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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO.39695 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
MR. P.L.G. MANU
S/O. LATE P.P. LUKE,
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS,
RESIDING AT 'JAREIN MANSION',
AQUEM, MARGAO, GOA-403601.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.K. SAMPATH KUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SRI. SURAJ S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
VANDANA S
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY THE
HULIMAVU POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY THE S.P.P.
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
AMBEDKAR VEEDI,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2.
MR. R. JAYAVELU
S/O MR. RAMAMURTHY
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/AT NO.501/a4, 9TH MILE STONE
HULIMAVU, BENGALURU-560 012.
(AMENDMENT CARRIED OUT AS PER ORDER DT: 13.03.2026)
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ARUNA SHYAM, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
FOR SRI. DARSHAN R., ADVOCATE FOR R.2;
SRI. SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SRI. AJAY J.N., ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED
APPLICANT IN I.A.NO.2/2026;
SMT. DEEPTHI ALVA, HCGP FOR R.1.)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BHARATIYA
NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.09.2025 IN CRL.REV.PET. NO.198/2025
(ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THE HON'BLE CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, BANGALORE (CCH-66), ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioner seeks for the following reliefs:(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction quashing the impugned order dated
17.09.2025
in
Crl.Rev.Pet.No.198/2025
(Annexure-A)
passed by the Hon’ble City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bangalore (CCH 66);
(ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction quashing the impugned order dated
27.03.2025 in C.C.No.13613/2009 (Annexure-B) passed by
the Hon’ble III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at
Bangalore.
(iii) Consequently, issue a Writ of Mandamus or any
other appropriate order or direction allowing the application
filed by the petitioner in C.C.No.13613/2009 under Section
322 of the Cr.P.C., as prayed for therein (Annexure-F).
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(iv) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court
deems fit considering the facts and circumstances of the
case in order to meet the ends of justice.
2.
The petitioner is arraigned as accused No.1 in
C.C.No.13613/2009 pending before the Trial court, in which, the
2nd respondent is the de facto complainant for alleged offences
punishable under Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471 and Section
120B IPC. The petitioner filed an application dated 14.03.2024
under Section 322 Cr.P.C., interalia contending that the ingredients
attracting the offence under Section 406 IPC were not made out
and the Trial court (III ACMM, Bangalore), which is a Special Court
for offences punishable under Sections 403 to 409 IPC did not
have inherent jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the
proceedings against the petitioner and the matter be stayed and
referred to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, for
proceeding further in the matter. The said application having been
opposed by the 1st respondent – State, the Trial court proceeded to
pass the impugned order
dated 27.03.2025 rejecting the
application filed by the petitioner, who filed a Revision petition in
Crl.Rev.P.No.198/2025 before the Revisional / Sessions court
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which dismissed the said Revision petition vide impugned order
dated 17.09.2025, thereby confirming the order of the Trial court.
Aggrieved by the impugned orders passed by the Trial court and
Revisional / Sessions court, petitioner is before this Court by way
of the present petition.
3.
During the pendency of the present petition, accused
No.5 – Sri.Alben P.Mathew @ Altin Mathew filed an Intervention
application I.A.No.2/2026 seeking to intervene as additional
respondent No.3 to the present petition and for other reliefs. The
said application is opposed by the 1st respondent – State and the
2nd respondent - de facto complainant, while the petitioner has not
contested / opposed the said application.
4. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and
learned Senior counsel for the 2nd respondent as well as learned
Senior counsel for the Intervening applicant in I.A.No.2/2026 and
the learned HCGP for 1st respondent and perused the material on
record.
5. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior
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counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is not guilty
of any of the offences alleged against him including the offence
under Section 406 IPC which is triable exclusively by the Trial court
which is a Special court to try offences falling under Sections 403
to 409 IPC. It was submitted that since the offence under Section
406 is not made out as against the petitioner, the Trial court did not
have inherent jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the said
offence, as a result of which, the remaining offences were not
capable of being adjudicated upon by the Trial court which was
required to place the matter before the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bangalore, to proceed further in the matter. It was
further submitted that under these circumstances, petitioner filed
the instant application under Section 322 Cr.P.C. which was
erroneously dismissed by the Trial court and confirmed by the
Revisional court by recording erroneous findings which were
contrary to facts and law and as such, the impugned orders passed
by both the Courts deserve to be set aside and the application filed
by the petitioner deserves to be allowed.
In support of his
submissions, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner places
reliance upon the following judgments:-
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(i) Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd., & Ors., vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors., - (2024) 10 SCC 690;
(ii) S.N.Vijayalakshmi & others vs. State of
Karnataka & others – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1575;
(iii) Arshad Neyaz Khan vs. State of Jharkhand &
Another – AIR 2025 SC 4620;
(iv) R.Kalyani vs. Janak C.Mehta & others – (2009)
1 SCC 516;
(v) Sharif Ahmed & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Anr. – AIR 2024 SC 2420;
(vi) V.P.Shrivatsava vs. Indian Explosives Ltd., &
others – (2010) 10 SCC 361;
(vii) Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab and others
– (2014) 3 SCC 92;
(viii) Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar – (2001) 7 SCC 318.
(ix) State of Punjab vs. Pritam Chand and others –
(2009) 16 SCC 769;
(x) Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R.Singh
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others – Crl.A.No.2963/2025
dated 14.07.2025;
(xi) State Through Special Cell Central Bureau of
Investigation) vs. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru &
others – (2003) 6 SCC 641.
6. Per contra, learned Senior counsel for the 2nd respondent
submits that the petitioner having approached this Court seeking
quashing
of
the
entire
proceedings
by
preferring
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Crl.P.No.3782/2009, withdrew the said petition with liberty to file a
discharge application before the Trial court and having done so,
the petitioner was neither entitled to file an application under
Section 322 Cr.P.C. nor challenge the impugned orders by way of
the present petition, which is not maintainable and the same was
liable to be dismissed. It was also submitted that having challenged
the impugned order passed by the Trial court rejecting the
application under Section 322 Cr.P.C. by preferring a Revision
petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C., which was also dismissed by
the Sessions court , the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the
orders of the Trial court and Revisional court and the present
petition is not maintainable on this ground also.
It was further
submitted that the necessary ingredients to attract Section 322
Cr.P.C., had not been made out by the petitioner and the said
provision is confined to want of forum-competence and not to test
whether the ingredients of offence are made out and where a
genuine jurisdictional question does arise under Section 322
Cr.P.C., it is either a territorial or forum question of fact and not an
assertion that the ingredients are absent as sought to be urged by
the petitioner whose claim was liable to be rejected. It was also
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submitted that apart from the fact that both the Courts had come to
the prima facie conclusion that the ingredients of Section 406 IPC
had been disclosed which cannot be reopened at this stage,
neither valid nor sufficient ground had been made out by the
petitioner in the application filed by him which was rightly rejected
by the trial court and correctly confirmed by the Revisional /
Sessions court by passing the impugned orders, which do not
warrant interference by this Court in the present petition, which is
liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned
Senior counsel for the 2nd respondent places reliance upon the
following judgments:(i) Krishnan & Anr., vs. Krishnaveni and Anr., (1997) 4 SCC 241;
(ii) Dharam Pal vs. Ramshri – AIR 1993 SC 1361;
(iii) Simrikhia vs. Dolley Mukherjee – (1990) 2 SCC
437;
(iv) Deepti vs. Akhil Rai – (1995) 5 SCC 751;
(v) Saroja Kanta Behera vs. State of Odisha – 2026
SCC OnLine ORI 6450;
(vi) Asim Shariff vs. National Investigation Agency
– (2018) 3 SCC 493;
(vii) S.W.Palanitkar & others vs. State of Bihar and
another – (2002) 1 SCC 241;
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(viii)
Baba
Abdul
Khan
&
others
vs.
Smt.A.D.Sawant, JMFC, Nagpur and others – 1994 SCC
OnLine Bom 612;
(ix) Shankar Malharrao Deshmukh vs. State of
Maharastra – (1997) 2 Mh.L.J. 163;
(x) Mahendar Goyal vs. Kadamba International 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3508 (Full Bench);
(xi) Kumari Seema Jha and others vs. State of
Jharkhand and Another – 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar 5632;
(xii) Smt.Padira Vidyavathi vs. Public Prosecutor,
Hyderabad & others – 2020 SCC OnLine AP 5083;
7.
Learned HCGP for the 1st respondent – State would
support the impugned orders and submits that there is no merit in
the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed.
