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2025:MLHC:1248
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 24 of 2025
Date of Decision :17.12.2025
M/s BSC-C & C JV
Through Mr. D. Srinivasa Rao,
Deputy General Manager (Contracts),
Office at: Plot No. 30, Institutional Area,
Sector-32 Gurugram, Haryana-122001
… Petitioner(s)
Versus
Public Works Department (Roads) through
Its Chief Engineer (National Highways)
Government of Meghalaya
… Respondent(s)
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge.
_____________________________________________________________
2025:MLHC:1248
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. S. Muralidhar. Sr. Adv. with
Mr. R. Prakash, Adv.
Mr. A. Raghuvanshi, Adv.
Ms. S. Gangar, Adv.
Mr. M.A Karthik, Adv.
Ms. G.C. Marboh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. A.S. Pandey, Adv.
Mrs. N.G. Shylla, Sr. GA
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Add. Sr. GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
By the instant writ petition the petitioner a joint venture concern
is assailing the order dated 03.12.2024 passed by the respondents, whereby
the petitioner has been blacklisted/debarred for 5(five) years from
participating in any future tender/contract of Public Works Department.
2.
The brief facts are that the tender and contract referred to in the
impugned order of blacklisting, relates to a work of ‘Two (2) Laning of
Shillong-Nongstoin Section of NH-44E and Nongstoin-Rongjeng-Tura Road
under Phase-A of SARDP-Ne-NH-44E & SR-MG-PWD-2010-11-172’, in
the State of Meghalaya, which was awarded to the petitioner, at a bid amount
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of Rs. 1303.83 Crores, with the date of completion of the contract set at
07.03.2014. During the course of execution, the original contract price went
into several revisions mostly on account of the additional works, which were
added and due to price adjustments. Due to several factors, the work was not
completed by the stipulated completion date but was prolonged further for a
period of 6(six) years and was finally completed in December, 2017. Disputes
thereafter, between the parties arose in the year 2017 and 2018, on certain
claims, which as per the terms of the contract were put before a duly
constituted Dispute Resolution Board (DRB), but as the respondent failed to
make payment of interest awarded by the DRB, notice was sent by the
petitioner with regard to the intention to invoke arbitration on the unpaid
claims.
3.
However, before the arbitration proceedings were concluded, the
respondent filed a complaint for registration of an FIR on the allegations, that
the petitioner had indulged in fabrication of records and adopted corrupt
means to cause huge loss to the public exchequer. The case was then
accordingly registered and a show cause notice of blacklisting was also issued
to the petitioner, which was also annexed by the respondent as an annexure to
a Section 16 application, filed before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral
Tribunal then passed its award with the majority of 2:1, allowing Claim-I of
the petitioner and rejecting the entire Claim-II of the petitioner. The petitioner
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then received the impugned notice of blacklisting, debarring it for 5(five)
years on the allegations of bribery and corruption. Hence, the writ petition.
4.
Mr. S. Muralidhar, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. R.
Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner
was awarded the contract on 21.02.2011, and while the project encountered
certain delays, which were beyond the petitioner’s control, the work was
successfully completed on 15.12.2017. The project completion certificate he
submits, was issued by the respondent on 13.03.2018 and that, during the
execution period there were no complaints or allegations against the
petitioners regarding the quality, workmanship or progress of work. In the
course of the contract it is submitted, the contract price increased which was
subject to adjustment on the increase or decrease in the rates and prices of
materials, which were to be dealt with under clause 47 of the contract. The
learned Senior counsel submits that due to the additional scope of works and
amounts, supplementary agreements were signed between the petitioner and
the respondent under four sanctioned revised cost estimates on 30.07.2013,
06.02.2015, 07.07.2015 and 30.05.2017, which took the project cost from
1303.83 Crores to 2406.46 Crores. These revisions in the contract price it is
submitted, were as per due procedure and in fact, the revised cost estimate
was prepared by the officers of the respondent and forwarded to Ministry of
Roads Transport and Highways for evaluation and due sanction. The
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respondent therefore, he contends despite having full knowledge and
understanding of the procedure involved, while sanctioning the increased
cost, falsely stated that it was with the connivance and involvement of the
petitioner and its officers that the revisions were allowed.
