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signed by
SHAYNA
KADRI
2026:CGHC:7211
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 9110 of 2023
1 - Mukesh Kumar Choudhary S/o Ramanand Choudhary Aged About
46 Years Worked As Asst. Engineer (Civil) In The Office Of Utility
Powertech Limited, Korba Site, Korba, C.G R/o H.N.- B- 1337, Krishna
Vihar, Korba,, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
2 - Ramesh Kumar S/o Sakal Deep Upadhyay Aged About 51 Years
Worked As Junior Engineer (Grade- I) In The Office Of Utility Powertech
Limited, Korba Site, Korba, Cg R/o A-2/162, Po- Dhurwa, Distt- Ranchi,
Jharkhand, District : Ranchi, Jharkhand
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - National Thermal Power Corporation (Ntpc) Limited Represented By
Its General Manager (Hr), Having Its General Manager (Hr),having Its
Office At Core- 7 Scope Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003,
District : New Delhi, Delhi
2 - Utility Powertech Limited A Joint Venture Division Of Ntpc Ltd. And
Reliance Infrastructure Limited, Upl House W- 24, Sector- Ii, Noida201301, Uttar Pradesh, India, Represented By Its General Manager
(Hr), District : Noida, Uttar Pradesh
3 - The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) D/6, Adarsh
Society, Sector- 1, Avanti Vihar,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - The Assistant Labour Commissioner Korba, District : Korba,
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title is taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Syed Afaque Hussain Rizvi, Advocate
holding brief on behalf of Mr. Lakhan
Singh Bhadoriya, Advocate
For State
:
Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government
Advocate
For Resp. No. 1 :
Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate
For Resp. No. 2 :
Mr. Parth Shrivastava, Advocate
SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
09/02/2026
1.
The present writ petition is being filed seeking following reliefs:-
“10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to admit the Writ Petition; issue Rule NISI
calling upon the Respondent/ Authorities to
show cause as to why the prayers of the
Petitioners shall not be allowed and if the
Respondents fail to show cause, or show
insufficient cause thereof, the said Rule be
made absolute in the interest of justice. That,
the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash
the impugned orders of termination /removal
from service as vide Annexure-3 (Colly.) by
issuing a Writ in the nature of Certiorari.
10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to issue a writ of mandamus directing the
respondents
to
command
the
Respondents/Authorities to reinstatement the
Petitioners against their posts which are
perennial in nature and they may further be
directed to allow these Petitioners to continue
further as before till the Company survives or
in the alternative, without leave of this Hon'ble
Court and also be granted with all
consequential service benefits. etc., in the
interest of justice.
10.3 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may
deem
and
proper
in
the
present
circumstances of the case”
2.
The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioners were duly
selected in the year 2008 by a duly constituted Selection
Committee of the Management of Utility Powertech Limited (UPL),
a Joint Venture Company of NTPC Limited and Reliance
Infrastructure Limited having equal shareholding, and were issued
letters of appointment against substantive posts, whereafter they
have continuously rendered satisfactory services without any
adverse remark in their service records; Petitioner No.1 was
initially appointed as Supervisor (Civil) on 28.04.2008 and is
presently working as Assistant Engineer (Civil), while petitioner
No.2 was appointed as Junior Engineer on 02.02.2008 and is
presently working as Junior Engineer (Grade-I), and their recent
engagements were for the periods 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 and
01.07.2023 to 31.12.2023 respectively at the UPL project site,
Korba. The petitioners were given to understand that UPL, being
a sister concern of NTPC Limited and managed substantially by
NTPC personnel, would continue to retain employees recruited on
merit and qualifications so long as the Joint Venture and its
principal partner subsisted, and accordingly, though termed
contractual and tenure-based, their engagements were renewed
year after year due to continued requirement of work, availability
of substantive workload and satisfactory performance, with parity
in duties and responsibilities with regular employees of NTPC
projects;
however,
while
their
tenure
engagements
were
subsisting and without any closure of projects or reduction of
manpower, the Deputy Manager (HR) of respondent No.2Company issued communications dated around 31.08.2023
abruptly
terminating
their
engagements
with
effect
from
30.09.2023, citing vague reasons stated to be beyond the control
of the Company and treating the said communication as one
month’s notice, despite the fact that the appointing authority was
of a much higher rank, namely the General Manager, rendering
the termination orders without jurisdiction. The petitioners contend
that such termination is arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory,
particularly when similarly placed and even junior employees have
been retained, in violation of settled principles of “last come first
go” and Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, and that
the respondents have indulged in pick-and-choose without
disclosing any rational basis; subsequent thereto, the respondents
further issued an order dated 13.10.2023 directing the petitioners
to vacate the residential quarters by 31.10.2023 and issued
service certificates on 02.11.2023, thereby aggravating their
hardship, especially in the case of petitioner No.1 who has minor
school-going children and no alternative accommodation or
source of livelihood; despite repeated representations dated
06.09.2023, 07.09.2023, 12.09.2023 and 15.09.2023 seeking
continuation till completion of tenure and reinstatement, no relief
was granted, though similarly situated employees have obtained
interim protection from the High Court of Orissa in WP(C)
No.31625/2023; hence, alleging violation of fundamental rights,
arbitrariness in decision-making, lack of competence of the
terminating authority and infringement of their right to livelihood,
the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present
writ petition
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the
petitioners were initially appointed on contractual basis on
28.04.2008 and 02.02.2008 respectively and have been illegally
and arbitrarily terminated without assigning any cogent or
sufficient reasons, which action is ex facie violative of the settled
principles of natural justice. It is further contended that the case of
the present petitioners is squarely covered by the judgment
passed by this Court in Sushanta Kumar Rath and others v.
