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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21st DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 1751 OF 2025
(397(Cr.PC) / 438(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
MR. SUNDAR MURUGESAN
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
M/S. VASAN HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD.,
NO.28 AND 29, 7TH MAIN,
4TH BLOCK, DIAGONAL ROAD,
JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU -560 011.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. D PRABHAKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by
NAGARATHNA
M
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
M/S. MEDIHAUXE INTERNATIONAL
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER
MR. GURAJA RAO P.
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
S/O. P. RAMAKRISHNA RAO,
NO.2676/20, 11TH MAIN,
'D' BLOCK, 2ND STAGE,
RAJAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 010.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN C., ADVOCATE)
* * *
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 READ WITH 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 11.09.2025 IN CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO.1797/2023 PASSED BY THE LX ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CCH-61 AND ALSO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT
AND
SENTENCE
DATED
07.11.2023
IN
C.C.NO.28812/2018
PASSED
BY
THE
XXVIII
ADDL.CMM,
BENGALURU.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND
RESERVED
ON
19-08-2026,
COMING
ON
FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV JUDGMENT
Heard
learned
counsel
for
the
revision
petitioner
Sri D. Prabhakar and Sri C. Praveen, learned counsel for the
respondent.
2. The present criminal revision petition has been
preferred
by the accused/petitioner challenging the order
dated 11.09.2025 passed by the learned LX Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru in Crl.A.No.1797/2023,
wherein the criminal appeal preferred by the petitioner was
allowed-in-part
by
the
first appellate
court
and
thereby
confirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence
dated 07.11.2023 passed by the learned XXVIII Addl. CMM,
Bengaluru
in
CC
No.28812/2018,
wherein
the
learned
Magistrate had convicted the accused under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act and thereby sentenced them to
pay fine of Rs.7,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine,
accused No.2 to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
3. Briefly stated, the admitted facts of the case leading
to the present criminal revision petition are that:-
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
HC-KAR
The complainant is a firm dealing with medical supplies
of all kinds of drugs, surgical medicines and life-saving drugs
to the respective clients. Accused No.1 M/s Vasan Health Care
Private Limited, Hubli is the client of the complainant. During
the course of business with the complainant, the accused
issued in all 18 cheques in favour of the complainant drawn on
Axis Bank(KT) Branch, Dharwad towards payment for the
goods supplied. The complainant presented the said cheques
for realization through its banker viz., Karnataka Bank,
Malleshwaram Branch, Bengaluru on
08.01.2018. The said
cheques were dishonoured for the reason 'funds insufficient'
on 11.01.2018 and the same was intimated to the complainant
on 16.01.2018 and thereafter, the complainant got issued
legal notice dated 15.02.2018, wherein the complainant called
upon accused No.1 company and its Directors to pay the
amount covered under the cheques. Though notices were
served upon few directors, certain notices were returned
unserved with an endorsement 'not claimed' and 'addressee
vacated' and some of
the Directors gave evasive reply.
However, accused No.2, the authorised officer of the company,
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
replied to the notice admitted the transaction, however, he
failed to make payments of the amounts covered under the
cheques. Therefore, the complainant instituted a private
complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable
under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
4. After institution of the complaint, the Trial Court
recorded
the sworn statement of the complainant, took
cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C., secured
the presence of the accused and recorded the plea of accused
No.2. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. The complainant, in order to prove its case, examined
the authorised officer of the complainant as PW.1 and relied
upon 31 documents marked at Exs.P1 to P31. On behalf of the
defence, accused No.2 was examined as DW.1 and he relied
upon four documents marked as Exs.D1 to D4.
6. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence
on
record, the Trial Court convicted the accused for the
offence
punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act and
sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs.7,00,000/- and in default
of
payment
of
fine,
accused
No.2
imprisonment for a period of one year.
to
undergo
simple
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
order
of sentence passed by the Trial Court, the accused
preferred an
appeal before the First Appellate Court in
Crl.A.No.1797/2023.
In turn,
the
First
Appellate
Court
confirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by
the Trial Court. Hence, the accused preferred this Criminal
Revision Petition.
8.
Learned
petitioner/accused
counsel
Sri
No.2 contended
D.