5.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that disputes arose in
2017/2018, when the recommendation of the Dispute Resolution Board
(DRB) with respect to the legitimate claims of the petitioner were partly
honoured, but not the other claims that had been adjudicated and
recommended by a second reference of dispute to the DRB. He submits that
though attempts were made to settle the matter amicably, the same was
ultimately referred to arbitration under clause-3 of the Special Conditions of
Contract and the proceedings commenced on 10.04.2019. It is submitted that
the record of the arbitration would show that the respondent delayed the
proceedings and did not file its reply until 09.11.2020 and in its statement of
defense, no whisper of any allegation with respect to any documents that were
placed by the petitioner/claimant, were made therein. Thereafter, even when
issues were framed on 14.02.2022, the learned Senior counsel submits, there
was no whisper of any allegation and this continued even into the evidence
stage, and that even after the petitioners’ witnesses were extensively
examined on many dates, there never was any hint about any charge or
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charges of bribery/corruption and the entire discourse was only with regard to
exaggeration of claims.
6.
It is then contended that only after the petitioner had established
its legitimate claims in the arbitration proceedings, and after conclusion of
arguments in September 2024, at this very belated stage, the respondent as an
afterthought resorted to the drastic measure of blacklisting the petitioner by
first issuing a show cause notice dated 16.09.2024, and subsequently the
impugned order of blacklisting dated 03.12.2024. The learned Senior counsel
then argues that it is the case of the petitioner, that blacklisting has been
resorted to as a means to arm twist the petitioner into giving up its legitimate
contractual claims against the respondent, and in this context, submits, it has
not been explained as to what was the basis for this punitive action, which
neither arose from, or is related to the contract in question. The timings he
submits, i.e. the events of lodging of complaint, FIR, show cause notice and
eventual blacklisting, all happened around the same time i.e. September,
2024, after the conclusion of the final opening arguments by the
petitioner/claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal. These actions he contends,
have been made with serious malice only to frustrate and prejudice the mind
of the Arbitral Tribunal and also the on-going investigation on the charges
levelled by the respondent.
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7.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that in trying to establish
a case of corruption and bribery, the respondent is relying upon the documents
submitted by the petitioner in the arbitration proceedings and is trying to
mould the same to try and make out a case to meet its own mala fide
objectives. It is further submitted that the said issue of alleged corruption and
bribery was not a subject matter of arbitration, and was only maliciously
brought in by the respondent by way of an application under Section 16, at
the time of filing arguments before the Arbitral Tribunal. He then asserts that
since neither an issue was framed before the Tribunal on this point, and the
Tribunal also lacking authority to deal with a subject matter pending
investigation, the same cannot be allowed to be relied upon by the respondent
before this Court. The impugned blacklisting order he submits, is patently
flawed as it is based on unproven and unsupported allegations and in this
regard has contended that while the show cause notice refers to 17 ledger
entries for the financial year 2014-2015, and alleges bribery and corruption,
however, in the blacklisting order apart from these 17 entries, certain entries
of 2015-2016, 2016-2017, has also been added which were never included in
the show cause notice issued by the respondent. It is then contended that
though the entire basis for blacklisting hinges upon the charges of bribery and
corruption, however, on a bare perusal of the FIR, it would be evident that
there are no charges of bribery and further only one retired Chief Engineer
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has been named in the FIR, who till date has not been summoned by the
Investigating Officer.
8.
It then submitted that the principle of fairness and natural justice
requires the authority to issue a clear specific and reasoned show cause notice
before issuing any adverse order that affects a person’s rights. The charges
enumerated against the petitioner in the impugned order it is submitted, are
patently unjust, unfair and abuse of power by the respondent by instructing
the concerned Police authorities to lodge the FIR against the petitioner and its
officers including shareholders. Admittedly he contends, the so-called action
by the respondents was taken after seven years from the day the project was
completed and the same was purely a mala fide act to prejudice the arbitral
tribunal and consequently sabotage the legitimate claim of the petitioner. The
learned Senior counsel has then reiterated his earlier arguments, with regard
to the actions of the respondents being a clear counterblast with the intent to
scuttle the arbitration proceedings, which is reflected by their conduct when
the second set of claims which had been presented before the Dispute
Resolution Board (DRB), had been allowed.
9.
The learned Senior counsel has also narrated the sequence of
events whereby, the respondent had made several attempts to challenge the
interim award of the Rs. 75 Crores passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on
27.07.2021, till the stage of final arguments after the conclusion of the
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petitioner’s side when on 03.09.2024, the respondent had filed the complaint
against the petitioner based on the documents filed along with the statement
of claims on 30.05.2019. Thereafter he submits, on 17.09.2024, the
respondent had filed an application under Section 16, contending that the
dispute had become non-arbitrable, and that it was along with this application
that a copy of the show cause notice was served on the petitioner. The attempt
of the respondent it is submitted to justify that the blacklisting, was also on
the basis of the award of the Tribunal 12.12.2024 upholding claim-I but
rejecting claim II, is unfounded, inasmuch as, the show cause notice was
issued on 16.09.2024 and the blacklisting notice on 03.12.2024, which was
much prior to the Arbitral award 12.12.2024.
