The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. In view of the above, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants has not advanced the argument for better appreciation of the present appeal. It is needless to observe that in the second appeal, appreciation of evidence that does not form part and parcel of the arguments on substantial questions of law cannot be considered.
15. With the above observation and direction, this instant second appeal stands dismissed.
16. Consequently, pending application(s), if any, also stands closed. Send back the LCRs. Suhanjit
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA NO.03 OF 2020
1. Miss Kalpana Sarkar,
D/o Late Upendra Kumar Sarkar.
2. Sri Subrata Sarkar,
S/o Late Upendra Sarkar.
3. Smt. Alpana Sarkar,
W/o Sri Uttam Basak.
4. Sri Debabrata Sarkar,
S/o Late Upendra Sarkar.
All are resident of Madhya Badharghat, P.O.-A.D. Nagar,
P.S. Amtali, West Tripura.
………Defendant-Appellant (s)
Vs.
Shri Akhil Datta,
S/o Late Amulya Bhusan Datta,
Resident of Bimanghati,
South Manik Bhandar,
P.S. Kamalpur, District Dhalai.
…….. Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
: Mr. G.S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Mr. B. Saha, Advocate.
Date of hearing
: 06.09.2022
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 09/09/2022.
Whether fit for reporting : NO.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
This present appeal is filed against the Judgment and
Decree dated, 10.04.2019, passed by the learned Addl. District
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, in T.A. 09 of 2018 arising out of
the Judgment and Decree dated 22.02.2018 passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.1, Agartala, West
Tripura in T.S.53 of 2015.
2.
The
facts
of
the
case,
in
brief,
are
that
respondent as plaintiff filed a title suit claiming the right title
and interest on the suit land and for recovery of possession in
respect of the suit land against the defendant-appellant for
land measuring 6 gandas comprised in khatian No. 5951 of
old CS Plot No. 7098(p), Hal CS plot No. 25610 under MoujaBadharghat, sheet No. 5, Tehsil- Badharghat. According to the
plaintiff-respondent, he is the owner of the suit land, and on
the basis of title deed No. 1-7109 dated 09.10.2007 executed
by the vendor-defendant, he took possession of the same. He
applied for the mutation but the same was not granted in his
favour. On 18.05.2008 when the respondent-plaintiff intended
to fix pillars on his land, at that time he was resisted by the
defendant-appellant,
her
sons and
persons.
to
the
According
daughter,
and other
Plaintiff-respondent,
he
was
dispossesed on 09.10.2008. In spite of his effort, he could not
enter into the suit land. Hence, the Plaintiff-respondent filed
that instant T.S. No.53 of 2015
3.
The defendant-appellant therein contested the
suit by filing a written statement denying the assertions of the
plaintiff-respondent. Defendant-appellant therein further took
the plea that since she was unable to read and write, the
plaintiff-respondent
by
applying
fraud
took
the
thump
impression of her on the sale deed wherein she understood
that she would sell 2 gandas of land for a consideration of
Rs.2,40,000/-. Later when the plaintiff-respondent tried to
occupy suit land measuring 6 gandas, at that time, it came to
her knowledge that in place of 2 gandas collusively 6 gandas
was written. Further according to the defendant-appellant
therein she was/is in possession of the suit land. Furthermore,
the plaintiff-respondent did not make further payment as per
the sale deed. It was the plaintiff-respondent to prove the
sale. Further, the mandatory provision of Section 68 of the
Evidence Act was not complied with. The Learned Court below
decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent vide
judgment and decree dated 22.02.2018.
4.
Being
aggrieved
thereby,
the
defendant-
appellant therein preferred an appeal bearing No.T.A.01. of
2018 before the learned First Appellate Court. But the First
Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 10.04.2019
dismissed the said appeal.
5.
Aggrieved
thereby,
the
defendant-appellants
herein have filed this instant appeal under Section 100 read
with Or.XLII, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
6.
Vide
order
dated
10.08.2020,
the
following
substantial questions of law were formulated:“1. Whether the findings of the learned Courts
below are perverse?
2. Whether the contents of the Sale Deed(Exbt-1)
and the Sale Deed as a whole has been proved in accordance
with law?”
7.
Heard
Mr.
G.S.
Bhattacharjee,
learned
counsel
appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. S. Bhattacharjee,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
8.
Mr. G.S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for
the defendant-appellants submits that the sale deed cannot be
taken as proof and source of title when admittedly the
executrix(vendor) herself is unable to read and write the
Bengali script and denied the sale of the quantum of 06 gandas
of land. He further submits that the learned First Appellate
Court has failed to consider and appreciate the evidence on
record in passing the judgment impugned, when the deposition
of attesting witness is mandatory for proving the execution and
contention of the indenture, under dispute. Staying this,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants urged this Court
to allow this instant appeal.
