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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
****
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354 of 2023
MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU, AGED 49
YEARS,
R/O.
D.NO.1-1,
MUDDADAPETA,
DAKAMARRI,
BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
… PETITIONER
Versus
ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.48-13-20/7, SRINAGAR, AKKAYYAPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM AND
OTHERS
… RESPONDENTS
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED :
04.08.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the order?
:
Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of order may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
:
Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the order?
:
Yes/No
_____________________
SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J
* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354 OF 2023
% 04.08.2026
Civil Revision Petition No: 354 of 2023
MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU, AGED 49
YEARS,
R/O.
D.NO.1-1,
MUDDADAPETA,
DAKAMARRI,
BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
… PETITIONER
Versus
ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.48-13-20/7, SRINAGAR, AKKAYYAPALEM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
… RESPONDENTS
! Counsel for Petitioner
:
^ Counsel for Respondents :
< Gist
:
> Head Note
:
? Cases referred
:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
(2013) 5 SCC 397
2005 (6) SCC 733
(2008) 13 SCC 658
(1995) 3 SCC 147
(2007) 10 SCC 82
(2010) 7 SCC 417
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015
AIR 1954 SC 75
(1992) 2 SCC 524
2026 SCC OnLine SC 745
(2010) 8 SCC 329
(2001) 8 SCC 97
(2022) 4 SCC 181
This Court made the following:
Sri G. Ram Gopal, learned counsel
Sri Srinivas, learned counsel
representing Sri K.B. Ramanna Dora,
learned counsel for respondent No.1
Date of reserved for orders :17.07.2026
Date of pronouncement
: 04.08.2026
Date of uploading
: 06.08.2026
APHC010713252022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3331]
TUESDAY, THE 4th DAY OF AUGUST 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 354/2023
Between:
1. MUDDADA RAMU NAIDU,, S/O. LATE MUDDADA PAPU NAIDU,
AGED 49 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.1-1, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI,
BHEEMUNIPATNAM, VISAKHAPATNAM.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. ANDE SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. VANAMALA RAO, AGED 53 YEARS,
R/O.
D.NO.48-13-20/7,
SRINAGAR,
AKKAYYAPALEM,
VISAKHAPATNAM.
2. MUDDADA RAMA LAKSHMI, W/O. APPALANAIDU, AGED 69 YEARS,
R/O. D.NO.50-1 -67,
LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM
MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM.
3. MUDDADA BANGARU NAIDU, S/O, LATE MUDDADA APPALA
NAIDU, AGED 35 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.54-17-78/2/2, CHAKALIPETA,
HB COLONY, VISAKHAPATNAM.
4. LODAGALA GANGAMMA, D/O. LATE APPALANAIDU, AGED 49
YEARS, R/O. D.NO.9-78, LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM
MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM.
5. LODAGALA PYDIRAJU, W/O. LODAGALA RAMUNAIDU, AGED 34
YEARS, R/O. H.NO.7-132, LODAGALAVANIPALEM, ANANDAPURAM
MANDAL, VISAKHAPATNAM.
6. NODAGALA SANYASAMMA, W/O. NODAGALA SURYANARAYANA,
AGED 36 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.8173, MUDDADAPETA, DAKAMARRI,
VISAKHAPATNAM.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the
circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be
pleased to Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition to this Hon'ble Court,
against the Order dated 27.06.2022 in I.A.No.183 of 2022 in O.S.No.1 of 2022
on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam
IA NO: 1 OF 2023
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
stay all further proceedings in OS.No.1 of 2022 on the file of II Additional
District Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending disposal of the above revision petition
in the interest of justice.
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. G RAMA GOPAL
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. K B RAMANNA DORA
The Court made the following:
:ORDER:
Defendant No.6 in the suit O.S.No.1 of 2022 on the file of the learned II
Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, filed the above civil revision petition
(hereinafter referred to as „the revision‟), against the order, dated 27.06.2022
in I.A.No.183 of 2022.
2.