Prabhakar,
that
the
for
the
judgment
of
conviction and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court as
well as the First Appellate Court are not in accordance with
law. The complainant has failed to prove the requirements of
Section 138 of N.I. Act, as the accused has
disputed the
cheques in question. The Trial Court as well as the
First
Appellate Court have failed to appreciate the fact that the
complainant has supplied the medicines in the year 2014 and
at that time, accused No.1 has issued undated cheques which
were
signed by the petitioner, as he was the authorized
signatory of the Company. It is further contended that, the
Trial Court has failed to notice that the petitioner was not a
Director or involved in the day-to-day management or affairs
of accused No.1 company and he was only an employee on a
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
monthly salary. He further contends that Section 142 of N.I.
Act
can
be
attracted
towards
an
employee,
Manager,
Secretary or other person only if such of them are deemed to
be guilty of the offence and proved by the complainant that
the
offence
has
been
committed
with
the
consent
or
connivance of, or is attributable, to any neglect. Whereas, in
the present case, on one hand, there is no whisper about the
same in the complaint or in the evidence; however, the Trial
Court has failed to consider this aspect.
9. It is contended that the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court also failed to note that an Operational Creditor
has initiated Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings
(CIRP) before the NCLT Division Bench-I, Chennai under
Section 9 of IBC, 2016 in CA/1-IB/2017 and in pursuance of
the same, the NCLT has appointed one Mr. V. Mahesh as
Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) and he has taken over
the management of the company in the year 2017 and as
such, the petitioner having signed the cheques in the year
2018, does not arise and inspite of the petitioner having taken
such contention, the courts below have failed to consider the
same and has passed the impugned
judgment, which is
contrary to law. Further, the IRP has caused public notice to
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
be issued pursuance to the NCLT proceedings, calling upon
the creditors to lay their claims against accused No.1 company
and the complainant has lodged claim in respect of the very
same
amount covered under the cheques. The IRP has
admitted a portion of the amount out of the said claim and in
pursuance to the resolution passed, the creditors were paid at
the rate of 38 paise per rupee and the RP has transferred
Rs.1,391/- towards full and final settlement of the claims of
the complainant and as
such, the entire liabilities stood
extinguished and there was no existing liability dischargeable
by the accused persons.
9a. Further, during the course of cross-examination, the
complainant has accepted the above said facts, but the courts
below have not considered the same aspect.
9b. Further, the petitioner has taken specific contention
that when the cheques were handed over to the complainant,
the cheques
were undated and it is the complainant, who
subsequently inserted the date and it was also contended that
the complainant has falsely deposed that the cheques were
issued on the dates mentioned therein, the same has been
established beyond doubt that the accused company was
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
under dissolution process and IRP was appointed and he has
taken over the management of the company, much prior to
the dates mentioned in the cheques. As such, the petitioner
ought to have been exonerated for the alleged offence, as he
was not divested with signing authority on the cheques as
authorized signatory and he was only an employee.
9c. Further, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court
have failed to take note of the fact that the liability did not
arise on the date of issuance of cheques and it is settled
proposition of law that when the cheques are issued towards
future
payments
and
the
same
being
disputed
or
the
settlement is withdrawn, then in that event, the cheques
issued would be squarely for security purpose and there is no
legally recoverable debt to which the cheques were issued and
in such event, the provision of 138 of N.I. Act does not attract
and accused No.2 cannot be convicted. However, the courts
below have ignored these factual aspects.
9d. It is contended that the courts below have failed to
take note of the fact that the complainant is an unregistered
partnership firm and there is prohibition under Section 69(2)
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
of
the Indian Partnership Act to institute any proceedings
including that of complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
9e. Further, the complaint filed by the partner of an
unregistered partnership firm is not maintainable and is barred
under law.
9f. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have
failed to take note of the admissions made by the complainant
in his cross-examination, where the accused was able to elicit
the truth from the mouth of the complainant. Further, the
complainant has admitted regarding receipt of Exs.D1 to D4,
namely, the letter addressed to the complainant by the
accused and the demand made by the accused not to present
the cheques and having informed the
bankers for stop
payment of the said cheques. The complainant, in spite of the
said knowledge, had presented the cheques when there was
dispute between the complainant and the accused. On
all
these grounds, learned counsel prayed to allow the revision
petition.
