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THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.24 of 2026
Date of Decision: 10.07.2026
_______________________________________________________
Mukand Lal
…….Petitioner
Versus
H.P. State Co-operative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank
… Respondent
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. D.S. Nainta, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Narender Singh Thakur, Advocate.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section
438(1) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
lays challenge to
judgment dated 20.11.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Case No.59-R/10
of 2024, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
06.07.2024/11.07.2024, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in
Criminal case No.194-3 of 2022, titled H.P. State Agriculture and
Rural Development Bank, whereby learned trial Court, while holding
petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) guilty
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
of his having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘Act’), convicted and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four
months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,60,000/- to the
respondent-complainant
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
‘complainant’).
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the
pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the
respective parties, are that the respondent-complainant instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that in the year 2019-20, accused approached it for
sanctioning the loan and after completion of all codal formalities, loan
to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- was advanced to him under the Tank
Irrigation Scheme for a period of five years on half yearly installments
of ₹ 40,000/-, with interest @ 10.50%. Since accused failed to make
the payment of installments as agreed by him, sum of ₹ 1, 60,000/became outstanding against him. To discharge his aforesaid liability,
accused issued cheque bearing No. 887233 dated 14.01.2022
amount to ₹ 1,60,000/- of H.P. State Co Operative Bank, branch at
Jangla of his account No.41210107104, but fact remains that
aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was
dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of
the accused. Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid return memo,
respondent-complainant served accused with legal notice dated
08.03.2022, calling upon him to make the payment good within
stipulated time, but still needful was not done within stipulated time,
complainant had no option, but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, which subsequently, on
the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties,
held accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under
S. 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as
per description given herein above.
3.
Being
aggrieved
and
dissatisfied
with
aforesaid
judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial
Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, Shimla, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh, but same also came to be dismissed vide
judgment dated 20.11.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioneraccused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings,
praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by
Courts below.
4.
Vide order dated 08.01.2026, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by Court below, subject to petitioner-
accused furnishing personal bond and depositing 30% of the
compensation amount within a period of eight weeks.Though,
aforesaid order was complied with, but thereafter request was made
for time to deposit the remaining amount, but in vain.
Learned
counsel representing the petitioner fairly states that this Court may
proceed to decide the matter on its own merit.
5.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties
and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned
in the impugned judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rohru District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, affirming judgment
of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court,
this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the
petitioner that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the
evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court is convinced and
satisfied that both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each
and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for
interference.
6.
Though, in his statement recorded under Section 313
Cr.P.C, accused attempted to deny the case of the complainant in
toto, but pattern of cross-examination conducted upon the accused
reveals that he attempted to set up a case that at the time of his
having availed loan from the complainant-bank, complainant-bank
had obtained his signatures on the simple papers, content whereof
are not read over to him. While stating that in lieu of loan, blank
cheque signed was obtained from him, he further attempted to set up
a case that though he had paid the whole outstanding amount to the
complainant-bank, but same was not adjusted and cheques were
misused.
7.
Since factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well
as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, rather stands
admitted, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the
Courts below while, invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which
speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that
cheque was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. No doubt,
aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption,
accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record
by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading
positive evidence, if any.
8.
In the case at hand, complainant-bank has examined Sh.
Archit Kuthiala, Manager of complainant bank as CW-1, who tendered
his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.C-1/CW1, reiterating therein the
contents of the complaint. He also tendered in evidence Ex.C-2/CW1,
bank memo Ex.C-3/CW1, legal notice Ex.C-4/CW1, postal receipt as
Ex.C-5/CW1, acknowledgment card Ex.C-6/CW1 and authorization
letter as Ex.C-7/CW1. Cross-examination conducted upon afore
witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract anything
contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his
cross-examination, afore witness admitted that loan documentation
was not done in his presence and the loan pertains to irrigation tank.
He stated that the accused person was to pay half yearly installments
of Rs. 40,000/-. While feigning ignorance to the number of
installments deposited by the accused with the bank, he deposed that
statement of account of accused is not annexed with the complaint,
he clarified that installments of last four years are pending for
payment. He further denied suggestion put to him that bank had taken
blank cheque from the accused, while sanctioning loan to him. As per
him, bank has not taken any cheque from the accused.
9.
With a view to probablize aforesaid defence, accused
examined himself as DW-1 and deposed that he had availed loan
from the bank and his signature were obtained on simple papers. He
also stated that in lieu of loan, blank cheque book was got signed
from him. He stated that he had paid the whole outstanding amount to
the complainant, but the same was not adjusted by the complainantbank. He deposed that false case has been filed against him. In his
cross-examination, he deposed that he had availed a loan of
₹ 3,00,000/- from the complainant, but denied if he has given a
cheque of Rs.1,60,000/- to the complainant bank.
10.
It is clearly evident from the statement made by DW-1
that loan to the tune of Rs. 3, 00,000/- was availed by him. Though,
he attempted to set up a case that at the time of grant of loan, blank
cheques were obtained, but such defence never came to be
probablized. Interestingly, afore witness neither put suggestion to the
complainant with regard to blank cheque, if any, taken by the
complainant nor he stated in his statement, rather he attempted to set
up a case that entire amount was paid, but same was not adjusted.
No evidence, worth credence, ever came to be led on record qua
payment of loan amount, if any.
11.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V.
State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that
if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates
doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the
accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into
play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of
the judgment herein:“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is
an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included
in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the
credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the
Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the
dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under
Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course
of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must
be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong
whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the
test of proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant
accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high
standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a
settled position that when an accused has to rebut the
presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is
inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need
to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the
offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard
to the materials submitted by the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques
in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI
Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called
upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the
payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only
when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and
despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time
stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an
offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the
question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt
or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued,
would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine
having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the
cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid
consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters
where there has been instruction to stop payment despite
sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.
12.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment passed
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4
SCC 197, wherein it was observed as under:
“37. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and
139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque
and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he
adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque
had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a
liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in
by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly
signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the
penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
38. answered in the negative.
40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed
over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would
attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to
show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.
41. The fact that the appellant-complainant might have been
an Income Tax practitioner conversant with knowledge of law
does not make any difference to the law relating to the
dishonour of a cheque. The fact that the loan may not have
been advanced by a cheque or demand draft or a receipt
might not have been obtained would make no difference. In
this context, it would, perhaps, not be out of context to note
that the fact that the respondent-accused should have given or
signed blank cheque to the appellant- complainant, as claimed
by the respondent-accused, shows that initially there was
mutual trust and faith between them.
42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in
question was not signed by the respondent-accused or not
voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence of
any evidence with regard to the circumstances in which a
blank signed cheque had been given to the appellantcomplainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the
cheque was filled in by the appellant-complainant being
the payee in the presence of the respondent-accused
being the drawer, at his request and/or with his
acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled
signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change
in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the
payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the
respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act.
13.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued
as “security” can also attract offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati
Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of
2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque
as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not
repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer
the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section
138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
14.
Needless to say, expression “security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if
any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The
Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in
respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of
such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing
in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would
attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour.
15.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients
of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly,
factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the
accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
16.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially,
in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the
courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of
an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature
is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
17.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as
fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned
judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the
revisional power.
18.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme
Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a
failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure,
sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to
prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material
irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the
well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below.
19.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein
above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court
sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments
recorded by the Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based
upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as
such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is
20.
dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to
surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of two
months to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if
not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled. Interim
direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
21.
The amount lying deposited with the learned trial Court is
ordered to be released in favour of the respondent-complainant, by
remitting the same in its saving bank account, details whereof, shall
be furnished by learned counsel for the respondent-complainant
within a period of two weeks.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
July 10,2026
(shankar)
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