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2024:MLHC:675
Serial No.01
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C). No. 354 of 2023
Date of Order :30.07.2024
1. Shri. Monirul Islam,
S/o: Shri. Saidur Rahman,
Resident of Kasharipara,
Post Office: Hallidayganj,
Police Station: Hallidayganj,
District: West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
2. Shri. Ruhul Amin Sk,
S/o: Shri Abu Taleb Sk
Resident of Kasharipara,
Post Office: Hallidayganj,
Police Station: Hallidayganj,
District: West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
… Petitioners.
Vs.
1. The Meghalaya Lokayukta,
represented by the Secretary,
Matti Building, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
2. The Chairperson,
Meghalaya Lokayukta,
Matti Building, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
3. Shri. Eddris Mondal,
S/o: (L) Foziar Rahman,
President of Kasharipara VEC,
R/o: Kasharipara,
2024:MLHC:675
P.O. and P.S.: Hallidayganj,
District: West Garo Hills, Meghalaya.
4. Shri. Jakir Hussain,
S/o: (L) Nur Hussain,
Ex-Secretary of Kasharipara VEC
R/o: Kasharipara,
P.O. + P.S: Hallidayganj,
District: West Garo Hills, Meghalaya.
5. Shri. Jude Rangku T. Sangma,
Ex-Block Development Officer,
MNREGS, Selsella C&RD Block,
Selsella, West Garo Hills District,
Meghalaya.
…Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge.
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. S.K.Hassan, Adv.
Ms. M.Rahman, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S.Jindal, Adv. with for R 1 & 2.
Mr. S.A.Sheikh, Adv. for R 3 & 4.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT & ORDER
2024:MLHC:675
1.
The petitioners are before this Court by way of the instant writ
petition with the following prayer:
“In the premises aforesaid, it is therefore
prayed that Your Lordship would be
graciously pleased to admit this instant Writ
Petition, Call for Records, issue Notice/Rule
calling upon the Respondent to show cause as
to why a Writ in the nature of Mandamus
and/or Certiorari and/or any appropriate
Writ, Order or Direction should not be issued
directing the Respondents particularly to
Chairperson of Meghalaya Lokayukta,
Shillong, refer the matter to any Investigating
Agency as per Section 20 (5) of the
Meghalaya Lokayukta Act’ 2014 for
investigation into the allegation and to file
Charge Sheet before the Special Court and/or
as to why the Impugned Order passed vide
Memo. No. MEGH Lok. Case No. 4/2022/Ex9-A dated 10-05-2023, in Complaint Case No.
4 of 2022 should not be set aside and quash
and/or as to why the direction should not be
issued to the chairperson, Meghalaya
Lokayukta, Shillong, to refer the matter for
investigation as being sufficient materials
existed in the Preliminary Investigation and
show cause if any, being filed and after
hearing the parties make the rule absolute,
and/or may pass Such other or further orders
or orders or direction as Your Lordship may
deem fit and proper.”
2.
Briefly put, the petitioners had filed a complaint before the
Meghalaya Lokayukta, Shillong which was registered as Complaint
Case No. 4 of 2022, whereafter, the learned Chairperson was pleased to
2024:MLHC:675
pass orders directing the Police to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
matter. Thereafter, on completion of the preliminary inquiry, a report
was submitted along with findings on 13-02-2023, and the writ
petitioners thereafter on receipt of the inquiry report, submitted their
written arguments, and the learned Chairperson of Meghalaya
Lokayukta was pleased to pass the order dated 10-05-2023 which has
been impugned herein.
3.
Mr. S.K.Hassan, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted
that the Meghalaya Lokayukta, Shillong did not find any prima facie
case of corruption established against the public servants whereas, in the
preliminary inquiry report dated 13-02-2023 (Annexure-3 to the writ
petition) in its findings, has clearly indicated in allegation No. 1, (c), (e)
and (f) that for the project work that is yet to be started, the job card
holders have already been paid. The learned counsel has taken this Court
to the impugned order dated 10-05-2023, and submits that the learned
Chairperson (Respondent No. 2), though holding that no prima facie
case of corruption had been established, had recorded that certain works
detailed therein were yet to start, but the wages amount had been already
credited to the Bank Account of the job card holders, and had then
directed the Community & Rural Development Department, to cause an
2024:MLHC:675
inquiry regarding the payment of wages, when the work had not yet
started.
4.