10.
respondent
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
for
the
Sri Praveen C., vehemently contended that there
was transaction
between the complainant and the accused
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
and the complainant had supplied goods to accused No.1
company, accused No.2 is none other than authorized officer
of accused No.1 company and therefore, the question of nonjoinder of other persons would not arise.
11. In Ex.P25 dated 21.02.2018, accused No.2 has
clearly admitted that he has answered to the legal notice
issued by the complainant. In fact, the accused No.1 company
had issued the cheques on different dates in respect of supply
of goods. As none of the directors came forward to reply to
the legal notice, accused No.2, the authorized officer, issued
the reply. Hence, issuance of cheques and signature found in
the cheques is admitted by the accused persons.
12. In so far as Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership
Act, 1932, is concerned, in fact, filing of a lawsuit is barred
under Section 69(2) of Partnership Act, whereas complaint
under
Section
of
Negotiable
Instruments
Act
is
maintainable. In fact, there are concurrent findings of the Trial
Court and the First Appellate Court. Thus, there is no error on
the face of the record in the findings of the courts below.
Hence,
petition.
learned
counsel
prayed
to
dismiss
the
revision
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
13. In the light of the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the revision petitioner, perusal of the judgments of
the Trial Court and First Appellate Court and the materials
available on record, the following points arise for consideration
by this Court:
1. Whether the revision petitioner has proved that
there is an apparent error on the face of
the record in the judgments of the Trial Court
as well as the First Appellate Court in convicting
the accused for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act?
2. Whether the judgment of conviction and order
on sentence passed by the Trial Court as well as
the First Appellate Court are perverse and calls
for interference by this Court?
14.
Admittedly,
the
complainant
filed
a
private
complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. against the accused
for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
15. Before delving into the contentions of the parties
and appreciation of facts, the Court wished to underline the
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
aims and objectives of Chapter XVII (Sections 138 to 148) of
NI Act, which was inserted by Act No.66 of 1988 with effect
from 01.04.1989. The scope and intent of bringing the said
Chapter in the statute is to inculcate faith in the efficiency of
banking operations and credibility in transacting business on
negotiable instruments. It is to enhance the acceptability of
cheque in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable
for penalties in case of dishonor of cheques due to insufficient
arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards
to prevent harassment of honest drawers. This chapter has
been introduced to prevent dishonesty on the part of the
drawer of Negotiable instruments to draw a cheque without
sufficient funds in the account maintained by him in the bank
and induce the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. In
other words, these provisions have been introduced to give
greater credibility to the Trade, Business, Commerce and
Industry, which is absolutely imperative in view of the
growing international trade and business. In this regard, it
would be appropriate to rely on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. M/s. Galaxy
Traders and Agencies Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2001) 6
SCC 463.
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
16. Section 138 of NI Act aims to enhance the
acceptability of cheque in settlement of liabilities and by
making the drawer liable for penalties in case where cheques
are dishonoured due to insufficient arrangements made by the
drawer. Section 138 of NI Act is extracted as hereunder:138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
funds in the account.—
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment of any
amount of money to another person from out of that
account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt
or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
because of the amount of money standing to the credit of
that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement made with that bank, such
person shall be deemed to have committed an offence
and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this
Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend
to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is
drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within
thirty days of the receipt of information by him from
the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the
case may be, to the holder in due course of the
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said
notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or
other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other
liability.]
17. Section 138 of NI Act, which is a penal provision, provides
that wherever any cheque is drawn by a person for discharge of any
liability is returned by the bank unpaid for the reason of insufficiency
of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account on
which the cheque was drawn or for the reason that it exceeds the
arrangements made by the drawer of the cheque which is a banker
for that account, the drawer of such cheque shall be deemed to have
committed an offence. In such circumstances, the drawer shall
without prejudice to the other provisions of the said Act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both.
18. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key
ingredients as highlighted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case
of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar
Peterson Securities Ltd. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 745,
wherein at paragraph Nos.10 and 11, the Hon'ble Apex Court
held as under:-
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
10. "On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of
the NI Act it is clear that the ingredients which are to
be satisfied for making out a case under the
provision are:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for
payment of a certain amount of money to
another person from out of that account for the
discharge of any debt or other liability;
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to honour
the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15
days of the receipt of information by him from
the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid;
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or the
holder in due course of the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the said notice.
11. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied then
the person who has drawn the cheque shall be
deemed to have committed an offence. In the
explanation to the section clarification is made that
the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally
enforceable debt or other liability."
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
19. The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are
as follows:-.
i. The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account
maintained by him with the banker for the payment
of any amount of money to another from that
account.
ii. The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole
or in part of any debt or other liability.
iii. Presentation of cheque to the bank within the
period of 6 months or within the period of its
validity.
iv.The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as
unpaid either because the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient
to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account.
v.A notice by the payee or the holder in due course
making a demand for the payment of the amount to
the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the
receipt of information from the bank in a regard to
the return of the cheque.
vi.Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make
payment of the amount of money to the payee or
the holder in due course within 15 days of the
receipt of the notice.
vii. Filing of the complaint within a month from the date
of expiry of the grace period of 15 days before a
magistrate or a judicial magistrate not below the
first class.
20. At this juncture, the Court finds it appropriate to deal
with
certain presumptions that flow from the NI Act with
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
respect to cheques drawn in favour of the payee or the holder
in due course. Section 118 of the NI Act provides for certain
special rules of evidence. The said provision is extracted as
hereunder:-
118.Presumptions
as
to
negotiable
instruments.—Until the contrary is proved, the
following presumptions shall be made:—
(a) of consideration —that every negotiable
instrument
was
made
or
drawn
for
consideration, and that every such instrument,
when it has been accepted, indorsed,
negotiated or transferred, was accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred for
consideration;
(b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument
bearing a date was made or drawn on such
date;
(c) as to time of acceptance —that every
accepted bill of exchange was accepted within
a reasonable time after its date and before its
maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer —that every transfer
of a negotiable instrument was made before
its maturity;
(e) as to order of indorsements —that the
indorsements appearing upon a negotiable
instrument were made in the order in which
they appear thereon;
(f)
as to stamps —that a lost promissory note,
bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped;
(g) that holder is a holder in due course —that
the holder of a negotiable instrument is a
holder in due course:
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
Provided that, where the instrument has been
obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person
in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence
or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or
acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud,
or for unlawful consideration, the burden of
proving that the holder is a holder in due course
lies upon him.
21. Section 118 lays down certain special rules of
evidence
relating to presumptions akin to Section 114 of
Indian Evidence Act, 1874(Section 119 of Bharatiya Saksha
Adhiniyam, 2023). The rationale behind these presumptions is
that negotiable instruments such as cheque are passed from
hand to hand on endorsement and therefore it would make
trading
very
difficult
and
negotiability
of
Instruments
impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. Section
118(a) of NI Act provides presumption to be raised until the
contrary is proved. Under Section 118 of the NI Act, until the
contrary is proved, presumption shall be made that every
negotiable instrument was made for a
consideration. Once
there is admission that the execution of a cheque or the same
is proved to have been executed, the
presumption under
Section 118 is raised that it is supported by consideration.
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
22. Similar presumptions are made in the sub clauses(b)
to (g) of Section 118.
23. Presumption under Section 118(b) relates to the
date on which negotiable instruments were and statutory
presumption is that, the said instrument was drawn or made
on such date, unless the contrary is proven with regard to the
time of acceptance, it is presumed that Section 118(c)of the
NI Act that every bill of exchange including bill of exchange
payable on demand was accepted within a reasonable time
after its issue and
before its maturity until the contrary is
proven. Similar is the presumption under Sections 11(d), (e)
and (f) relating to the time of transfer, order of indorsement
and due stamping of a lost negotiable instrument respectively.
Lastly, the statutory presumption under Section 118(g) is that
every holder of a negligible instrument shall be considered as
a holder in due course i.e., he is presumed to have paid the
consideration for the instrument and in good faith.
