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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
WP (C) No. 450/2021
Reserved On: 17th of September, 2026.
Pronounced On: 22nd of September, 2026.
Uploaded On: 22nd of September, 2026.
Whether the operative part or
full Judgment is pronounced:
Full.
Mohammad Amin Dar, (59 Years)
S/O Ghulam Ahmad Dar
R/O New Colony, Khanabal,
Harnag, Anantnag.
… Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr Arif Javaid Khan, Advocate.
V/S
1. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir,
Through its Chief Secretary,
Civil Secretariat,
Srinagar/ Jammu.
2. Principal Secretary to Government,
Public Works (R&B) Department,
Civil Secretariat, Jammu/ Srinagar.
3. Jammu & Kashmir Projects Construction,
Corporation Limited (JKPCC Ltd.),
Through its Managing Director,
Srinagar/ Jammu.
4. Managing Director,
Jammu & Kashmir Projects Construction,
Corporation Limited (JKPCC Ltd.),
Srinagar/ Jammu.
… Respondents
Through: Mr Waseem Gul, Government Advocate.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE.
(JUDGMENT)
01.
The Petitioner, through the medium of the instant Writ Petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged Order
WP (C) No. 450/2021
No. 168 of 2020 dated 18th of December, 2020 issued by the Managing
Director, JKPCC/ Respondent No.4 herein, whereby the Petitioner has been
placed under suspension with immediate effect, with further direction to
him to remain attached with the office of General Manager (K), JKPCC,
Kashmir, during the suspension period.
02.
The Petitioner claims that he was working as Head Assistant in
the JKPCC at Unit 5th, Anantnag; that, in the year 2011, an FIR No.
07/2011 dated 11th of April, 2011 was registered by Vigilance Organization,
Kashmir, Srinagar against one Mohammad Shafi Shah S/O Ghulam Mohiud-Din Shah R/O Changu, Doru, the then Assistant Manager, JKPCC
Limited, under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and RPC
for forging his academic qualification certificate and obtaining employment
in JKPCC; that in the aforesaid FIR, the Petitioner was implicated for
preparing the service book of the accused without going for verification of
his testimonials, though, as per the Petitioner, he was not bound or
authorized, in any manner, to direct the verification or re-verification of
testimonials which had already been verified by the concerned DDO way
back in 1991-92; that from the date of registration of aforesaid FIR in the
year 2011 till date, the JKPCC has not even contemplated or initiated any
departmental inquiry or even preliminary fact finding enquiry, so as to
ascertain the veracity of the allegations of commission of offences or of
alleged misconduct by its employees, in particular against the Petitioner
herein.
03.
Upon notice having been issued, the Respondents have filed
their Reply/ Objections, inter alia, stating therein that the Petitioner herein,
who was working as the then Establishment Clerk in the RespondentJKPCC Unit 5th, Anantnag, came to be implicated as one of the accused in
FIR No.07/2011 registered by Vigilance Organization, Kashmir (now AntiCorruption Bureau), for the accusation of having prepared the service book
of the main accused-Mohd. Shafi Shah, on fake and forged matriculation
certificate, thereby hatching a criminal conspiracy which has been proved
WP (C) No. 450/2021
without any shadow of doubt; that the Vigilance Organization, Kashmir
(Anti-Corruption Bureau) have already conducted thorough investigations
in the case and it was based on the charge sheet framed by them against the
main accused and co-accused,
i.e., Petitioner herein, that their names
surfaced to be involved in the criminal conspiracy; that the charges against
the Petitioner were proved by the Vigilance Organization Kashmir (AntiCorruption Bureau) and the Challan of the case has been produced before
the learned Anti-Corruption Court, Anantnag; that the Petitioner is facing
trial in the aforesaid case and has not been, till date, exonerated from the
charges levelled against him, as such, there is no question of reinstatement.
04.
The Petitioner has, thereafter, submitted his Rejoinder to the
Reply, stating therein that the Petitioner has been falsely implicated in case
FIR No. 07/2011; that the aforesaid FIR has culminated into a charge sheet
which stands filed after nine years; that during the pendency of these nine
years, no departmental enquiry or preliminary fact finding was conducted
by the Respondents, but, unfortunately, the Petitioner was placed under
suspension by virtue of impugned Order dated 18 th of December, 2020; that
the main accused, namely, Mohammad Shafi Shah, was also placed under
suspension w.e.f. May, 2011, who challenged the same through the medium
of SWP No. 1379/2015; that the said Writ Petition came to be disposed of
vide Judgment dated 1st of March, 2018, whereby the suspension order was
quashed; that the said Judgment, on challenge, came to be upheld upto the
level of Hon’ble Supreme Court ; that the Respondents, in utter disregard of
principles of natural justice and without following the law on the subject, so
much so, without conducting any enquiry in the matter, have placed the
Petitioner under suspension.
05.
Heard and considered.
06.
The moot question that begs consideration of this Court in this
Petition is, whether the impugned Order could be reviewed by this Court in
exercise of the power of the judicial review or not.
WP (C) No. 450/2021
07.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled “Jayrajbhai
Jayantibhai Patel V. Anilbhai Nathubai Patel & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC
200”, has held that the power of judicial review may not be exercised qua
an administrative decision, unless the same is illogical or suffers from
procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense
that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards, but no standardized
formula, universal applicable to all cases, can be evolved and that each case
has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that
exercises of the powers, the source, the nature or scope of power and the
indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affect the individual
or society and though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognized, is the order
of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on
wholly irrelevant consideration or material or excludes from consideration
the relevant material or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have
arrived at it on the given material may be struck down.
08.
