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Civil

Muddada Ramu Naidu vs Ande Srinivasa Rao

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Court
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Date
3 August 2026
Case No.
CRP 354/2023
Result
Dismissed
Bench
Subba Reddy Satti
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47. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed. Ikn Whether the order is : Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No

Filed under

Constitution of India Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Article 227, Constitution of India Section 19, Specific Relief Act, 1963

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI **** CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354 of 2023 MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU, AGED 49 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.1-1, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI, BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM. … PETITIONER Versus ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.48-13-20/7, SRINAGAR, AKKAYYAPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM AND OTHERS … RESPONDENTS DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 04.08.2026 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the order? : Yes/No 2. Whether the copy of order may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes/No 3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the order? : Yes/No _____________________ SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J * HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354 OF 2023 % 04.08.2026 Civil Revision Petition No: 354 of 2023 MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU, AGED 49 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.1-1, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI, BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM. … PETITIONER Versus ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.48-13-20/7, SRINAGAR, AKKAYYAPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM. … RESPONDENTS ! Counsel for Petitioner : ^ Counsel for Respondents : < Gist : > Head Note : ? Cases referred : 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) (2013) 5 SCC 397 2005 (6) SCC 733 (2008) 13 SCC 658 (1995) 3 SCC 147 (2007) 10 SCC 82 (2010) 7 SCC 417 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015 AIR 1954 SC 75 (1992) 2 SCC 524 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745 (2010) 8 SCC 329 (2001) 8 SCC 97 (2022) 4 SCC 181 This Court made the following: Sri G. Ram Gopal, learned counsel Sri Srinivas, learned counsel representing Sri K.B. Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for respondent No.1 Date of reserved for orders :17.07.2026 Date of pronouncement : 04.08.2026 Date of uploading : 06.08.2026 APHC010713252022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3331] TUESDAY, THE 4th DAY OF AUGUST 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354/2023 Between: 1. MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU, AGED 49 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.1-1, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI, BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM. ...PETITIONER AND 1. ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.48-13-20/7, SRINAGAR, AKKAYYAPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM. 2. MUDDADA RAMA LAKSHMI, W/O. APPALANAIDU, AGED 69 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.50-1 -67, LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM. 3. MUDDADA BANGARU NAIDU, S/O, LATE MUDDADA APPALA NAIDU, AGED 35 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.54-17-78/2/2, CHAKALIPETA, HB COLONY, VISAKHAPATNAM. 4. LODAGALA GANGAMMA, D/O. LATE APPALANAIDU, AGED 49 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.9-78, LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM. 5. LODAGALA PYDIRAJU, W/O. LODAGALA RAMUNAIDU, AGED 34 YEARS, R/O. H.NO.7-132, LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM. 6. NODAGALA SANYASAMMA, W/O. NODAGALA SURYANARAYANA, AGED 36 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.8173, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI, VISAKHAPATNAM. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased to Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition to this Hon'ble Court, against the Order dated 27.06.2022 in I.A.No.183 of 2022 in O.S.No.1 of 2022 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam IA NO: 1 OF 2023 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings in OS.No.1 of 2022 on the file of II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending disposal of the above revision petition in the interest of justice. Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. G RAMA GOPAL Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. K B RAMANNA DORA The Court made the following: :ORDER: Defendant No.6 in the suit O.S.No.1 of 2022 on the file of the learned II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, filed the above civil revision petition (hereinafter referred to as „the revision‟), against the order, dated 27.06.2022 in I.A.No.183 of 2022. 