24. Now coming to Section 139 of NI Act, the said
section raises the presumption that unless the contra is
proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque had
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of
any debt or other liability.
25. Section 139 of NI Act is extracted as hereunder:-
139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It
shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved,
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of
the nature referred to in section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.
26. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, upon
perusal of the documents and material on record, it is evident
that the accused has admitted his signature on the cheques as
a drawer and therefore the complainant becomes the holder in
due course. The records further reveal that it is the case of
the complainant that the complainant is a firm dealing with
medical supplies of all kinds of drugs, surgical and life-saving
drugs, to the respective clients. Accused no.1 company is the
client of the complainant. During the course of business with
the complainant, the accused had issued in all 18 cheques in
favour of the complainant and on presentation of the cheques,
same were dishonored with the reason ‘funds insufficient’ and
thus the same was intimated to the accused, but the accused
issued evasive reply, however not paid any amount due under
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
the cheques. Upon admission of the execution of impugned
cheques, the Court is required to invoke the statutory
presumption with reference to Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act,
until the contrary is proven i.e., the said cheques were drawn
and issued for a consideration. It also has to be presumed,
unless the contrary is proven, that the cheques were bearing
the same date on which it was drawn or made, that the holder
of the said cheques was the holder in due course and had
received the said cheques for discharge of whole or a part of
any debt or liability. Since the signature on the cheques has
not been disputed as that of the accused, that is, the drawer,
the presumption under Section 118 and Section 139 have to
be invoked against the accused so as to make the accused
liable under Section 138 of NI Act.
27. Once the rigours of Section 138 are satisfied, the
onus of proof shifts upon the accused to prove his defence
with cogent evidence, so as to demonstrate how the offence
under the said section is not made out.
28. Upon perusal of the submissions and
arguments
advanced by the learned counsel for the accused in defence, it
appears that, the defence of accused No.2 is that complaint
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
under Section 138 Act is not maintainable in view of Section
69 of the Indian Partnership Act. PW.1 in his evidence
admitted that the complainant firm is an unregistered
partnership firm and in view of the admitted fact, the Court
proceeded to examine the contention of the accused. Hence it
is just and necessary to analyze Section 69 of The Indian
Partnership Act, 1932, which reads as under:-
69. Effect of non-registration.—
(1)"No suit to enforce a right arising from a
contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any
court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in
a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to
have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is
registered and the person suing is or has been shown in
the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2)No suit to enforce a right arising from a
contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf
of a firm against any third party unless the firm is
registered and the persons suing are or have been shown
in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3)The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall
apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to
enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not
affect,—
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the
dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a
dissolved firm, or any right or power to
realise the property of a dissolved firm,
or(b)the powers of an official assignee,
receiver or Court under the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or
the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of
1920) to realise the property of an insolvent
partner.
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
(4)This section shall not apply,—
(a)to firms or to partners in firms which have no
place of business in [the territories to which
this Act extends], or whose places of business
in [the said territories', are situated in areas
to which, by notification under section 56, this
Chapter does not apply, or
(b)to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding
one hundred rupees in value which, in the
Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in
section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause
Courts Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), or, outside the
Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in
the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any
proceeding in execution or other proceeding
incidental to or arising from any such suit or
claim."
29. The perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear
that the bar contained in Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act
applies only in the respect of suits and are not applicable to
the proceedings
initiated under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act. The Coordinate bench of this Court in case of
Ajmera
Housing
Corporation,
Bengaluru
vs.
Ramachandra reported in 2019 (3), Karnataka Law
Journal 362, wherein it opined that unregistered partnership
firm also can maintain a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC
for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act. Further, in the case of Bhavani Agencies
vs. GC Colour Lab, Bengaluru, reported in (2004) I KLJl
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
421, the Co-ordinate Bench held that the bar created for
maintaining a suit in Section 69 of the Partnership Act by an
unregistered firm cannot be stretched and applied to maintain
a criminal proceedings under Section 138 of N.I.Act and
therefore, non-registration of partnership firm, is not a bar to
prosecute the accused under Section 138 of NI Act, as the bar
is only for initiation of civil suit and not the criminal
proceedings. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of
the
counsel
for
the
revision
petitioner
insofar
as
non
applicability of Section 69 of Partnership Act is concerned.
