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WP No. 69 of 2026
C/W WP No. 38117 of 2025
RESERVED ON 25TH AUGUST 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.69 OF 2026 (GM-CPC)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.38117 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
IN W.P. NO.69/2026:
BETWEEN:
Digitally
signed by C K
LATHA
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
1.
M/S. S.K.T. & COMPANY
A PARTNERSHIP FIRM
RAMESHWARA TEMPLE BUILDING
1ST CROSS, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU-560 018
REP. BY SRI DEVARAJULU H.B.
2.
SRI. H.B. DEVARAJULU
S/O LATE H. BASAVAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS,
R/AT RAMESHWARA TEMPLE BUILDING,
1ST CROSS, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU-560 018.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. T.N. VISWANATHA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
BENGALURU WATER SUPPLY &
SEWERAGE BOARD, BENGALURU,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CUM SECRETARY,
KAVERI BHAVAN,
BENGALURU-560 009.
(BY SRI. MONESH KUMAR K.B., ADVOCATE)
…RESPONDENT
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 14.11.2025 PASSED ON I.A.NO.III IN EXECUTION
PETITION NO.2328/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE XVI ADDITIONAL
CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-H
AND ETC.
IN W.P. NO.38117/2025:
BETWEEN:
1.
M/S. S.K.T. & COMPANY
A PARTNERSHIP FIRM
RAMESHWARA TEMPLE BUILDING,
1ST CROSS, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU-560 018
REPRESENTED BY SRI DEVARAJULU H.B.
(PROPRIETOR CONCERN)
2.
SRI. H.B. DEVARAJULU,
S/O LATE H. BASAVAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS,
R/AT RAMESHWARA TEMPLE BUILDING,
1ST CROSS, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU-560 018.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. T.N. VISWANATHA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
BENGALURU WATER SUPPLY &
SEWERAGE BOARD, BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CUM SECRETARY,
KAVERI BHAVAN,
BENGALURU-560 009.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. MONESH KUMAR K.B., ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 14.11.2025 PASSED ON I.A.NO.IV IN EXECUTION
PETITION NO.2328/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE XVI ADDITIONAL
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CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-H
AND ETC.,
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, ORDERS WAS PRONOUNCED AS UNDER:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
CAV JUDGMENT
1.
These two writ petitions are filed by the judgment
debtors impugning the common order dated 14.11.2025 passed on
I.A.Nos. III and IV in Execution Petition No.2328/2019 on the file of
XVI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
[Executing Court].
By the impugned common order, the
Executing Court rejected I.A.No.III filed under Section 151 of Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 [CPC] seeking recall of the order of
attachment and I.A.No. IV filed under Section 151 read with Article
136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [Limitation Act] seeking dismissal
of the execution petition on the ground that it was barred by
limitation. Both the applications were filed by the judgment
debtors.
Prefatory facts
2.
The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
[BWSSB] (respondent) instituted suit. O.S No.1171/1983 against
the petitioners for recovery and other consequential reliefs. The
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petitioners had filed suit, O.S. No.1477/1983 seeking recovery of
transportation charges, demurrage
charges and earnest money
deposit against the respondent. Both the suits were clubbed
together and by common judgment dated 02.03.2002, the
respondent's suit was decreed holding that the respondent is
entitled to recover the suit sum of `7,60,382.02 with future interest
at the rate of 18% and the petitioners suit O.S No.1477/1983 was
dismissed with costs. The petitioners challenged the judgment and
decree dated 02.03.2002 in RFA No.950/2002. There was no
interim stay of the decree. The appeal was dismissed on
23.10.2009, confirming the decree. The respondent thereafter filed
Execution Petition No.2328/2019. The petitioners' objection to the
maintainability of the execution petition was rejected by the
Executing Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners
preferred W.P.No. 30384/2024, which came to be dismissed. The
order of this Court was thereafter challenged before the Supreme
Court in SLP (C) No.13650/2025 which was also dismissed,
thereby confirming the order of the executing court. Thus, the
maintainability of the execution petition is no longer open to
challenge.
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3.
The petitioners filed I.A.No.III seeking recall of the
attachment warrant and I.A. No.IV was filed seeking dismissal of
the execution petition as barred by limitation. Against the rejection
of I.A.No.III, the petitioners have preferred W.P No.69/2026 and
against rejection of I.A.No.IV, the petitioners have preferred W.P
No.38117/ 2025.
