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[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22069/2018
1.
Mohan Lal Verma S/o Badripraad, Aged About 75 Years,
Resident H.N. 1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of
Paladi House, Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur
2.
Rajesh Kumar Verma S/o Mohan Lal Verma, Resident H.N.
1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of Paladi House,
Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur
3.
Tarun Kumar Verma S/o Mohan Lal Verma, Resident H.N.
1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of Paladi House,
Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur
----Petitioners/Appellants
Versus
Rajendra Prasad Shah S/o Shri Heera Lal Ji Shah, Aged About 61
Years, Infront Of Paladi House, Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur
----RespondentTenant
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 25759/2018
1.
Mohan Lal Verma S/o Badri Bux, Aged About 75 Years,
Resident H.N. 1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of
Paladi House, Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur.
2.
Rajesh Kumar Verma S/o Mohan Lal Verma, Resident H.N.
1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of Paladi House,
Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur.
3.
Tarun Kumar Verma S/o Mohan Lal Verma, Resident H.N.
1853 Khajane Walon Ka Rasta, Infront Of Paladi House,
Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur.
----Petitioners/Appellants
Versus
Rajendra Prasad Shah S/o Shri Heera Lal Ji Shah, Aged About 61
Years, Infront Of Paladi House, Chokari Topkhana Desh, Jaipur.
----Respondent/Tenant
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Mangal Chand Taylor
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Saransh Saini with
Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma
Ms. Sanjana Choudhary
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Reportable
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments
27.02.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved
27.02.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative
part is pronounced
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement
19.03.2026
1.
Both the writ petitions arise out of a common order dated
20.02.2018,
passed
by
the
learned
Rent
Tribunal,
Jaipur
Metropolitan, in an eviction petition. Since two appeals came to be
filed, one by the landlord bearing Appeal No. 66/2018 and another
by the tenant bearing Appeal No. 52/2018, and the same were
disposed of by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal vide order
dated 21.08.2018, whereby Appeal No. 52/2018 was allowed, and
Appeal No. 66/2018 was dismissed.
2.
The landlord has preferred two writ petitions, one bearing
number S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22069/2018 against the order
passed in Rent Appeal No. 52/2018, and another writ petition
bearing number S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 25759/2018 against
the order passed in Rent Appeal No. 66/2018. The writ petition
bearing number S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 22069/2018 is against
the reversal of the finding on Issue No. 2 and the remand order;
therefore, the facts are taken from the said writ petition. Since
common facts are involved, both the writ petitions are decided
together.
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3.
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The facts giving rise to the present writ petitions are that the
landlords filed a petition under Section 6 and 9 of the Rajasthan
Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of
2001') before the learned Rent Tribunal seeking eviction of the
tenant and revision of rent.
4.
The grounds taken in the eviction petition were that the
tenant had committed default in payment of rent; the shop in
dispute was required for the personal and bonafide necessity of
the son of the landlord for carrying on the business of tailoring;
and further, that the tenant had acquired suitable alternative
accommodation available of his own use. Along with the prayer for
eviction, the landlords have also sought a revision of rent. The
said petition came to be allowed by the learned Rent Tribunal vide
judgment dated 20.02.2018 by deciding Issue No. 5 against the
landlords and in favor of the tenant, and Issue Nos. 2 and 3 in
favor of the landlords and against the tenant, which was
subsequently corrected vide order dated 31.03.2018. The decree
for eviction as well a decree for revision of rent was passed by the
learned Rent Tribunal on the ground of bonafide need of the son of
the landlord. The Issue Nos. 1 and 4 were not pressed by the
landlords during the hearing before the learned Rent Tribunal.
5.
Thereafter, the tenant and landlords preferred appeals before
the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. The learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, vide judgment dated 21.08.2018, dismissed the Appeal
No. 66/2018 (preferred by the landlords) challenging the Issue
No. 5 (Suitable accommodation being available) and allowed the
Appeal No. 52/2018 (preferred by the tenant on issue of bonafide
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need of landlord) challenging the finding on Issue No. 2. While
reversing the finding recorded on Issue No. 2, the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal remanded the matter back to the learned
Rent Tribunal with a direction that the learned Rent Tribunal shall
take into consideration the subsequent events brought on record
and permit the parties to carry out necessary amendments. The
learned Rent Tribunal was further directed to frame appropriate
issues in respect of such subsequent events; permit the parties to
lead evidence thereon, and thereafter, decide the eviction petition
afresh on merits.
