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2025:MLHC:680
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 154 of 2025
Date of Decision: 05.08.2025
Meghalaya Golf Promoters Society,
A Society registered under the Meghalaya
Societies Registration Act, XII of 1983
Having its registered office at Thana Road,
Shillong-793001, Meghalaya and being represented by its President,
Shri Daniel S. Jyrwa,
S/o B. Surong,
R/o Mawlai Nongkwar, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya
… Petitioner(s)
- Versus –
1. Union of India represented by the Secretary
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of India.
2. The Indian Golf Union represented by the President
[Faction elected in election results (under challenge)
Dated 11.12.2024], Located at 14, Anand Lok, 2nd Floor,
August Kranti Marg, New Delhi-110049
With Registered Office situated at Sukh Sagar,
2nd Floor, 2/5 Sarat Bose Road, Kolkata,
West Bengal-700 020.
3. The Director General,
Indian Golf Union,
14, Anand Lok, 2nd Floor, August Kranti Marg,
New Delhi-110 049.
4. Shillong Golfers Association represented by its Secretary,
C/o Shillong Club Ltd., M.G. Road, Shillong-793001,
Meghalaya.
…. Respondent(s)
2025:MLHC:680
_________________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. With
Ms. K. Decruse, Adv.
Ms. S. Khatun, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. M. Myrchiang, Adv. (For R 1)
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. M. Hajong, Adv.
Mr. H.R. Phalpher, Adv. (For R 2&3)
Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv. (For R 4)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The petitioner by way of the instant writ petition has put a
challenge to a letter dated 28.04.2025 issued by the respondent No. 2
namely; the Indian Golf Union, whereby the affiliation accorded to the
petitioner society has been withdrawn. The ground for seeking
invocation of Article 226 is that firstly, the respondent Golf Union
despite being an autonomous body, discharges public functions and is
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thus amenable to writ jurisdiction and secondly, the action in
withdrawing the affiliation is arbitrary and in violation of the principles
of natural justice.
2.
When this matter had come up for consideration, the
respondents Nos. 2 & 3, had raised the question of maintainability of the
writ petition on the ground as the respondents are private registered
societies registered under the Societies Act, the State/Government does
not have pervasive financial control, nor is any fiscal support provided
for the day-to-day functioning, and that only recognition is afforded to
the Union by the Government. In brief, the further grounds raised are
that the Golf Union does not come within the definition of ‘State’ or
‘other authority’, and that it does not perform any ‘public function’.
3.
On these grounds being raised, this Court therefore first
took up the issue of maintainability on four basic considerations: i)
Whether the Indian Golf Union is a public authority and
performs public functions and is thus amenable to writ
jurisdiction of this Court
ii)
Whether the impugned withdrawal of affiliation is a public
function of the Golf Union
2025:MLHC:680
iii)
Whether there exists any arbitrable dispute and
iv)
Whether the impugned letter of dis-affiliation is arbitrary,
illegal and is in violation of the principles of natural justice.
4.
Mr. K. Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. K.
Decruse, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Indian Golf
Union (IGU) is the Governing Body for golf in India and recognized as
a National Sport Federation by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports,
and performs State like functions in the absence of a legislative regime
in the field of golf. As such, he submits IGU, being the highest in the
hierarchy in the golf administration, is expected to act in fairness and in
compliance with the NSCI Code, 2011 (Sports Code), wherein as per
notification dated 30.03.2010, the Ministry has declared National Sports
Federations as public authorities under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act as
they are performing State functions and are substantially financed by the
Government. The learned Senior counsel submits that the IGU’s
recognition as a National Sports Federation is conditional upon
compliance with the NSCI Code, 2011 and vide Rule 56 of Rules and
Regulations, the IGU has committed itself to abide by Ministry’s
guidelines. The IGU it is contended, is a public authority as it discharges
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public functions like National Team Selection and representation of
India in National and International Golf tournaments.
5.
The dis-affiliation by the IGU it is submitted, was without
any notice, or reasons provided, nor was any access provided to the
petitioner society to the materials relied upon in arriving at such a
decision, which has resulted in the violation of the principles of natural
justice. Affiliation or dis-affiliation it is contended, impacts the
governance and regulation of the sport, especially with regard to access
to State and National Sports participation, as it is the IGU and State Golf
Associations that regulate access to tournaments resources etc. and this
is a public function for all practical purposes.
6.
It has been further argued that the action of dis-affiliation
is a regulatory and public function and not contractual, therefore though
Rule 66 of the Memorandum of Association of the Indian Golf Union
provides for un-resolved disputes be settled by an Arbitration
Commission of the Indian Olympic Association, wherein all affiliated
members of the IGU shall voluntarily surrender their rights of seeking
redress in any court of law, the same will not be applicable in the instant
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case. This argument is sought to be substantiated by the submission that
Rule 66, applies only to un-resolved disputes within an existing
membership framework, and the petitioner being already dis-affiliated,
there is no live or subsisting dispute for the same to be arbitrable. It is
further contended that a dispute essentially arises when there is a claim
and denial, whereas, the same does not exist in the present case as the
IGU, unilaterally carried out the dis-affiliation and the petitioner was
completely shunted out, without an opportunity to repudiate the same.