Respondent No.1 herein, being the plaintiff, filed O.S.No.1 of 2022
against six defendants seeking the following reliefs:
a) Directing the Defendants 1 to 6 to execute Regular
Registered Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the
Plaint Schedule Property in terms of the Sale Agreement Dated 1708-2020 by receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.26,75,000/and get it Registered at the expenses of the Plaintiff.
b) In case if the Defendants 1 to 6 fails to execute the
Registered Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff as above, the
Honourable Court may be pleased to execute the same on behalf of
the Defendant No.6 in respect of the Plaint Schedule Property at
their expenses.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE
c) If for any reason, this Honourable court comes to a
conclusion the Plaintiff is not entitled for a Decree of Specific
Performance of Agreement of Sale, to direct the Defendants 1 to 5
to repay advance sale consideration of Rs.33,25,000/- to the
Plaintiff with subsequent interest @24% p.a. thereof from the date
of its payment till the date of its realization.
3.
cents
The land to an extent of Ac.1-50 ½ cents or 1.00 hectare out of Ac.3-01
covered
by
S.No.267
of
Dakamarri
Village
and
Panchayat,
Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, is the suit schedule property.
4.
The case, set out by the plaintiff, is that defendant No.1 is the mother of
the defendants 2 to 5, and defendant No.6 is the brother-in-law of defendant
No.1. Defendants 1 to 5 are the absolute owners of an undivided and
unspecified extent of land for an extent of Ac. 1.50½ cents or 1.00 hectare out of
Ac.3.01 cents of land covered by S.No.267 (old Survey No.59), Dakamarri
Village and Panchayat, Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District
(hereinafter referred to as „the suit schedule property‟). They acquired the same
through Sri Muddada Appala Naidu, S/o Papu Naidu, the husband of defendant
No.1 and father of defendants 2 to 5. Muddada Appala Naidu died on
28.06.2006.
ii)
Muddada Appala Naidu, during his lifetime, approached the
plaintiff and offered the suit schedule property for sale. Plaintiff agreed to
purchase the land for a consideration of ₹ 40,00,000/- and paid ₹ 10,00,000/as advance to late Muddada Appala Naidu, in the presence of defendants 1
to 5.
(iii)
During negotiations, Muddada Appala Naidu informed the plaintiff
that originally his father, late Muddada Papu Naidu, acquired the total extent
of Ac.15.40 cents in old survey numbers 59, 60 and 61 of Dakamarri Village,
Bheemunipatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, by way of purchase from
the Assistant Collector of Vizianagaram Estate vide proceedings No.Rc
6410/52-A.1/Revenue dated 01.09.1943. Later, the land was resurveyed, and
the total extent of the land was recorded as Ac.14-53 cents with new survey
numbers i.e. Ac. 10.96 cents in S.No.267 and Ac.3-57 cents in S.No.279/6.
Later, Muddada Papu Naidu obtained Ryotwari Patta in respect of the above
land vide Patta No.1911 from the Settlement Officer, Visakhapatnam.
(iv)
Muddada Papu Naidu died intestate, leaving behind his two sons,
Muddada Appala Naidu, Muddada Ramu Naidu (born to his second Wife) and
his 2nd wife, Muddada Atchayyamma, as his legal heirs. After the death of
Muddada Papu Naidu, his legal heirs, Muddada Appala Naidu, Muddada
Ramu Naidu and Muddada Atchayyamma, sold an extent of Ac. 11.52 cents
out of Ac.14.53 cents to one Chelluri Sadananda Rao and his wife Chelluri
Appalanarasamma and retained the remaining Ac.3.01 cents of land in
S.No.267, Dakamarri Village.
(v)
After the demise of Muddada Appala Naidu, defendants 1 to 5
approached the plaintiff and requested for more amount, and the plaintiff paid
Rs.10,00,000/- out of the total sale consideration of Rs.40,00,000/-.
Thereafter, defendants 1 to 5 approached the plaintiff and requested him for
enhancement of total sale consideration. The sale consideration was fixed at
Rs.60,00,000/-. The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5 entered into a sale
agreement on 17.08.2020.
(vi)
The time was fixed for the performance of the contract.
Thereafter, the plaintiff paid amounts totalling to Rs.33,25,000/- on different
dates towards part sale consideration out of the total sale consideration of
Rs.60,00,000/-. Defendants 1 to 5 have been conveniently postponing the
execution of the document.