10.
The invocation of the clauses of the bid document or contract, it
is argued is legally unsustainable, inasmuch as, both the tender process and
the work were conducted by the petitioner in accordance with the directions
of the respondents and no objection was made by the respondent at any stage,
and as such, there can be no reliance by the respondent on clause 37 of the
Instructions to Bidders and clause 59 of the General Conditions of Contract.
Clause 37, it is submitted which is sought to be relied upon by the respondent
relates to mis-conduct, or improper actions at the pre-award stage and clause
59 of the GCC, which grants the respondent the right to terminate for the
fundamental or material breach is not applicable in the present case, nor can
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it be invoked retrospectively to justify the impugned blacklisting. The learned
Senior counsel also urged that the said clauses i.e. clause 37 and 59, cannot
form the basis for blacklisting at this belated stage without establishing any
fundamental breach and therefore, the impugned show cause on this ground
alone is liable to be quashed.
In support of his arguments, the learned Senior counsel has relied
upon the following cases:1. M/S Eurasian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd v. State of
West Bengal (1975) 1 SCC 70;
2. Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi)
and Other (2014) 9 SCC 105;
3. UMC Technologies Private Ltd v. Food Corporation of
India and Anr (2021) 2 SCC 551;
4. V-MARC India Ltd v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC
OnLine All 379;
5. Floral Electrical Pvt. Ltd v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran
Nigam Ltd and Anr, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 2191; and
6. M/S Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook
Corporation & ANR, SLP (c) No. 10042 of 2023.
11.
The learned AG on behalf of the respondents in reply has at the
outset submitted that both the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed,
inasmuch as, the blacklisting is justified, reasonable, proportionate and in
larger public interest and is consequent to admitted acts of the contractors of
large-scale corruption, bribery and extension of illegal gratification by the
contractor to Government officials and other entities during execution of the
contract. The learned AG has submitted that the petitioners have admitted by
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way of its own ledger entries, that it indulged in extending illegal
gratifications including supply of wine bottles, costly gifts, laptops, hotel
arrangements, donations to unknown organizations, apart from other such
means, to Government officials, Dispute Resolution Board members and
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways officials as part of the execution
of the contract. Sixteen (16) volumes of documents it is submitted, running
close to 9500 pages, in various ledgers which had been filed for supporting
the claims of the petitioners before the Arbitral Tribunal, contain the entries
which revealed the illegal gratifications to procure favour from the Engineers
and Government officials and DRB members etc. The learned AG has then
enumerated the many entries, which he submits, has irrefutably substantiated
the petitioners’ indulgence in rampant corruption and that the ledger entries,
are just the tip of the iceberg, which the petitioners have not denied, but tried
to term these acts of bribery and corruption, as legitimate business expenses.
12.
The petitioners he submits, failed to respond to any of the
allegations of ledger entries regarding corruption and bribery in their reply to
the impugned show cause, rather they admitted the correctness of such entries
and sought to justify that the money was paid legitimately for day-to-day
expenses of the project incurred between 2014-17. The witness for the
petitioners the learned AG submits, in cross-examination in the Arbitral
proceedings, had also admitted to the correctness of such ledger entries and
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as such the explanation given by the petitioners is nothing but admission of
illegal gratification and a disingenuous attempt to camouflage outright
corruption. The materials presented it is submitted, were examined in greater
detail to meet the arbitral claims made by the contractor and the same revealed
the adoption of a systematic approach of extending illegal gratification on a
regular basis to various officials, DRB members, MoRTH officials, apart
from such other expenditures, which were also claimed as a legitimate cost of
the project, for which reimbursement was sought from the Arbitral Tribunal.
13.
The learned AG submits that the matter is undergoing detailed
investigation and that the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 have also been invoked. The Directorate of Enforcement he submits, has
also issued summons to one Shri Almond M. Kharmawphlang, former Chief
Engineer in relation to investigation under the provisions of Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002, and has called for attendance for production of
the records, documents, evidence etc., collected in connection with the said
FIR.
14.
The Arbitration Tribunal he submits, having the benefit of all the
materials including deposition on cross-examination vide award dated
12.12.2024, returned a categorical finding that the petitioners/contractor
indulged in acts of corruption and fraud. To buttress this submission, the
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learned AG has taken this Court to the relevant paragraphs of the award,
which are set forth hereinbelow: - (reproduced from written submissions)
“181. The Claimant has asked to reimburse donation
made to The Police Officers Wives Association (of Rs
4,00,000/-, page 5886 of SOC, donation made to
Nongkhnum We care Society (Rs 5,00,000/-), donation
made to Khasi Students Union (of more than Rs 6,00,000/); to Gurudwara Singh Sabha (many entries eg at pages
5871, 5874, 5881, 5882, 5884 etc), Badminton
Association (Rs 25,000/-) etc. these donations are not
related to the project expenditure and cannot be
reimbursed.