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. and others, WP(C)
No.31625/2023, wherein similarly situated employees have been
granted protection, and therefore the petitioners are also entitled
to identical relief. Learned counsel submits that the premature
termination of the petitioners’ contractual engagement prior to the
expiry of the tenure, i.e., till 01.04.2023 and 31.12.2023
respectively, infringes their fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, particularly
when no show cause notice or opportunity of hearing was
afforded to them, rendering the impugned order dated 31.08.2023
void ab initio for non-compliance of the rule of audi alteram
partem. It is argued that the respondents have also failed to
adhere to the principle of “first come last go” while issuing the
orders of disengagement and have ignored the repeated
representations submitted by the petitioners, compelling them to
approach the Labour Department, which in turn advised them to
seek redressal before this Court. Learned counsel would further
submit that the illegal termination has gravely affected the
Petitioners’ right to livelihood and shelter, protected under Article
21 of the Constitution, inasmuch as they have been deprived of
their sole source of income, and in the case of petitioner No.1, his
minor
children
are
pursuing
their
education
at
Korba,
Chhattisgarh, and the family has no independent house or
alternative means of livelihood except the accommodation
provided by respondent No.2 – UPL. It is contended that the
respondents, while discharging public functions, have acted in an
arbitrary and unjust manner, giving a complete go-bye to the
principles of social justice, despite the fact that the work being
discharged by the petitioners is of a perennial nature and there
was no justification to retrench employees who are in the middle
of their service career.
4.
Learned State counsel would submit that grievance of petitioners
pertains
to
the
alleged
termination
of
their
contractual
engagement by the Deputy Manager (HR) of respondent No.2Company vide communication dated 31.08.2023; it is contended
that the writ petition as framed is wholly misleading, suffers from
misrepresentation of facts and is misconceived in law, and
therefore deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. Learned
State counsel would further submit that the petitioners have never
submitted any representation or grievance before the answering
respondent at any point of time and no order has been passed by
the answering respondent against the petitioners, as such there is
no occasion or requirement for the answering respondent to
comment upon the merits of the allegations raised in the petition.
It is further urged that any issue arising out of the present dispute
squarely falls within the jurisdiction of respondent No.3, who alone
is the competent authority to deal with the same, and the
answering respondent has been impleaded only in a formal
capacity, with no substantive relief having been claimed against it.
5.
Learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that the
impugned order dated 31.08.2023 terminating the contractual
engagement of the petitioners has been passed by respondent
No.2, namely Utility Powertech Limited, which was also the
appointing authority, and therefore the writ petition, as framed, is
not maintainable against respondent No.1 – NTPC Limited. It is
contended that the petitioners were appointed purely on
contractual and tenure basis by respondent No.2, which is a joint
venture company incorporated as a private entity and not a public
sector undertaking, nor an instrumentality of the State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as it is neither a
Government company under Section 2(45) of the Companies Act,
2013 nor does it have majority Government shareholding, and
merely having NTPC Limited as one of its shareholders does not
render it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Learned
counsel submits that respondent No.2 is an independent legal
entity having its own Board of Directors, separate establishment,
independent contracts, and executes works for NTPC Limited
under contractual arrangements, and therefore no public law
element is involved in the termination of contractual employees
governed purely by the terms of appointment, which clearly
stipulate that the engagement is renewable annually based on
work requirement and can be terminated by either side by giving
one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof. It is further argued that
no relief has been claimed against NTPC Limited, nor could any
relief be granted against it, since the petitioners were never its
employees and the termination letters under challenge were
issued solely by respondent No.2. Learned counsel would also
submit that the petitioners have approached this Court with
unclean hands by suppressing the material fact that they had
earlier filed WPC No.4718/2023 seeking similar relief, which was
withdrawn with liberty to approach the appropriate forum, yet in
the present writ petition they have falsely stated that no such
proceedings were ever initiated, thereby rendering the petition
liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material
facts. It is further contended that the petition has, in any event,
become infructuous as the contractual periods of both petitioners
have already expired by efflux of time and their appointment
letters specifically provided for automatic termination on expiry of
the contract period. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary Education
Society and Others v. Rajendra Prasad, reported in (2023) 4
SCC 498.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and having
carefully perused the pleadings and material placed on record,
this Court proceeds to decide the writ petition on merits.
7.