8. Learned Senior counsel for the Intervening applicant –
accused No.5 would reiterate the submissions made by the learned
Senior counsel for the petitioner and contend that the Intervening
applicant – accused No.5 is identically / similarly situated as that of
the petitioner – accused No.1 and that the impugned orders be set
aside and the application filed by the petitioner under Section 322
Cr.P.C. deserves to be allowed.
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9.
I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
10. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is
an undisputed fact that in the instant proceedings initiated against
petitioner – accused No.1, intervening applicant – accused No.5
and other accused persons, at the instance of the 2nd respondent –
de facto complainant in the impugned proceedings, which have
been initiated against the accused persons for alleged offences
punishable under Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471 r/w Section
120B IPC; the petitioner filed the instant application dated
14.03.2024 invoking Section 322 Cr.P.C. as hereunder:“APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 322 OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 ON BEHALF OF
ACCUSED NO. 1
The undersigned humbly submits as follows:
1. It is submitted that the Complainant Police have
submitted a Chargesheet in the above matter for the alleged
offences under Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471, 120(B) of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the Accused. In fact,
since a false Chargesheet was filed against Accused No. 11
in the above case although there were no allegations and/or
material whatsoever against him, the Hon'ble High Court of
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Karnataka was pleased to quash this case against him vide
its Order dated 19.02.2024 in Crl. Pet. No. 577/2023.
2. It is submitted that this Hon'ble Court is a special Court
having jurisdiction to try offences falling under Sections 403
to 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Thus, in case any of
the offences under the said sections are not made out from
the material on record, this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction
to deal with the matter and the matter must be tried before
the jurisdictional Magistrate.
3. It is further submitted that the instant matter is at the
stage of hearing before Charge / framing of Charges and
hence, it is at a pre-trial stage wherein the stage of "inquiry"
into the alleged offences is under progress. It is the settled
position in Law that Trial is distinct from an inquiry and must
necessarily succeed it and Trial commences only on
Charges being framed. It is further trite in Law that the stage
of inquiry commences on the Chargesheet being filed by the
Police and continues until the Trial commences with
Charges having been framed.
4. In the instant matter, from a plain reading of the
complaint, FIR, Chargesheet and documents annexed
thereto and taking them at their face value, it is prima facie
seen that it is nobody's case that anything was ever
entrusted to any of the Accused by anyone. It is not the
case of the Complainant that any property or dominion over
property was ever entrusted in any manner by him or
anyone else in M/s. Shashi Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. to all or any
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of the Accused. Further, even by a liberal reading of the
material on record, there is no allegation that such entrusted
property was dishonestly misappropriated or converted by
the Accused to their own use or that the Accused
dishonestly used or disposed of that property in violation of
any direction of Law prescribing the mode in which such
trust was to be discharged or any legal contract (express or
implied) that was made by touching discharge of such trust
or willfully caused any other person so to do or omit. Thus,
the essential ingredients of the alleged offence of Criminal
Breach of Trust as set out in Section 405 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 being totally absent and wholly missing
from the evidence before this Hon'ble Court, this Hon'ble
Court has no inherent jurisdiction to inquire into this matter
and/or to try the case or commit it for trial since the alleged
offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
is not made cut by any stretch of the imagination.
5. It is humbly submitted that the same goes to the root of
the matter and further proceedings before this Hon'ble Court
must be immediately stayed, failing which, grave prejudice
shall be caused to this Accused. Thereafter, in terms of
Section 322 of the Cr.P.C., this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to submit this case with a brief report explaining its
nature to the Hon'ble Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bangalore or to such other Magistrate having jurisdiction, as
the Hon'ble Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore
directs.
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6. It is further submitted that this Application is being filed
for the aforesaid bonafide reasons and not to delay the
matter or the framing of Charges. This Accused humbly
reserves his rights to address further grounds, rely on
additional
documents
and
citations
at
the
time
of
consideration of this Application.
WHEREFORE, it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may be pleased to stay these proceedings and submit the
case
to
the
Hon'ble
Chief
Metropolitan
Magistrate,
Bangalore, in the interest of justice.”
11. As can be seen from the aforesaid application, it is the
specific contention of the petitioner that the Trial court was a
Special court having jurisdiction to try offences falling under
Sections 403 to 409 IPC (including 406) and in case, any of the
said offences had not been made out from the material on record,
the Trial court did not have jurisdiction and the matter would
necessary have to be tried before the jurisdictional Magistrate; in
this context, it would be necessary to extract Section 322 Cr.P.C.,
which reads as under:322. Procedure in cases which Magistrate cannot
dispose of.— (1) If, in the course of any inquiry into an
offence or a trial before a Magistrate in any district, the
evidence appears to him to warrant a presumption—
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(a) that he has no jurisdiction to try the case or
commit it for trial, or
(b) that the case is one which should be tried or
committed for trial by some other Magistrate in the district,
or
(c) that the case should be tried by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, he shall stay the proceedings and submit the
case, with a brief report explaining its nature, to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or to such other Magistrate, having
jurisdiction, as the Chief Judicial Magistrate directs.
(2) The Magistrate to whom the case is submitted
may, if so empowered, either try the case himself, or refer it
to any Magistrate subordinate to him having jurisdiction, or
commit the accused for trial.
12. The said application was opposed by the 1st respondent
– State and the petitioner filed written arguments dated 27.05.2024
as hereunder:“WRITTEN ARGUMENTS OF ACCUSED NO. 1 ON THE
APPLICATION FILED BY HIM UNDER SECTION 322 OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
The undersigned humbly submits as follows:
1. It is submitted that the Complainant Police have
submitted Chargesheet in the above matter for the alleged
offences under Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471, 120(B) of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the Accused. At the
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stage of Hearing before Charge, the subject matter
application was filed by the 1st Accused.
2. It is submitted that since a false Chargesheet was filed
against Accused No. 11 in the above case although there
were no allegations and/or material whatsoever against him,
the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka was pleased to quash
this case against him vide its Order dated 19.02.2024 in Crl.
Pet. No. 577/2023. The allegation being of criminal
conspiracy by the 11th Accused with Accused Nos. 1 to 10,
the entire case falls to the ground against all the Accused
since the Complainant himself has expressly admitted that
there is no material against Accused No. 11 in the false
Chargesheet filed in this matter with whom the others are
supposed to have conspired criminally. This also raises
serious doubts about the bonafides of the Police, the
manner in which the investigation was carried out and the
authenticity and reliability of the Chargesheet that has been
filed in the instant matter to aid the Complainant in his
malafide endeavours.
3. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in LAWS (SC) 2024
(5) 3: Sharif Ahmed and Another vs State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another, the Investigating officer must make clear and
complete entries of all columns in Chargesheet so that the
Court can clearly understand which crime has been
committed by which Accused and what is the material
evidence available on file. The role played by each Accused
in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in
the Chargesheet for each of the Accused persons.
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However, the same has not been done in the instant matter
and the same is explicitly evident from the fact that for the
first time, the Prosecution in its objections to the Application
filed under Section 322 of the Cr.P.C. by this Accused has
admitted that there are no allegations under Section 406 of
the I.P.C. against any of the Accused except the 3rd
Accused, whereas from a reading of the Chargesheet, no
allegations containing the ingredients of Section 406 are
forthcoming even against the 3rd Accused. It is further trite
in Law that the Prosecution cannot improve upon the
Chargesheet in its objections to an application and it cannot
make claims that are not found in the Chargesheet.
4. The objections filed by the Prosecution are also on the
mistaken premise that the 1st Accused cannot claim that the
prosecution has to be split up against him since there are
no allegations under Section 406 of the I.P.C. against him
whereas in reality, no such claim has been made by this
Accused and the Application has been filed under Section
322 of the Cr.P.C. by this Accused on the ground that there
are no ingredients of Section 406 of the I.P.C. against any
of the Accused.
5. It is submitted that this Hon'ble Court is a special Court
having jurisdiction to try offences falling under Sections 403
to 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Thus, in case any of
the offences under the said sections are not made out from
the material on record, this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction
to deal with the matter and the matter must be tried before
the jurisdictional Magistrate.