182. The Claimant has booked significant amounts spent
towards Diwali and Christmas gifting which include
costly gifts such as mobiles, cameras etc as per entries as
below:
183. There are then entries regarding payment to CFO of
the district Council @ Rs 5,000/- per month (entries for
May June July 2014 at page 5878, Aug and Sep 2014 at
page 5881, Nov 14 at page 5887, entries for month of July,
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August and September on page 7120 of SOC). There are
entries regarding monthly payments to the police station.
184. There are entries of influencing/bribing sales tax
offices (many entries eg pages 5876, 5891 and 7121 of
SOC), IOCL officials and bank auditors. There are many
entries regarding influencing the officers of PWD
department, the employer in this case. MoRTH officers
and DRB members are also not left uncompromised.
185. It is surprising that the Claimant is asking the State
to reimburse (along with interest), the expenditure made
by the Contractor on the above, wrongly entertaining the
officials/officers, offerings liquor and gifts to the same not
only at Diwali and Christmas festivals, but at other times.
188. These payments, presented by the Claimant are for
purchasing gift items for government officials including
PWD, wine bottles for officials, making stay and food
arrangements of MoRTH officials, arranging food and
other expenditure at the time of DRB meetings. It also
comes out that DRB member accompanies Mr. D Srinivas,
the witness of the Claimant in the present case, while
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coming to Shillong and tickets are also booked by the
Claimant.
191. It is true that there is no specific plea by the
Respondent in SOD regarding the corruption angle. It was
also not made at the time of decision dated 27.07.2021.
However, the Arbitral Tribunal is duty bound to see the
papers presented by the Claimant in the Statement of
Claim, especially when these are being brought to our
knowledge. Despite such knowledge coming to the fore,
the Claimant's written submissions remain silent on this
issue. Obviously, the Claimant has nothing to say as all
such vouchers register the detail and even at some points
name the Government officials who have gotten the
favours. There is an extensive list favouring Engineers,
DRB members, MoRTH officials. Such payments clearly
indicate connivance between engineers and the Claimant
as noted by the Hon'ble High court of Meghalaya in its
order dated 09.05.2022.
193. Thus, regarding this sub issue, the Arbitral tribunal
is of the view that the Claimant has caused Fundamental
Breach of Contract under Clause 59(h) of the Contract.
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194. The Arbitral Tribunal also has no hesitation in
observing that such documents do show connivance of
the Claimant with the Engineers on the site. Even
MoRTH and RB are also not beyond suspicion.
209. The Arbitral Tribunal, after hearing both the parties
and going through the record, is of the view that the
Respondent has invoked arbitration after DRB 2 as per its
right which it has not done in the case of DRB I. Therefore,
the DRB 2 decision needs to be looked into greater detail
by the Tribunal and it cannot be taken as such as
suggested by the Claimant despite the fact that the
Engineers have given nil challenge to the Claimant's
claim before DRB 2 and happily even 'physical verified'
the machinery in a meeting of DRB 2.
226. The so-called verification has happened in August
2018 which is not of much help. How can physical
verification of machinery deployed in 2011-2016 take
place in 2018? Rather it raises more issues than answers
and brings in the influence of liquor and gifts in the
whole set up to get public money where it is not fully
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proven. In any case the verification by Engineers is not
of much use as they are under influence of the Claimant.
238. Having discussed the above sub issues, the arbitral
tribunal looked at the whole issue (ii) in entirety. A few
salient points emerge as follows:
(i) The Claimant has the temerity to put up vouchers
showing offering of liquor, gifts to everybody involved in
the process starting from JE to Chief Engineers,
arranging parties for Engineers, funding MoRTH
officials for stay and even members of DRB. The
Claimant has even asked the Arbitral Tribunal to
reimburse all such expenditures with interest. These
vouchers perhaps explain the argument made by the
Claimant that no letter of Claimant has been
controverted and even in DRB, Engineers have not put
up any paper against the claims put up by the Claimant.
The so-called correspondence of the Engineers to
MoRTH in favour of the Claimant also comes under
suspicion. As MoRTH officials are also claimed (by
vouchers) to be compromised, perhaps the issue of
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increase of work from Rs 1,303 cr to Rs 2,406 cr also
needs reexamination.