6.
Being
aggrieved
by
the
said
order
of
remand
dated
21.08.2018, passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal as well
as dismissal of his appeal, the landlords have preferred the instant
writ petitions before this Court.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has committed illegality in
remanding the matter to the learned Rent Tribunal with a direction
that
amendments
may
be
permitted
in
respect
of
every
subsequent event. It was further directed that issues be framed
on
each
such
amendment,
documents
relating
to
every
subsequent event be taken on record, and evidence be recorded
on each such event before deciding the matter afresh.
7.1
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that
such a remand order is not contemplated under any provision of
the Act of 2001.
7.2
It was further submitted that the proceedings before the
learned Rent Tribunal as well as the learned Appellate Rent
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Tribunal under the Act of 2001 are summary in nature and that
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are not strictly
applicable.
7.3
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in
summary proceedings, as held in a catena of judgments, every
subsequent event is not required to be permitted by way of
amendment, nor it is necessary that evidence be recorded on each
and every such event. It is submitted that in such summary
proceedings, subsequent events can be taken into consideration
on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties and can be decided
thereof.
7.4 It was further contended that if the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal was of the view that certain subsequent events required
consideration, it ought to have taken them into account on the
basis of affidavits filed by the parties instead of remanding the
matter. However, while remanding the case, the learned Appellate
Rent Tribunal directed that most of the
applications filed under
Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which had earlier been rejected by the
learned Rent Tribunal, be allowed and that all applications seeking
to take documents on record, which had also been rejected earlier
were allowed and direction was issued to decide the rent
application afresh.
7.5 Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that by issuing
such directions, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction, which is not contemplated under the provisions of
the Act of 2001. It is therefore, prayed that the impugned order
passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal be quashed and set
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aside and that the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Rent Tribunal be restored.
7.6 It was further submitted that the decree for eviction was
granted on Issue No. 2 and that the entire evidence of the parties
with respect to the said issue was already available on record
before the learned Rent Tribunal. Learned counsel also submitted
that all alleged subsequent events had already been brought on
record.
7.7 Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that, as per the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and other
High
Courts,
such
subsequent
events
can
be
taken
into
consideration by the Court itself on the basis of affidavits filed by
the parties. There is no requirement of permitting amendments,
framing of additional issues, or recording of further evidence in
respect of each subsequent event in summary proceedings.
7.8 It was submitted that the bonafide requirement of the landlord
is to be assessed as on the date of filing of the eviction petition. If
every subsequent event is permitted to be brought on record by
way of amendment, framing of issues, and recording of evidence,
the trial would become endless.
7.9 It was also argued that while adjudicating landlord–tenant
disputes under the Act of 2001, subsequent events, if any, can be
taken into consideration by the Court on the basis of affidavits
filed by the parties without permitting amendments, framing
additional issues, or recording further evidence. Learned counsel
for the petitioner thus, submitted that this is precisely the object
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of Act of 2001 that is to provide a summary procedure for
adjudication of landlord–tenant disputes.
7.10 Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Appellate
Rent Tribunal cannot act as an Ordinary Appellate Court. The
scope and powers of the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal are
limited and must be exercised strictly within the framework of the
provisions of the Act of 2001.
7.11 Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contended
that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has exceeded its
jurisdiction while passing the impugned order remanding the
matter to the learned Rent Tribunal with directions. Furthermore,
the directions contained in the impugned order are, on the face of
the record, without jurisdiction and therefore, deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
7.12 Learned counsel further submitted that the primary ground
taken by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal for remanding the
matter is that the learned Rent Tribunal had not properly
considered certain material evidence available on record. Learned
counsel submitted that even if it is assumed that some evidence
had not been properly appreciated by the learned Rent Tribunal, it
was well within the jurisdiction of the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal to examine the same and record its own findings by
setting aside or correcting the findings recorded by the learned
Rent Tribunal.