30. Learned counsel for the accused/petitioner further
contended that in view of the bar under Section 14 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016(for short 'IBC'),
initiation and continuation of proceedings before the appellate
court for recovery of money is not maintainable. The counsel
also contended that Section 14 of IBC creates a bar for the
continuation of the proceedings.
31. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P Mohanraj
and others v Shah brothers ISPAT Pvt. Ltd. reported in
2021 SCC Online SC 152, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that the
Corporate debtor would be covered by the
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of IBC, by
which, continuation of Section 138/141 of N.I. Act proceedings
against the said debtor during the
corporate insolvency
regulation process are interdicted. The legal
impediment
contained in Section 14 of the IBC would make it impossible
for such proceedings to continue or to be instituted against
the corporate debtor. Therefore, for the period of moratorium,
since no section under Section 138/141 proceedings
can
continue or be initiated against the corporate debtor because
of statutory bar, but such proceedings can be initiated or
continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1)
and (2) of N.I Act. Therefore, the
moratorium provision
contained in Section 14 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
would apply only to corporate debtor, the natural persons
mentioned in Section 141, continuing to be statutorily liable
under Chapter XVII of Negotiable Instruments Act.
32. Whereas,
in the instant case, the issuance of
cheques is not at all disputed by the company and accused
No.2 in favour of the complainant and thus Section 114(1) and
141(2) of N.I. Act provides for prosecution of Director of the
company and also Manager, Secretary or other officer of the
company. The perusal of Ex.P25 clearly demonstrated that
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
accused No.2 was working as
Director(Operations) in the
accused
the
company
and
he
is
authorised
signatory
representing the accused company. In his statement recorded
under Section 313 CrPC, accused No.2 clearly admitted the
issues of cheques at Exs.P5 to Ex.P22, on behalf of accused
No.1 in favour of the complainant. Therefore, initiation of
proceedings before the NCLAT and appointment of resolution
professional under IBC is not a legal embargo to prosecute
accused No.2.
33. Learned counsel further has taken the contention
that an operational creditor has initiated Corporate Insolvency
Resolution
Proceedings (CIRP) before the NCLT, Division
Bench-I, Chennai, under Section 9 of IBC, and in pursuance
to the same, the NCLT has appointed one Mr. V. Mahesh as
Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) and he has taken over
the management of the company in the year 2017 and as
such, the petitioner having signed on the cheques in 2018
does not arise. In this regard, learned
counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the decision in the case of Vishnoo
Mittal vs M/s Shakti Trading Company in Special Leave
Petition(Crl) No.1104 of 2022((2025) 9 SCC 417) disposed on
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
17.03.2025, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph
Nos.12 and 13 held as under:-
12. "There is another aspect to this matter. In the present
case, on 25.07.2018, the moratorium was imposed and
management of the corporate debtor was taken over by
the interim resolution professional as per Section 17 of the
IBC. Here, we would also like to reproduce extracts from
Section 17 of the IBC which are as follows:
“17. Management of affairs of corporate
debtor by interim resolution professional.—
(1) From the date of appointment of the interim
resolution professional—
(a) the management of the affairs of the corporate
debtor shall vest in the interim resolution
professional;
(b) the powers of the Board of Directors or the
partners of the corporate debtor, as the case may
be, shall stand suspended and be exercised by the
interim resolution professional;
(c)***
(d) the financial institutions maintaining accounts
of the corporate debtor shall act on the
instructions of the interim resolution professional
in relation to such accounts and furnish all
information relating to the corporate debtor
available with them to the interim resolution
professional.”
13. The bare reading of the above provision shows that
the appellant did not have the capacity to fulfil the demand
raised by the respondent by way of the notice issued under
clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 NI Act. When the
notice was issued to the appellant, he was not in charge of
the corporate debtor as he was suspended from his
position as the Director of the corporate debtor as soon as
IRP was appointed on 25-7-2018. Therefore, the powers
vested with the Board of Directors were to be exercised by
the IRP in accordance with the provisions of IBC. All the
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
bank accounts of the corporate debtor were operating
under the instructions of the IRP, hence, it was not
possible for the appellant to repay the amount in light of
Section 17 IBC."
