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[2026:RJ-JP:8067]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15944/2025
Mintu Ram Yadav S/o Late Shri Kanwar Singh, Resident of VillageRiwali, Tehsil- Behror, District-Alwar (Now District-Kotputli-Behror),
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, through its
Chairman, RSRTC Headquarters, Parivahan Marg, Chomu
House, Jaipur-302001.
2.
Deputy General Manager (Admn.), Rajasthan State Road
Transport
Corporation
Headquarters,
Parivahan
Marg,
Chomu House, Jaipur -302001.
3.
Chief
Manager,
Rajasthan
State
Road
Transport
Corporation, Matshya Nagar Depot, Alwar, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Mahender Singh Yadav Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
19/02/2026
1.
Present writ petition has been filed seeking issuance of
direction to the respondents to grant compassionate appointment to
the petitioner on account of the death of the petitioner’s father, who
was serving as Driver with the respondents. The petitioner contends
that the family suffered financial hardship upon the demise of the
deceased
employee
and
that
the
denial
of
compassionate
appointment is arbitrary and unjust.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Late
Shri Kanwar Singh, father of the petitioner was working on the
substantive post of Driver in Rajasthan State Road Transport
(2 of 12)
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[CW-15944/2025]
Corporation. However, on 24.07.2006, while driving the bus of the
Corporation, father of the petitioner met with an accident and
suffered injuries. Therefore, father of the petitioner could not join
duties. Thereafter, on 23.11.2006, father of the petitioner suffered
burn injuries on account of blast of LPG Cylinder. However, father of
the petitioner was terminated from service by the respondents vide
order dated 22.06.2007. Feeling aggrieved, father of the petitioner
approached this Court by way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
8971/2007 which was dismissed on 29.10.2007 on the ground of
availibility of alternative remedy. Thereafter, father of the petitioner
raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the Appropriate
Government to the Industrial Tribunal & Labour Court, Alwar
(hereinafter to be referred as 'the Industrial Tribunal').
3.
However, during pendency of the reference before the
Industrial Tribunal, father of the petitioner died on 27.10.2013,
leaving behind his widow, one son (the petitioner) and three
daughters. Industrial Tribunal vide its award dated 11.09.2019
answered the reference in favour of the workman-father of the
petitioner and held him entitled for 50% of the salary payable to the
deceased-workman as compensation from the date of termination
till the date of death of the workman along with continuity of
service.
4.
The respondent challenged the award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal by way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
422/2020 which was dismissed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
vide order dated 14.12.2022. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted
an
application
to
the
respondents
on
30.09.2019
seeking
appointment on compassionate ground. However, vide order dated
(3 of 12)
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[CW-15944/2025]
14.07.2025, application filed by the petitioner seeking appointment
of the petitioner on compassionate ground was dismissed by the
respondents. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court by
way of filing instant writ petition. It is submitted that the action of
the
respondents
in
declining
benefit
of
appointment
on
compassionate ground to the petitioner is unjustified, unwarranted
and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned
counsel for the petitioner argued that when the compassionate
appointment
rules
entitles
the
petitioner
for
compassionate
appointment for saving the family of deceased employee from
starvation, there is no justification in not providing the same to the
petitioner, dependent of the deceased employee. Therefore, learned
counsel for the petitioner has prayed for allowing the writ petition as
also
issuance
of
direction
to
the
respondents
for
grant
of
appointment to the petitioner on compassionate ground.
5.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
carefully perused the material on record.
6.
Perusal of the material on record would reveal that claim
of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has
been declined by the respondents for the reason that at the time of
death of father of the petitioner, he was not in active employment
of the respondents. Be that as it may, this Court is of the view that
the claim of the petitioner seeking appointment on compassionate
ground is hopelessly barred by time.
7.
The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, disclose that
the deceased employee died in harness on 27.10.2013 several
years prior to the filing of the present writ petition. It is an admitted
position that no immediate claim for compassionate appointment
(4 of 12)
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was pursued and the present writ petition has been instituted after
a substantial and unexplained lapse of time.