7.13 However, it was not within the jurisdiction of the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal to remand the matter in the manner done
in the present case as if the Appellate Court was exercising
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jurisdiction under the ordinary Appellate Jurisdiction available
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
7.14 Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, without examining the relevance
and necessity of summoning the documents, held that the order
passed by the learned Rent Tribunal declining the applications for
summoning of documents was incorrect. In doing so, the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal exercised its powers as if it was acting
under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However,
such powers are not available to the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal under the provisions of the Act of 2001.
7.15 Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that even
otherwise the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
relating to remand, namely Order 41 Rules 23 to 25 CPC, do not
contemplate the nature of remand as directed by the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal in the present case.
7.16
Learned
counsel
further
submitted
that
as
many
as
seventeen opportunities were granted to the respondent, however,
no evidence was led by him and therefore the learned Rent
Tribunal was justified in closing his evidence. Consequently, the
evidence led by the petitioners remained unrebutted on record.
7.17 Learned counsel for the petitioners thus submitted that in
such circumstances, permitting the respondent at this stage to
lead evidence and direct consideration of each alleged subsequent
event was wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Appellate
Rent Tribunal under the provisions of the Act of 2001.
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7.18 Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, prayed that
the present writ petition be allowed, the impugned order dated
21.08.2018 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal be
quashed and set aside, and the order dated 31.03.2018 passed by
the learned Rent Tribunal be restored.
7.19 Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the
following judgments to buttress his submissions:
(i) Gaya Prasad v. Shri Pradeep Srivastava;
(2001) 2 SCC 604 (SC).
(ii) Anil Bajaj & Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja; 2014 (2)
WLC (SC) (Civil) 53.
(iii) Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul and Anr.; Civil
Appeal No. 7806 of 2021, Supreme Court of India,
(decided on 13.02.2023).
8.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has rightly exercised its
jurisdiction within the four corners of the provisions of the Act of
2001.
8.1 Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that
most of the applications seeking amendment, discovery of
documents and for taking documents on record had been rejected
by the learned Rent Tribunal and the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, upon examining those orders, found them to be
incorrect. Therefore, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has
rightly passed the impugned order.
8.2 Learned counsel for the respondent contended that if
interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of the eviction
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proceedings are found to be incorrect, the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal is competent to remand the matter back for proper
adjudication. Since several interlocutory orders were found to be
erroneous by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, the remand
order passed vide order dated 21.08.2018 does not warrant any
interference by this Court.
8.3 Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the
applications filed by the respondent under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC
had been wrongly rejected by the learned Rent Tribunal and the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has rightly held the same to be
incorrect. Therefore, the impugned order dated 21.08.2018 is
justified and does not call for any interference by this Court. He,
therefore, prayed that the present writ petitions be dismissed.
9.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
10.
The issue involved in the present writ petitions is whether
the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal can remand a matter back to
the learned Rent Tribunal even when sufficient evidence is already
available
on
record.
Further,
the
question
that
arises
for
consideration is whether, in the present case, the remand order by
the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was justified. Whether the
learned Rent Appellate Tribunal could have exercised its own
jurisdiction by taking into consideration the subsequent events
placed on record and deciding the appeal itself on merits instead
of remanding the matter back to the learned Rent Tribunal for
adjudication of the issue.
11.
It is relevant to note that the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001 is a complete code in itself. At this juncture, it is pertinent to
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refer to Sections 19 and 21 of the Act of 2001, which read as
under:
“Section 19. Appellate Rent Tribunal,
Appeals and limitation thereof.- (1) The State
Government shall constitute such number of
Appellate Rent Tribunals and at such places as
may be deemed necessary by it, by notification in
the Official Gazette.
(2) Where two or more Appellate Rent Tribunals
are
constituted
for
any
area,
the
State
Government may, by general or special order,
regulate
the
distribution
of
business
among
them.
(3) An Appellate Rent Tribunal shall consist of
one person only (hereinafter referred to as the
Presiding Officer of the Appellate Rent Tribunal)
to be appointed by the High Court.
(4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as
Presiding Officer of the Appellate Rent Tribunal
unless he is a member of [the District judge
cadre Service] having not less than [three years]
experience as such.
(5)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained
in sub-section (3), the High Court may authorize
the Presiding Officer of one Appellate Rent
Tribunal
to
discharge
the
functions
of
the
Presiding Officer of the another Appellate Rent
Tribunal also.