34. In Vishnoo Mittal's case, the said case was arising
out of a petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC seeking
quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 138 of N.I.Act
against
the accused in that case. Whereas the present
criminal revision is arising out of concurrent findings of the
trial
court
and
the
first
appellate
court.
Further
the
proceedings i.e., the liability of accused No.1 company and
accused
No.2
can
continue
against
the
erstwhile
directors/persons in-charge of and responsible for the conduct
of the business of the company in view of the ratio laid down
in P.Mohanraj case cited supra.
35. Therefore in the present case, the accused have not
discharged the burden cast upon them regarding the nonexistence
of consideration either by direct evidence or by
probable
evidence
as
to
show
that
the
existence
of
consideration was improbable, doubtful or illegal. The accused
have not produced any kind of evidence to show that the
existence of consideration was improbable, doubtful or illegal.
Therefore, the trial Court as well as the first appellate court
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
have drawn the presumption that the cheques were issued
towards a legally enforceable debt. Whether
the accused
issued the cheques for repayment of the loan, as security, or
towards discharge of the current transaction, it makes
no
difference under Section 138 of NI Act and the legal
consequence is the same without any distinction.
36. The present revision petition has been filed by the
petitioner/accused No.2 challenging the concurrent findings of
the trial court as well as first appellate court.
37. The scope of revision refers to the limited authority
of a higher court to review the judgment of the trial Court and
the first
appellate court, focusing on correcting errors of
judgment or gross
legal or factual flaws rather than re-
examining the merits of the case. This power is exercised
sparingly and is intended to set right a patent defect, and not
to function as an automatic second
appeal. The specific
grounds and the limitations vary between civil and criminal
proceedings. Revision can address situations where
the
decision is grossly erroneous, not supported by evidence,
or where relevant evidence has been ignored. Therefore, the
revision is not a fresh trial and there is a bar on re-examining
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
the evidence and substituting the revision court's own findings
for those recorded by the courts' below.
38. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi
v. State of Rajasthan and Another reported in (2001) 9
SCC 631 while discussing the scope of Section 397 of the
Cr.P.C. at paragraph No.3 has held as under:
"3. xxx xxx xxx. The revision power under the
Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised
in a routine and casual manner. While exercising
such powers the High Court has no authority to
appreciate the evidence in the manner as the
trial and the appellate courts are required to do.
Revisional powers could be exercised only when
it is shown that there is a legal bar against the
continuance of the criminal proceedings or the
framing of charge or the facts as stated in the
first information report even if they are taken at
the face value and accepted in their entirety do
not constitute the offence for which the accused
has been charged."
39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu and Others reported in
(2023)6 SCC 768 at paragraph No.79 has held as under:
"79. Thus, the revisional power cannot be
exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It
can only be exercised to correct manifest error of
law or procedure which would occasion injustice,
if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot
be equated with the appellate power. A Revisional
Court cannot undertake meticulous examination
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
of the material on record as it is undertaken by
the trial court or the appellate court. This power
can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to
the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts
as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true
on their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not constitute the offence for which the
accused has been charged. It is conferred to
check grave error of law or procedure."
40. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar reported in
(2008) 9 SCC 475 at paragraph No.16 has held as under:
"16. xxx xxx xxx. Now it is well settled that
revisional jurisdiction can be exercised sparingly
and only in exceptional cases. A Revisional
Court cannot convert itself into a regular court
of appeal."
41. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction should be
exercised in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect
in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law
and consequently, there has been a flagrant miscarriage of
justice.
42. In the present case, the trial Court as well as the
first
appellate court considering the oral and documentary
evidence on record and the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case,
have convicted the petitioner for the offence
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CRL.RP No. 1751 of 2025
punishable under
require
any
Section 138 of NI Act, which does not
interference
by
this
Court. Therefore,
the
criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner/accused No.2
is liable to be dismissed.
Hence, I proceed to pass the following:-
ORDER
1. The criminal revision petition is dismissed.
Pending IAs, if any, stands disposed of.
Sd/(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
MN/-
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