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[2026:RJ-JP:22455]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14904/2024
1.
Mohit, Aged About 13 Years S/o Late Nandkishore, Child
Through
Guardian
Mother
Smt.
Rajani
W/o
Late
Nandkishore, R/o Jain Gali, Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana,
Distt. Bharatpur (Rajasthan)
2.
Rajni, Aged About 34 Years, W/o Late Nandkishore, R/o
Jain
Gali,
Town
Bayana,
Tehsil
Bayana,
Distt.
Bharatpur(Rajasthan).
----Plaintiffs/Petitioners
Versus
1.
Sunita, Aged About 53 Years, D/o Late Hariram W/o Late
Hetram,
R/o Kaman, Tehsil Kaman, Presently Jain Gali,
Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana, Distt. Bharatpur(Rajasthan).
----Original Defendant/Respondent
2.
Sushila, Aged About 87 Years,
W/o Late Hariram, R/o
Jain
Tehsil
Gali,
Town
Bayana,
Bayana,
Distt.
Bharatpur(Rajasthan).
----Formal Defendant/Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Sukhdev Singh Solanki with
Ms. Barsha Kumari
For Respondent(s)
:
Ms. Shazadi Bano with
Mr. R.Babu
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments
19.05.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved
19.05.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative Full Judgment
part is pronounced
Date of pronouncement
1.
27.05.2026
The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order
dated 28.05.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge
No. 1, Bayana, Bharatpur, in Civil Suit No. 18/2023, whereby the
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application filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners under Order VI Rule
17 CPC for amendment of plaint has been dismissed.
2.
The genesis of the present petition, inter-alia, leading to the
present petition is that the plaintiffs-petitioners instituted a suit
for partition and permanent injunction against the defendantsrespondents. Pursuant thereto, the learned Trial Court issued
notice to the defendants-respondents on 14.07.2023. In response,
the defendants-respondents filed their written statement on
28.07.2023, denying the averments made in the plaint, and also
produced certain documents contending that the property in
dispute had already been transferred in favour of defendant No. 1
by virtue of an agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021. He further
stated that, on the basis of the said agreement, defendant No. 1
had obtained a patta from Nagar Palika, Bayana.
2.1 Upon perusal of the aforesaid documents, the plaintiffspetitioners promptly filed an application under Order VI Rule 17
CPC on 07.10.2023 seeking amendment of the plaint. The
defendants-respondents filed their reply to the said application.
2.2 After hearing both the parties, the learned Trial Court
dismissed the application vide order dated 28.05.2024.
2.3 Aggrieved by the order dated 28.05.2024, the plaintiffspetitioners have preferred the present writ petition before this
Court.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the
impugned order dated 28.05.2024 passed by the learned Trial
Court is wholly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the
facts and material available on record, inasmuch as the learned
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Trial Court failed to appreciate the settled principles governing
amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. He
submitted that the plaintiffs-petitioners instituted a suit for
partition and permanent injunction in respect of ancestral property
situated at Jain Gali, Bayana, District Bharatpur, seeking partition
by metes and bounds and protection of their possession over the
suit property. During pendency of the suit, defendants No.1 and 2,
in their written statements dated 28.07.2023, for the first time
produced an alleged agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021 and
patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on 15.02.2022, claiming
defendant No.1 to be the sole owner of the suit property and
further contending that the suit was not maintainable without
cancellation of the said patta.
3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that
immediately after gaining knowledge of the aforesaid documents,
the petitioners filed an application dated 07.10.2023 under Order
VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC seeking amendment of the
plaint for incorporation of a relief declaring the agreement to sell
dated 25.03.2021 and patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on
15.02.2022 as null, void, ineffective and not binding upon the
rights of the plaintiffs. The amendment was sought at the initial
stage of the proceedings, prior to framing of issues and before
commencement of Trial; therefore, no prejudice whatsoever could
have been caused to the defendants.