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6. It is further submitted that the instant matter is at the
stage of hearing before Charge / framing of Charges and
hence, it is at a pre-trial stage wherein the stage of "inquiry"
into the alleged offences is under progress. It is the settled
position in Law that Trial is distinct from an inquiry and must
necessarily succeed it and Trial commences only on
Charges being framed. It is further trite in Law that the stage
of inquiry commences on the Chargesheet being filed by the
Police and continues until the Trial commences with
Charges having been framed. What constitutes the stage of
"trial" and what constitutes "inquiry" is settled by the
decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in
(2014) 3 SCC 92: Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab. Thus,
the said Application filed by this Accused is liable to be
considered even at this stage. It is pertinent to point out that
there was no progress in this matter for several years due to
the stay order passed by this Hon'ble High Court of
Karnataka in W.P. No. 43675/2013 as well as due to the
Interim Order that was passed in W.A. No. 2873/2019. Even
now, the appointment of the 2nd Special Public Prosecutor
for this matter by the State Government has also been
stayed
in
W.P.
No.
103/2023,
which
is
pending
consideration.
7. In the instant matter, from a plain reading of the
complaint, FIR, Chargesheet and documents annexed
thereto and taking them at their face value, it is prima facie
seen that it is nobody's case that anything was ever
entrusted to any of the Accused by anyone. It is not the
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case of the Complainant that any property or dominion over
property was ever entrusted in any manner by him or
anyone else in M/s. Shashi Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. to all or any
of the Accused. Further, even by a liberal reading of the
material on record, there is no allegation that such entrusted
property was dishonestly misappropriated or converted by
the Accused to their own use or that the Accused
dishonestly used or disposed of that property in violation of
any direction of Law prescribing the mode in which such
trust was to be discharged or any legal contract (express or
implied) that was made by touching discharge of such trust
or willfully caused any other person so to do or omit. There
is not a single allegation of entrustment against any of the
Accused even in the objections filed by the Prosecution.
Thus, the essential ingredients of the alleged offence of
Criminal Breach of Trust as set out in Section 405 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and elaborated on by the Apex
Court in the decisions in LAWS (SC) 2024 (5) 3: Sharif
Ahmed and Another vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,
(2010) 10 SCC 361: V.P. Shrivastava vs Indian Explosives
Ltd. and (2009) 16 SCC 769: State of Punjab vs Pritam
Chand and Others, being totally absent and wholly missing
from the material before this Hon'ble Court, this Hon'ble
Court has no inherent jurisdiction to inquire into this matter
and/or to try the case or commit it for trial since the alleged
offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
is not made out by any stretch of the imagination.
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8. In fact, the allegation in the Complaint in this matter is of
alleged theft by the 3rd Accused which is diametrically
opposed to the allegation of entrustment. In case it is
alleged that any property was stolen as has been done in
the instant case and for which reason Section 380 of I.P.C.
has been invoked, by no stretch of the imagination can it be
said that any property was entrusted to the Accused, which
allegations are mutually destructive to each other.
9. Moreover, it is evident from Clauses F and G of the Deed
of Settlement dated 09.10.2009 between the Complainant
and the 3rd Accused produced by this Accused that the
Complainant himself has stated that the documents which
were allegedly stolen, were in fact "handed over" to the 3rd
Accused, who "lost it" and therefore, "fresh documents were
executed to get over such loss". The said settlement has
been acted upon as seem from the Affidavit and Order in
Crl. Pet. No. 2613/2008 and has been admitted by the
Complainant even in his objections to Crl. Pet. No.
577/2023. In the said settlement in Clause 5, the
Complainant has agreed not to prosecute Accused Nos. 3
and 6 to 10 in the instant matter, which shows the
fraudulent nature of this prosecution and that it is being
solely prosecuted to harass this Accused and to avoid the
consequences of illegally taking over his company, i.e. M/s.
Shashi Distilleries Private Limited.
10. Furthermore, the Complainant's allegation is that the 3rd
Accused who was a Director of the Complainant company
stole the company documents, which is impossible of
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performance and it is akin to a father being accused of
kidnapping his own child. The Law is well settled that a
father being a natural guardian cannot kidnap his own child
as laid down in (1993) 2 SCC 6: Chandrakala Menon (Mrs.)
and Another vs Vipin Menon (Capt.) and Another.
11. Pertinently, some of the other facts that show the
malicious nature of this prosecution and the collusion
between the Complainant and the Police are set out herein
below. It is submitted that the repeated allegations in the
Complaint are that there was only an intention to cheat and
intention to cause loss and no actual wrongful loss or
delivery of property is alleged or claimed to have been
suffered by the Complainant and hence, no case is made
out. It is submitted that under Indian Law, an attempt to
cheat is not an offence under Section 420 of I.P.C. such as
an attempt to murder may be. Additionally, no loss could
have been caused to the Complainant company as it is
nobody's case that the appointment of Accused Nos. 4 to 10
as Directors of the Complainant company was approved by
the Registrar of Companies, Bangalore.
12. In any case, the appointment, removal, resignation of
Directors and other related issues are the subject matter of
a Civil trial which is ongoing in O.S. No. 25582/2012,
pending before the Hon'ble Civil Court, Mayohall Unit,
Bangalore, which is evident from the Plaint and Issues
framed in that suit. Also, the basis for this Complaint being
the same, the effort of the Complainant to settle the Civil
disputes and claims which do not involve any criminal
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offence, by way of applying pressure through criminal
prosecution, may be deprecated and discouraged by this
Hon'ble Court as held in LAWS (SC) 2024 (5) 3: Sharif
Ahmed and Another vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
13. It is further seen that the signatures of the 1st and 2nd
Accused were sent to the state and central forensic labs for
verification by the Police and despite both the reports being
issued (central forensic lab report is a part of the
Chargesheet) that their signatures are forged and do not
match with their admitted signatures, they themselves have
been arrayed as Accused herein by turning the matter on its
head, which shows the preposterous nature of this
prosecution.
14. It is humbly submitted that the absence of the
ingredients of Section 406 of I.P.C. goes to the root of the
matter and further proceedings before this Hon'ble Court
must be immediately stayed, failing which, grave prejudice
shall be caused to this Accused. Thereafter, in terms of
Section 322 of the Cr.P.C., this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to submit this case with a brief report explaining its
nature to the Hon'ble Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bangalore or to such other Magistrate having jurisdiction, as
the Hon'ble Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore
directs, for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may be pleased to allow the Application filed by the 1st
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Accused under Section 322 of Cr.P.C., in the interest of
justice.”
13. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Trial
court will indicate that having come to the conclusion that it was a
specially designated court to try offences punishable under
Sections 403 to 409 IPC, the Trial court proceeded to examine the
merits of the matter in relation to all alleged offences viz., Sections
380, 406, 420, 468, 471 and 120B IPC without appreciating that
the application filed by the petitioner under Section 322 Cr.P.C.
was restricted to Section 406 IPC and not in relation to other
offences; in this context, it is relevant to state that the various
contentions urged by the petitioner in the application and written
submissions referred to supra have not been considered or
appreciated by the Trial court while passing the impugned order,
which is bereft of any proper or cogent / valid reasons as to why it
was rejecting the application filed by the petitioner; similarly, having
referred to various judgments relied upon by the petitioner, the trial
court does not assign valid or cogent reasons as to why the same
were not applicable to the facts of the instant case, thereby
indicating that the impugned order passed by the Trial court is
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clearly a cryptic, laconic, unreasoned and non-speaking order
warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.
14. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Sessions
/ Revisional court will indicate that upto paragraph-41 of the
impugned order, the contentions of both sides have been recorded
by the Court; despite doing so, from paragraph-42 onwards,
absolutely no reasons are assigned as to why the impugned order
passed by the Trial court was being confirmed by the Revisional /
Sessions Court; on the other hand, while considering the rival
contentions, the Revisional court also has gone beyond the scope
and ambit of the application filed by the petitioner under Section
322 Cr.P.C., which was restricted to the offence punishable under
Section 406 IPC and has scrutinised / evaluated the material by
referring to all the offences viz., Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471
r/w 120B IPC, thereby clearly traversing beyond the scope and
ambit of the dispute in controversy between the parties and
consequently, the impugned order passed by the Sessions court /
Revisional court also deserves to be quashed; in other words, the
impugned order passed by the Sessions Court is also cryptic,
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laconic,
unreasoned
and
non-speaking
order
warranting
interference by this Court in the present petition.