(6) From every final order passed by the Rent
Tribunal, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Rent
Tribunal,
within
the
local
limits
of
whose
jurisdiction the premises is situated and such an
appeal shall be filed within a period of [sixty
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days] from the date of final order alongwith copy
of such final order.
(7) The Appellate Rent Tribunal, upon filing an
appeal under sub-section (6), shall serve notice,
accompanied
by
copy
of
appeal,
on
the
respondent on the date fixed by the Rent
Tribunal under section 17 for the appearance of
the parties before it. If the respondent fails to
appear on the date so fixed before the Appellate
Rent Tribunal, he may be proceeded against
ex- parte. In case the final order under section
17 was passed in ex- parte proceedings against
any party, the
Appellate rent Tribunal shall
issue notice, accompanied by copy of appeal,
fixing a date not later than thirty days, requiring
the respondent to appear before it on the date so
fixed and service of such a notice shall be
effected through process server of the Tribunal or
Civil Court as well as by the registered post,
acknowledgment due and
notice duly served
by any of these methods shall be treated as
sufficient service. Where however, the Appellate
Rent Tribunal otherwise consider it necessary so
to do in the interest of justice in the facts of the
case, it may issue notice of appeal to the
respondent in the manner indicated above.
(8) The Appellate Rent Tribunal shall, thereafter,
fix a date of hearing which shall not be later than
forty five days from the date of service of notice
of appeal on the respondent and the appeal shall
be disposed of within a period of one hundred
and eighty days from the date of service of notice
of appeal on the respondent.
(9) Where the Appellate Rent Tribunal considers
it necessary in the interest of arriving at a just
and proper decision, it may allow filing of
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additional affidavit or documents at any stage of
the proceedings in appeal.
(10) The Appellate Rent Tribunal may in its
discretion pass such interlocutory order, during
the pendency of the appeal, as it may deem fit.
(11) (a) While deciding the appeal, the Appellate
Rent
Tribunal
may
after
recording
reasons
therefore,(i) confirm, vary, set aside, reverse or modify the
order passed, by a Rent Tribunal; or
(ii) if necessary in the interest of justice, remand
the case to the Rent Tribunal along with such
direction as it may deem fit.
(b) The Appellate Rent Tribunal shall issue
appropriate recovery certificate according to the
decision rendered by it.
(c) The decision of the Appellate Rent Tribunal
shall be final and no further appeal or revision
shall lie against its order.
(12) On the application of any of the parties and
after notice to the parties and after hearing such
of them as have desired to be heard, or of its
own motion without such notice, the Appellate
Rent Tribunal may at any stage transfer any case
from one Rent Tribunal to any other Rent
Tribunal for disposal.
(13) Where any case has been transferred under
sub-section (12), the Rent Tribunal which has
thereafter to try or dispose of such case may,
subject to any special direction in the order of
transfer, proceed from the stage at which it was
transferred.
Explanation.-The
expression
"final
order"
referred to in sub-section (6) shall mean an order
by which any proceeding pending before the Rent
Tribunal is finally disposed of.”
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……
“Section 21. Procedure and powers of the
Rent
Tribunal
and
the
Appellate
Rent
Tribunal. –
(l) In every case before the Rent Tribunal and the
Appellate Rent Tribunal the evidence of a witness
shall be given by affidavit. However, the Rent
Tribunal or the Appellate Rent Tribunal, where it
appears to it that it is necessary in the interest of
justice to call a witness for examination or
cross-examination
and
such
witness
can
be
produced, may order attendance for examination
or cross-examination of such a witness.
(2) The documents filed before the Rent Tribunal
by the petitioner shall be distinctly marked by
him as Ex-1, Ex-2 and so on in the red ink and
the
documents filed by the respondent shall be
similarly distinctly marked by him as Ex-A1, ExA2 and so on in red ink and in the affidavits the
documents shall be referred by these exhibit
marks and signatures or other parts of the
documents referred to in the affidavits shall be
distinctly
marked
by
the
party
filing
the
document as A to B or C to D and so on in red
ink.