3.2 Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
proposed amendment neither changes the nature of the suit nor
introduces any new cause of action, as the original suit itself
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pertains to partition and protection of the petitioners’ rights in the
ancestral property. The challenge to the alleged agreement and
patta is directly connected with and incidental to the relief of
partition,
since
the
defendants
are
relying
upon
the
said
documents to defeat the lawful rights of the petitioners in the suit
property. He argued that the learned Trial Court failed to
appreciate that the petitioners were not seeking independent
cancellation of the patta, but only a declaration that the alleged
documents produced by the defendants are forged, fabricated,
ineffective and not binding upon their rights. The amendment was
bona fide and necessary for complete and effective adjudication of
the real controversy involved in the suit.
3.3 Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that it is
a settled proposition of law that amendment of pleadings can be
permitted at any stage of the proceedings if such amendment is
necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute and does not
prejudice the opposite party. He also submitted that the suit
property is an ancestral residential house wherein the plaintiffs
and defendant No.2 were residing separately pursuant to an oral
family arrangement, though no partition by metes and bounds had
taken place. Defendant No.1 threatened the plaintiffs-petitioners
with dispossession, compelling them to institute the suit for
partition and permanent injunction.
3.4 Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
plaintiffs have already lodged FIR No.724/2023 at Police Station
Bayana for offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC
regarding the alleged forged and fabricated agreement to sell
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dated 25.03.2021 and patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on
15.02.2022, and the matter is presently under investigation. He
contended that defendants No.1 and 2, being mother and
daughter, acted in collusion with each other with the intention to
deprive the plaintiffs of their lawful rights in the ancestral
property. He further argued that the alleged agreement to sell
dated 25.03.2021 is unregistered, does not properly disclose the
consideration amount and was never acted upon by execution of a
registered sale deed, which clearly indicates that the said
document is forged and fabricated. Similarly, the patta dated
07.02.2022 was allegedly obtained from Nagar Palika, Bayana by
concealing material facts regarding the ancestral nature of the
property and the rights of the plaintiffs therein.
3.5 Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that
despite the amendment application having been filed immediately
after
knowledge
of
the
disputed
documents
and
before
commencement of Trial, the learned Trial Court rejected the same
on erroneous and perverse findings by wrongly observing that the
amendment would change the nature of the suit.
3.6 Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and
Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors.; (2009) 10
SCC 84.
3.7 Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, prayed that the
impugned order dated 28.05.2024 be quashed and set aside and
the amendment application filed by the petitioners under Order VI
Rule 17 CPC be allowed.
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4.
[CW-14904/2024]
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the proposed amendment sought by the plaintiffs-petitioners
is wholly misconceived, untenable in law, and liable to be rejected.
He further contended that the application has been moved solely
with an intent to delay the proceedings of the suit and to protract
the litigation unnecessarily.
4.1
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents argued
that
the
proposed amendment cannot be permitted in the present suit as
the
plaintiffs-petitioners,
through
the
said
amendment,
are
seeking declaratory reliefs in respect of the agreement to sell
dated 25.03.2021 and the patta dated 07.02.2022. According to
the
respondents,
allowing
such
an
amendment
would
fundamentally alter the nature and character of the original suit
for partition and permanent injunction, and would introduce an
entirely new cause of action, which is impermissible in law.
4.2 Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that if
the proposed amendment is allowed, it would substantially enlarge
the scope of the suit and give rise to fresh issues, thereby
resulting in unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. He
also contended that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffspetitioners cannot be adjudicated without proper valuation of the
suit and payment of the requisite Court fees. However, since the
plaintiffs-petitioners have neither amended the valuation clause
nor deposited the appropriate Court fees, the application is legally
defective and not maintainable.
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4.3 In view of the above submissions, learned counsel for the
respondents prayed that the present writ petition be dismissed
and the order dated 28.05.2024 be upheld.
5.
Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6.
Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be
apposite to examine the scope of interference available to this
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. It is well settled that the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is extremely limited in
nature.
6.1 The said position of law has been reiterated time and again by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments of Sadhana Lodh vs
National Insurance Company Limited & Anr.; 2003 (3) SCC
524 and Ranjeet Singh vs Ravi Prakash; 2004 (3) SCC 682,
wherein the Court has held that the interference under Article 227
of the Constitution of India is warranted only in cases where there
is flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of law or justice,
or where there is a patent error, not requiring elaborate
examination. Thus, the Court ought not to re-appreciate or reevaluate evidence as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction.
