Judgments
LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/mukesh-kumar-alias-kaka-vs-state-of-haryana-20260120/ · Printed 20 Nov 2026
Civil

Mukesh Kumar Alias Kaka vs State of Haryana

Add to a compilation

Keep judgments in folders, mark the paragraphs you rely on, and print a compilation with an index. It comes with the Research and Advocate Pro judgment plans and with a campus licence. Sign in · See the plans

Court
Punjab & Haryana High Court
Date
20 January 2026
Case No.
CRM-M 70302/2025
Result
Allowed
Bench
Sumeet Goel
Cite this judgment
Citation
Link for your website or blog
Cite the court's own record or the law report in court filings.

The court's order

The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.

6. 6 Indubitably, the present petition is the 2nd attempt by the petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 7.2.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of about 11 months and no substantial progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-23322023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof reads as under: “10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge: I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof. 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -9- maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for nonprosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits. III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suff…

7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:- 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted. (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial. (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial. (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail. (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -10- Court. (vi) The petitioner shall give his cell-phone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate. (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial. (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any…

Filed under

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Section 37, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 NDPS Act

The law on this, in one place: Drug cases (NDPS Act)

The law this judgment cites

Opens the section on Law Maker (lawmaker.in), our sister site for law students.

Supreme Court judgments it cites, on LegalFirms.in

Found by their neutral or S.C.R. citation in the text of this judgment.

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH ***** CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 Date of decision : 20.1.2026 Date of uploading : 20.1.2026 Mukesh Kumar @ Kaka ………….Petitioner Versus State of Haryana …….Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present: Mr. Davneet Sangwan, Advocate, for the petitioner Ms. Priyanka Sadar, Senior DAG, Haryana --SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL) 1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case FIR No.293 dated 12.7.2024, under Sections 22(C) and 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, registered at Police Station Gandhi Nagar, District Yamuna Nagar. 2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 576 capsules of tramadol weighing 354.96 grams and the petitioner has been nominated, in this case, on the disclosure of co-accused Deepak Kumar 3. ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -2- is in custody since 6.11.2024. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel has further iterated that sole basis to array the petitioner as an accused is the disclosure statement of co-accused, namely Deepak Kumar. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 01 year and 2 months. Thus, regular bail is prayed for. 4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 19.1.2026 in the Court, which is taken on record. 5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available records of the case. 6. The petitioner was arrested on 6.11.2024 whereinafter investigation was carried out and challan qua him was presented on 21.12.2024. Total 18 prosecution witnesses have been cited, but only 3 have been examined till date. The petitioner has been implicated as an accused in the FIR in question solely on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused- Deepak Kumar from whom 576 capsules of tramadol weighing 354.96 grams was allegedly recovered. As per the prosecution version, there is no other material available to connect the petitioner with the contraband except for the said disclosure statement. It is pertinent to ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -3- note that such disclosure statements, in the absence of corroborative evidence hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be sole basis for implicating the petitioner. The reliance on this unsubstantiated statement raises serious doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the investigation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not present at the spot. The veracity and weightage required to be attached to the disclosure statement made by the co-accused will be fully tested at the time of trial. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence. 6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment passed by this Court in Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab, passed in CRM-M-65094-2024 (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 5592; Smt. Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus State of Gujrat, Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by (NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.’, 2022 (1) RCR (Criminal) 762; and Vijay Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023, has held thus: ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -4- “6.3 It is a well established principle of law that a confession made by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co-accused. However, as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement made by a co-accused fall within the domain of the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial in accordance with established principles of law. However, while adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of law is not misused, abused or misdirected.” 6.2. Further, this Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh alias Kala versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-33729-2025 (2025:PHHC:089161) has held thus: “14. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following postulates emerge: (I) (i)A bail plea on merits; in respect of an FIR under NDPS Act of 1985 involving offence(s) under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A thereof and for offence(s) involving commercial quantity; is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act. (ii) The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to a bail plea(s) on medical ground(s), interim bail on account of any exigency including the reason of demise of a close family relative etc. (iii)The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act pale into oblivion when bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bailapplicant has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial is procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bailapplicant. ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document II. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are in addition to the conditions/parameters contained in Cr.P.C./BNSS or any other applicable extant law. III. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act are cumulative in nature and not alternative i.e. both the CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -5- conditions are required to be satisfied for a bail-plea to be successful. IV. For consideration by bail Court of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(i) of NDPS Act i.e. “there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence”: (i) The bail Court ought to sift through all relevant material, including case-dairy, exclusively for the limited purpose of adjudicating such bail plea. (ii) Such consideration, concerning the assessment of guilt or innocence, should not mirror the same degree of scrutiny required for an acquittal of the accused at the final adjudication & culmination of trial. (iii) Plea(s) of defence by applicant-accused, if any, including material/documents in support thereof, may be looked into by the bail-Court while adjudicating such bail plea. V. For consideration of the condition stipulated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) i.e. ‘he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail’: (i) The word ‘likely’ ought to be interpreted as requiring a demonstrable and substantial probability of re-offending by the bail-applicant, rather than a mere theoretical one, as no Court can predict future conduct of the bail-applicant. (ii) The entire factual matrix of a given case including the antecedents of the bail-applicant, role ascribed to him, and the nature of offence are required to be delved into. However, the involvement of bail-applicant in another NDPS/other offence cannot ipso facto result in the conclusion of his propensity for committing offence in the future. (iii) The bail-Court may, at the time of granting bail, impose upon the applicant-accused a condition that he would submit, at such regular time period/interval as may stipulated by the Court granting bail, an affidavit before concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court/Illaqa (Jurisdictional) Judicial Magistrate/concerned Police Station, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In the facts of a given case, imposition of such condition may be considered to be sufficient for satisfaction of condition enumerated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii). VI. ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of exercise of power by a Court; while satisfying itself regarding the conditions stipulated in Section 37 of NDPS Act; shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -6- constitute parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Section 37 (ibid) as every case has its own unique facts/circumstances. Making such an attempt is nothing but a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such matter.” 6.3. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted. 6.4. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 19.1.2026 filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 01 year, 2 month and 13 days. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6.5. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -7- Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus: ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document “7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Courtdockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -8- neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity. Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.” 6.6 Indubitably, the present petition is the 2nd attempt by the petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 7.2.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of about 11 months and no substantial progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-23322023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof reads as under: “10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge: I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof. ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -9- maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for nonprosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits. III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances. IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s). V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed.” Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:- ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document (i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted. (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial. (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial. (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail. (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial CRM-M No.70302 of 2025 -10- Court. (vi) The petitioner shall give his cell-phone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate. (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial. (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof. 8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner. 9. Ordered accordingly. 10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. (SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE 20.1.2026 Ashwanii Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: ASHWANI KUMAR 2026.01.20 18:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Yes/No Yes/No

This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.

Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong? Request a review

All P&H HC judgments →
LegalFirms.in Directory
Find an advocate for this matter
Dealing with a similar case? Find an advocate who handles this kind of matter on LegalFirms.in.
Find an advocate →