(vii)
The plaintiff came to know that the defendants No.1 to 5 filed
O.S. 86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 on the file of the IV Addl. District
Judge, Visakhapatnam, for partition of Ac.3.01 cents of land in Survey No.267
of Dakamarri Village into two equal shares and allot one such share to the
defendants 1 to 5 and another share to defendant No.6. Defendants 1 to 5 did
not bring to the notice of the plaintiff about the filing of O.S.No.86 of 2021. The
plaintiff came to know that defendants 1 to 5 colluded with defendant No.6 and
filed O.S.No.86 of 2021 without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The defendants
are making efforts to get a compromise decree in O.S.86/2021 by referring the
matter to the Lok Adalat, to defeat or delay the execution of the registered
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
(viii) As per the terms and conditions of the sale agreement, dated
17.08.2020, without adding defendant No.6 as a party to the sale agreement,
if a decree is passed, it may not be executable against a third party. In fact,
the plaintiff‟s name was mentioned as the agreement holder in suit O.S.No.86
of 2021. The Plaintiff filed an application vide G.R.No. 1707 on 25.11.2021, to
implead him as party respondent to the suit O.S.No.86 of 2021. However, the
same was not accepted.
(ix)
The plaintiff got issued a legal notice, dated 05.12.2021, to
defendants 1 to 6 demanding them to stop their illegal acts in respect of the
suit schedule property and come forward for registration. Defendant No. 6,
knowing the agreement between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 5, obtained
a compromise award before the Lok Adalat. Thus, defendant No.6 is a
necessary party in view of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. In the
compromise, defendants 1 to 5 received an alternative property for the suit
schedule property and defendant No.6 is vested with the rights over the suit
schedule property.
5.
With these averments, in a nutshell, the suit was filed seeking specific
performance of the agreement of sale dated 17.08.2020.
6.
Defendant No.2 filed a written statement and denied the averments in
the plaint. It was contended, inter alia, that his grandfather Muddada Papu
Naidu was the absolute owner of an extent of Ac.10-96 cents and Ac.3-57
cents, totalling Ac.15-40 cents in old Sy.Nos.59, 60 and 61, which correlate to
new survey Nos.267 and 279/6, of Dakamarri Village. It was pleaded that after
the demise of Papu Naidu, the properties were partitioned orally between the
first wife's son, Appalanaidu and the mother of defendant No.6, before the
village elders. As per the said partition Ac.2-65 cents in survey No.267 and
Ac.1-19 cents in survey No.279/6, totalling Ac.3-84 cents, were given to the
share of Appalanaidu. An extent of Ac.3-84 cents was given to the mother of
defendant No.6 and the remaining property was given to defendant No.6.
Since then, Appala Naidu, Achiyyamma and defendant No.6 have been
cultivating and enjoying the properties separately and independently.
(ii) Defendants 1 to 5 sold the extent of their share to Chelluri
Sadananda Rao. Defendant No.6 and his mother also sold away some of the
lands to Chelluri Appalanarasamma, who, in turn, sold some of the lands to
Thota Ramachandra Rao and his wife Lakshmi Devi. Neither the defendants
nor their father have any right over the suit schedule property, and they never
executed the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. Defendants 1 to 5
filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 in respect of Ac.3-01
cents in Survey No.267. The defendants are surprised to note that they have
no right over the said property. The matter was placed before the elders and
thereafter before Lok Adalat, and a compromise was recorded. A decree was
passed accordingly. The agreement of sale and the receipts are false and
fabricated. The defendants previously sold their lands to real estate persons
through the plaintiff. Defendant No.2 approached the plaintiff and requested
him to advance some money for the maintenance of his family during
lockdown. The plaintiff gave five cheques for Rs.25,000/- each and obtained
the thumb impression of defendants 1 to 5 on white paper. Later, they repaid
the amount to the plaintiff. The plaintiff created receipts on white paper, and
he approached the Court with unclean hands. Eventually prayed to dismiss
the suit.
7.
Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement in the same lines of
the written statement filed by defendant No.2. It was pleaded that in respect of
an extent of Ac.3-01 cents covered by S.No.267 of Dakamarri village,
Bheemunipatnam Mandal, which was earlier granted Ryotwari Patta, by an
order in RP No.267 / 1966 dated 28.04.1966, of the Settlement Officer,
Visakhapatnam, was erroneously entered against the Form-3 list of assigned
lands, communicated to concerned Sub-Registrar under Section 5(i) of the
Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer). Therefore,
Defendant No.6 filed an application before the Tahsildar, Bheemunipatnam,
seeking deletion. The same is pending consideration before the District
Collector.
(ii)
The Government recognised the right, title and possession of
Defendant No.6 over Ac.3-01 cents covered by S.No.267 of Dakamarri village,
Bheemunipatnam Mandal. Defendant No.6 is the absolute owner of the
property, and defendants 1 to 5 have no right. Defendants 1 to 5, in collusion
with the plaintiff, brought the agreement of sale and later defendants 1 to 5
filed O.S.No.86 of 2021 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge,
Visakhapatnam. On the intervention of the village elders, defendants 1 to 5
realised their mistake and the matter was settled before Lok Adalat. The
plaintiff knows that the suit schedule property in Survey No.267 is included in
the 22-A list of the Registration Act; eventually, prayed to dismiss the suit.
8.
Pending the suit, the revision petitioner/defendant No.6 filed I.A.No.183
of 2022 under Order I Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to strike out
his name from the suit as well as I.A.No.5 of 2022.
9.
In the affidavit, it was pleaded that the suit was filed seeking specific
performance of the agreement of sale executed by defendants 1 to 5. The
deponent/defendant No.6 is not a party to the sale agreement. He was
improperly arrayed as defendant No.6. Indeed, he is not a proper and
necessary party. Thus, prayed to strike out his name from the array of the
defendants.
10.
The plaintiff filed a counter and opposed the application.
11.
The trial Court, by order dated 27.06.2022, dismissed the petition by
relying on Thomson Press (India) Ltd. V/s Nanak Builders and Investors
Pvt. Ltd and others.1
12.
Heard Sri G. Ram Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Srinivas, learned counsel representing Sri K.B. Ramanna Dora, learned
counsel for respondent No.1.
13.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the revision
petitioner/defendant No.6 is not a party to the agreement. Hence, he is not a
necessary party to the suit. The trial Court failed to appreciate Section 19 of
the Specific Relief Act, vis-a-vis defendant No.6 in a proper perspective. The
(2013) 5 SCC 397
trial Court also failed to appreciate the scope of the application filed under
Order I Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. The learned counsel, in support of his contention,
relied upon decisions reported in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and others2,
Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Constructions Company3 and Anil
Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra @ Gadara Guru4.
14.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 would contend that
defendant No.6 is also a proper and necessary party to the suit. Defendant
No.6 got the plaint schedule property, in pursuance of a compromise decree in
O.S.No.86 of 2021, from defendants 1 to 5 after the execution of the
agreement of sale dated 17.08.2020. Hence, defendant No.6 is a proper and
necessary party. The trial court considered this aspect and dismissed the
application. He placed reliance upon Thomson Press Ltd.’s case, referred to
supra. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the revision.
15.
The point for consideration is:
1. Whether the suit filed seeking specific performance against
defendant No.6, a non-executant of the agreement, be
allowed to continue?
2. Whether the interlocutory application filed by defendant
No.6 to strike out his name from the array of the
defendants, in the facts of this case, can be ordered?
3. Whether the order passed by the trial court suffers from any
illegality warranting interference of this Court, while
2005 (6) SCC 733
(2008) 13 SCC 658
(1995) 3 SCC 147
exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the
Constitution of India?
16.
The facts narrated supra need no reiteration. According to the plaintiff,
defendants 1 to 5 executed an agreement of sale dated 17.8.2020.
17.
The following instances, according to this court, weigh with the court
while dealing with the I.A. filed by the revision petitioner/D6.
Defendants 1 to 5 filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant
No.6 on the file of the IV Addl District Judge, Visakhapatnam,
seeking partition of Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri
Village.