As such, the learned Senior counsel submits the action of the IGU in disaffiliating the petitioner society, apart from being totally arbitrary and
illegal, the same being an exercise of the public functions of the IGU,
interference is called for by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In
support of his arguments, the learned counsel has relied on the following
judgments: i)
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami
Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. vs. V.R
Rudani & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691 (17-21)
ii)
Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2005)
4 SCC 649 (31-33)
iii)
Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Cricket Association
of Bihar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 251 (33)
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iv)
Binny Ltd., & Anr. vs. V. Sadavisan & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC
567 (11, 19)
v)
Thalappalam Service Coopeative Bank Ltd., & Ors. vs. State
of Kerala & Ors. (2013) 6 SCC 8 (35-38)
vi)
Indian Olympic Association vs. Veeresh Malik & Ors. ILR
(2010) IV Delhi 1 (63-65)
vii)
Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority (1988)
2 SCC 338 (4)
viii) B and TAG vs. Ministry of Defence (2024) 5 SCC 358 (3638)
7.
ix)
Manipur Fencing Association vs. Fencing Association of
India 2021 SCC OnLine Mani 126 : (2021) 5 GLT 132 (26,
29,34,37)
x)
Hanbanslal Sahnia & Ors. vs. Indian Oil Corporation &
Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 107 (7)
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Senior counsel assisted by
Ms. M. Hajong, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 &
3, has submitted that the IGU is a registered society having its own bye
laws and has as its members, State Golf Associations (SGAs) who are
affiliated to it and that any member of the IGU thereof, is in a contractual
relationship with the IGU with its byelaws being the contract. The grant
of affiliation and dis-affiliation of a member, it is contended, is purely
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an internal issue of the IGU with its affiliate SGA’s and is purely
contractual, and that in the instant case the petitioner’s society stood disaffiliated upon investigation and the report by the Governing Council of
the IGU dated 26.04.2025.
8.
The IGU, the learned senior counsel submits, is recognized
by the International Federation of Golf (IGF), Indian Olympic
Association (IOA) and by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
(MYAS) as a matter of policy under the NSCI, 2011, and therefore the
mere applicability of the RTI Act, cannot automatically convert all the
actions of the IGU into public functions. It is further submitted that the
public functions discharged by the IGU are selection of players, sending
of players for participation in the Olympics or other international events,
training of golfers etc., but however, IGU is not a State within the
definition of Article 12, since there is no pervasive financial, functional
or administrative control over the IGU by the Government. It is
submitted that the cases relied upon by the petitioner to make the action
of the respondent No. 2, amenable to writ jurisdiction is only for matters
which involves the exercise of public functions or duties and will not
extend to matters of affiliation or dis-affiliation, which are purely
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private, internal and bilateral issues between the IGU and its affiliate
SGAs. It is reiterated by the learned Senior counsel that the action of
severance of ties between the IGU and the petition’s society purely falls
under the realm of private law and not public law.
9.
The learned Senior counsel has also stressed upon the
availability of alternative remedy in terms of clause 66 of the byelaws
of the IGU, and even if the dispute is not arbitrable as per the petitioner,
it would nonetheless have to pursue civil remedy by way of civil suit
and not to seek relief by way of a writ petition. In conclusion, it is
submitted that the instant issue being purely a private dispute squarely
covered under the byelaws of the IGU, and with the availability of
institutional arbitration or for that matter, recourse to civil remedy by
way of a civil suit, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of maintainability.
10.
Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI assisted by Ms. M.
Myrchiang, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, only submission
is that leaving aside the aspect as to whether the State exercises deep or
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pervasive control, affiliation and de-affiliation will come within the
ambit of public function of the IGU.
11.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties on the first
question as to whether the Indian Golf Union is a public authority and
performs public functions and is thus amenable to writ jurisdiction of
this Court, on this aspect it is noted that the IGU is a recognised National
Federation responsible for regulating golf in India and amongst others,
its mandate is to select team/golfers to represent India in National and
International tournaments, maintain liaison with the Government of
India and the Indian Olympic Association and one of its functions is to
grant affiliation to State Golf Associations. Clause 7 of the Rules and
Regulations on this subject reads as follows:7. Grant of Affiliation and Recognition
(a) The Council shall have power to make, rescind and
vary bye-laws relating to the affiliation of an Affiliate,
provided however that an Affiliate may or may not be a
member and may or may not have any voting rights.
While granting affiliation, the Council shall have the
power to impose such conditions and it may think fit, and
the decision of the Council in this regard shall be final
and binding and Provided that, if the activities of any
Affiliate, at any time is, in the opinion of the Council, are
detrimental to any of the aims and objects of THE
INDIAN GOLF UNION, the Council shall have the
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power to cancel such affiliation. The Council shall have
the option to charge such amount as it may deem fit, from
time to time, on a case to case basis, for granting
affiliation and shall also be entitled to waive payment of
any charges. The Council shall have the option to grant
affiliation with or without membership and/ or with or
without voting rights, as it may deem fit from time to time
on a case to case basis.
