not counted as duty for
any purpose. Accordingly Shri Mukul Kumar Chaudhuri is
directed to report for duties to the post of Manager (System),
NEC, Assam on or before 10-11-2009.”
20.
By the said order, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of
Coal India Limited directed that the petitioner will not be entitled
for any back wages for the intervening period from the date of his
removal from service till the date of joining of reinstatement. The
said period was directed to be treated as dies-non.
21.
After the reinstatement of the petitioner into service, the
pension payment order for the past services of the petitioner was
issued and the petitioner started taking pension on the basis of
such pension payment order in addition to the salary for his second
part of his service. Thereafter, the petitioner superannuated from
service on February 28, 2018. A revised pension payment order was
issued in favour of the petitioner upon taking into consideration the
period of service rendered by the petitioner after his reinstatement
only.
22.
The petitioner is aggrieved by such revised pension order. The
revised pension order has been issued taking into consideration the
period of service rendered by the petitioner only after his
reinstatement into service. According to the petitioner, since the
period of his absence of service was directed to be treated as diesnon, the said period may not have been taken into consideration for
the purpose calculation of his pension but the authorities ought to
have issued a revised single pension payment order taking into
consideration the period of service rendered by the petitioner prior
to his removal from service and that after his reinstatement, leaving
aside the period directed to be treated as dies-non.
23.
As evident, the petitioner entered into the service of Coal India
Limited. He was removed from service on the ground of misconduct.
He challenged the findings of the disciplinary authority which went
to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and ultimately he was reinstated into
service in terms of order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
service of the petitioner with the Coal India Limited was the one and
only service. It cannot be bifurcated into two services. The
authorities issued separate pension payment orders for the period
of
service
rendered
prior
to
his
removal
and
that
after
reinstatement. Since a specific order was passed by the authorities
that the period of absence from service was to be treated as diesnon, the entire service period of the petitioner ought to have been
taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of the
pensionable service, leaving aside the period directed to be treated
as dies-non.
24.
A preliminary point was raised on behalf of the respondent
nos. 3 and 4 that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the instant writ petition. In reply to such contention of
respondent nos. 3 and 4, the learned advocate for the petitioner
relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
No. 3630 of 2020 to contend that after superannuation a pensioner
is required to give an option for the place where such person wants
to receive pension. Such place is specified by the pensioner, the
Court having jurisdiction over such place where the pensioner has
specified to receive the pension has got territorial jurisdiction to
entertain writ petition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case
held as follows:“29. Form the facts of the present case, we are of the
considered opinion that part of cause of action has arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. The
deceased petitioner was continuously receiving pension for
the last 08 years in his saving bank account in State Bank
of India, Darbhanga. The stoppage of pension of late B.N.
Mishra affected him at his native place, he being deprived
of the benefit of pension which he was receiving from his
employer. The employer requires a retiring employee to
indicate the place where he shall receive pension after his
retirement. Late Shri B.N. Mishra had opted for receiving his
pension in State Bank of India, Darbhabga, State of Bihar,
which was his native place, fromwhere he was drawing his
pension regularly for the last 08 years, stoppage of pension
gave a cause of action, which arose at the place where the
petitioner was continuously receiving the pension. We, thus,
are of the view that the view of the learned Single Judge as
well as the Division Bench holding the writ petition not
maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction
was completely erroneous and has caused immense
hardship to the petitioner.”
25.
In view of the discussions made, I am of the opinion that the
entire service of the petitioner in Coal India Limited, both before his
removal and after his reinstatement in pursuance of the order
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is to be taken into
consideration and a consolidated pension payment order should be
issued in favour of the petitioner. The authorities, of course, will be
entitled to leave out the period of absence of the petitioner from
service which has been directed to be treated a dies-non.
26.
In such circumstances,
the
respondent authorities are
directed to act in accordance with the directions and observations
made in this judgment for issuance of consolidated revised pension
payment order taking into consideration the entire period of service
except the period of dies-non. Such action shall be completed by the
respondent authorities within a period of eight weeks from date.
27.
The writ petition being WPA 24770 of 2024 is, accordingly,
disposed of.
28.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment may be
supplied to the parties expeditiously, if applied for.
(Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.)
tbsr/38
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