The plaint schedule property is part of Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267
of Dakamarri Village, as per the averments in the plaint.
In O.S.No.86 of 2021, in the plaint, as seen from the averments in
the present suit, a mention was made about the agreement of
sale dated 17.08.2020.
Later, the suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 was referred to the Lok Adalat,
and the suit was compromised. The plaintiffs in that suit i.e.
defendants 1 to 5 herein, accepted the claim of the defendant in
that suit i.e. defendant No.6.
18.
In the Written Statement filed by defendant No.2 in the present suit, it
was stated as follows:
“It is true that these defendants filed a suit against 6 th defendant
bearing O.S.No. 86 of 2021 on the file of the 4th Additional District Judge,
Visakhapatnam and they came to know that the matter was put before
elders, but, they have filed the above suit in respect of the property in an
extent of Ac.3-01 cts in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village, and they were
surprised to note the same as they have no right over the said property.
Before the elders, they admitted their mistake and the matter was settled
before the elders and ultimately the matter was settled before the
Hon‟ble lok Adalat and compromise was recorded and decree was
passed accordingly.”
19.
Of course, as noted supra, defendant No.2, in the written statement,
denied execution of the sale agreement and pleaded forgery and fabrication.
Defendants 1, 3 and 5 adopted the written statement of defendant No.2.
20.
Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement and asserted title to
Ac.3-01 cents in S.No. 267 of Dakamarri Village.
In the light of the above pleadings, whether D6 is a proper and
necessary party to the suit?
21.
As seen from the pleadings, the plaintiff is seeking relief of specific
performance against defendants 1 to 6 and for refund of amount against
defendants 1 to 5.
22.
Defendant No.6, the revision petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support of
the petition to strike off his name, contended that he is the absolute owner of
the suit schedule property and it is his ancestral property; he is not a party to
the agreement of sale and he was unnecessarily and improperly added as
defendant No.6. The necessary documents were filed to prove his title and
possession over the plaint schedule property.
23.
Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 envisages relief against the
parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. It is apt to
extract Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
“Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific
performance of a contract may be enforced against—
(a) ….
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to
the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in
good faith and without notice of the original contract;
(c) …
(ca) …
(d) …
(e) …”
24.
In this case at hand, the agreement of sale relied upon by the plaintiff is
dated 17.08.2020, allegedly executed by defendants 1 to 5. Defendants 1 to 5
filed suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 against defendant No.6 seeking partition of the
suit schedule property and other property. The suit O.S.No.86 of 2021 was
referred to and settled by defendant No.6 before Lok Adalat. Whether
defendant No. 6 acquired title in pursuance of suit O.S. No. 86 of 2021 or is
claiming independent title is a matter to be decided after the parties have led
in evidence. If the trial Court concludes that defendant No.6 got the suit
schedule property pursuant to the settlement in O.S No. 86 of 2021, Section
19(b) of the Relief Act comes into play.
25. The next question is whether defendant No.6 is a proper and necessary
party to the suit. It is apt to refer to the principle of “Semblance of title” as laid
down by the Apex Court time and again to determine this issue.
Semblance of title
26. It is well settled law that in a suit for specific performance, the class of
“necessary parties” is ordinarily confined to the parties to the contract, their
legal representatives, and transferees from a party to the contract. That is,
however, not the end of the legal regime. A division bench of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Sumtibai vs Paras Finance Co.,5 while distinguishing Kasturi’s
case (supra) on facts, held that a person who shows a fair semblance of title
or interest in the suit property may be impleaded as a proper party, even
though not a necessary party, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
27.
This position was later reiterated by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Mumbai
International Airport (P) Ltd. vs Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P)
Ltd. and Ors.6, wherein the Apex Court reconciled Kasturi’s case and
Sumtibai’s case and held that there is no real conflict between those
(2007) 10 SCC 82
(2010) 7 SCC 417
judgments. Kasturi‟s case confines the necessary-party category, while
Sumtibai’s case recognises a wider, discretionary category of proper parties
available to anyone with a semblance of title.
28.