Hence, the Court is vested with limited role and cannot interfere in
findings of fact unless the same are shown to be perverse,
patently illegal or vitiated by a jurisdictional error. Keeping these
principles in mind, the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for both the parties have been considered.
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7.
[CW-14904/2024]
Before adverting to the rival submissions advanced on behalf
of the parties and the principal question arising for consideration
in the present matter, it would be appropriate to reproduce the
relevant provisions of Order VI Rule 17 CPC, for the sake of
convenience and ready reference:
“17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at
any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter
or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such
terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be
made
as
may
be
necessary
for
the
purpose
of
determining the real questions in controversy between
the parties:
Provided that no application for amendment shall be
allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court
comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence,
the party could not have raised the matter before the
commencement of trial.”
7.1 It is a settled proposition of law that although amendment of
pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is to be considered liberally
in appropriate cases, such amendment cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. The underlying object of the provision is to
advance substantial justice and to avoid multiplicity of litigation;
however,
the
circumscribed
discretionary
by
settled
power
legal
vested
in
the
Court
principles.
The
Court,
is
while
considering an application for amendment, is required to examine
whether the proposed amendment is bonafide, necessary for
determining the real controversy between the parties, and
whether such amendment can be permitted without causing
serious prejudice or injustice to the opposite side. Equally, the
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Court must ensure that the amendment does not alter the
fundamental nature and character of the original proceedings.
7.2 This Court finds that in the case of Life Insurance
Corporation ofIndia vs Sanjeev Builders Private Limited
&Anr.; reported in 2022 (16)SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that amendments should ordinarily be permitted where they
do not alter the nature of the suit, are not barred by limitation,
and do not cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
“71. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus:
71.1. Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure operates
as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of
amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview.
The plea of amendment being barred Under Order II
Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure is, thus, misconceived
and hence negatived.
71.2. All amendments are to be allowed which are
necessary
for
determining
the
real
question
in
controversy provided it does not cause injustice or
prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is
apparent from the use of the word "shall", in the latter
part of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
71.3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed.
71.3.1. If the amendment is required for effective and
proper adjudication of the controversy between the
parties.
71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided
(a) the amendment does not result in injustice to
the other side
(b) by the amendment, the parties seeking
amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear
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admission made by the party which confers
aright on the other side and
(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred
claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a
valuable accrued right (in certain situations).
71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to
be allowed unless:
71.4.1 By the amendment, a time barred claim is
sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the
claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor
for consideration.
71.4.2.The amendment changes the nature of the suit.
71.4.3.The prayer for amendment is malafide, or
71.4.4.By the amendment, the other side loses a valid
defence.
71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of
pleadings, the court should avoid a hyper technical
approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially
where
the opposite party can be compensated by costs.
71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to
pin- pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in
rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for
amendment should be allowed.
71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an
additional or a new approach without introducing a time
barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be
allowed even after expiry of limitation.
71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is
intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the
plaint.
71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not
aground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is
arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and
the issue of limitation framed separately for decision.
71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of
the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an
entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the
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plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where,
however, the amendment sought is only with respect to
the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which
are
already
pleaded
in
the
plaint,
ordinarily
the
amendment is required to be allowed.
71.11.
Where
the
amendment
commencement of trial,
is
sought
before
the court is required to be
liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in
mind the fact that the opposite party would have a
chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such,
where the amendment does not result in irreparable
prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite
party of an advantage which it had secured as a result
of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the
amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where
the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively
adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between
the parties, the amendment should be allowed.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
7.3 In the present matter, it is not in dispute that the plaintiffspetitioners had initially instituted the suit merely seeking relief of
partition and permanent injunction in respect of the disputed
property. Subsequently, by way of the impugned amendment
application, the plaintiffs-petitioners sought incorporation of an
entirely new and substantive relief praying that the agreement
dated 25.03.2021, the lease deed dated 07.02.2022, and the
registered deed dated 15.02.2022 be declared null and void qua
their alleged share in the suit property.
7.4 The learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated that the
proposed amendment was not merely clarificatory or ancillary in
nature, but rather sought to introduce a completely distinct cause
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of action involving adjudication upon the legality and validity of
registered
documents.