8.
The central issue that arises for consideration is whether
a claim for compassionate appointment can be sustained after a
long and unexplained delay and whether such a claim survives the
settled legal principles governing compassionate appointment under
public service jurisprudence.
9.
At the outset, it must be reiterated that compassionate
appointment is not a matter of right, nor an alternative mode of
recruitment. It constitutes a narrowly carved exception to the
general rule of public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, intended solely to provide immediate financial
assistance to the family of a deceased employee who dies in
harness, leaving the family in sudden penury. The underlying
purpose is to mitigate an unforeseen financial crisis and to ensure
that the family is not left without means of subsistence.
10.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma
Gosain & Others vs Union of India & Others, (1989) 4 SCC
468, authoritatively held that compassionate appointment must be
provided without delay, as the very rationale of the scheme is to
relieve the family from immediate destitution caused by the death
of the sole breadwinner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised
that appointments should be made promptly and that the creation
of supernumerary posts, if necessary, is permissible to serve the
humanitarian
purpose
of
the
scheme.
However,
the
Hon'ble
Supreme Court also cautioned that undue delay defeats the very
object
of
compassionate
unsustainable.
appointment,
rendering
such
claims
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11.
[CW-15944/2025]
In the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs State of
Haryana & Others, (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court explained that compassionate appointment is an exception to
the general rule of public employment and is intended solely to
enable the family of a deceased employee, left in dire financial
straits, to tide over the immediate financial crisis caused by the
sudden death of the breadwinner. It is not a source of permanent
recruitment or a vested right that can be exercised at any time in
the future. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere death in
service does not automatically entitle the family to compassionate
employment, and that compassionate appointment cannot be
granted after the lapse of a reasonable period, because after such
delay the very purpose of providing immediate relief is lost. The
entitlement, thus, depends on immediacy of need and the financial
condition of the family at the time of the employee’s death, not on
abstract entitlement.
12.
The above legal position has been reiterated and fortified
in subsequent decisions. In the case V. Sivamurthy vs State of
Andhra Pradesh & Others, (2008) 13 SCC 730, the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
held
that
compassionate
appointment
is
an
exception designed to meet a transient crisis and cannot be invoked
years after the death of the employee. The Court categorically
observed that when a family survives for a long period after the
demise of the employee, it must be presumed that the immediate
financial crisis no longer exists. Claims raised after considerable
delay,
therefore,
cannot
be
entertained,
as
they
convert
a
humanitarian exception into a vested employment entitlement,
which is impermissible in law.
(6 of 12)
[2026:RJ-JP:8067]
13.
[CW-15944/2025]
More recently, in State of West Bengal v. Debabrata
Tiwari & Others, (2025) 5 SCC 712, after having regard to the
object
of
Supreme
granting
Court
compassionate
reaffirmed
that
appointment,
prolonged
the
Hon’ble
delay,
whether
attributable to the claimant or to administrative inaction, creates a
strong presumption that the family has overcome the initial financial
hardship. The Court held that compassionate appointment cannot
be granted as a matter of course after years have elapsed and such
belated
claims
are
non-maintainable
unless
exceptional
circumstances are demonstrated. It was further held that no vested
right accrues to a dependent merely because an application was
once made. Para 32, 33, 35 to 46 of the above judgment are
relevant and quoted as under:"32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles emerge:
32.1. That a provision for compassionate appointment
makes a departure from the general provisions providing for
appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of
recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment
being made without following the said procedure, it is in the
nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be
resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives i.e.
to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden
financial crisis.
32.2. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a
source of recruitment. The reason for making such a
benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector
undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased
are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables
the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial
crisis.
32.3. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right
which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate
employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of
time and after the crisis is over.
32.4. That compassionate appointment should be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper
to keep such a case pending for years.