(ii) Clause 59.2 of the Contract states that 'corrupt
practice’ means the offering, giving, receiving or
soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of a
public official in procurement process or in contract
execution. The action of the Claimant meets all these
parameters and Claimant, by virtue of these vouchers, has
indulged into corrupt practice. Thus, the Claimant has
caused Fundamental Breach of Contract
(iii) Someone may say that the decision to decide about
the Fundamental Breach is with the Engineer and
Engineer has not decided anything. Further there is no
effect of the Fundamental breach at this time as the
Contract is already over and no action envisaged in
59.3,59.4, 59.5 or Clause 60 can be taken. Thus, there is
no consequence of this fundamental breach at this
moment.
(iv) However, the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that in
view of such vouchers on the file put by the Claimant
itself, the so-called argument that the claims are
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admitted by the Respondent falls flat as this so-called
admission is influenced by extraneous considerations
and cannot be relied upon. Even the DRB orders have
become suspect. Further such a conduct saddles the
Claimant with more responsibility to prove his claims
with more rigour.
(v) Further the Arbitral tribunal comes to the considered
conclusion that the Supplementary agreements of
06.08.2013, 23.02.2015 and 24.08.2016 have altered the
intended completion date and in any case, it is common
sense that the work of Rs 2406 crore cannot be completed
in the same time as work of Rs 1303 crore
(vi) As noted above, 98% of the work gets completed by
April 2016 itself, much before the agreed date of
completion as per three Supplementary Agreements.
(vii) Further as explained above, the Claimant's
calculations are totally off mark. These stand highly
exaggerated and in the light of acceptance of plea that
intended
completion
date
got
altered
due
to
Supplementary Agreements, no claim is made out.
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240. In the light of issues taken holistically, the Claimant
has been compensated more than what is required, by the
fact of increased cost of the project and consequent
profit; and by the award in lieu of DRB 1 when some of
the issues which have come to the light now, had not
come to the fore, though the papers were available."
15.
The learned AG then strongly contends that in the light of these
revelations, the contractor/petitioner is liable to be barred from participating
in future tenders, as permitting or condoning such conduct would result in
substantial loss to the public and encourage the repetition of similar
malpractices. The Arbitral Tribunal in this context he submits, has also
correctly held that the increase in the project cost is also in question, and has
even concluded that the DRB recommendations, are also not beyond the
shadow of doubt and that the same needs to examined in the light of various
illegal gratifications extended by the petitioners. The learned AG has gone on
to submit that from an initial project cost of Rs. 1300 Crores, the same has
increased to more than Rs. 2400 Crores approximately, and that there are
specific ledger entries in respect of DRB members, who had verified the
claims of plant and machinery of the contractors in August-September 2018,
when the project itself stood completed in December, 2017 and there was no
question of there being any plant and machinery present. The
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contractors/petitioners he submits, has already admitted to receiving 2523.38
Crores, as part of the total payments and has also received 94 Crores in
pursuance to order dated 22.07.2021, passed by the Arbitration Tribunal
based on admissions before the DRB. The admission of such claims by the
Engineer causing huge loss to public exchequer he submits, is apparent from
a letter dated 16.05.2016, whereby the earlier Engineer had denied all the
claims of the petitioners, but on the U-turn taken by the new Engineer vide
letter dated 12.09.2016, the Arbitral Tribunal by way of award dated
27.07.2021, awarded 75 Crores based on these admissions.
16.
The learned AG submits that as ledger entries themselves reveal
the underlying reasons for admissions made by the Government officials,
which has caused huge loss to the public exchequer, in the light of such
revelations, the blacklisting of the petitioners is reasonable, justified and
proportionate. In support of his submissions, the learned AG has relied upon
the following decisions: 1. Public Works Department (National Highway) v/s
M/S BSC-CC &JV, passed in Arb.A.No.6 of 2023,
para 37;
2. Shri Dharamukkala Srinivasa Rao v/s State of
Meghalaya and Ors, passed in Crl. M.C. No.26 of
2025 in Crl. Petn No.20 of 2025; and
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3. Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General
Manager Western Telecom Project BSNL, (2014)
14 SCC 731, Para 17.
17.
It is then submitted that clause 59.2 (h) of the contract including
clause 37 of the Instructions to Bidders permit the respondents to
blacklist/debar the contractor for fraudulent practice and that even
independent of the same, an Employer has an inherent right to choose with
whom to do business with and to debar entities which indulge in fraudulent
activities. The learned AG has cited the case of Kulja Industries Limited vs.
Chief General Manager Western Telecom Project BSNL (2014) 14 SCC
732, to support this submission.