Now, coming to the issue of suspension, as involved in this
Petition, it is settled position of law that the word “suspension” refers to
that state when an employee temporarily is debarred by his employer for the
time being from performing his official functions or enjoying certain
privileges. When an employee is placed under suspension by an employer,
during the period of suspension, the employee is essentially kept away from
exercise of his official functions and enjoyment of those privileges. The
main purpose of placing an employee under suspension by his employer is
temporary and is not a permanent feature envisaged for the purposes of
completing an enquiry or trial in respect of the conduct of an employee.
09.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled “State of Orissa
V. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 2296” has held
that it would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to
suspend an employee, but it should be on consideration of the gravity of the
alleged misconduct or the nature of allegations imputed to the delinquent
WP (C) No. 450/2021
employee; and that the suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate
result of the investigation or inquiry; and that the authority must keep in
mind public interest of the impact of delinquent’s continuation in office,
while facing the departmental enquiry or trial of a criminal charge.
10.
In “Union of India V. Ashok Kumar Agarwal, 2013 (16)
SCC 147”, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while summarizing the concept of
suspension, has held that a suspension order can be passed by the competent
authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct viz. serious act
of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available, however,
facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of
universal application can be laid down in this regard. It was further held
that the suspension order should be passed only where there is strong prima
facie case against the delinquent and the charges, if proved, would
ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment, i.e., removal or
dismissal from service or reduction in rank, etc.
11.
Again, in case titled “Ajay Kumar Choudhary V. Union of
India, (2015) 7 SSC 291”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs No.
11, 12, 20 and 21, has held as under: “11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation
of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature,
and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an
indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound
reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this
would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary
proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued
with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the
memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even
long delay.
12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated
renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not
the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person
suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society
and the derision of his department, has to endure this
excruciation even before he formally charged with some
misdemeanor, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his
knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take
an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its
culmination, that is, to determine his innocence or iniquity,
WP (C) No. 450/2021
much too often this has now become an accompaniment to
retirement. Indubitably, the sophist will nimbly counter that
our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right
to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the
presumption of innocence to the accused, But we must
remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are
inextricable tenets of Common Law jurisprudence,
antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that
–“We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either justice or right”. In similar vein the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.
20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 and
accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive
period of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and
supervision. The code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains
a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the
power of the Magistrate to authorize detention of an accused
person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation
relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and
beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to
any other offence, Drawing support from the observations
contained of the Divisions Bench in Raghubir Singh V State
of Bihar and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay,
we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso
to Section 167(2) CRPC, 1973 to moderate suspension orders
in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems
to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person
be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days
even though accused of commission of the most heinous
crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after
the expiry of the similar period especially when a
memorandum of charges/charges-sheet has not been served
on the suspended persons. It is true that the proviso to
Section 167(2) CrPC postulates personal freedom, but
respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right
to a speedy trial should be also be placed on the same
pedestal.
21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a
suspension order should next extend beyond three months if
within this period the memorandum of charges/charges-sheet
is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the
memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served a reasoned
order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As
in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the
person concerned to any department in any of its offices
within or outside the State so as to sever any local or
personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse
for obstructing the investigation against him. The
Government may also prohibit him from contacting any
person or handling records and documents till the stage of his
WP (C) No. 450/2021
having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately
safeguard the universally recognized principle of human
dignity and the right to speedy trial and shall also preserve
the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We
recognize that the previous Constitution Benches have been
reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and
to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition
of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed
in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests
of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance
Commission that pending a criminal investigation,
departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands
superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.”
12.
Having regard to the afore-stated exposition of law and
reverting back to the facts of the case on hand, admittedly, the Petitioner
herein came to be placed under suspension on 18th of December, 2020,
whereafter, he has retired from service upon reaching the age of
superannuation on 31st of May, 2021. It is also not in dispute that chargesheet stands filed before the Anti-Corruption Court, Anantnag, in
connection with the case with reference to which the Petitioner was placed
under suspension. In such a situation, the question that arises is as to
whether the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary’s case (supra) would be extendable and applicable to the case
of the Petitioner herein qua the impugned Order of suspension.
13.
True it is that the scope of judicial review in the matter of
suspension of an employee is limited and that the matter of suspension, its
continuation or revocation is the exclusive domain of the employer, yet the
principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary’s case (supra) cannot be overlooked having regard to the
peculiarity of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, more
particularly, having regard to the fact that the impugned suspension Order
of the Petitioner came to be issued way back in the year 2020 and that,
admittedly, no departmental enquiry parallel to the filing of the chargesheet has been initiated by the Respondents which would get prejudiced by
termination of the suspension of the Petitioner and also that the Petitioner
WP (C) No. 450/2021
has already retired from service upon reaching the age of superannuation in
May, 2021.
14.
It is trite in law that, although suspension is not a punishment,
but once a suspension is prolonged for almost six years and without any
departmental enquiry, as in the present case, then it amounts to punishment,
inasmuch as, it has very strong stigmatic social connotations. In the
considered opinion of this Court, the Respondents have failed to discharge
their obligations to proceed in the matter in accordance with law by issuing
charge sheet and conducting inquiry after placing the Petitioner under
suspension for almost six years now and no plausible reasons have been
explained for such a delay for not framing the charge sheet, even after a
lapse of almost six years.
15.
Viewed thus, the present Petition is allowed and the impugned
Order No. 168 of 2020 dated 18th of December, 2020, whereby the
Petitioner was placed under suspension, is hereby quashed. The
Respondents are directed to reinstate the Petitioner back into service within
a period of six weeks from the date of this Order notionally, settle his
suspension period, release all consequential benefits in his favour and
process his case for grant of pensionary benefits as per Rules governing the
field.
16.
Writ Petition is, thus, disposed of on the above terms, along
with any CM(s) pending therewith.
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
September 22nd, 2026
“TAHIR”
i.
Tahir Manzoor Bhat
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