2. Respondent No.1 herein, being the plaintiff, filed O.S.No.1 of 2022 against six defendants seeking the following reliefs: a) Directing the Defendants 1 to 6 to execute Regular Registered Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the Plaint Schedule Property in terms of the Sale Agreement Dated 1708-2020 by receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.26,75,000/and get it Registered at the expenses of the Plaintiff. b) In case if the Defendants 1 to 6 fails to execute the Registered Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff as above, the Honourable Court may be pleased to execute the same on behalf of the Defendant No.6 in respect of the Plaint Schedule Property at their expenses. IN THE ALTERNATIVE c) If for any reason, this Honourable court comes to a conclusion the Plaintiff is not entitled for a Decree of Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale, to direct the Defendants 1 to 5 to repay advance sale consideration of Rs.33,25,000/- to the Plaintiff with subsequent interest @24% p.a. thereof from the date of its payment till the date of its realization. 3. cents The land to an extent of Ac.1-50 ½ cents or 1.00 hectare out of Ac.3-01 covered by S.No.267 of Dakamarri Village and Panchayat, Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, is the suit schedule property. 4. The case, set out by the plaintiff, is that defendant No.1 is the mother of the defendants 2 to 5, and defendant No.6 is the brother-in-law of defendant No.1. Defendants 1 to 5 are the absolute owners of an undivided and unspecified extent of land for an extent of Ac. 1.50½ cents or 1.00 hectare out of Ac.3.01 cents of land covered by S.No.267 (old Survey No.59), Dakamarri Village and Panchayat, Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District (hereinafter referred to as „the suit schedule property‟). They acquired the same through Sri Muddada Appala Naidu, S/o Papu Naidu, the husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendants 2 to 5. Muddada Appala Naidu died on 28.06.2006. ii) Muddada Appala Naidu, during his lifetime, approached the plaintiff and offered the suit schedule property for sale. Plaintiff agreed to purchase the land for a consideration of ₹ 40,00,000/- and paid ₹ 10,00,000/as advance to late Muddada Appala Naidu, in the presence of defendants 1 to 5. (iii) During negotiations, Muddada Appala Naidu informed the plaintiff that originally his father, late Muddada Papu Naidu, acquired the total extent of Ac.15.40 cents in old survey numbers 59, 60 and 61 of Dakamarri Village, Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, by way of purchase from the Assistant Collector of Vizianagaram Estate vide proceedings No.Rc 6410/52-A.1/Revenue dated 01.09.1943. Later, the land was resurveyed, and the total extent of the land was recorded as Ac.14-53 cents with new survey numbers i.e. Ac. 10.96 cents in S.No.267 and Ac.3-57 cents in S.No.279/6. Later, Muddada Papu Naidu obtained Ryotwari Patta in respect of the above land vide Patta No.1911 from the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam. (iv) Muddada Papu Naidu died intestate, leaving behind his two sons, Muddada Appala Naidu, Muddada Ramu Naidu (born to his second Wife) and his 2nd wife, Muddada Atchayyamma, as his legal heirs. After the death of Muddada Papu Naidu, his legal heirs, Muddada Appala Naidu, Muddada Ramu Naidu and Muddada Atchayyamma, sold an extent of Ac. 11.52 cents out of Ac.14.53 cents to one Chelluri Sadananda Rao and his wife Chelluri Appalanarasamma and retained the remaining Ac.3.01 cents of land in S.No.267, Dakamarri Village. (v) After the demise of Muddada Appala Naidu, defendants 1 to 5 approached the plaintiff and requested for more amount, and the plaintiff paid Rs.10,00,000/- out of the total sale consideration of Rs.40,00,000/-. Thereafter, defendants 1 to 5 approached the plaintiff and requested him for enhancement of total sale consideration. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs.60,00,000/-. The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5 entered into a sale agreement on 17.08.2020. (vi) The time was fixed for the performance of the contract. Thereafter, the plaintiff paid amounts totalling to Rs.33,25,000/- on different dates towards part sale consideration out of the total sale consideration of Rs.60,00,000/-. Defendants 1 to 5 have been conveniently postponing the execution of the document. (vii) The plaintiff came to know that the defendants No.1 to 5 filed O.S. 86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 on the file of the IV Addl. District Judge, Visakhapatnam, for partition of Ac.3.01 cents of land in Survey No.267 of Dakamarri Village into two equal shares and allot one such share to the defendants 1 to 5 and another share to defendant No.6. Defendants 1 to 5 did not bring to the notice of the plaintiff about the filing of O.S.No.86 of 2021. The plaintiff came to know that defendants 1 to 5 colluded with defendant No.6 and filed O.S.No.86 of 2021 without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The defendants are making efforts to get a compromise decree in O.S.86/2021 by referring the matter to the Lok Adalat, to defeat or delay the execution of the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. (viii) As per the terms and conditions of the sale agreement, dated 17.08.2020, without adding defendant No.6 as a party to the sale agreement, if a decree is passed, it may not be executable against a third party. In fact, the plaintiff‟s name was mentioned as the agreement holder in suit O.S.No.86 of 2021. The Plaintiff filed an application vide G.R.No. 1707 on 25.11.2021, to implead him as party respondent to the suit O.S.No.86 of 2021. However, the same was not accepted. (ix) The plaintiff got issued a legal notice, dated 05.12.2021, to defendants 1 to 6 demanding them to stop their illegal acts in respect of the suit schedule property and come forward for registration. Defendant No. 6, knowing the agreement between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5, obtained a compromise award before the Lok Adalat. Thus, defendant No.6 is a necessary party in view of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. In the compromise, defendants 1 to 5 received an alternative property for the suit schedule property and defendant No.6 is vested with the rights over the suit schedule property. 