18.
The learned AG has also advanced the submission that the joint
venture and consequently the constituting entities are liable for the acts of
bribery, corruption, fraud and cheating, inasmuch as, both the constituent
partners of the joint venture actively participated in execution of the contract
and indulged in acts of illegal gratification. A bare perusal of the JV
agreement dated 14.06.2010 between M/s BSCPL Infrastructure Ltd., and C
& C Construction Ltd., he submits, reveals the liability of both the partners
and further the reply to the show cause has also been filed on behalf of the
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Joint Venture itself. In this regard, the learned AG has placed reliance on the
following decisions: i)
ITD Cementation India Ltd. v. SSJV-ZVS JV, (2023) SCC OnLine
Del 1391
ii)
TPF Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. National Highway Logistics
Management Ltd., (2023) SCC OnLine Del 7116
iii)
19.
State of Odisha v. Panda Infraproject Ltd., (2022) 4 SCC 393
On the question of the delay in lodging the FIR and in issuing the
impugned show cause notice, it is submitted by the learned AG, that such a
contention in itself, amounts to an implicit admission that acts of corruption
were indeed committed by the petitioners, and are now being urged to be
disregarded merely on the ground of delay in their detection. This contention
he submits, is untenable and contrary to the principles of the Rule of Law, as
acts of bribery, corruption, fraud and cheating cannot be wiped away. It is
further submitted that the show cause notice, was served immediately upon
discovery of the corrupt and fraudulent acts committed by the petitioners,
inasmuch as, as there was a stay of arbitral proceedings by the Supreme Court,
the cross-examination of the witness of the contractors could be concluded
only on 17.10.2023, after the stay had been lifted and thereafter, as the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal then expired and was revived only pursuant
to order dated 04.07.2024 passed by the Commercial Court, considerable time
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had elapsed. Thus, he submits it was only on the resumption of the
proceedings on a detailed examination of the ledgers to meet the arbitral
claims, that the systematic corruption was revealed leading to the issuance of
the show cause notice to the contractor and its constituent JV partners.
20.
It is also been asserted by the learned AG, that the petitioner has
suppressed material and facts such as corporate insolvency resolution process
initiated against C&C Construction the joint venture partners, and that the
same is under liquidation. It is also been submitted that there is a Serious
Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) inquiry initiated against C&C Construction
and that the Joint Venture has filed the writ petition without the permission of
the official liquidator. It does appear he contends, that M/s BSCPL
Infrastructure has been pursuing Arbitration and appropriating the amounts
behind the back of C&C Construction, inasmuch as, the statement of claims
was filed before the Arbitral Tribunal on 05.08.2019, much after the initiation
of CIRP without ever mentioning the same.
21.
In the context of the show cause, the learned AG has referred to
the case of Grosons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd., v. State of U.P & Ors. (2001)
8 SCC 604, which he submits the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is a
sufficient requirement of law, that an opportunity of show cause is given
before blacklisting and that it is also not necessary to give all materials. He
then submits that the petitioner was granted reasonable opportunity of being
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heard and that the Show Cause Notice, specifically detailed the grounds on
which blacklisting was proposed and the failure of the petitioner to explain
the allegations and even admitting to the alleged acts in its reply to the show
cause, the blacklisting order is therefore reasonable, proportionate and in
public interest. In this regard reliance has been placed in the case of Patel
Engineering v/s Union of India (2012) 11 SCC 257, wherein he submits it
has been held that power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect
private interest at the cost of public interest. Reliance has also been placed on
this same point, by citing the cases of Asia Foundations and Construction
Ltd v/s State of Gujarat (1985) SCC OnLine Guj 93 and Ridhhi Siddhi
Associates v/s NHAI 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5513. The learned AG then
closes his submission by reiterating his submissions that the blacklisting of
the petitioners is justified, reasonable, proportionate and in the larger public
interest and is consequent to admitted acts of large-scale corruption and
extension of illegal gratification by the contractor to government officials
during the execution of the contract.
22.
On hearing the learned counsels of the parties, though lengthy
submissions have been advanced and various authorities quoted in support of
their respective cases, on examination of the materials and on consideration
of the arguments so advanced, in the considered view of the court the issue
revolves only around the legality of the blacklisting order, whether there was
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substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice, whether there
was adequate and substantial basis for the action, whether blacklisting the
petitioner was a mala fide and a colorable exercise of power and lastly
whether the punishment of debarment for five years can be held to be
reasonable or proportionate to the alleged misconduct.
23.