15. While dealing with the provisions contained in Section
322 Cr.P.C., the Maharastra High Court in the case of Shankar
Malharrao Deshmukh vs. State of Maharastra – 1997(2)
Mh.L.J.163, held as under:“6. Before dealing with the case relied on by the
learned Magistrate, it may be necessary to set out the
relevant provisions of Sections 322, 323 and 325 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. They are as under :
"S.322. Procedure in cases which Magistrate
cannot dispose of (1) If, in the course of any inquiry into an offence or
a trial before a Magistrate, in any district, the
evidence appears to him to warrant as presumption
(a) that he has no jurisdiction to try the case or
commit it for trial, or
(b) that the case is one which should be tried or
committed for trial by some other Magistrate in the
district, or,
(c) that the case should be tried by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate he shall stay the proceedings
and submit the case, with a brief report explaining
its nature, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or to
such other Magistrate, having jurisdiction, as the
Chief Judicial Magistrate directs.
(2) The Magistrate to whom the case is submitted
may, if so empowered, either try the case himself,
or refer it to any Magistrate, subordinate to him
having jurisdiction, or commit the accused for trial.
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S.323. Procedure when, after commencement of
inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be
committed (1) If, in any inquiry into an offence or a trial before
a Magistrate, it appears to him at any stage of the
proceedings before signing judgment that the case
is one which ought to be tried by the Court of
Session, he shall commit it to that Court under the
provisions hereinbefore contained and thereupon
the provisions of Chapter XVIII shall apply to the
commitment so made.
S.324. ..............................................................
S.325 Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass
sentence sufficiently severe. (1) Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after
hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the
accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he
ought to receive a punishment different in kind,
form or more severe than, that which such
Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a
Magistrate of the second class, is of opinion that
the accused ought to be required to execute a
bond under S. 106, he may record the opinion and
submit his proceedings and forward the accused to
the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is
subordinate.
(2) When more accused than one are being tried
together, and the Magistrate considers it necessary
to proceed under sub-s. (1), in regard to any of
such accused, he shall forward all the accused,
who are in his opinion guilty, to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate.
(3) The Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the
proceedings are submitted may, if he thinks fit,
examine the parties and recall and examine any
witness who has already given evidence in the
case and may call for and take any further
evidence, and shall pass such judgment, sentence
or order in the case as he thinks fit, and as is
according to law."
7. Now, on reading these Sections 322 to 325, it will
appear that applicability of Sections 322 to 325 is
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depending upon certain conditions. Section 322 applies
before commencement or in course of any inquiry or trial
and is wide enough to include the cases of lack of
jurisdiction, defective jurisdiction or local or territorial
jurisdiction, or other cases in which the Magistrate is of the
opinion from the facts disclosed in the police report or other
evidence the case should be tried by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate. Section 323 applies after commencement of
inquiry or trial and that too at any stage of proceedings
before signing the judgment. This section empowers the
Magistrate to commit the case to Court of Session, if it
appears to him that the case is one which ought to be tried
by the Court of Session.
Section 325, however, applies when the Magistrate on
finding an accused guilty is of opinion that the punishment
should be (i) different from that which he can inflict or (ii)
should be more severe than he can inflict, he should,
without convicting the accused, submit the case to the
Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate for his
order.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners fairly accepts
the position that though the charge sheet is filed the inquiry
or trial has not yet commenced into the offences alleged
against the petitioners. That means, the impugned order
can very well fall within the ambit of Section 322 of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
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9. Now in order to bring the case under the ambit of
Section 322 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short the
Code) there must be shown to exist following conditions,
i.e. (i) lack of jurisdiction, (ii) defective jurisdiction/legal or
territorial, and (iii) in ability to inflict adequate punishment
for any other sound reason, to which the Chief Judicial
Magistrate is empowered.
It is, therefore, incumbent on the Magistrate to give
adequate reasons to exercise his powers under Section
322(1)(c) of the Code. Merely quoting the section and
observing that, ".... taking into consideration the gravity of
the offences and public importance of the cases, these
cases are required to be transferred to the Court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate for trial ...." is by itself not a sufficient
compliance of provisions of Section 322 of the Code. The
reason assigned by the learned trial Magistrate for transfer
of the cases to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is not
only but also suffers from patent illegality under the
express provisions of Section 322 of the Code.
Secondly, Section 322 of the Code does not empower
the Magistrate to transfer the case, even if the aforesaid
conditions are fulfilled, to the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate for trial. What section requires is that, the
Magistrate, in such a case, shall stay the proceeding in the
first hand and secondly, submit the case with brief report
explaining it's nature to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or to
such other Magistrate having jurisdiction, as the Chief
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Judicial Magistrate directs. In no cases, the Magistrate can
straight way commit or transfer the case or cases to the
Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 322 of the
Code.”
16. The petitioner has filed written submissions by way of
brief note dated 07.09.2026 as hereunder:1. This Petition has been filed challenging the Order
dated 17.09.2025 passed by the Hon'ble City Civil and
Sessions Judge (CCH 66), Bangalore (Annexure A),
wherein it has dismissed the Crl.Rev.Pet. No. 198/2025
(Annexure K) filed by the Petitioner and also being
aggrieved by the Order dated 27.03.2025 passed by the
Hon'ble III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bangalore
(Hon'ble Trial Court) in C.C. No. 13613/2009 (Annexure B),
wherein the Application filed by the Petitioner under Section
322 of the Cr.P.C. (Annexure F) at the stage of Hearing
before Charge has been erroneously rejected by the
Hon'ble Trial Court.
2. It is submitted that the 1st Respondent Police have
submitted a Chargesheet (Annexure E), which was taken
cognizance of by the Hon'ble Trial Court in C.C. No.
13613/2009 for the alleged offences punishable under the
following Sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against
Accused Nos. 1 to 11:
i) Section 380 - Theft in Dwelling House, etc.
ii) Section 406 - Punishment for Criminal
Breach of Trust
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iii) Section 420 - Cheating and dishonestly
Inducing delivery of property
iv) Section 468 - Forgery for purpose of
Cheating
v) Section 471 - Using as genuine a forged
document or electronic record
vi) Section 120-B - Punishment of Criminal
Conspiracy
3. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Trial Court is a
special Court having jurisdiction to try offences falling
under Sections 403 to 409 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. Thus, in case any of the offences under the said
sections are not made out from the material on record, the
Hon'ble Trial Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the
matter and the matter must be tried before the jurisdictional
Magistrate, who has jurisdiction to try the remaining
offences.
4. In the instant matter, from a plain reading of the
complaint (Annexure C), FIR (Annexure D), Chargesheet
(Annexure E) and documents annexed thereto and taking
them at their face value, it is prima facie seen that it is
nobody's case that anything was ever entrusted to any of
the Accused by anyone. It is not the case of the 2nd
Respondent herein that any property or dominion over
property was ever entrusted in any manner by him or
anyone else in M/s. Shashi Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. to all or any
of the Accused persons. Further, even by a liberal reading
of the material on record, there is no allegation that such
entrusted property was dishonestly misappropriated or
converted by any of the Accused to their own use or that
any of the Accused dishonestly used or disposed of that
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property in violation of any direction of Law prescribing the
mode in which such trust was to be discharged or any legal
contract (express or implied) that was made by touching
discharge of such trust or willfully caused any other person
so to do or omit. There is not a single allegation of
entrustment against any of the Accused that has been
identified even in the objections filed by the Respondents
before the Hon'Grand Trial Court or the Hon'ble Revision
Court. Thus, the essential ingredients of the alleged offence
of Criminal Breach of Trust as set out in Section 405 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and elaborated on by the Apex
Court in a catena of decisions including in (2024) 10 SCC
690: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and Others vs State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others, LAWS (SC) 2025 (7) 90: S.N.
Vijayalakshmi and Others vs State of Karnataka, AIR 2025
SC 4620: Arshad Neyaz Khan vs State Of Jharkhand and
Another, (2009) 1 SCC 516: R. Kalyani vs Janak C. Mehta,
AIR 2024 SC 2420: Sharif Ahmed and Another vs State of
Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 361: V.P.
Shrivastava vs Indian Explosives Ltd. and (2009) 16 SCC
769: State of Punjab vs Pritam Chand and Others, being
totally absent and wholly missing from the material before
the Hon'ble Trial Court, the Hon'ble Trial Court has no
inherent jurisdiction to inquire into this matter and/or to try
the case or commit it for trial since the alleged offence
under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not
made out by any stretch of the imagination.
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5. The Application under Section 322 of the Cr.P.C. can
be filed at any stage of the matter when the Hon'ble
Magistrate has no inherent jurisdiction to decide the subject
matter as in the instant case. As per the Section, it can be
filed at the stage of inquiry or trial and hence, there is no
question of delay in filing the said Application by the
Petitioner. In fact, even Charges are yet to be framed in
C.C. No. 13613/2009, which shows that the matter is still at
a preliminary stage.