Para 13 & 14 of Sumtibai (supra), which are relevant, are reproduced
as under:
“13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8
SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without
disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also
observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)
“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation
of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are
neither to be read as Euclid‟s theorems nor as provisions of a statute
and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be
read in the context in which they appear to have been stated.
Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary
for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is
meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do
not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words
are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co.
Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott
observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi
case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot
be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific
performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be
impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of
title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take
a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because
then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a
suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the
property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.”
(emphasis added)
29.
Similarly, paras 24 to 26 of Mumbai International Airport (supra), the
Hon‟ble Apex Court observed as follows:
“24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a
proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc., the court will normally
implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a
non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party
and the court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his
addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter
the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss
the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want
to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may
direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either
unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if D claiming to be a coowner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in
favour of P representing that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P
files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in
respect of the undivided half-share, the court may permit the other coowner who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded
as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the
issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the
agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share;
alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and
leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the defendant
vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other coowner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but
subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded coowner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will
not be the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it
will decide in the suit only the issues relating to specific performance,
that is, whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and
whether such contract should be specifically enforced.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject
an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon
the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he
should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party.
26. If the principles relating to impleadment are kept in view, then the
purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be nonexistent. The observations in Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733]
and Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] are with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the respective cases. In Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733]
this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to
the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a
transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties.
In Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] this Court held that a person having
semblance of a title can be considered as a proper
party. Sumtibai [(2007) 10 SCC 82] did not lay down any proposition that
anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor
did Kasturi [(2005) 6 SCC 733] lay down that no one, other than the
parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be
impleaded even as a proper party.”
30.
Given the expressions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court, it is sufficient to
satisfy the threshold of a “fair semblance of title or interest”, either to array a
party as defendant or a person coming on record as a defendant. Whether the
claim ultimately succeeds is a matter for trial. It is not to be pre-adjudicated.
31.
In a recent judgement, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in M/S J N Real Estate
v. Shailendra Pradhan & Ors.,7 considered Kasturi (supra), Sumtibai
(supra) and Mumbai International Airport (supra) and held that the
genuineness of a subsequent claim of title is a matter for trial and “cannot be
used to block impleadment at the preliminary stage. The relevant para 32 of
the decision is reproduced hereunder:
“32. Having regard to the material on record, we are of the view that the
High Court should not have interfered with the order passed by the Trial
Court impleading the original defendant no. 8 (appellant herein) as one
of the defendants in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We say so because the
genuineness of the transaction, if any, including the genuineness of the
documents is to be looked into in the course of the trial. A party who is
seeking impleadment may not be a necessary party but still, could be
termed as a proper party. There is a fine distinction between a
necessary party and a proper party. A necessary party is a person in
whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court.
Whereas a proper party is one who though not a necessary party is a
person whose presence would enable the court to effectively and
adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit.”
32.
Of course, in the decisions referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Apex Court
dealt with a category of cases, wherein a third party intended to come on
record by pleading a semblance of title. In the case at hand, the plaintiff
arrayed defendant No.6 to the suit and contended that defendant No.6 is a
subsequent transferee, pursuant to the decree in the suit O.S. No. 86 of 2021.
33.
Let the issue be dealt with from another perspective. In the suit filed for
specific performance, if D1 to D5 remained ex parte, and the Plaintiff proved
the agreement and the Court grants relief for specific performance, then the
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015
defendant No.6 will be the ultimate affected party. Of course, the Court, by
the presence or the pleading of defendant No.6, barely enlarge the scope of
the suit from specific performance to a declaration. While considering the
genuineness or otherwise of the sale agreement, in the fact scenario, the
presence of the 6th defendant, in the opinion of this court, is imperative.
34. The facts of the case in Anil Kumar Singh, cited by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, can be distinguished on facts. Section 19 of the Specific
Relief Act was not considered in that case. Apart from the same, the later
decisions, the Apex Court proceeded on the ground of semblance of title.
35.
In Bharat Karsondas Thakkar’s case, respondent No.1 therein prayed
the Court to declare that the consent decree obtained by the appellant was not
binding on him and also for a declaration that the consent decree was null and
void in the suit filed for specific performance. Thus, on the facts, the ratio in
Bharat Karsondas Thakkar’s case does not apply to the case at hand.