(3) The Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent
Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid
down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(Central Act No.5 of 1908), but shall be guided
by the principal of natural justice and subject to
other provisions of this Act or the Rules made
thereunder and shall have powers to regulate
their own procedure, and for the purpose of
discharging their functions under this Act they
shall have, the same powers as are vested in a
Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure,
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1908 (Central Act No.5 of 1908) while trying a
suit or an appeal in respect of following matters,
namely:(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of
any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
documents;
(c) reviewing its decision;
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of
witnesses or documents;
(e) dismissing petition for default or deciding it
ex-parte;
(f) setting aside any order of dismissal of any
petition for default or any order passed by it exparte;
(g) bringing legal representatives on record; and
(h) any other, matter as may be prescribed.
(4)
Rent
adjournment
recording the
Tribunal
shall
not
without
written
grant
any
application
and
reasons therefore in writing.
(5) Any proceeding before the Rent Tribunal or
Appellate Rent Tribunal shall deemed be to be a
judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections
193 and 228 and for the purpose of section 196
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act No.
45 of 1860) and the Rent Tribunal or the
Appellate Rent Tribunal shall be deemed to be a
Civil Court for the purposes of section 195 and
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (Central Act No.2 of 1974).”
(emphasis supplied)
12.
A perusal of Section 21 of the Act of 2001 makes it clear that
the procedure prescribed under the Act applies equally to the
learned Rent Tribunal as well as to the learned Rent Appellate
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Tribunal. Both forums have been empowered to record the
evidence of witnesses by way of affidavits. The provision further
stipulates that whenever the Rent Tribunal or the Appellate Rent
Tribunal deems it necessary in the interest of justice, they may
call a witness for examination or cross-examination.
13.
Section 21(3) of the Act of 2001 further clarifies that neither
the Rent Tribunal nor the Appellate Rent Tribunal is bound by the
procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Instead, both forums are required to be guided by the principles of
natural
justice
and
are
empowered
to
regulate
their
own
procedure for discharging their functions under the Act of 2001.
13.1 At the same time, the said provision also vests both the Rent
Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal with powers akin to those
of a Civil Court, including the power to summon and enforce the
attendance of any person and examine him on oath; to require
discovery and production of documents; to review their decisions;
to issue commissions for examination of witnesses or documents;
to dismiss petitions for default or decide them ex-parte; to set
aside orders of dismissal for default or ex-parte orders; to bring
legal representatives on record; and to exercise such other powers
as may be prescribed.
14.
A perusal of Section 19(9) of the Act of 2001 reveals that the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal is empowered to permit the filing
of additional affidavits or documents at any stage of the appellate
proceedings in order to arrive at a just and proper decision.
Further, Section 19(11)(a)(ii) of the Act of 2001 provides that the
learned Rent Appellate Tribunal may, in the interest of justice,
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remand the case to the learned Rent Tribunal along with such
directions as it may deem fit.
15.
This Court, upon examining the powers conferred and the
procedure prescribed under the Act of 2001, is of the firm opinion
that when both the learned Rent Tribunal and the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal have been vested with similar powers
regarding summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons
and requiring discovery and production of documents, the learned
Rent
Appellate
Tribunal
ought
not
to have
refrained
from
exercising its own powers. Merely because an application for
discovery and production of documents had been dismissed by the
learned Rent Tribunal, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal ought
not to have remanded the matter but should have exercised the
powers vested in it under the Act of 2001 if necessary.
16.
This Court finds that the power of remand should be
exercised only in situations where the learned Rent Appellate
Tribunal is unable to effectively exercise its jurisdiction under the
Act of 2001. Such circumstances may arise where the learned
Rent Tribunal has disposed of the petition on a preliminary issue
without entering into the merits of the case, or in other similar
situations. However, once the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal itself
possesses the necessary powers under the Act of 2001, it ought
not to remand the matter but should instead exercise those power
itself.
17.
One of the other grounds on which the learned Appellate
Rent Tribunal remanded the matter was that the application filed
by the respondent-tenant before the learned Rent Tribunal under
Order XI Rules 12 and 14 CPC had been dismissed. However, it is
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evident from the order of the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal that
no reasons were assigned as to why the order of the learned Rent
Tribunal
dismissing
the
said
application
was
perverse
or
unsustainable.
18. This Court therefore finds that instead of remanding the
matter on the aforesaid ground, the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, if it deemed it necessary, could have exercised its own
powers available under Section 21 of the Act of 2001.