6. Hence, the matter was at a pre-trial stage wherein the
stage of "inquiry" into the alleged offences was under
progress when the said Application was filed by the
Petitioner, who is arrayed as Accused No. 1 in C.C. No.
13613/2009. It is the settled position in Law that Trial is
distinct from an inquiry and must necessarily succeed it and
Trial commences only on Charges being framed. It is further
trite in Law that the stage of inquiry commences on the
Chargesheet being filed by the Police and continues until
the Trial commences with Charges having been framed.
What constitutes the stage of "trial" and what constitutes
"inquiry" is settled by the decision of the Constitution
Bench of the Apex Court in (2014) 3 SCC 92: Hardeep
Singh vs State of Punjab.
7. The impugned Order of the Hon'ble Trial Court is an
intermediary order, wherein if the Application was allowed,
the proceedings before the Hon'ble Trial Court would have
stopped as Section 406 of the I.P.C. would have been
dropped and the matter would have been transferred to the
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jurisdictional Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the
remaining offences alleged.
8. As held by the Apex Court in (2003) 6 SCC 641:
State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs Navjot Sandhu @
Afshan Guru and Others, even when there is a bar under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., this Petition filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India r/w Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is maintainable
and this Hon'ble Court's inherent jurisdiction to consider this
matter is not affected by the provisions of Section 397(3) of
the Cr.P.C., especially to prevent abuse of process or
miscarriage of justice.
9. The Petitioner has not filed for discharge as falsely
alleged by the Respondents in the Hon'ble Trial Court and
before the Hon'ble Revision Court. It is Accused No. 4 who
has filed the discharge application, which has no bearing on
the Application filed by the Petitioner under Section 322 of
the Cr.P.C.
10. It is not the Petitioner's case that only his case must
be transferred to the jurisdictional Magistrate having
jurisdiction since there are no allegations of Section 406 of
the I.P.C. against him, but it is his specific case in the
Application filed in C.C. No. 13613/2009 that there are no
allegations of entrustment against any of the Accused in the
Complaint, FIR, Chargesheet or Chargesheet documents.
The Hon'ble Revision Court has misled itself into assuming
that the Petitioner only wants the case in C.C. No.
13613/2009 with respect to the Petitioner to be segregated
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on the alleged ground that there is no offence under Section
406 against the Petitioner, whereas it has quite clearly been
the case of the Petitioner in all his pleadings and oral
arguments at all times that there is no offence or allegation
of Section 406 against any of the Accused persons and
the case cannot go on before the Hon'ble Trial Court
against any of the Accused persons.
11. The Respondents, both before the Hon'ble Trial
Court and the Hon'ble Revision Court, both in their
objections and during their arguments, have not made even
a whisper as to what was allegedly entrusted to any of the
Accused persons by the 2nd Respondent. Thus, without the
key and basic ingredient of entrustment being present in the
allegations, which is the first and foremost ingredient to
make out an offence under Section 406 of the I.P.C., there
is no question of the invocation of the said Section against
any of the Accused.
12. Both the impugned Orders do not set out as to what
property was allegedly entrusted to any of the Accused by
the 2nd Respondent or M/s. Shashi Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. or
any details of when and where it was entrusted since there
are no such allegations in the Chargesheet or anywhere
else in the records.
13. Section 322 of the Cr.P.C. does not require that all
the Accused must approach the Hon'ble Trial Court and any
of them may seek the relief, which would then be applicable
for the entire case and in respect of all Accused persons.
The Hon'ble Revision Court's finding that only the Petitioner
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has approached the Court and thus his application ought to
be dismissed is totally perverse and erroneous as there is
no requirement in Law that all the accused persons must
jointly approach the Court for relief under Section 322 of the
Cr.P.C. for the application to be allowed.
14. If Section 406 of the I.P.C. is not attracted since it is
nobody's case that anything was ever entrusted to any of
the Accused, then the Hon'ble Trial Court has no inherent
jurisdiction to inquire or try the matter as that Court gets
jurisdiction only if any of the offences under Section 403 to
409 of the I.P.C. are attracted since it is a special Court.
Here, since the ingredients of Section 406 of the I.P.C. are
conspicuous by their absence, the Hon'ble Trial Court
before whom the matter is pending has no inherent
jurisdiction and any order passed by the Hon'ble Trial Court
is a nullity and void ab initio and of no consequence and no
useful purpose will be served by continuing the inquiry or
trial in the Hon'ble Trial Court.
15. Sections 380 and 406 of the I.P.C. regarding theft
and criminal breach of trust are the antithesis of each other
and they cannot coexist on the same set of facts. Either one
can be accused of stealing a property or such property may
have been voluntarily entrusted to the accused, but a
person cannot be accused of both acts simultaneously.
16. Sections 420 and 406 of the I.P.C. regarding
cheating and criminal breach of trust are the antithesis of
each other and they cannot coexist on the same set of facts
as categorically held by the Apex Court in (2024) 10 SCC
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690: Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and Others vs State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others, LAWS (SC) 2025 (7) 90: S.N.
Vijayalakshmi and Others vs State of Karnataka, AIR 2025
SC 4620: Arshad Neyaz Khan vs State Of Jharkhand and
Another and in the Order dated 14.07.2025 passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal
No.2963/2025: Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R.
Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others. Either one can
be accused of inducing a person fraudulently to deliver the
property with mens rea right from the outset or such
property may have been voluntarily entrusted to the
accused by another person and the accused then converts
the property entrusted to his own use by later developing
mens rea, but a person cannot be accused of both acts
simultaneously.
17. Sections 380, 406 and 420 of the I.P.C. are
impossible to coexist with each other on the same set of
facts and they are mutually destructive of each other and
the
requisite
ingredients
of
all
three
offences
are
fundamentally opposed to each other, which shows the
frivolous nature and absurdity of the case of the prosecution
and the same is a gross abuse of the process of Law,
further proven by the fact that the case in C.C. No.
13613/2009 has been quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of
Karnataka in Crl. Pet. No. 577/2023 vide its Order dated
19.02.2024 against Accused No. 11 based on the
concession of the 2nd Respondent herein that there is no
material in the Chargesheet against the 11th Accused,
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which is under challenge before the Apex Court but there is
no stay order.
18. The proceedings pending before the Hon'ble Trial
Court are vitiated and the Petitioner is prejudiced as the
Hon'ble Trial Court, without even framing Charges, despite
not having inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter, has
already decided prematurely in a biased manner without
even trial commencing, vide the impugned Order at
Annexure B in Para 10 on Page 16 that "The accused
persons were involved in this case" and in Para 11 on Page
No. 17 that "thereby the accused have committed the
criminal breach of trust and cheated to the complainant
company". The same impeaches the fundamental right of
the Petitioner to a fair trial as guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India.
19. An altogether new case has been made out in Para
11 of the impugned Order at Annexure B to the material
prejudice of the Petitioner and it has led to usurpation of
jurisdiction that is not available to the Hon'ble Trial Court. In
fact, the Hon'ble Trial Court holds that Accused Nos. 1 and
2 have modified the company name on Shashi Distilleries to
Shashi Distilleries Private Limited on 07.06.2005, which
allegation is not found anywhere in the Complaint or
Chargesheet itself.
20. The Hon'ble Revision Court has also made out a
new case not found anywhere else as it holds in the
Annexure A order that the fund of the partnership firm
appears to be utilized by the Petitioner and hence, it
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allegedly makes out a case to hear regarding charge for the
offence under Section 406 of the I.P.C., which is nobody's
case and not found in the Chargesheet. In fact, the
allegation in the Complaint is only of an attempt / intention
to cheat and there is not a single averment or document in
the Chargesheet regarding any actual loss sustained by the
2nd Respondent or the company. Additionally, no loss could
have been caused to the company as it is nobody's case
that the appointment of Accused Nos. 4 to 10 as Directors
of the company was approved by the Registrar of
Companies, Bangalore. The Hon'ble Trial Court and the
Hon'ble Revision Court seem to have stepped into the
shoes of the investigating authority by making new
allegations not found in the records of the case, which
renders the impugned Orders illegal and perverse.
21. The prejudice to the Accused persons in this case is
all the more amplified by the fact that nowhere in the
Complaint, FIR, Chargesheet or Chargesheet documents is
it the case that the 2nd Respondent or M/s. Shashi
Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. has been actually cheated and on the
contrary, it is repeatedly mentioned in the Complaint that
the Accused only had an intention to cheat and a common
intention to cause wrongful loss but no one is alleged to
have been actually cheated nor is there an allegation
anywhere of wrongful loss actually being caused.