Findings of the Executing Court
4.
The Executing Court held that the decree passed by
the Trial Court on 02.03.2002 was challenged in RFA No.950/2002
and the same was dismissed on 23.10.2009 confirming the decree
and applied the doctrine of merger holding that the decree of the
Trial Court merged with the decree in the appeal upon dismissal.
Consequently, for the purpose of computing limitation for
execution, the relevant date was treated as 23.10.2009 (RFA
950/2002 dismissal) and not 02.03.2002 (the decree in Trial
Court). The Executing Court held that since the Execution Petition
2328/2019 was filed on 02.07.2019, it was within the period of 12
years as prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
Contentions
5.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
contends that the execution petition is filed beyond the period of
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limitation as prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
According to him, the decree was passed on 02.03.2002, whereas
the execution petition was filed only in 2019, nearly 17 years later.
It is contended that the limitation period commenced from the date
of decree of the Trial Court dated 02.03.2002, which continued to
run as there was no order of stay of the said decree during the
pendency of RFA 950/2002.
6.
Takes support of Section 9 of the Limitation Act and
Order XLI Rule 5 CPC, to contend that mere pendency of an
appeal does not arrest the running of limitation or operate as a stay
of execution. Therefore, the subsequent dismissal of the appeal on
23.10.2009 could not give a fresh starting point for limitation.
7.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondent on
the other hand, contends that the decree of the Trial Court merged
with the appellate decree upon dismissal of RFA No.950/2002
dated 23.10.2009. Consequently, the period of limitation for
execution commenced from the date of disposal of the appeal and
the execution petition filed on 02.07.2019 was within 12 years. In
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support of his contention, he places reliance on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Gajanan vs Pralhad1 (Gajanan).
Reasons and conclusions
8.
The principal question is whether the execution petition
filed was within the period prescribed under Article 136 of the
Limitation Act and whether the dismissal of the appeal on
23.10.2009 in RFA No.950/2002 furnished a fresh starting point of
execution, notwithstanding the absence of stay during the
pendency of the appeal. The relevant statutory provisions
necessary for answering the said question are set out below :
9.
Article 136 of the Limitation Act reads as under :
Description of
Period of
application
limitation
136. For the execution Twelve
of any decree (other
years
than a decree granting
a mandatory injunction)
or order of any civil
court.
2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Time from which
period begins to run
When the decree or
order
becomes
enforceable or where
the decree or any
subsequent
order
directs any payment
of money or the
delivery
of
any
property to be made
at a certain date or at
recurring
periods,
when
default
in
making the payment
or delivery in respect
of which execution is
sought, takes place:
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Provided that an
application for the
enforcement
or
execution of a decree
granting a perpetual
injunction shall not
be subject to any
period of limitation.
10.
The provision thus makes the enforceability of the
decree the starting point of limitation, and prescribes a period of 12
years for execution.
11.
Section 9 of the Limitation Act reads thus:
“9.
Continuous running of time.—Where once
time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability
to institute a suit or make an application stops it:
Provided that where letters of administration to the
estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the
running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the
debt shall be suspended while the administration
continues.”
12.
This provision embodies the principle that once
limitation has commenced, a subsequent disability or inability does
not stop its running.
13. "Order XLI Rule 5 reads as under :
“5.
Stay by Appellate Court.–(1) An appeal shall
not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or
order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court
may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by
reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the
decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause
order stay of execution of such decree.
xx xx xxxx”
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14.
The above provision makes it clear that mere filing of
an appeal does not operate as a stay of the execution. A stay has
to be specifically granted by the appellate court.
15.
The contention of the petitioners is that in the absence
of any stay of the decree during the pendency of the appeal,
limitation continued to run from the date of the original decree. The
said contention, however, is unsustainable. Order XLI Rule 5 of
CPC provides that filing of an appeal does not by itself stay
execution. Section 9 of the Limitation Act embodies the principle
that once limitation has commenced, a subsequent disability or
inability does not stop its running. However, neither of these
provisions can be read in isolation from Article 136 so as to
disregard the effect of the subsequent appellate decree upon the
decree sought to be executed. In Chandi Prasad and Others vs
Jagdish Prasad and Others2,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed at para Nos. 19, 20, 21, 23 and 24 as under :
“19. Article 136 substantially reproduces the
provisions of Section 48(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
which by reason of the Act stands repealed. In that view of
the matter, Parliament thought it fit to provide for one period
of limitation for an application for execution in stead and
place governing each of the several execution applications
(2004) 8 SCC 724
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which the decree-holder can make within a period of 12
years.