On the first issue that is, whether the respondent authorities
possessed the legal authority either on the basis of a concluded contract viz
clauses 37 of the ‘Instruction to Bidders’ and clause 59 of the ‘General
Conditions of Contract’ or inherent power to blacklist a contractor after the
contract has been concluded, the aforementioned clauses for the sake of
convenience are reproduced hereinbelow: 37. Corrupt or Fraudulent Practices.
37.1 The Employer will reject a proposal for award
if it determines that the bidder recommended for
award has engaged in corrupt or fraudulent
practices in competing for the contract in question
will declare the form in eligible, either indefinitely
or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a
contract with National Highway Authority of
India/State P.W.D and any other agencies, if at any
time determines that the firm has engaged in
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corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the
contractor, or in execution.
37.2 Furthermore; Bidder shall be aware of the
provision stated in Sub-Clause 23.2 and SubClause 59.2 of the Conditions of Contract.
59. Termination
59.1. The Employer or the Contractor may
terminate the Contract if the other party causes a
fundamental breach of the Contract.
59.2. Fundamental breaches of Contract include,
but shall not be limited to the following:
a) the Contractor stops work for 28 days when
no stoppage of work is shown on the current
Programme and the stoppage has not been
authorized by the Engineer;
b) the Engineer instructs the Contractor to
delay the progress of the works and the
instruction is not withdrawn within 28 days;
c) the Employer or the Contractor is made
bankrupt or goes into liquidation other than
for a reconstruction or amalgamation;
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h) if the Contractor, in the judgment of the
Employer has engaged in corrupt or
fraudulent practices in competing for or in
executing the contract.
For the purpose of this paragraph: “corrupt practice” means
the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of anything of value
to influence the action of a public official in procurement process
or in contract execution. “Fraudulent practice” means a
misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement
process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the
Borrower and includes collusive practice among Bidders (prior
to or after bid submission) designed to establish bid prices at
artificial non-competitive levels and to deprive the borrower of
the benefits of free and open competition.
24.
A perusal of clause 37, would show that the same would apply at
the time of competing for a contract. However, clause 59.2 (h) of the GCC
clearly spells out the scope of the words ‘corrupt practice’ and ‘fraudulent
practice’, and in the instant case as can be seen from the circumstances, the
said corrupt practice by the petitioner was while executing the contract and as
such clause 59.2 (h) of the GCC, has vested the respondent/employer with the
power to take appropriate action even though it was a concluded contract.
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Added to this, is also the inherent power of the respondent to blacklist even
when the said provision is absent in the contract. In this context, the judgment
cited by the respondent in the case of Kulja Industries Ltd (supra) has dealt
with this aspect wherein at para 17 it has been held as follows:
“17. That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor
whether the contract be for supply of material or
equipment or for the execution of any other work
whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party
allotting the contract. There is no need for any such
power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved
by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply
signifies a business decision by which the party affected
by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual
relationship with the party committing the breach.
Between two private parties the right to take any such
decision is absolute and untrammelled by any
constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not
to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties.
But any such decision is subject to judicial review when
the same is taken by the State or any of its
instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision
will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the
principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of
proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being
blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a
proper exercise of the power and a valid order of
blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself
being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of
the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court.
As such therefore, it is seen that the respondent was well within
its authority to issue the show cause notice to the petitioner for blacklisting.
25.
On the aspect of compliance with the principles of natural justice,
the petitioner has raised the point that apart from the show cause notice being
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vague, the final blacklisting order incorporated new allegations and relied on
ledger entries from 2015-16 and 2016-17, that were never put to the petitioner
in the notice. A perusal of the show cause notice dated 16.09.2025, would
show that the same has clearly set out the instances of alleged corrupt practice
directly attributable to the petitioner, which in the reply thereto, dated
30.09.2025, have not been specifically denied but sought to be explained
away as valid expenses incurred, and not any act of alleged bribery or
corruption. The contractor, notwithstanding the incorporation of ledger
entries for the year 2015-16, 2016-17, in the order of blacklisting, in the
opinion of this Court, has failed to explain the allegations on which the
blacklisting was proposed and as such, cannot take the ground that all the
details were not provided and reasonable opportunity not granted. The
allegations made in the show cause notice pointing to fraudulent acts indulged
by the petitioner, also has immense ramifications as it affects larger public
interest and loss being caused to the public exchequer. Though the petitioner
has also raised a contention that the decision is pre-determined, the same
appears to not hold good, inasmuch as, in the blacklisting of the petitioner,
sufficient opportunity had been provided which was not substantially
rebutted. The case of Grosons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd., (supra) cited by
respondents in this aspect is relevant, wherein at paragraph-2, it has been held
as follows: -
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“2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that
seeing the nature and seriousness of the order passed against
the appellant, the respondent ought to have supplied all the
materials on the basis of which the charges contained in the
show-cause notice were based along with the show-cause
notice and in the absence of supply of materials, the order
impugned is against the principles of natural justice. We do not
find any merit in this contention. Admittedly, the appellant has
only contractual relationship with the State Government and
the said relationship is not governed by any statutory rules.