22. The Hon'ble Revision Court has failed to note that
the averments in the Complaint and Chargesheet regarding
the registered firm M/s Shashi Distilleries" have no bearing
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or nexus with regard to the alleged offences committed
against the company "M/s. Shashi Distilleries Pvt. Ltd.",
which are independent of each other without any corelation. The Hon'ble Revision Court has misled itself by
going off on a tangent about the partnership firm, which has
nothing to do with the alleged offences committed
purportedly in respect of the private limited company by
virtue of the Board Meeting held on 14.12.2006.
23. It is trite in Law that justice must not only be done
but must be seen to be done in the matter. The Inordinate
delay in the adjudication of the Application by the Hon'ble
Trial Court, even after Written Arguments were filed by the
Petitioner on 27.05.2024, has led to much doubt and has a
tendency to shake the confidence of the general public in
the judicial system as laid down in (2001) 7 SCC 318: Anil
Rai vs State of Bihar. In the instant case, the matter was
reserved for orders for months at a stretch repeatedly and
the impugned Order at Annexure B was passed finally only
on 27.03.2025. It is not humanly possible to remember all
the facts and arguments in a matter after many months
when the Court is overburdened with cases.
24. The Deed of Settlement dated 09.10.2009 between
the 2nd Respondent and the 3rd Accused (Annexure J),
which is a part of the Additional Chargesheet dated
09.12.2025 filed by the Hulimavu Police Station in C.C. No.
13613/2009, goes to the root of the matter and takes away
the foundation of the prosecution case, but it has not been
considered by the Hon'ble Trial Court or the Hon'ble
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Revision Court nor the fact that the signatures of the 1st
and 2nd Accused were sent for testing and despite both the
reports being issued that their signatures are forged and do
not match with their admitted signatures, which makes them
the victims of forgery, but they themselves have been
arrayed as accused by turning the matter on its head to aid
the 2nd Respondent in his nefarious designs.
25. The Hon'ble Revisional Court simply ignores the
said Deed of Settlement, which sequence of events goes to
the root of the matter and takes away the foundation of the
allegation of theft and the Hon'ble Revision Court has failed
to note the fraud being played by the 2nd Respondent, the
3rd Accused and Accused Nos. 7 to 10 on the Court as well
as on the Petitioner and other Accused persons.
26. Moreover, it is evident from Clauses F and G of the
said Deed of Settlement that the 2nd Respondent himself
has stated that the documents which were allegedly stolen,
were in fact "handed over" to the 3rd Accused, who "lost it"
and therefore, "fresh documents were executed to get over
such loss". The said settlement has been acted upon as
seen from the Affidavit and Order in Crl. Pet. No. 2613/2008
and has been admitted by the 2nd Respondent even in his
objections to Crl. Pet. No. 577/2023. In the said settlement
in Clause 5, the 2nd Respondent has agreed not to
prosecute Accused Nos. 3 and 6 to 10 in the instant matter,
which shows the fraudulent nature of this prosecution and
that it is being solely prosecuted to harass the Petitioner
and some other Accused and to avoid the consequences of
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illegally taking over his company, i.e. M/s. Shashi Distilleries
Private Limited.
27. Infact, it has been categorically admitted in the
Application for Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail of the 2nd
Accused filed in Crl. Misc. No. 4123/2026 by the 2nd
Respondent himself, that the 2nd Accused, who is similarly
situated in this case to the Petitioner, is a victim of forgery
and that ironically he has been arrayed as an accused
nonetheless, that the quashing of proceedings against the
11th Accused demonstrates the selective and motivated
nature of the case and that an NBW was issued against the
2nd Accused contrary to established Law. This highlights
the perversity of the prosecution case and confirms the
frivolousness of it.
28. Shockingly, it is seen that although the 3rd Accused
in C.C. No. 13613/2009 got sent a Legal Notice dated
18.09.2006 to the 2nd Respondent herein through his
counsel, Mr. C.V. Nagesh in the same subject matter, to
which the 2nd Respondent caused a Reply Notice dated
22.09.2006 to Mr. C.V. Nagesh, later Mr. C.V. Nagesh
started appearing for the 2nd Respondent in all the matters
against all the Accused, including in W.P. No. 43675/2013,
W.P. No. 2168/2026 and even in Crl. Pet. No. 2613/2008
against the 3rd Accused himself.
29. In any case, the appointment, removal, resignation
of Directors and other related issues are the subject matter
of a civil trial which is ongoing in O.S. No. 25582/2012,
pending before the Hon'ble Civil Court (CCH 74), Mayohall
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Unit, Bangalore, which is evident from the Plaint and Issues
framed in that suit. Also, the basis for this Complaint being
the same, the effort of the 2nd Respondent to settle the civil
disputes and claims which do not involve any criminal
offence, by way of applying pressure through criminal
prosecution, may be deprecated and discouraged by this
Hon'ble Court as held in AIR 2024 SC 2420: Sharif Ahmed
and Another vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another.
30. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in the same
case, the Investigating officer must make clear and
complete entries of all columns in Chargesheet so that the
Court can clearly understand which crime has been
committed by which Accused and what is the material
evidence available on file. The role played by each Accused
in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in
the Chargesheet for each of the Accused persons.
However, the same has not been done in the instant matter
and the same is explicitly evident from the fact that for the
first time, the 1st Respondent in its objections to the
Application before the Hon'ble Trial Court has admitted that
there are no allegations under Section 406 of the I.P.C.
against any of the Accused except the 3rd Accused,
whereas from a reading of the Chargesheet, no allegations
containing the ingredients of Section 406 are forthcoming
even against the 3rd Accused. The Prosecution cannot
improve upon the Chargesheet in its objections to an
application or during oral arguments. It cannot make claims
that are not found anywhere in the Chargesheet.
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31. It is trite in Law that any order passed by a Court
without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and void ab initio.
The Hon'ble Revision Court has failed to consider the said
principle of Law and passed the impugned Order at
Annexure A mechanically. No useful purpose will be
served by continuing the proceedings before the Hon'ble
Trial Court which has no inherent jurisdiction since none of
the offences under Sections 403 to 409 of the Indian Penal
Code are attracted.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner humbly prays that the
above Petition may kindly be allowed as prayed for, in the
interest of justice.”
17. So also, the 2nd respondent – de facto complainant has
filed written arguments dated 17.09.2026 as hereunder:1. The present petition under Section 528 BNSS read
with Articles 227 of the Constitution of India is directed
against a concurrent finding rendered by two courts below
on an identical question. The chronology is as follows:
(a) C.C. No. 13613/2009 is pending before the Court of
the III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Special Court),
Bengaluru, against the Petitioner and others for offences
punishable under Sections 380, 406, 420, 468, 471 and
120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on a police
chargesheet.
(b) The Petitioner (Accused No. 1) filed an application
dated 14.03.2024 under Section 322 Cr.P.C., contending
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that since the essential ingredients of the offence under
Section 405/406 IPC were, on the Petitioner's reading of the
chargesheet, not made out, the Special Court, whose
jurisdiction the Petitioner characterised as confined to
offences under Sections 403 to 409 IPC, had no jurisdiction
to proceed, and that the matter ought to be stayed and
submitted to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under
Section 322 Cr.P.C.
(c) By a reasoned order dated 27.03.2025, the learned
III ACJM rejected the application, holding, on a perusal of
the complaint and the chargesheet, that a prima facie case
under Section 406 IPC (among the other sections) was
made out against the Petitioner, and that the jurisdiction of
the Court "does not extend to a single accused" so as to
permit severance of the Petitioner's case from that of the
co-accused tried together on the same chargesheet.
(d) The Petitioner carried the said order in revision
under Section 397 Cr.P.C. before the learned LXV
Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH66), registered as Crl.R.P. No. 198/2025. Respondent No. 2
herein was heard as intervenor/applicant, having been
permitted to intervene as the person aggrieved and the de
facto complainant in the underlying dispute. By a detailed
order dated 17.09.2025, the revisional Court dismissed the
revision petition, affirming that the material on record prima
facie discloses the ingredients of Section 406 IPC, and that
the Petitioner's case could not be severed from the coaccused merely on an asserted want of jurisdiction.