20.
It is not disputed that all decrees, be they
original or appellate, are enforceable. Once a decree is
sought to be enforced for the purpose of execution thereof
irrespective of being original or appellate, the date of the
decree or any subsequent order directing any payment of
money or delivery of any property at a certain date would be
considered to be the starting period of limitation.
21.
It is axiomatic true that when a judgment is
pronounced by a High Court in exercise of its appellate
power upon entertaining the appeal and a full hearing in the
presence of both parties, the same would replace the
judgment of the lower court and only the judgment of the
High Court would be treated as final. (See U.J.S. Chopra v.
State of Bombay.)
x
x
x
Merger
23.
The doctrine of merger is based on the
principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice-delivery
system. The doctrine of merger does not make a distinction
between an order of reversal, modification or an order of
confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said
doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one
operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a
given point of time.
24.
It is trite that when an appellate court passes a
decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree
of the appellate court and even if and subject to any
modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the
decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the
trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place
irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court
affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial
court. When a special leave petition is dismissed summarily,
doctrine of merger does not apply but when an appeal is
dismissed, it does. [See V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. (P) Ltd.
v. CIT.]”
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16.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Article 136
provides a period of 12 years for execution of a decree or order
from the date when it becomes enforceable. It was observed that
where an appeal is provided by law and entertained, the suit
continues in an appellate forum. The doctrine of merger is founded
upon the principle that there cannot be more than one operative
decree governing the same subject matter at the same time.
Consequently, where the appellate court passes a decree, the
decree of the Trial Court merges with the appellate decree,
irrespective of whether the appellate court confirms, modifies or
reverses the decree. The appellate decree is a decree which
supersedes the decree of the Trial Court and becomes the
operative decree for the purposes of execution. The Supreme
Court held that the date of the appellate decree is the starting point
of limitation when the appellate decree has superseded the decree
of the Trial Court. The doctrine of merger, therefore does not make
a distinction between an order of reversal, modification or
confirmation passed by the appellate authority.
17.
The same principle was reiterated in Shyam Sundar
Sarma vs Pannalal Jaiswal and Others3 (Shyam Sundar),
(2005) 1 SCC 436
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wherein the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an appeal for
default or non-prosecution is a decision in the appeal and the
decree attains finality only upon the final dismissal of the appeal.
18.
More recently, in Gajanan (supra), the Supreme Court
while discussing Shyam Sundar Sarma’s case held at para Nos.
19, 20, 21 and 22 as under :
“19. Furthermore, this Court, in Shyam Sundar Sarma
(supra), while discussing the implication of the Explanation
to Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC, held that even if an appeal is
dismissed in default or as time-barred, such dismissal would
still amount to a final disposal of the appeal, as the same
cannot be equated with non-filing of appeal or withdrawal of
the appeal. The relevant portions of the said judgment are
extracted hereunder:
“12. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision
in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh [(2001) 1 SCC 469]
rendered by two learned Judges of this Court and
pointed out that it was held therein that dismissal of an
application for condonation of delay would not amount
to a decree and, therefore, dismissal of an appeal as
time-barred was also not a decree. That decision was
rendered in the context of Article 136 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 and in the light of the departure made from
the previous position obtaining under Article 182 of the
Limitation Act, 1908. But we must point out with respect
that the decisions of this Court in Mela Ram and Sons
[1956 SCR 166 : AIR 1956 SC 367] and Sheodan
Singh [AIR 1966 SC 1332 : (1966) 3 SCR 300] were
not brought to the notice of Their Lordships. The
principle laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Mela Ram and Sons [1956 SCR 166 : AIR
1956 SC 367] and that stated in Sheodan Singh [AIR
1966 SC 1332 : (1966) 3 SCR 300] was, thus, not
noticed and the view expressed by the two-Judge
Bench, cannot be accepted as laying down the correct
law on the question. Of course, Their Lordships have
stated that they were aware that some decisions of the
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High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an
appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time
is a decree within the definition of a decree obtaining in
the Code. Thereafter, noticing the decision of the
Calcutta High Court above- referred to, Their Lordships
in conclusion apparently agree with the decision of the
Calcutta High Court. Though the decision of the Privy
Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey
[(1932) 59 IA 283 : AIR 1932 PC 165] was referred to,
it was not applied on the ground that it was based on
Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and there was a
departure in the legal position in view of Article 136 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. But with respect, we must
point out that the decision really conflicts with the ratio
of the decisions in Mela Ram and Sons [1956 SCR 166
: AIR 1956 SC 367] and Sheodan Singh [AIR 1966 SC
1332 : (1966) 3 SCR 300] and another decision of this
Court rendered by two learned Judges in Rani
Choudhury v. Lt.-Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury [(1982) 2
SCC 596]. In Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama
Krishna Reddy [(2000) 6 SCC 94] brought to our
notice, two other learned Judges of this Court left open
the question. Hence, reliance placed on that decision is
of no avail to the appellant.