32.5. In determining as to whether the family is in financial
crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including
the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits
if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and
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(7 of 12)
[CW-15944/2025]
marital status of its members, together with the income from
any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of
compassionate employment is to enable the family of the
deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the
death of the breadearner which has left the family in penury
and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure
humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family
would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a
provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of
the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such
appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of
no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the
dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which
arose on account of death of a breadwinner, has been
overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a
sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate
appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the
scheme of compassionate appointment would be frustrated.
Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of
death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for
seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist
and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant
circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in
determining as to whether a case for the grant of
compassionate appointment has been made out for
consideration.
34. xxxxxx
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in
the first instance, regarding whether applications for
compassionate appointment could be considered after a
delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case
where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of
the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the
authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is
diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the
family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better,
since the time of the death of the government employee. In
such circumstances, courts or other relevant authorities are
to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of
delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain
themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment
from
some
other
source.
Granting
compassionate
appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim
Singh Haryana SEB v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 would
amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment
as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of
succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since
compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the
same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced
by the dependants of the deceased government employee as
a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate
appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a
considerable period of time since the death of the
government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a
person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for
obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant
of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock,
[2026:RJ-JP:8067]
(8 of 12)
[CW-15944/2025]
in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874)
LR 5 PC 221 as under : (LR pp. 239-40)
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as it relates to the
remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled
grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could
disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in
the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our
Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, 1967
SCC OnLine SC 117. In the said case, it was regarded as a
principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a
High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566
this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier
pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-95,
para 24)
24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does
not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on
a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and
if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay,
it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of thirdparty rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period
of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be
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(9 of 12)
[CW-15944/2025]
filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9
SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ petitioners
submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the
year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently
pursued the matter and had not slept over their rights. In
this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this
Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari,
(2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were
made: (SCC p. 184, para 19)
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal
that even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation
to the competent authority does not arrest time.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case,
we hold that the respondent-writ petitioners, upon
submitting their applications in the year 2006-2005 did
nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e.
for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy approach
of the authorities of the appellant State in dealing with their
applications, the respondent-writ petitioners delayed
approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of a
mandamus against the authorities of the State. In fact, such
a prolonged delay in approaching the High Court, may even
be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as discernible by the
conduct of the respondent-writ petitioners. Such a delay
would disentitle the respondent-writ petitioners to the
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Further, the order of the High Court dated 17-3-2015
[Debabrata Tiwari v. State of W.B., WPA No. 3243 of 2015,
order dated 17-3-2015 (Cal)], whereby the writ petition filed
by some of the respondents herein was disposed of with a
direction to the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West
Bengal to take a decision as to the appointment of the
respondent-writ petitioners, cannot be considered to have
the effect of revival of the cause of action.
42. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the
following observations of this Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy v.
State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766, as to the manner in
which the authorities must consider and decide applications
for appointment on compassionate grounds: (SCC paras 1416)
“14. Before parting with the present order, we are
constrained to observe that considering the object and
purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds i.e.
a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a
position of financial hardship upon the untimely death
of the employee while in service and the basis or policy
is immediacy in rendering of financial assistance to the
family of the deceased consequent upon his untimely
death, the authorities must consider and decide such
applications for appointment on compassionate grounds
as per the policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not
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(10 of 12)
[CW-15944/2025]
beyond a period of six months from the date of
submission of such completed applications.
15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have
found that in several cases, applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds are not
attended in time and are kept pending for years
together. As a result, the applicants in several cases
have to approach the High Courts concerned seeking a
writ of mandamus for the consideration of their
applications. Even after such a direction is issued,
frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting
the applications. Once again, the applicants have to
challenge the order of rejection before the High Court
which leads to pendency of litigation and passage of
time, leaving the family of the employee who died in
harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further,
for reasons best known to the authorities and on
irrelevant considerations, applications made for
compassionate appointment are rejected. After several
years or are not considered at all as in the instant case.