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(e) The Petitioner now impugns both orders, that of the
learned Magistrate dated 27.03.2025 and that of the learned
Sessions Judge dated 17.09.2025, in the present petition
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under
Section 528 BNSS.
II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO MAINTAINABILITY
2. It is respectfully submitted, as a threshold objection,
that the present petition is not maintainable in the manner
framed, and deserves to be dismissed in limine on this
ground alone, without the necessity of entering into the
merits.
3. The Petitioner's grievance, that the Section 322
application was wrongly rejected, has already been
examined and rejected on merits, after full hearing, by the
learned Magistrate and, on revision under Section 397
Cr.P.C., by the learned Sessions Judge. What is now
sought before this Hon'ble Court, under the label of Section
528 BNSS., is in substance nothing but a second revision
against the very same order on the very same ground that
has already been considered and rejected by the revisional
Court.
4. It is well settled that where a person has already
invoked and exhausted the revisional remedy under Section
397 Cr.P.C., recourse to the inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to reagitate the identical grievance is
impermissible save in the narrowest of circumstances, to
prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the
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ends of justice in a case of manifest miscarriage of justice.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni,
(1997) 4 SCC 241, held that permitting a second look at an
order through Section 482 Cr.P.C. after the same order has
been tested in revision "may amount to circumvention of the
provisions of Section 397(3)" of the Code, and that the
inherent power survives only as a narrow safety valve, to be
exercised sparingly so as to avoid "needless multiplicity of
procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of
proceedings." This view draws upon and is consistent with
the earlier line of authority in Dharam Pal v. Ramshri, AIR
1993 SC 1361, Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2
SCC 437, and Deepti v. Akhil Rai, (1995) 5 SCC 751, all of
which caution against Section 482 Cr.P.C. being used to
circumvent the statutory scheme governing successive
challenges to the same order.
5. In the present case, no exceptional ground of abuse
of process or miscarriage of justice has been made out, or
is capable of being made out, given that: (i) two courts have
concurrently and independently examined the Petitioner's
contention on identical facts and identical case law and
found it wanting; (ii) the reasoning of both courts below
correctly applies settled principles, as elaborated in Part III
below; and (iii) the Petitioner does not point to any change
in
circumstance,
any
material
overlooked,
or
any
jurisdictional error going to the very competence of the
courts below to have heard the matter. Mere disagreement
with two concurrent, reasoned findings is not, without more,
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a ground to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court as if it were an appellate forum re-hearing the Section
322 application afresh.
III. THE PETITION IS EQUALLY UNSUSTAINABLE ON
MERITS
6. Without prejudice to the preliminary objection above,
it is submitted that even on merits, the impugned orders
warrant no interference, for the following cumulative
reasons.
A. Section 322 Cr.P.C. is confined to want of forumcompetence; it is not a provision to test whether the
ingredients of an offence are made out.
7. Section 322(1) Cr.P.C. reads:
"(1) If, in the course of any inquiry into an offence
or a trial before a Magistrate in any district, the
evidence appears to him to warrant a presumption(a) that he has no jurisdiction to try the case or
commit it for trial, or
(b) that the case is one which should be tried or
committed for trial by some other Magistrate in the
district, or
(c) that the case should be tried by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, he shall stay the proceedings
and submit the case, with a brief report explaining
its nature, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or to
such other Magistrate, having jurisdiction, as the
Chief Judicial Magistrate directs."
8. All three limbs of Section 322(1) i.e., clauses (a), (b)
and (c) are, in terms, directed to one and the same
question: which Magistrate or which Court is competent, as
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a matter of forum allocation (territorial, class-of-Magistrate,
or notification-based subject-matter jurisdiction), to try or
commit the case. None of the three limbs speaks to, or
contemplates, an inquiry into whether the material on record
discloses the ingredients of the offence charged. That is an
altogether distinct question, textually and conceptually, and
the Code deliberately routes it through a separate and
specific
machinery,
Sections
and
Cr.P.C.
(discharge), and, at the instance of the High Court, Section
482 Cr.P.C. (quashing), each carrying its own procedural
safeguards
of
notice,
hearing
and
a
reasoned,
appealable/revisable order.
9. This is confirmed by Saroja Kanta Behera v. State of
Odisha, 2026 SCC OnLine Ori 6450, where the Orissa High
Court, while examining an identical species of challenge
under Sections 409 and 420 IPC, held in terms: "Section
240 CrPC empowers a Magistrate to frame a charge where
there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence which the Magistrate is competent to
try... Section 322 CrPC operates in a different field. It
provides that where, in the course of an inquiry or trial, the
evidence appears to warrant a presumption that the case
should be tried by another Magistrate... Therefore, the
competence of a Judicial Magistrate First Class to try an
offence under Section 409 IPC does not preclude him from
submitting
the
case...
where
the
circumstances
contemplated under Section 322 CrPC exist." The Court
there, relying on Asim Shariff v. National Investigation
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Agency, (2018) 3 SCC 493, and S.W. Palanitkar v. State of
Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, confirmed that the question of
whether ingredients of Sections 406/409/420 IPC are prima
facie disclosed is one for the discharge/charge stage,
requiring the Court to "sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case... has been made out" and is not, and cannot be,
collapsed into a Section 322 jurisdictional inquiry.
10. The same understanding of Section 322 as a
narrow, forum-specific provision, distinct from a merits
review, is reflected in Baba Abdul Khan v. Smt. A.D.
Sawant, J.M.F.C., 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 612, where the
Bombay High Court explained that Sections 322 to 325
Cr.P.C. together "deal with the powers of the Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, regarding the transfer of the cases
in certain situation to the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate and
Sessions Judge for trial", a scheme available to specific,
enumerated jurisdictional and sentencing contingencies,
and to nothing else; and in Shankar Malharrao Deshmukh v.
State of Maharashtra, 1997(2) Mh.L.J. 163, where the
Bombay High Court held that even where the conditions of
Section 322(1)(c) are genuinely fulfilled, the Magistrate
must record adequate reasons and follow the two-step
procedure of staying the proceedings and submitting a
report, underscoring that Section 322 confers no power to
short circuit the ordinary course of the case, let alone to test
the sufficiency of the prosecution material.
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11. The historical pedigree of Section 322 Cr.P.C.
reinforces this narrow reading. As explained by the Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Mahender Goyal v.
Kadamba International, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 3508,
Section 322 Cr.P.C. "corresponds to Section 346 of the
1898 Code" and traces to the 41st Report of the Law
Commission of India, which introduced the present clause
(a) want of jurisdiction purely to remove a doubt as to
whether the pre-existing provision for inter-Magistrate
transfer within a district also covered jurisdictional defects;
the provision was never intended, and has never been read,
as a freestanding vehicle for testing the sufficiency of the
prosecution case. The Full Bench further held that Section
322 Cr.P.C. is so narrowly and hierarchically confined that a
Magistrate cannot even transfer a case to a Chief Judicial
Magistrate outside his own territorial subordination, since
"transfer by a Magistrate to a Magistrate without instructions
of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Chief Judicial
Magistrate outside the District is not envisaged in the
Section." This confirms that Section 322 is a technical,
administrative, forum-allocation provision operating strictly
within a defined hierarchy, the very opposite of the
evidence-appreciating exercise the Petitioner asks this
Hon'ble Court to read into it.
B. Where a genuine jurisdictional question does arise
under Section 322, it is a territorial or forum question of
fact, not an assertion that ingredients are absent, as the
Respondent's own authorities illustrate.
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12. It is instructive to contrast the present case with one
where Section 322 Cr.P.C. was genuinely and properly
invoked. In Kumari Seema Jha v. State of Jharkhand, 2015
SCC OnLine Jhar 5632, the accused pursued two entirely
separate and parallel challenges in the very same complaint
case: (i) a revision against rejection of their discharge
application (testing whether the ingredients of Section 498A IPC were made out on the complaint), and (ii) a separate
petition challenging an order rejecting their application
under Section 322 Cr.P.C. (testing whether the Ranchi court
had territorial jurisdiction at all, since no part of the alleged
cruelty had occurred within its limits). The Jharkhand High
Court
decided
the
Section
322/territorial-jurisdiction
question strictly on the touchstone of Sections 178 and 179
Cr.P.C. i.e., where the ingredients of the offence were said
to have occurred following Amarendu Jyoti v. State of
Chhattisgarh, and held that mere receipt of threatening
telephone calls at Ranchi did not, without more, confer
territorial jurisdiction on the Ranchi court. That is a
paradigm Section 322 case: a genuine, fact-specific dispute
about where the case ought to be tried. It has nothing in
common with the Petitioner's contention here, which is not
that this case belongs in some other territorial forum, but
that no offence under Section 406 IPC is made out at all on
the merits, a discharge-stage contention dressed up,
incorrectly, in the language of jurisdiction, even the accused
in Kumari Seema Jha did not treat the discharge and
Section 322 questions as interchangeable; they pursued
them as two separate, independent remedies before two
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separate proceedings, precisely because the two inquiries
are legally distinct, exactly as Respondent No. 2 submits
here.