19.
Another reason assigned for remanding the matter was the
dismissal of various applications filed by the tenant under Order VI
Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the written statement on the
basis of subsequent events. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
allowed all such applications filed by the tenant and thereafter
remanded the matter back to the learned Rent Tribunal.
19.1 This Court finds that the proceedings under the Act of 2001
are summary in nature and are not strictly governed by the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In a catena of
judgments, this Court as well as other High Courts have permitted
parties in summary proceedings to place subsequent events on
record by way of affidavits. Both the learned Rent Tribunal and the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal are empowered to consider such
subsequent events on the basis of affidavits and decide the matter
accordingly. The intention behind prescribing such procedure is
that if strict provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applied,
the summary proceedings contemplated under the Act of 2001
would be converted into regular civil suit proceedings.
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19.1 The said position of law was reiterated in the case of
Murlidhar vs Nandkishore ; 2006 (2) RLW 1687, wherein a Coordinate Bench of this Court while relying upon the case of
Radhey Shyam Soni v. Sumer Mal Phophalia; 2006 WLC(UC)
493 held that subsequent events which have a material bearing on
the relief claimed may be brought on record even at the appellate
stage and the procedure for doing so need not necessarily be
through formal amendment of pleadings. The Court may permit
such facts to be brought on record by way of affidavits under
Order XIX Rule 1 CPC instead of insisting upon a formal
amendment of pleadings, as procedural law should not be
burdened with unnecessary technicalities. The relevant paragraph
of Murlidhar (supra) is reproduced herein under:
15. The Division Bench of this Court also very recently
on 22nd March, 2006, Radhey Shyam Soni v. Sumer Mal
Phophalia and Anr. D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.
201/2006 has considered the identical issue and invoked
the provisions of Order 19 Rule 1 CPC in place of Order
6 Rule 17 C.P.C. and allowed the application under
Order 8 Rule 1(3). The relevant portion of the said
judgment is reproduced here under for ready reference:
We do not wish to make any comment on the
relevance and possible effects of the subsequent
even in the instant case. That is a matter to be
considered by the Trial Court in the suit. But as
observed in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram 1992 SC
700 to which reference was made on behalf of the
respondent, the normal rule is that rights and
obligations of the parties are to be adjudicated as
they exist at the commencement of the lis, but
(20 of 24)
[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
[CW-22069/2018]
where subsequent events of fact or law have
material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to
relief, the court is not precluded from taking
cognizance of the subsequent events to mould the
relief. Reference may also be made to the provisions
of Order 7 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that the suit
was
instituted
in
the
year
and
if
the
application for amendment of the written statement
is allowed it may cause prejudice to the respondent
as it may give rise to chain of consequences. The
desired purpose can be served by permitting the
party to file affidavit as provided under Order 19
Rule 1 CPC as held in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram
(supra).
He referred the following observations in the judgment.
When subsequent events are pleaded in the course
of an appeal or proceeding of revision, the Court
may, having regard to the nature of the allegations
of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence
to be adduced by means of affidavits as envisaged
in Rule 1 of Order 19, CPC. The Court may also
treat any affidavit filed in support of the pleadings
itself as one under the said provision and call upon
the opposite side to traverse it. The Court, it if
finds that having regard to the nature of the
allegations, it is necessary to record oral evidence
tested
by
oral
cross-examination,
may
have
recourse to that procedure. It may record the
evidence itself or remit the matter for an inquiry
and evidence. All these depend upon the factual
and
situational
differences
characterizing
a
particular case and the nature of the plea raised.
There can be no hard and fast rule governing the
(21 of 24)
[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
[CW-22069/2018]
matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with
technicalities.”
20.
This Court further notes that the issue as to whether
subsequent events should be incorporated by way of amendment
in the pleadings had already been dealt with in the very same
dispute
between
the
parties.
In
S.B.
Civil
Writ
Petition
No.15430/2010 titled as Rajendra Prasad Shah vs Mohan Lal
Verma & Ors., vide order dated 31.01.2011, this Court declined
the prayer of the tenant seeking amendment of pleadings but
granted liberty to file affidavits regarding the subsequent events
and directed the learned Rent Tribunal to record its opinion and
render findings thereon.