16. If the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds as envisaged under the relevant
policies or the rules have to be achieved then it is just
and necessary that such applications are considered
well in time and not in a tardy way. We have come
across cases where for nearly two decades the
controversy regarding the application made for
compassionate appointment is not resolved. This
consequently leads to the frustration of the very policy
of granting compassionate appointment on the death of
the employee while in service. We have, therefore,
directed that such applications must be considered at
an earliest point of time. The consideration must be fair,
reasonable and based on relevant consideration. The
application cannot be rejected on the basis of frivolous
and for reasons extraneous to the facts of the case.
Then and then only the object and purpose of
appointment on compassionate grounds can be
achieved.”
(emphasis supplied)
43. In Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the claim of the appellantapplicant therein for compassionate appointment was
directed by this Court to be considered by the competent
authority. This Court noted that in the said case, there was
no lapse on the part of the appellant-applicant therein in
diligently pursuing the matter. The delay in considering the
application of the appellant therein was held to be solely
attributable to the authorities of the State, and no part of it
was occasioned by the appellant-applicant. Further, in the
said case, the appellant-applicant was prejudiced not only
because of the prolonged delay in considering his application
but also by the fact that in the interim, the policy of the
State governing compassionate appointment had changed to
his detriment. Therefore, the facts of the said case were
distinct from the facts involved herein. In the present case,
the conduct of the respondent-writ petitioners cannot be said
to be blameless in that they did not pursue their matter with
sufficient diligence. However, the observations made in the
said case as to the manner in which applications for
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(11 of 12)
[CW-15944/2025]
compassionate appointment are to be considered
disposed of are relevant to the present case.
and
44. As noted in Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the operation of a
policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded on
considerations of immediacy. A sense of immediacy is called
for not only in the manner in which the applications are
processed by the authorities concerned but also in the
conduct of the applicant in pursuing his case, before the
authorities and if needed before the courts.
45. In the present case, the applications for compassionate
appointment were made by the respondent-writ petitioners
in the year 2005-2006. Admittedly, the first concrete step
taken by the Chairman of Burdwan Municipality was in the
year 2013, when the said authority forwarded a list of
candidates to be approved by the Director of Local Bodies,
Burdwan Municipality. The respondent-writ petitioners
knocked on the doors of the High Court of Calcutta only in
the year 2015 i.e. after a lapse of nearly ten years from the
date of making the application for compassionate
appointment. The respondent-writ petitioners were not
prudent enough to approach the courts sooner, claiming that
no concrete step had been taken by the appellant State in
furtherance of the application by seeking a writ in the nature
of mandamus.
46. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate
appointment has been lost in the present case. This is
attributable to the authorities of the appellant State as well
as the respondent-writ petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim
which was made in 2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be
of no avail, because admittedly, the respondent-writ
petitioners have been able to eke out a living even though
they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the
Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that
this are therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the
respondent-writ
petitioners
for
appointments
on
compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained."
14.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the petitioner has approached
this Court after a long lapse of time. The very fact that the family
has managed to subsist for several years after the death of the
employee clearly indicates that the immediate financial crisis, which
alone justifies compassionate appointment, no longer subsists.
15.
This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that granting
compassionate appointment after such a prolonged delay would
amount to converting a welfare-oriented exception into a regular
source of employment, thereby violating the constitutional mandate
(12 of 12)
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[CW-15944/2025]
of equal opportunity in public employment. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has consistently deprecated such an approach and has
cautioned that compassionate appointment must not be allowed to
become a parallel mode of recruitment.
16.
The contention of the petitioner that rejection of the
claim is arbitrary cannot be accepted. Adherence to the settled legal
principles
governing
compassionate
appointment
is
neither
arbitrary, nor unreasonable. On the contrary, granting relief in the
present case would run counter to the law declared by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and would undermine the very purpose of the
scheme.
17.
considered
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
opinion
that
the
claim
of
the
petitioner
for
compassionate appointment is barred by inordinate and unexplained
delay and is wholly unsustainable in law. The respondents have
committed no illegality or arbitrariness in rejecting application filed
by mother of the petitioner claiming appointment on compassionate
ground for her son, i.e., the petitioner.
18.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
19.
Interim applications, if any, stand disposed off.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /41
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