9.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for
the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the learned Trial Court
and learned First Appellate Court has rightly delivered the
judgments and decree and urged this Court to dismiss this
instant appeal. Learned counsel further referred to the crossexamination part of D.W.1 before the learned Trial Court which was
recorded by the Advocate Commissioner. In said cross-examination
the defendant-appellant herself specifically stated that “I have sold
the suit land in favour of the Plaintiff and handed over the same to
the plaintiff, now I am possessing the suit land.”. Referring to the
said portion of cross-examination of the defendant-appellant, it is
submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that since there is a
clear admission by the defendant-appellant herself, so, there is no
scope to disbelieve her evidence regarding the transfer of land.
10.
To substantiate his argument, he has pressed into
service Para- 17, 18, 29 & 23 the Hon’ble Apex Court Judgment
passed in Hero Vinoth(Minor) Vs. Seshammal reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 545 dated 08.05.2022 which is reproduced as
under:“ 17. After the amendment a second appeal can be
filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The
memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial
question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy
itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the
High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved
in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the question so
formulated. However, the respondent at the time of hearing of the
appeal has a right to argue that the case in the court did not involve
any substantial question of law. The proviso to the section
acknowledges the powers of the High Court to hear the appeal on a
substantial point of law, though not formulated by it with the object
of ensuring that no injustice is done to the litigant where such a
question was not formulated at the time of admission either by
mistake or by inadvertence.
18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in
the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of
admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally
deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure
prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found
in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish
between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In
exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the
findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been
disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is
neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation.
Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions
mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second
appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to
enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not
be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this
section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be
distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
(AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that :
"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in
the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of
general public importance or whether it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by
the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty
or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled
by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled and there is a mere
question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is
palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of
law."
20.
The question of law raised will not be considered as a
substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger
Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the
Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for
a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be
allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in
second appeal. There mere appreciation of facts, the documentary
evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the
documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of
law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed
jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in
the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law.
Where the fact appellate court is shown to have exercised its
discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error
either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal.
This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey
(1976 (1) SCC 803) held that whether the trial court should not
have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law
justifying interference.([See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitribai
Sopan Gujar and Others (1999(3) SCC 722)].
23.
To be "substantial" a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the
case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties
before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the
case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and
the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact
arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that
question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An
entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is
not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the
matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of
each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and
involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration
being the need for striking a judicious balance between the
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling
necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See
:Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. [(2001) 3
SCC 179].”
He has also referred to Para-14 of the Hon’ble
11.
Apex
Court Judgment passed in
Parminder Singh Vs.
Gurpreet Singh reported in (2018)13 SCC 352 dated
25.07.2017 which is reproduced here-in-under:“ 14. In our considered opinion, the question as to
whether specific performance of an agreement should be granted or
not is essentially in the discretion of the Court. Indeed Section 20 of
the Specific Relief Act says so in no uncertain terms. Therefore, once
the Trial Court, first and second Appellate Court formed an opinion
and decided to grant the specific performance of the agreement to
the plaintiff in exercise of their respective discretionary powers, this
Court being the last Court in hierarchy cannot disturb such
concurrent findings while exercising power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. As mentioned above, these findings are
binding on this Court.”
12.
Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the evidence on record.
13.
Admittedly,
the
defendant-appellants
are
in
possession of the scheduled land and the defendants have
received a sum of Rs.80,000/- only. The plaintiff-respondent
has not made out the case to say that he is dispossesed
from the property. The plaintiff-respondent has not placed
anything on evidence to show that he has been delivered
peaceful and vacant possession of the scheduled land
property by the defendants. The plaintiff-respondent has also
not placed any evidence on record to show that the sale
consideration
of
Rs.2,40,000/-
has
been
paid
to
the
defendants and the details as to on what dates the amount
has been paid. Even according to the evidence of Deed
writer, Sri Partha Paul i.e. P.W.4, in his cross-examination,
he has categorically stated that the value of the scheduled
property during 2007 is around 8(eight) to 9(nine) lakhs.
The vendor-defendant-Smt.Subarna Prava Sarkar was an
aged woman. She was bedridden and ill and could not visit
the Registration office. Accordingly, arrangements were
made to get the document registered by visiting the house of
the vendor-defendant. The said deed writer i.e. P.W.4 has
not stated that the recitals of the sale deed i.e. Exbt. No.1,
1(i) and 1(ii) have been read over to the vendor- defendant
and she had understood and then signed the sale deed.
These are the several issues during the course of argument,
this Court felt that they were not appreciated by the Courts
below. Now since this Court is dealing only with the second
appeal, the substantial questions of law which is framed are
again reproduced herein-under:““1. Whether the findings of the learned Courts
below are perverse?
2. Whether the contents of the Sale Deed(Exbt-1)
and the Sale Deed as a whole has been proved in accordance
with law?”
14.
In view of the above, the learned counsel
appearing for the defendant-appellants has not advanced the
argument for better appreciation of the present appeal. It is
needless to observe that in the second appeal, appreciation
of evidence that does not form part and parcel of the
arguments on substantial questions of law cannot be
considered.
15.
With the above observation and direction, this
instant second appeal stands dismissed.
16.
Consequently, pending application(s), if any,
also stands closed.
Send back the LCRs.
JUDGE
Suhanjit
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