36.
In Kasturi’s case referred to supra, the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered
the question whether in a suit for specific performance of sale, instituted by
purchaser against the vendor, may a stranger or third party to the contract
claiming to have an independent title or possession over the property be
entitled to be added as party defendant in the suit. In para 16 of the Judgment,
the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed as under:
“16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule
(2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved in the suit” it is
abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies
raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only,
that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and
the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the
controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the
defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a
third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of
collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of
contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiffappellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1
and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a
complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious
questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to
be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the
contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and
interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted
property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier,
Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added
in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale.”
37.
Thus, the ratio laid down in Kasturi’s case does not apply to the
present case.
38.
In Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand,8 the Three Bench of the
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that in a suit for specific performance, a decree
against the vendor, alone, may become ineffective because legal title has
already passed to the transferee. The decree should direct the subsequent
transferee to join in the conveyance to pass the title vested in him to the
plaintiff.
39.
In the case at hand, the plaintiff, by arraying defendant No.6, sought
relief in respect of specific performance, on the allegation of transfer of title
after the agreement. However, in respect of alternative relief of refund of
amount, no relief was claimed against him.
40.
The plaintiff, in the present case, is not requesting the court to implead
a third party as a party defendant to the suit. Plaintiff, being dominus litis, filed
the suit by adding defendant No.6 as party defendant. The Court, at the most,
considers the case of defendant No.6 vis-à-vis the enforceability of the
agreement entered into between the plaintiff on one side and defendants 1 to
5 on the other. The array of defendant No. 6 is only for the purpose of joining
him in the conveyance, if the plaintiff in the suit ultimately succeeds.
41.
A necessary party is a person who ought to have been joined as a party
to the suit and in whose absence effective decree cannot be passed by the
AIR 1954 SC 75
court. A proper person is a person whose presence enables the court to
adjudicate upon all the matters and issues, completely effectively and
properly, though he may not be a person, in whose favour or against whom, a
decree is to be made.
42.
If the trial Court concludes that defendant No.6 got the suit schedule
property after agreement of sale, definitely, defendant No. 6 is a necessary
party, without whose presence, the decree will not be implemented. If this
Court looks at the issue from the other angle, defendant No. 6 is a proper
party, for the reasons that defendant No.6 is claiming semblance of title in the
schedule property.
43.
In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Bombay9, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while considering the scope of Order I
Rule 10(2) CPC at para 14, held as under:
“14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that
appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main
objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is
necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not
merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions
involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely
that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved
and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason
which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so
that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to
be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be
effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been
drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or
the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that
the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the
answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will
affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say
that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only
object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was
considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 :
(1956) 1 QB 357] , wherein after quoting the observations of WynnParry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England [(1950) 2
(1992) 2 SCC 524
All ER 605, 611] , that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of
what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what
would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights
could be established, Devlin, J. has stated:
“The test is „May the order for which the plaintiff is
asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his
legal rights‟.”
44.
The trial court exercised the jurisdiction vested in it and dismissed the
application. This court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, will not normally interfere unless there is any perversity
in the order. This Court should not substitute its opinion by taking the role of
an appellate Court.
45.
In Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and Another Vs.
B. Gurappa Naidu and Others10, the Hon‟ble Apex Court by referring to the
decisions reported in Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil11;
Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.12, and Garment Craft Vs.
Prakash Chand Goel13 and considered the scope of supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 and summarised the principles as follows:
“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters, is as follows:
a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised
unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not
vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an
unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals.
b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article
cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error,
which is not apparent on the face of the record.
c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court
of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which
the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not
to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is
2026 SCC OnLine SC 745
(2010) 8 SCC 329
(2001) 8 SCC 97
(2022) 4 SCC 181
justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.”
46.
Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any perversity or
illegality in the order passed by the trial Court. The order under revision
brooks no interference. There are no merits in the revision.
47.
Hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand
closed.
___________________________
JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
Date : 04.08.2026
Ikn
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