The undisputed facts reveal that the petitioners were engaged by
respondent No.2–Utility Powertech Limited (UPL) on contractual
and tenure basis. Their initial engagement dates back to the year
2008 and thereafter their contracts were renewed from time to
time depending upon the requirement of work. The latest
engagements of petitioner No.1 were for the period from
01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 and of petitioner No.2 from 01.07.2023
to 31.12.2023. The impugned communication dated 31.08.2023
terminating their contractual engagement was admittedly issued
by respondent No.2, which was also the appointing authority.
8.
Respondent No.2 is a joint venture company incorporated under
the Companies Act, having its own independent legal existence,
Board of Directors and establishment. Merely because NTPC
Limited holds 50% shareholding in the joint venture, respondent
No. 2 does not become a “Government company” within the
meaning of Section 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013, nor can it
be treated as “State” or “instrumentality of the State” under Article
12 of the Constitution of India. The relationship between the
petitioners and respondent No.2 is purely contractual in nature
and governed by the terms of engagement. No statutory duty or
public law element has been demonstrated so as to attract writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary's Education
Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, reported in (2023) 4
SCC 498 has held as under :
“75.1. An application under Article 226
of the Constitution is maintainable
against a person or a body discharging
public duties or public functions. The
public duty cast may be either statutory
or otherwise and where it is otherwise,
the body or the person must be shown
to owe that duty or obligation to the
public involving the public law element.
Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge
of
public
function,
it
must
be
established that the body or the person
was seeking to achieve the same for
the collective benefit of the public or a
section of it and the authority to do so
must be accepted by the public.
75.2. Even if it be assumed that an
educational
institution
is
imparting
public duty, the act complained of must
have a direct nexus with the discharge
of public duty. It is indisputably a public
law action which confers a right upon
the
aggrieved
to
invoke
the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 for a prerogative writ.
Individual wrongs or breach of mutual
contracts without having any public
element as its integral part cannot be
rectified through a writ petition under
Article 226. Wherever Courts have
intervened
in
their
exercise
of
jurisdiction under Article 226, either the
service conditions were regulated by
the statutory provisions or the employer
had the status of “State” within the
expansive definition under Article 12 or
it was found that the action complained
of has public law element.
75.3. It must be consequently held that
while a body may be discharging a
public function or performing a public
duty and thus its actions becoming
amenable to judicial review by a
constitutional
court,
its
employees
would not have the right to invoke the
powers of the High Court conferred by
Article 226 in respect of matter relating
to service where they are not governed
or controlled by the statutory provisions.
An educational institution may perform
myriad
functions
touching
various
facets of public life and in the societal
sphere. While such of those functions
as would fall within the domain of a
“public function” or “public duty” be
undisputedly open to challenge and
scrutiny under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the actions or decisions
taken solely within the confines of an
ordinary contract of service, having no
statutory force or backing, cannot be
recognised as being amenable to
challenge under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In the absence of the
service conditions being controlled or
governed by statutory provisions, the
matter would remain in the realm of an
ordinary contract of service.”
10.
It is well settled that contractual employees do not acquire a
vested or indefeasible right to continue beyond the terms of
contract. The appointment letters specifically provided that the
engagement
was
tenure-based,
renewable
subject
to
requirement, and terminable by either party by giving one month’s
notice or salary in lieu thereof. Termination in accordance with
contractual terms does not, by itself, amount to violation of
principles of natural justice. In such cases, issuance of show
cause notice or holding of disciplinary enquiry is not mandatory
unless the termination is punitive or stigmatic, which is not the
case here. The contention that the termination was arbitrary or
discriminatory on the ground of non-adherence to the principle of
“last come first go” also cannot be accepted. The said principle is
applicable in cases of retrenchment governed by statutory service
rules or labour laws. The Petitioners were engaged on individual
contracts, and disengagement pursuant to contractual terms
cannot be tested on the anvil of seniority principles unless
specifically provided for in the contract, which is admittedly not so
in the present case.
11.
So far as the argument that the Deputy Manager (HR) was not
competent to issue the termination order is concerned, the record
does not disclose any statutory rule or binding regulation
prohibiting such delegation of administrative powers within
respondent No. 2. In absence of any such prohibition, internal
administrative
authorization
cannot
be
scrutinized
in
writ
jurisdiction, particularly when the termination itself flows from
contractual stipulations. The plea of parity with the interim order
passed by the High Court of Orissa in Sushanta Kumar Rath and
others is also of no assistance to the petitioners. An interim order
passed in another writ petition does not lay down a binding
precedent, nor does it confer an enforceable right of automatic
parity, especially when maintainability itself is in question before
this Court.
12.
Additionally, it is not in dispute that the contractual periods for
which the petitioners were last engaged have already expired by
efflux of time. In terms of the appointment letters, the contract
stood automatically terminated on expiry of the tenure. Even
otherwise, therefore, no effective relief of reinstatement can be
granted at this stage, rendering the writ petition infructuous.
13.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the writ petition is not maintainable against
respondent No.2, no enforceable legal or fundamental right of the
petitioners has been violated, the termination is in consonance
with the contractual terms.
14.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby
dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
Shayna
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
JUDGE
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