5. With these averments, in a nutshell, the suit was filed seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 17.08.2020. 6. Defendant No.2 filed a written statement and denied the averments in the plaint. It was contended, inter alia, that his grandfather Muddada Papu Naidu was the absolute owner of an extent of Ac.10-96 cents and Ac.3-57 cents, totalling Ac.15-40 cents in old Sy.Nos.59, 60 and 61, which correlate to new survey Nos.267 and 279/6, of Dakamarri Village. It was pleaded that after the demise of Papu Naidu, the properties were partitioned orally between the first wife's son, Appalanaidu and the mother of defendant No.6, before the village elders. As per the said partition Ac.2-65 cents in survey No.267 and Ac.1-19 cents in survey No.279/6, totalling Ac.3-84 cents, were given to the share of Appalanaidu. An extent of Ac.3-84 cents was given to the mother of defendant No.6 and the remaining property was given to defendant No.6. Since then, Appala Naidu, Achiyyamma and defendant No.6 have been cultivating and enjoying the properties separately and independently. (ii) Defendants 1 to 5 sold the extent of their share to Chelluri Sadananda Rao. Defendant No.6 and his mother also sold away some of the lands to Chelluri Appalanarasamma, who, in turn, sold some of the lands to Thota Ramachandra Rao and his wife Lakshmi Devi. Neither the defendants nor their father have any right over the suit schedule property, and they never executed the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. Defendants 1 to 5 filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 in respect of Ac.3-01 cents in Survey No.267. The defendants are surprised to note that they have no right over the said property. The matter was placed before the elders and thereafter before Lok Adalat, and a compromise was recorded. A decree was passed accordingly. The agreement of sale and the receipts are false and fabricated. The defendants previously sold their lands to real estate persons through the plaintiff. Defendant No.2 approached the plaintiff and requested him to advance some money for the maintenance of his family during lockdown. The plaintiff gave five cheques for Rs.25,000/- each and obtained the thumb impression of defendants 1 to 5 on white paper. Later, they repaid the amount to the plaintiff. The plaintiff created receipts on white paper, and he approached the Court with unclean hands. Eventually prayed to dismiss the suit. 7. Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement in the same lines of the written statement filed by defendant No.2. It was pleaded that in respect of an extent of Ac.3-01 cents covered by S.No.267 of Dakamarri village, Bheemunipatnam Mandal, which was earlier granted Ryotwari Patta, by an order in RP No.267 / 1966 dated 28.04.1966, of the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam, was erroneously entered against the Form-3 list of assigned lands, communicated to concerned Sub-Registrar under Section 5(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer). Therefore, Defendant No.6 filed an application before the Tahsildar, Bheemunipatnam, seeking deletion. The same is pending consideration before the District Collector. (ii) The Government recognised the right, title and possession of Defendant No.6 over Ac.3-01 cents covered by S.No.267 of Dakamarri village, Bheemunipatnam Mandal. Defendant No.6 is the absolute owner of the property, and defendants 1 to 5 have no right. Defendants 1 to 5, in collusion with the plaintiff, brought the agreement of sale and later defendants 1 to 5 filed O.S.No.86 of 2021 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam. On the intervention of the village elders, defendants 1 to 5 realised their mistake and the matter was settled before Lok Adalat. The plaintiff knows that the suit schedule property in Survey No.267 is included in the 22-A list of the Registration Act; eventually, prayed to dismiss the suit. 8. Pending the suit, the revision petitioner/defendant No.6 filed I.A.No.183 of 2022 under Order I Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to strike out his name from the suit as well as I.A.No.5 of 2022. 9. In the affidavit, it was pleaded that the suit was filed seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale executed by defendants 1 to 5. The deponent/defendant No.6 is not a party to the sale agreement. He was improperly arrayed as defendant No.6. Indeed, he is not a proper and necessary party. Thus, prayed to strike out his name from the array of the defendants. 10. The plaintiff filed a counter and opposed the application. 11. The trial Court, by order dated 27.06.2022, dismissed the petition by relying on Thomson Press (India) Ltd. V/s Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd and others.1 12. Heard Sri G. Ram Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Srinivas, learned counsel representing Sri K.B. Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the revision petitioner/defendant No.6 is not a party to the agreement. Hence, he is not a necessary party to the suit. The trial Court failed to appreciate Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, vis-a-vis defendant No.6 in a proper perspective. The (2013) 5 SCC 397 trial Court also failed to appreciate the scope of the application filed under Order I Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. The learned counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon decisions reported in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and others2, Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Constructions Company3 and Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra @ Gadara Guru4. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would contend that defendant No.6 is also a proper and necessary party to the suit. Defendant No.6 got the plaint schedule property, in pursuance of a compromise decree in O.S.No.86 of 2021, from defendants 1 to 5 after the execution of the agreement of sale dated 17.08.2020. Hence, defendant No.6 is a proper and necessary party. The trial court considered this aspect and dismissed the application. He placed reliance upon Thomson Press Ltd.’s case, referred to supra. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the revision. 15. The point for consideration is: 1. Whether the suit filed seeking specific performance against defendant No.6, a non-executant of the agreement, be allowed to continue? 2. Whether the interlocutory application filed by defendant No.6 to strike out his name from the array of the defendants, in the facts of this case, can be ordered? 3. Whether the order passed by the trial court suffers from any illegality warranting interference of this Court, while 2005 (6) SCC 733 (2008) 13 SCC 658 (1995) 3 SCC 147 exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? 16. The facts narrated supra need no reiteration. According to the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 5 executed an agreement of sale dated 17.8.2020. 17. The following instances, according to this court, weigh with the court while dealing with the I.A. filed by the revision petitioner/D6.  Defendants 1 to 5 filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 on the file of the IV Addl District Judge, Visakhapatnam, seeking partition of Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village.  The plaint schedule property is part of Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village, as per the averments in the plaint.  In O.S.No.86 of 2021, in the plaint, as seen from the averments in the present suit, a mention was made about the agreement of sale dated 17.08.2020.  Later, the suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 was referred to the Lok Adalat, and the suit was compromised. The plaintiffs in that suit i.e. defendants 1 to 5 herein, accepted the claim of the defendant in that suit i.e. defendant No.6. 18. In the Written Statement filed by defendant No.2 in the present suit, it was stated as follows: “It is true that these defendants filed a suit against 6 th defendant bearing O.S.No. 86 of 2021 on the file of the 4th Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam and they came to know that the matter was put before elders, but, they have filed the above suit in respect of the property in an extent of Ac.3-01 cts in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village, and they were surprised to note the same as they have no right over the said property. Before the elders, they admitted their mistake and the matter was settled before the elders and ultimately the matter was settled before the Hon‟ble lok Adalat and compromise was recorded and decree was passed accordingly.” 19. Of course, as noted supra, defendant No.2, in the written statement, denied execution of the sale agreement and pleaded forgery and fabrication. Defendants 1, 3 and 5 adopted the written statement of defendant No.2. 20. Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement and asserted title to Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village. In the light of the above pleadings, whether D6 is a proper and necessary party to the suit? 21. As seen from the pleadings, the plaintiff is seeking relief of specific performance against defendants 1 to 6 and for refund of amount against defendants 1 to 5. 22. Defendant No.6, the revision petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to strike off his name, contended that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and it is his ancestral property; he is not a party to the agreement of sale and he was unnecessarily and improperly added as defendant No.6. The necessary documents were filed to prove his title and possession over the plaint schedule property. 23. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 envisages relief against the parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. It is apt to extract Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under: “Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against— (a) …. (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) … (ca) … (d) … (e) …” 24. In this case at hand, the agreement of sale relied upon by the plaintiff is dated 17.08.2020, allegedly executed by defendants 1 to 5. Defendants 1 to 5 filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 seeking partition of the suit schedule property and other property. The suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 was referred to and settled by defendant No.6 before Lok Adalat. Whether defendant No. 6 acquired title in pursuance of suit O.S. No. 86 of 2021 or is claiming independent title is a matter to be decided after the parties have led in evidence. If the trial Court concludes that defendant No.6 got the suit schedule property pursuant to the settlement in O.S No. 86 of 2021, Section 19(b) of the Relief Act comes into play. 25. The next question