21.
Despite the aforesaid order being on record, this Court finds
that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal applied the provisions of
Section 105 CPC and Order 43 Rule 1 CPC while remanding the
matter back to the learned Rent Tribunal. Such exercise of power
by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was not correct and was
not in consonance with the provisions of the Act of 2001.
22.
This Court further finds that while remanding the matter, the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal observed that the subsequent
events had not been considered as permission for amendment had
not been granted and the documents had not been taken on
record. However, from a perusal of the orders passed by the
learned Rent Tribunal, it is evident that each of the subsequent
events which had been permitted to be brought on record by way
of affidavits in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15430/2010, had in fact
been considered by the learned Rent Tribunal. The learned
(22 of 24)
[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
[CW-22069/2018]
Appellate Rent Tribunal, however, incorrectly recorded that the
learned Rent Tribunal had failed to consider the subsequent events
as directed by the High Court.
23.
This Court further finds that the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal failed to consider the binding judgment of the High Court
on the issue. Had the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal considered
the said judgment, it would have appreciated that subsequent
events
need
not
necessarily
be
incorporated
by
way
of
amendment in the pleadings. Instead, the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal allowed all the applications filed by the respondent-tenant
under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and permitted the subsequent events
to be incorporated in the pleadings, and thereafter remanded the
matter back to the learned Rent Tribunal.
24.
This Court finds that such exercise of power by the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal was contrary to the provisions of law. The
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal applied the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure without taking into consideration the special
procedure prescribed under the Act of 2001. The routine remand
of the matter has resulted in unnecessary delay in eviction
proceedings.
24.1 If the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal was of the view that
the learned Rent Tribunal had not recorded proper findings, or that
certain documents were required to be summoned, or that
subsequent events required consideration, it could have exercised
such powers itself instead of remanding the matter back to the
learned Rent Tribunal.
[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
(23 of 24)
[CW-22069/2018]
25. The Legislature, with the intention of expediting eviction
proceedings, introduced summary procedures under the Act of
2001. Earlier, such matters were governed by the Rajasthan
Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, under which
proceedings were conducted as regular civil suits and often took
several years to conclude. In view of the large pendency of rent
litigation, the Legislature enacted the Act of 2001 to ensure
expeditious disposal through summary proceedings. If the order of
the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal is sustained, the summary
proceedings contemplated under the Act of 2001 would effectively
be converted into regular civil suit proceedings. On this ground as
well, the order of the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal deserves to
be quashed and set aside.
26.
This Court also finds that the argument advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioners, seeking restoration of the judgment
passed by the learned Rent Tribunal cannot be accepted at this
stage. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments, has
held that while examining the legality of an order of remand, the
appropriate course is to set aside the order of remand and direct
the Appellate Court to decide the appeal on merits. This Court to
arrive at the said conclusion relies on the judgment rendered in
the case of J. Balaji Singh vs Diwakar Cole & Ors.; (2017) 14
SCC 207, wherein the Court observed and held as under:
“23. So far as the impugned order is concerned, the
High Court, in our view, committed jurisdictional error
when it also again examined the case on merits and set
aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court and
restored the judgment of the Trial Court. The High
[2026:RJ-JP:11680]
(24 of 24)
[CW-22069/2018]
Court, in our opinion, should not have done this for the
simple reason that it was only examining the legality of
the remand order in an appeal filed under Order 43 Rule
1(u) of the Code. Indeed, once the High Court came to
a conclusion that the remand order was bad in law then
it could only remand the case to the first Appellate
Court with a direction to decide the first appeal on
merits.”
27.
With the above observations, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
22069/2018 is allowed. Accordingly, the order dated 21.08.2018,
passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal is set aside qua
Appeal No. 52/2018 and the matter is remanded back to the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal to decide the said appeal on
merits. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal may exercise all such
powers as available under Section 19 and 21 of the Act of 2001
and decide the appeal on merits preferably within a period of six
months, keeping in view that the eviction petition has been
pending since 2005.
28.
Simultaneously, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 25759/2018,
being against the concurrent findings on issue no. 5 is dismissed
as no perversity has been demonstrated by the petitioners in the
concurrent findings.
29.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Sudha/35-36
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