C. On the facts, the courts below rightly held that the
ingredients of Section 406 IPC are, prima facie,
disclosed and that finding cannot be reopened at this
stage.
13. The learned Magistrate, on a detailed appreciation
of the complaint and the chargesheet, recorded that the
Petitioner and Accused No. 2, after receiving Rs. 25 lakhs
each from the complainant/Respondent No. 2's company
through banking channels and exiting the partnership,
thereafter colluded with Accused No. 3 to misappropriate
share certificates and letterheads of the firm, effected an
unauthorised change in its constitution, and caused
fabricated documents (Form No. 32) to be filed with the
Registrar of Companies and the Excise Commissioner
projecting persons who were never directors as directors of
a company stated to be worth over Rs. 52 crores and, on
that material, held that a prima facie case under Sections
380, 406, 420, 468, 471 and 120(B) IPC was made out.
This is not a case, therefore, where the complaint is silent
on entrustment or misappropriation; it is a case where the
Petitioner disputes the correctness of a considered prima
facie finding which is precisely the terrain of a discharge
application or a full-fledged quashing petition assessed on
Bhajan Lal principles, not a jurisdiction application under
Section 322 Cr.P.C.
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14. It is further submitted that the offences under
Sections 406 and 420 IPC in the present case are not, on a
fair
reading
of
the
chargesheet,
mutually
exclusive
allegations resting on an identical, indivisible factual
foundation. As held by the Orissa High Court in Saroja
Kanta Behera (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024
INSC 626, (relying on Delhi Race Club and Section 221
Cr.P.C.), the Code expressly contemplates alternative
charges of criminal breach of trust and cheating where, at
the threshold, it is uncertain which offence the facts
ultimately
proved
will
constitute;
the
precise
legal
characterisation is a matter for trial, not for a jurisdiction
application at the inception of the case.
D. Even accepting the Petitioner's own case at its
highest, Section 322 Cr.P.C. could never have yielded
the relief the Petitioner is truly after, at best a transfer,
never discharge or acquittal.
15. It is respectfully submitted that even if this Hon'ble
Court were to accept, for the sake of argument, that the
Special Court's jurisdiction is confined to offences under
Sections
to
IPC
(the
Petitioner's
own
characterisation in paragraph 2 of the Section 322
application), the learned Magistrate has correctly held that
the jurisdiction of the Court over a joint chargesheet "does
not extend to a single accused" so as to permit the
Petitioner alone to be severed out and sent elsewhere while
the co-accused, charged on the same facts and the same
chargesheet, remain to be tried before the same Court.
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16. More fundamentally, Section 322 Cr.P.C., by its very
text, results only in a stay of proceedings and a
transfer/submission of the case to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate. It does not, and cannot, result in discharge or
acquittal of an accused. This is authoritatively settled in
Smt. Padira Vidyavathi v. Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad,
2020 SCC OnLine AP 5083, relied upon by Respondent No.
2, where the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dealing with an
identical attempt to convert a jurisdiction objection into a
discharge, held: "even if the Court... has no jurisdiction to try
the said case... the Court... cannot acquit the accused. At
best, if the said Court finds at any stage of the case that it
has no jurisdiction to try the case, under Section 322 of
Cr.P.C. the Court has to stay the proceedings and submit
the case with a brief report explaining its nature to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate... Therefore, as per law, even when the
trial Court finds in any criminal trial that it has no territorial
jurisdiction to try the said case, it cannot either discharge
the accused on that ground or acquit the accused on that
ground. At best, it can only order for transfer of the said
case to the competent Court which has jurisdiction to try the
same." The same judgment also confirms, in the converse
and equally relevant situation, that at the stage of discharge
"the Court has to only see whether there is prima facie
evidence or material to frame a charge... leaving the proof
of the said allegations to be decided in the final adjudication
of the case" it is not for the Court, at that stage, to weigh
whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed in proving
entrustment or dishonest misappropriation under Section
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406 IPC, precisely the exercise the Petitioner asks this
Hon'ble Court to undertake under the guise of Section 322
Cr.P.C.
17. A transfer under Section 322 Cr.P.C., even where
warranted, therefore operates only upon the forum, not
upon the charge: the transferee Magistrate would in any
event
have
to
independently
examine,
at
the
charge/discharge stage, whether the very same ingredients
are made out. The relief the Petitioner seeks through
Section 322 Cr.P.C. is not, therefore, capable of yielding the
substantive outcome the Petitioner is in truth after discharge
from the Section 406 charge which only underscores that
Section 322 is being invoked here as a proxy for relief it was
never designed to grant.
WHEREFORE it is most respectfully prayed that this
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the above writ
petition as not maintainable and/or devoid of merit and pass
such other order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the
facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of
justice.”
18. As stated supra, a perusal of the impugned orders
passed by the Trial court and Sessions / Revisional court will
clearly indicate that the various contentions urged by both sides as
well as the material on record and the statutory provisions
contained in Section 322 Cr.P.C. and Section 406 IPC as well as
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the judgments relied upon by the parties have not been considered
by both the Courts and consequently, in order to enable both sides
to urge their respective contentions before the trial court and to
enable reconsideration of the matter afresh, I am of the considered
opinion that the impugned orders passed by the trial court and
Sessions / Revisional court deserve to be set aside and the matter
remitted back to the Trial court for reconsideration afresh and in
accordance with law.
19. Insofar as the Intervention application I.A.No.2/2026 filed
by the Intervening applicant – accused No.5 is concerned, the
same deserves to be disposed of reserving liberty in his favour to
file an appropriate application under Section 322 Cr.P.C., and by
directing the Trial court to dispose of the same in accordance with
law after providing an opportunity to the respondents in this regard.
I.A.No.2/2026 is accordingly disposed of.
20. In the result, I pass the following:ORDER
(i)
Petition is hereby allowed;
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(ii) The impugned order dated 17.09.2025 (Annexure-A)
passed by LXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru (CCH-66) in Crl.R.P. No.198/2025 and the impugned
order dated 27.03.2025 (Annexure-B) passed by III Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru in C.C.No.13613/2009 are
hereby set aside;
(iii) The matter is remitted back to the Trial court for
reconsideration of the application dated 14.03.2024 filed by the
petitioner under Section 322 of Cr.P.C afresh and in accordance
with law;
(iv) Liberty is reserved in favour of the Intervening applicant –
accused No.5 in I.A.No.2/2026 to file an application under Section
322 of Cr.P.C. before the trial Court;
(v) Liberty is also reserved in favour of respondent No.2 - de
facto
complainant
and
respondent
No.1-State
to
file
objections/additional objections to the application filed by the
petitioner under Section 322 of Cr.P.C. as well as the application
under Section 322 of Cr.P.C to be filed by the intervening
applicant- accused No.5;
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(vi) The Trial court is directed to reconsider the application
filed by the petitioner-accused No.1 under Section 322 of Cr.P.C
dated 14.03.2024 afresh and also consider the application under
Section 322 Cr.P.C to be filed by the intervening applicant-accused
No.5, without being influenced by the findings and observations
recorded in the impugned orders passed by the Trial court and
Sessions court / Revisional Court and pass appropriate orders in
accordance with law, within a period of six weeks from the date of
a receipt of a copy of this order;
(vii) It is made clear that while deciding the application under
Section 322 of Cr.P.C filed by the petitioner-accused No.1 and the
application under Section 322 of Cr.P.C to be filed by the
intervening applicant-accused No.5, the learned Magistrate shall
confine
the
consideration/scrutiny
relating
to
the
offence
punishable under Section 406 of IPC insofar as the petitioner –
accused No.1 and intervening applicant – accused No.5 and shall
not deal with or consider any of other offences alleged against the
accused persons.
- 58 HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:51051
WP No. 39695 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010845482025
(viii) All rival contentions on all aspects of the matter are kept
open and no opinion is expressed on the merits/demerits of the
rival contentions.
Sd/(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
Srl.
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