Such
amendment
would
inevitably
transform the nature of the suit from one simpliciter for partition
and injunction into a suit for declaration and cancellation of
documents. It is trite law that an amendment which changes the
“nature
and
complexion”
of
the
suit
cannot
ordinarily
be
permitted, particularly where the relief sought was available to the
party at the time of institution of the suit itself. The maxim
“mutatio libelli” which means ‘change in the nature of pleadings’
squarely applies in the present case.
7.5 In the instant case, the material available on record clearly
demonstrates that the plaintiffs-petitioners were fully aware, or at
the very least deemed to be aware, of the transactions in question
long prior to institution of the suit. The agreement sought to be
challenged was executed on 25.03.2021, whereas the lease deed
was executed on 07.02.2022 and registered on 15.02.2022.
Despite such knowledge, the suit itself came to be instituted only
on 11.07.2023. Significantly, the husband of plaintiff No.2 Rajni
wife of Nandkishore, had himself signed the agreement dated
25.03.2021 as a witness. The parties admittedly being close
relatives, the plea of ignorance raised by the plaintiffs-petitioners
is wholly implausible and contrary to the record.
7.6 The conduct of the plaintiffs clearly attracts the maxim
“vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”, meaning thereby
that the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who
sleep over their rights. Having failed to seek the declaratory relief
at the appropriate stage despite having knowledge of the relevant
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transactions, the plaintiffs cannot subsequently seek to reopen the
entire controversy by way of amendment.
7.7 Moreover, the proposed amendment appears to be a clear
attempt on the part of the plaintiffs-petitioners to fill up lacuna in
the original pleadings after disclosure of the defence by the
defendants. It is a settled principle of law that amendments
cannot be permitted where the same are intended to overcome
weaknesses in the case originally set up or to introduce an
altogether new foundation for the suit. The law does not permit a
litigant to improve or reconstruct his case at a belated stage so as
to prejudice the accrued rights of the opposite party.
7.8 The learned Trial Court has also rightly observed that allowing
the
proposed
amendment
would
necessitate
a
de
novo
adjudication regarding the genuineness and validity of the
agreement and registered deeds, thereby substantially enlarging
the scope of the suit and causing serious prejudice to the
defendants. The proposed amendment, therefore, fails the settled
test of balancing equities between the parties. At this stage,
permitting such amendment would also run contrary to the wellestablished legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”,
meaning thereby that it is in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation. Parties cannot be permitted to
indefinitely alter or expand the scope of proceedings in a manner
that prolongs adjudication and causes prejudice to the opposite
side.
7.9 So far as the contention of the plaintiffs-petitioners regarding
registration of FIR No.724/2023 at Police Station Bayana for
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[CW-14904/2024]
offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC concerning the
alleged forged and fabricated agreement and patta is concerned,
the same does not advance their case in the present civil
proceedings. It is trite law that criminal proceedings and civil
proceedings operate in distinct and independent spheres and are
governed
by
altogether
different
standards
of
proof
and
adjudication. Mere pendency of a criminal investigation neither
validates the proposed amendment nor dispenses with the
mandatory statutory requirements contemplated under Order VI
Rule 17 CPC. Therefore, the pendency of the criminal proceedings
cannot be construed as a valid ground for permitting amendment
of the plaint at such a belated stage.
7.10 The plaintiffs-petitioners further failed to demonstrate any
exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of discretionary
jurisdiction in their favour. The proposed amendment does not
satisfies the test of bonafides and instead seeks to fundamentally
alter the structure and scope of the original suit. Therefore, the
learned Trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the pleadings,
material available on record, and settled principles governing
amendment of pleadings, rightly concluded that the application
was devoid of merit and liable to be rejected.
7.11 Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 does not
suffer from any illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or
material irregularity warranting interference in its supervisory
jurisdiction. The dismissal of the application under Order VI Rule
17 CPC is fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the
present case and calls for no interference by this Court.
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7.12 The learned Trial Court is expected to decide the matter
expeditiously and strictly in accordance with law, after affording
adequate opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned.
7.13 Consequently, the present writ petition stands dismissed.
The impugned order dated 28.05.2024 is affirmed.
7.14 Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Sudha/97
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