13. In the context of the Explanation to Order 9 Rule
13 of the Code, the question was squarely considered
by this Court in Rani Choudhury case [(1982) 2 SCC
596] . The High Court, in our view, has rightly held that
the decision of this case is directly covered by that
decision. Therein, the plaintiff, the wife, obtained an ex
parte decree for divorce against the husband, the
defendant. The husband preferred an appeal in the
High Court against the decree and also made an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condoning the delay in filing that appeal. The High
Court dismissed the appeal as being time-barred. The
husband, the defendant, then filed a petition under
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex
parte decree along with an application under Section 5
of the Limitation Act. The trial court dismissed the
application holding that no sufficient cause was made
out for condoning the delay in filing the petition under
Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. The husband filed a civil
miscellaneous appeal in the High Court challenging the
said order of the trial court. The High Court took the
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view that the Explanation to Order 9 Rule 13 of the
Code did not create a bar to the maintainability of the
petition under that rule as the appeal against the ex
parte decree had been dismissed not on merits but on
the ground of limitation by not accepting the application
for condonation of delay which meant that no appeal
was preferred in the eye of the law. This view of the
High Court was challenged in appeal before this Court.
It was argued that the High Court has misunderstood
the scope and ambit of the Explanation to Order 9 Rule
13 of the Code and that in the circumstances, the High
Court should have held that the petition under Order 9
Rule 13 of the Code would not lie. This Court accepted
that contention. This Court held that where there has
been an appeal against an ex parte decree and the
appeal has not been withdrawn by the appellant and
had been disposed of on any ground, the application
under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code would not lie and
should not be entertained. Hence, even though the
appeal against the ex parte decree was disposed of on
the ground of limitation and not on merits, the
Explanation to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code was
attracted and hence no petition under Order 9 Rule 13
of the Code would lie. On the scope of the Explanation,
it was stated that the disposal of the appeal as
contemplated in the Explanation was not intended to
mean or imply a disposal on merits resulting in the
merger of the decree of the trial court with a decree, if
any, of the appellate court on the disposal of the
appeal. The disposal of the appeal may be on any
ground and though the withdrawal of an appeal by an
appellant is also to be considered a disposal of the
appeal, the same has been expressly exempted by the
Explanation. It was also observed that the legislative
intent incorporated in the Explanation to Order 9 Rule
13 of the Code was to confine the defendant to a single
course of action and to discourage the prolonging of
the litigation on the ex parte decree, namely, by
preferring an application to the trial court under Order 9
Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the decree and by
filing an appeal to a superior court against it. If he did
not withdraw the appeal filed by him or allowed the
appeal to be disposed of on any other ground, he was
denied the right to apply under Order 9 Rule 13 of the
Code. The Court also clarified that by the introduction
of the Explanation, the area of operation of the doctrine
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of merger was enormously extended. By virtue of the
Explanation, the disposal of the appeal on any ground
whatever, apart from its withdrawal, constituted
sufficient reason for bringing the bar into operation. In
the light of this, it was held that though in that case the
appeal filed by the husband against the ex parte
decree was dismissed on the ground of it being barred
by limitation, it was a disposal of the appeal and the
petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code was hit by
the Explanation. In P. Kiran Kumar v. A.S. Khadar
[(2002) 5 SCC 161] this Court followed the decision in
Rani Choudhury [(1982) 2 SCC 596] and held that the
dismissal of the appeal against an ex parte decree as
barred by limitation, prevented the trial court which
passed the ex parte decree, from exercising its power
under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code in view of the
Explanation.