is whether defendant No.6 is a proper and necessary party to the suit. It is apt to refer to the principle of “Semblance of title” as laid down by the Apex Court time and again to determine this issue. Semblance of title 26. It is well settled law that in a suit for specific performance, the class of “necessary parties” is ordinarily confined to the parties to the contract, their legal representatives, and transferees from a party to the contract. That is, however, not the end of the legal regime. A division bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Sumtibai vs Paras Finance Co.,5 while distinguishing Kasturi’s case (supra) on facts, held that a person who shows a fair semblance of title or interest in the suit property may be impleaded as a proper party, even though not a necessary party, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 27. This position was later reiterated by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. vs Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. and Ors.6, wherein the Apex Court reconciled Kasturi’s case and Sumtibai’s case and held that there is no real conflict between those (2007) 10 SCC 82 (2010) 7 SCC 417 judgments. Kasturi‟s case confines the necessary-party category, while Sumtibai’s case recognises a wider, discretionary category of proper parties available to anyone with a semblance of title. 28. Para 13 & 14 of Sumtibai (supra), which are relevant, are reproduced as under: “13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid‟s theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) 14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.” (emphasis added) 29. Similarly, paras 24 to 26 of Mumbai International Airport (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed as follows: “24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc., the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and the court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if D claiming to be a coowner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of P representing that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half-share, the court may permit the other coowner who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the defendant vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other coowner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded coowner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit only the issues relating to specific performance, that is, whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. 25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 26. If the principles relating to impleadment are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be nonexistent. The observations in Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733] and Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective cases. In Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733] this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733] lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party.” 30. Given the expressions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court, it is sufficient to satisfy the threshold of a “fair semblance of title or interest”, either to array a party as defendant or a person coming on record as a defendant. Whether the claim ultimately succeeds is a matter for trial. It is not to be pre-adjudicated. 31. In a recent judgement, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in M/S J N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan & Ors.,7 considered Kasturi (supra), Sumtibai (supra) and Mumbai International Airport (supra) and held that the genuineness of a subsequent claim of title is a matter for trial and “cannot be used to block impleadment at the preliminary stage. The relevant para 32 of the decision is reproduced hereunder: “32. Having regard to the material on record, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court impleading the original defendant no. 8 (appellant herein) as one of the defendants in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We say so because the genuineness of the transaction, if any, including the genuineness of the documents is to be looked into in the course of the trial. A party who is seeking impleadment may not be a necessary party but still, could be termed as a proper party. There is a fine distinction between a necessary party and a proper party. A necessary party is a person in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. Whereas a proper party is one who though not a necessary party is a person whose presence would enable the court to effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit.” 32. Of course, in the decisions referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Apex Court dealt with a category of cases, wherein a third party intended to come on record by pleading a semblance of title. In the case at hand, the plaintiff arrayed defendant No.6 to the suit and contended that defendant No.6 is a subsequent transferee, pursuant to the decree in the suit O.S. No. 86 of 2021. 33. Let the issue be dealt with from another perspective. In the suit filed for specific performance, if D1 to D5 remained ex parte, and the Plaintiff proved the agreement and the Court grants relief for specific performance, then the 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015 defendant No.6 will be the ultimate affected party. Of course, the Court, by the presence or the pleading of defendant No.6, barely enlarge the scope of the suit from specific performance to a declaration. While considering the genuineness or otherwise of the sale agreement, in the fact scenario, the presence of the 6th defendant, in the opinion of this court, is imperative. 