There is no statutory rule which requires and an approved
contractor cannot be blacklisted without giving an opportunity
of show-cause. It is true that an order blacklisting an approved
contractor result in civil consequences and in such a situation
in the absence of statutory rules, the only requirement of law
while passing such an order was to observe the principle of
audi alteram partem which is one of the facets of the principles
of natural justice. The contention that was incumbent upon the
respondent to have supplied the material on the basis of which
the charges against the appellant were based, was not the
requirement of the principle of audi alteram. It was sufficient
requirement of law that an opportunity of show-cause was
given to the appellant before it was blacklisted. It is not
disputed that in the present case, the appellant was given an
opportunity to show cause and it did reply to the show-cause
which was duly considered by the State Government. We are,
therefore, of the view that the procedure adopted by the
respondent while blacklisting the appellant was in conformity
with the principles of natural justice.”
26.
Coming to the next issue that is whether there exists any basis for
the impugned action by the respondents, it is most pertinent to note that the
materials relied upon for issuance of the show cause notice and subsequent
blacklisting is not based on hearsay or suspicion, but on the ledgers produced
by the petitioner and also supported by evidence in the cross examination
before the Arbitral Tribunal. The entries having provided sufficient and
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credible proof of illegal gratification, it was well within the rights of the
respondents, to have resorted to this coercive action of debarring the
petitioner. Another point that cannot be disregarded, is the fact that the said
entries were not denied, but sought to be explained as expenditure incurred in
the normal course of business, this explanation, in the view of this Court
defies logic as the expenses entered in the ledgers were for purchasing of
alcohol, personal gifts and other luxury items for government officials. The
findings of the Arbitral Tribunal, also support the action of the respondents
and as such the contention that the action resorted to by the respondent is
either mala fide or motivated, is misplaced and without any basis, as the State
is obligated to put public interest over everything else in such matters. With
regard to the primacy of public interest, in the case of Patel Engineering Ltd.,
(supra) at Para-36 & 37 thereof which is relevant, it has been held as follows:
36. We cannot say the reasoning adopted by the second
respondent is either irrational or perverse. The dereliction,
such as the one indulged in by the petitioner, if not handled
firmly, is likely to result in recurrence of such activity not only
on the part of the petitioner, but others also, who deal with
public bodies, such as the second respondent giving scope for
unwholesome practices. No doubt, the fact that the petitioner
is blacklisted (for some period) by the second respondent is
likely to have some adverse effect on its business prospects, but,
as pointed out by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of
Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517: (SCC p. 518)
“Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private
interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual
disputes.”
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37. The prejudice to the commercial interests of the petitioner,
as pointed out by the High Court, is brought about by his own
making. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned
decision of R-2 lacks proportionality.”
27.
Though arguments have also been raised as to the insufficiency
and deficiency of the FIR as the Prevention of Corruption Act has initially not
been mentioned, and only the name of one retired official has appeared, this
in the opinion of the court will not disable or render the ensuing investigation
invalid in any manner, inasmuch as, the FIR was registered on the materials
that were available which prima facie, validated the allegations of illegal
gratification.
28.
On the issue as to whether the penalty imposed of Five Years
debarment being excessive and disproportionate, considering the nature of
allegations which reflects the conduct of the petitioner, and taking to account
the size of the project and the scale of public funds involved, the penalty
imposed cannot be held to be in any manner disproportionate or excessive.
29.
The decisions relied upon learned Senior counsel for the petitioner,
though covering the spectrum of the prerequisites for blacklisting, such as
show cause notices to constitute a valid basis of a blacklisting order and that
the said notice to disclose the exact details the same however, are easily
distinguishable from the present case, wherein the facts stand on a completely
different footing. As such, the same are not elaborated or discussed upon.
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30.
Therefore, in view of the overwhelming circumstances, shorn of
all other technicalities that have been raised by the petitioner which would not
have the effect otherwise, of altering the basic facts present on record, in the
considered view of this Court, no case has been made out that would warrant
any interference by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
31.
All connected Misc. applications also stand disposed.
32.
There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
17.12.2025
“V. Lyndem- PS”
VALENTINO LYNDEM
Date: 2025.12.19 11:46:17 IST
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