xxx
15. We are not impressed by the argument of learned
counsel for the appellant that the decision in Rani
Choudhury case [(1982) 2 SCC 596] requires
reconsideration. On going through the said decision in
the light of the objects and reasons for the introduction
of the Explanation to Order 9 Rule 13 and the concept
of an appeal as indicated by the Privy Council and this
Court in the decisions already cited, the argument that
an appeal which is dismissed for default or as barred
by limitation because of the dismissal of the application
for condoning the delay in filing the same, should be
treated on a par with the non-filing of an appeal or the
withdrawal of an appeal, cannot be accepted. The
argument that since there is no merger of the decree of
the trial court in that of the appellate court in a case of
this nature and consequently the Explanation should
not be applied, cannot also be accepted in the context
of what this Court has earlier stated and what we have
noticed above.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20.
The Judgment Debtor’s reliance on the two-Judge
Bench judgment in Ratansingh (supra) is erroneous as the
said judgment has already been overruled by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra), which
clarified that Ratansingh does not lay down the correct law.
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21.
The upshot of this discussion is that an appeal is
intrinsically a continuation of the suit and thus, even if an
appeal against an order or decree of the Trial Court is
dismissed on any preliminary or technical ground, such as
limitation or non-prosecution, rather than the merits of the
case, it still gives rise to a fresh starting point for the
limitation period for execution of such order or decree. The
original decree of the Trial Court cannot be deemed as
“final” as long as the appeal against the same remains
pending. Thus, the order of dismissal of the appeal finally
disposes of the matter and confirms the decree of the Trial
Court, even if such dismissal is for reason of nonprosecution.
22.
The order dated 25.11.2004, which dismissed the
appeal in default, was thus a “final order” as it finally
confirmed the decree of the Trial Court and disposed of the
appeal. Therefore, the limitation period for execution of the
decree dated 03.12.1999 accrued on the date of dismissal
of the appeal i.e. 25.11.2004 and the execution application
filed on 04.12.2015 was within time, if we compute the
period of 12 years from 25.11.2004. ”
Emphasis supplied
19.
The Supreme Court while considering the point of
limitation for execution under Article 136, held that dismissal of an
appeal even on the preliminary ground such as limitation or nonprosecution, provides a fresh starting point of 12 years for
execution. The Supreme Court held that an appeal is continuation
of the suit and that a decree does not attain absolute finality until
the appeal is disposed of. The Supreme Court further cautioned
against adopting a hyper technical approach to limitation so as to
defeat substantive justice.
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20.
In the present case, the decree dated 02.03.2002 was
challenged in RFA No.950/2002, which was dismissed on
23.10.2009, confirming the decree. The fact that there was no stay
of the decree during the pendency of the appeal would not, by itself
mean that the decree ceased to be capable of execution or that the
appellate decree would be disregarded for the purpose of limitation.
The relevant question is whether the appellate decree superseded
the decree of Trial Court and became the operative decree. In view
of the doctrine of merger, the answer is in the affirmative. Thus,
where an appeal has been preferred against the decree, the
appellate proceedings and the date on which they attain finality
become relevant for determining the commencement of limitation.
The contention that the limitation necessarily commenced from the
date of the Trial Court decree, irrespective of the pending appellate
proceedings, therefore cannot be accepted. The petitioners may be
right in contending that in the absence of an order of stay the
decree holder could have initiated execution proceedings during
the pendency of the appeal. However, the fact that the decree
holder did not do so by itself, determine the commencement of
limitation of an execution petition filed after the disposal of the
appeal. Since the appellate proceedings concluded on 23.10.2009
and the decree of the Trial Court merged in the appellate decree,
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the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of disposal
of the appeal.
21.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the finding of
the Executing Court that the execution petition was within limitation
does not call for any interference. The rejection of I.A.Nos.III and IV
is therefore justified. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed.
Sd/____________________
JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
CKL
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