34. The facts of the case in Anil Kumar Singh, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, can be distinguished on facts. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act was not considered in that case. Apart from the same, the later decisions, the Apex Court proceeded on the ground of semblance of title. 35. In Bharat Karsondas Thakkar’s case, respondent No.1 therein prayed the Court to declare that the consent decree obtained by the appellant was not binding on him and also for a declaration that the consent decree was null and void in the suit filed for specific performance. Thus, on the facts, the ratio in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar’s case does not apply to the case at hand. 36. In Kasturi’s case referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered the question whether in a suit for specific performance of sale, instituted by purchaser against the vendor, may a stranger or third party to the contract claiming to have an independent title or possession over the property be entitled to be added as party defendant in the suit. In para 16 of the Judgment, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed as under: “16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiffappellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale.” 37. Thus, the ratio laid down in Kasturi’s case does not apply to the present case. 38. In Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand,8 the Three Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that in a suit for specific performance, a decree against the vendor, alone, may become ineffective because legal title has already passed to the transferee. The decree should direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance to pass the title vested in him to the plaintiff. 39. In the case at hand, the plaintiff, by arraying defendant No.6, sought relief in respect of specific performance, on the allegation of transfer of title after the agreement. However, in respect of alternative relief of refund of amount, no relief was claimed against him. 40. The plaintiff, in the present case, is not requesting the court to implead a third party as a party defendant to the suit. Plaintiff, being dominus litis, filed the suit by adding defendant No.6 as party defendant. The Court, at the most, considers the case of defendant No.6 vis-à-vis the enforceability of the agreement entered into between the plaintiff on one side and defendants 1 to 5 on the other. The array of defendant No. 6 is only for the purpose of joining him in the conveyance, if the plaintiff in the suit ultimately succeeds. 41. A necessary party is a person who ought to have been joined as a party to the suit and in whose absence effective decree cannot be passed by the AIR 1954 SC 75 court. A proper person is a person whose presence enables the court to adjudicate upon all the matters and issues, completely effectively and properly, though he may not be a person, in whose favour or against whom, a decree is to be made. 42. If the trial Court concludes that defendant No.6 got the suit schedule property after agreement of sale, definitely, defendant No. 6 is a necessary party, without whose presence, the decree will not be implemented. If this Court looks at the issue from the other angle, defendant No. 6 is a proper party, for the reasons that defendant No.6 is claiming semblance of title in the schedule property. 43. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay9, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while considering the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC at para 14, held as under: “14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 : (1956) 1 QB 357] , wherein after quoting the observations of WynnParry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England [(1950) 2 (1992) 2 SCC 524 All ER 605, 611] , that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated: “The test is „May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights‟.” 44. The trial court exercised the jurisdiction vested in it and dismissed the application. This court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, will not normally interfere unless there is any perversity in the order. This Court should not substitute its opinion by taking the role of an appellate Court. 45. In Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and Another Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and Others10, the Hon‟ble Apex Court by referring to the decisions reported in Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil11; Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.12, and Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel13 and considered the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and summarised the principles as follows: “35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters, is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745 (2010) 8 SCC 329 (2001) 8 SCC 97 (2022) 4 SCC 181 justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 46. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the trial Court. The order under revision brooks no interference. There are no merits in the revision. 47. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed. ___________________________ JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI Date : 04.08.2026 Ikn Whether the order is : Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No

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