The learned counsel contends that the impugned order has been
passed in violation of Section 20 of the Meghalaya Lokayukta Act,
2014, inasmuch as, as per the said Section, the respondent No. 2 after
deciding as to whether a prima facie case exists, may make
recommendations
for
investigation,
initiation
of
departmental
proceedings or other appropriate action against the concerned public
servants or order closure thereof of the proceedings. In the instant
proceedings, it is submitted, though the respondent No. 2 had found no
prima facie case made out, however, in the same order itself had
directed for an inquiry to be conducted as to the payment given to the
job card holders before the work had even commenced. The impugned
order therefore, he submits, is violative of Section 20 and had been
passed without jurisdiction as the Act does not contemplate such a
conditional order. It is further argued that the findings of the preliminary
inquiry clearly indicating the existence of corruption in the action of the
concerned officials, and the learned Chairperson having duly taken note
of the same and ordered an inquiry, the matter should have been taken to
its logical conclusion by ordering for appropriate action against the
concerned public servants by the competent authority.
2024:MLHC:675
5.
On the point as to whether a writ petition praying for a writ of
certiorari for quashing the order passed by the Meghalaya Lokayukta
would be maintainable, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the
following judgments to show that a writ of certiorari would be
maintainable to correct errors of jurisdictions committed by inferior
Courts or Tribunals and these cases are as follows:
(i)
Arvind Kumari Vrs. State of Jharkhand &
Ors. 2022 SCC Online Jhar 1709.
(ii)
South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. Vrs. Naveen
Mathew Philip & Anr. 2023 SCC online 435.
The learned counsel then concludes his submissions by praying that the
impugned order be set aside and quashed and the matter be remanded
back to the Meghalaya Lokayukta for reconsideration.
6.
Mr. S.Jindal, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents No. 1
& 2 has submitted that the writ petitioners are seeking to overturn a
finding of fact arrived at by the respondent No. 2, and in its place
substitute the same by another finding from this Court. This he submits,
is impermissible as in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, this Court is not
sitting in appeal over the order of the Lokayukta. In this context, the
learned counsel has placed the decision of Central Council for
Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vrs. Bikartan Das & Ors. 2023
SCC Online SC 996 wherein he submits, the Supreme Court has placed
2024:MLHC:675
a clear embargo against converting writ jurisdiction into appellate
jurisdiction and that, if a right of appeal against an order is not provided,
a superior court is not empowered to re-examine the evidence and
substitute its own findings. In the same vein, the learned counsel has
relied upon the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vrs. Ahmed Ishaque, AIR
1955 SC 233, and has further submitted that a conclusion of facts cannot
be interfered with under writ jurisdiction.
7.
On the merits of the case, the learned counsel has submitted that
the contention of the petitioners that after finding no prima facie case of
corruption and disposing the complaint, the respondent No. 2 had no
jurisdiction to direct the Community & Rural Development Department
to cause an inquiry, infact works in their favour, inasmuch as, on finding
no prima facie case, no further inquiry or action is called for. The fact
that the respondent No. 2 has ordered the inquiry he submits, has given
the petitioners limited relief. He further submits that the petitioners
therefore, have no locus to challenge this portion of the impugned order.
He then lastly submits that the writ petition not being maintainable and
devoid of any merit is liable to not be entertained by this Court and
dismissed.
8.
Mr. S.A.Sheikh, learned counsel for the respondents No. 3 & 4,
while endorsing the submission made by the counsel for respondents
2024:MLHC:675
No. 1 & 2, has briefly submitted that the respondent No. 2 infact, inspite
of not finding any prima facie case made out, had directed for an inquiry
which amounted to relief being granted to the writ petitioners, and
therefore, if any interference is called for, it should be to the extent of
quashing this portion of the impugned order, to make it in line with
Section 20 (3) (c) of the Act.
9.
Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, to the mind of this
Court, the first question to be examined is whether a writ of certiorari
can issue in such matters and the writ petition be maintainable in this
regard. The Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 provides for an authority to
inquire into allegations of corruption against certain public functionaries
and is a self contained Act. In the proceedings for which a preliminary
inquiry was directed to be gone into and findings generated therefrom,
the impugned order was then passed by the respondent No. 2 whereby,
no prima facie case of corruption was found to be made out against the
respondents and the matter was disposed of however, with a direction
that an inquiry be conducted regarding payment of wages to job card
holders when the work had not started and for action to be taken
accordingly. This impugned order as per the submissions of the
petitioners is without jurisdiction which needs correction. At this
juncture,
it
would
be
apposite
to
refer
to
the
case
of
2024:MLHC:675
Arvind Kumari Vrs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (supra) relied upon by
the petitioners. Paras 38 and 39 thereof which are relevant are
reproduced herein below:
“38. This Court is well conscious of the settled
position of law regarding the issuance of writ of
certiorari which is having limited scope, as has been
held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed
Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1964 SC
477 wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have
held as follows:—
“The question about the limits of the
jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of
certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal
position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A
writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior
courts or tribunals: these are cases where
orders are passed by inferior courts or
tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess
of it, or as a result of failure to exercise
jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued
where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on
it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity to be
heard to the party affected by the order, or
where the procedure adopted in dealing with
the dispute is opposed to principles of natural
justice. There is, however, no doubt that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an
appellate Court. This limitation necessarily
means that findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
2024:MLHC:675
law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued
if it is shown that in recording the said finding,
the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no
evidence, that would be regarded as an error
of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of
cases, however, we must always bear in mind
that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ
of certiorari on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to
sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy
or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ Court. It is within these
limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of
certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”
39. Reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque reported
in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph21, which is quoted hereinbelow:—
“With regard to the character and
scope of the writ of certiorari and the
conditions under which it can be issued, the
following propositions may be taken as
established : (1) Certiorari will be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an
inferior Court or Tribunal acts without
2024:MLHC:675
jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to
exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted
jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving
an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or
violates the principles of natural justice. (3)
The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in
exercise of a supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that
the Court will not review findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even
if they be erroneous. This is on the principle
that a Court which has jurisdiction over a
subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide
wrong as well as right, and when the
Legislature does not choose to confer a right
of appeal against that decision, it would be
defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior
Court were to rehear the case on the evidence
and substitute its own findings in certiorari.”
(Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the above noted case clearly lays down that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and
the Court exercising it is not to act as an Appellate Court and further that
finding of fact cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
However, another aspect that is also present that allows issuance of writ
of certiorari is when inferior Courts or Tribunals act without jurisdiction
or in excess of it, or when Courts find that the process does not conform
to law or statute. In this context, the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. &
Ors. Vrs. Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr. (supra) as cited by the
2024:MLHC:675
petitioner has some relevance, as in para 14 the Supreme Court has held
as follows:
“14. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a
decision when the Court finds that the process does
not conform to the law or statute. In other words,
courts are not expected to substitute themselves with
the decision-making authority while finding fault
with the process along with the reasons assigned.
Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all
violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is
expected to go into the issues of fact and law,
including a statutory violation. A question as to
whether such a violation would be over a mandatory
prescription as against a discretionary one is
primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. So also,
the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and
estoppel. We wish to place reliance on the decision
of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad
Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104,
“Then the question is whether there are
proper grounds for the issue of certiorari in
the present case. There was considerable
argument before us as to the character and
scope of the writ of certiorari and the
conditions under which it could be issued. The
question has been considered by this Court
in Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employees'
Association, Madras [(1952) 1 SCC 449 :
1952 SCR 519], Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and
Raman Ltd. [(1952) 1 SCC 334 : 1952 SCR
583], Ibrahim
Aboobaker v. Custodian
General [(1952) 1 SCC 798 : 1952 SCR 696]
and quite recently in T.C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa [1955 SCR 250]. On these
authorities, the following propositions may be
taken as established : (1) Certiorari will be
issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as
when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails
2024:MLHC:675
to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued
when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in
the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as
when it decides without giving an opportunity
to the parties to be heard, or violates the
principles of natural justice. (3) The Court
issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.
One consequence of this is that the Court will
not review findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be
erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subjectmatter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as
well as right, and when the Legislature does
not choose to confer a right of appeal against
that decision, it would be defeating its purpose
and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear
the case on the evidence, and substitute its
own findings in certiorari. These propositions
are well-settled and are not in dispute.
(4) The further question on which there
has been some controversy is whether a writ
can be issued, when the decision of the
inferior Court or Tribunal is erroneous in law.
This question came up for consideration
in Rex v. Northumberland
Compensation
Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [[1951] 1
K.B. 711], and it was held that when a
Tribunal made a “speaking order” and the
reasons given in that order in support of the
decision were bad in law, certiorari could be
granted. It was pointed out by Lord Goddard,
C.J. that that had always been understood to
be the true scope of the power. Walsall
Overseers v. London and North Western Ry.
Co. [[L.R.] 4 App. Cas. 30] and Rex v. Nat
Bell Liquors Ld. [[1922] 2 A.C. 128] were
quoted in support of this view. In Walsall
Overseers v. London and North Western Ry.
2024:MLHC:675
Co. [[L.R.] 4 App. Cas. 30] Lord Cairns, L.C.
observed as follows:
“If there was upon the face of the order of
the court of quarter sessions anything which
showed that order was erroneous, the Court of
Queen's Bench might be asked to have the
order brought into it, and to look at the order,
and view it upon the face of it, and if the court
found error upon the face of it, to put an end
to its existence by quashing it.”
In Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld. [[1922] 2 A.C.
128] Lord Sumner said:
“That supervision goes to two points; one
is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the
qualifications and conditions of its exercise;
the other is the observance of the law in the
course of its exercise.”
The decision in Rex v. Northumberland
Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte
Shaw [[1951] 1 K.B. 711] was taken in
appeal, and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal
in Rex v. Northumberland
Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte
Shaw [[1952] 1 K.B. 338]. In laying down
that an error of law was a ground for granting
certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that
it must be apparent on the face of the record.
Denning, L.J. who stated the power in broad
and general terms observed:
“It will have been seen that throughout all
the cases there is one governing
rule : certiorari is only available to quash a
decision for error of law if the error appears
on the face of the record.”
The position was thus summed up by Morris,
L.J.
“It is plain that certiorari will not issue as
the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not
2024:MLHC:675
lie in order to bring an order or decision for
rehearing of the issue raised in the
proceedings. It exists to correct error of
law where revealed on the face of an order or
decision, or irregularity, or absence of, or
excess of, jurisdiction where shown”.
In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman
Ltd. [1952 SCR 583], it was observed by this
Court that under article 226 the writ should
be issued “in grave cases where the
subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act
wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it,
or in violation of the principles of natural
justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction
vested in them, or there is an error apparent
on the face of the record”. In T.C.
Basappa v. T. Nagappa [1955 SCR 250] the
law was thus stated:
“An error in the decision or
determination itself may also be amenable to a
writ of ‘certiorari’ but it must be a manifest
error apparent on the face of the proceedings,
e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other
words, it is a patent error which can be
corrected by ‘certiorari’ but not a mere wrong
decision.”
10.
Another vital question in such exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 is answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Central
Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vrs. Bikartan Das
& Ors. (supra) where though a sort of embargo has been placed on the
exercise of writ jurisdiction, at para 51 thereof, however, has laid down
2024:MLHC:675
the first cardinal principle of law governing such exercise of
jurisdiction. The same is reproduced herein below:
“51. The first cardinal principle of law that
governs the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction
under
Article 226 of
the Constitution, more particularly when it
comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is
that in granting such a writ, the High Court
does not exercise the powers of Appellate
Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of the
inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be
without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but
does not substitute its own views for those of
the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can
be issued if an error of law is apparent on the
face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a
high prerogative writ, should not be issued on
mere asking.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11.
From the discussions above, wherein the parameters have been set
as regards the exercise of writ jurisdiction, from the facts of the present
case and the impugned order, what can be perceived is that in exercise
of powers under Section 20 (3) of the Meghalaya Lokauykta Act, 2014,
the respondent No. 2, while issuing the impugned order, has brought
into play two situations which are not contemplated in the Act. For the
sake of convenience before progressing with the analysis, Section 20 (3)
is reproduced herein below:
2024:MLHC:675
“20. (3) A bench consisting of not less than three
Members of the Lokayukta shall consider every
report received under sub-section (2) from the
Inquiry Wing or any agency and after giving an
opportunity of being heard to the public servant,
decide as to whether there exists a prima facie case,
and make recommendations to proceed with one or
more of the following actions, namely:—
(a) investigation by any agency (including
any special investigation agency);
(b) initiation
of
the
departmental
proceedings or any other appropriate action
against the concerned public servants by the
competent authority;
(c) closure of the proceedings against the
public servant and take action to proceed
against the complainant under section 47.”
12.
The above noted provision stipulates two situations, firstly, when
there exists a prima facie case and the recommended action to be taken
thereon is provided in 20 (3) (a) (b) and when no prima facie case is
made out, to close the proceedings as provided in Section 20 (3) (c).
Without touching the findings on fact, or reappreciating the case on its
merits, or for that matter seeking to substitute the findings of the
respondent No. 2, in the considered view of this Court, the statute being
clear as to the course of action to be taken on any eventuality based on
the finding of fact, the impugned order suffers from an error in law,
which can be corrected by the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
2024:MLHC:675
13.
The impugned order having recorded the fact that no prima facie
case had been made out, should as per the mandate of the Act at Section
20 (3) (c) closed the matter, but instead, in the same order directed for
an inquiry against the concerned officials. This order therefore, being in
excess of jurisdiction vested in the respondent No. 2 is bad in law and is
accordingly set aside and quashed.
14.
Consequently, the instant matter shall stand remanded back to the
respondent No. 2 for fresh reconsideration.
15.
Writ petition accordingly stands allowed and is disposed of.
Judge
SAMANTHA ANNA LIYA
RYNJAH
Date: 2024.07.30 17:28:58 IST
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