(b) The Council shall have power to make, rescind and
vary bye-laws relating to the recognition of a Legal Body
provided however that such a Legal Body shall not be a
member and shall not have any voting rights and while
granting recognition, the Council shall have the power to
impose such conditions as it may think fit. The decision
of the Council in this regard shall be final and binding
and provided that if the activities of any Legal Body, at
any time is in the opinion of the Council, detrimental to
any of the aims and objects of THE INDIAN GOLF
UNION, the Council shall have the power to cancel such
recognition. The Council shall have the option to charge
such amount as it may deem fit from time to time on a
case to case basis for granting recognition and shall also
be entitled to waive payment of any charges.”
A perusal of this Clause shows that the Council have been vested
with powers to grant affiliation and also to cancel such affiliation, if in
the opinion of the Council the same is warranted due to detrimental
circumstances. The powers of the IGU therefore, to control and regulate
the sport as a National Body is undisputed and the same is also fortified
by the fact that the Government of India in the Ministry of Youth Affairs
and Sport recognizes only one National Level Sports Federation in any
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discipline, such as the IGU. In this context, National Sport Federations
by a notification dated 21.04.2010, have also been declared as Public
Authorities under the Right to Information Act. Thus, the fact that the
IGU performs public functions is undisputed, and as such any of its
actions notwithstanding the fact that it is a registered Society, which are
considered to be public functions will be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
In the case of Binny Ltd. & Anr. vs. V. Sadasivan & Ors. reported in
(2005) 6 SCC 657, on this point the Supreme Court at Para-11 and 29
thereof, held as follows:“11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of
abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities.
However, under our Constitution, Article 226 is couched
in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued
even against a private authority. However, such private
authority must be discharging a public function and the
decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in
discharge of a public function. The role of the State
expanded enormously and attempts have been made to
create various agencies to perform the governmental
functions. Several corporations and companies have also
been formed by the Government to run industries and to
carry on trading activities. These have come to be known
as public sector undertakings. However, in the
interpretation given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this
Court took the view that many of these companies and
corporations could come within the sweep of Article 12 of
the Constitution. At the same time, there are private
bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It
is difficult to draw a line between public functions and
private functions when they are being discharged by a
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purely private authority. A body is performing a “public
function” when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit
for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by
the public or that section of the public as having authority
to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when
they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs
in the public interest. In a book on Judicial Review of
Administrative Action (5th Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf &
Jowell in Chapter 3, para 0.24, it is stated thus:
“A body is performing a ‘public function’ when it seeks
to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a
section of the public and is accepted by the public or that
section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies
therefore exercise public functions when they intervene
or participate in social or economic affairs in the public
interest. This may happen in a wide variety of ways. For
instance, a body is performing a public function when it
provides ‘public goods’ or other collective services, such
as health care, education and personal social services,
from funds raised by taxation. A body may perform public
functions in the form of adjudicatory services (such as
those of the criminal and civil courts and tribunal
system). They also do so if they regulate commercial and
professional activities to ensure compliance with proper
standards. For all these purposes, a range of legal and
administrative techniques may be deployed, including
rule making, adjudication (and other forms of dispute
resolution); inspection; and licensing.
Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the
State. Charities, self-regulatory organisations and other
nominally private institutions (such as universities, the
Stock Exchange, Lloyd's of London, churches) may in
reality also perform some types of public function. As Sir
John Donaldson, M.R. urged, it is important for the
courts to ‘recognise the realities of executive power’ and
not allow ‘their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and
sometimes complexity of the way in which it can be
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exerted’. Non-governmental bodies such as these are just
as capable of abusing their powers as is Government.”
29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the
remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law
remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against
private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various
rights of the public or to compel public/statutory
authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their
bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is
wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties.
This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial
control over administrative actions. This writ could also
be issued against any private body or person, specially in
view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution.
However, the scope of mandamus is limited to
enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is
determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced,
rather than the identity of the authority against whom it
is sought. If the private body is discharging a public
function and the denial of any right is in connection with
the public duty imposed on such body, the public law
remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body
may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of
such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be
the public law element in such action. Sometimes, it is
difficult to distinguish between public law and private law
remedies. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd
Edn., Vol. 30, p. 682,
“1317. A public authority is a body, not necessarily a
county council, municipal corporation or other local
authority, which has public or statutory duties to perform
and which perform those duties and carries out its
transactions for the benefit of the public and not for
private profit.”
There cannot be any general definition of public
authority or public action. The facts of each case decide
the point.”
2025:MLHC:680
12.
On the question as to whether the impugned withdrawal of
affiliation is a public function of the Golf Union, it has been strongly
argued by the respondent IGU that the same is a bilateral relation
between the IGU and the writ petitioner and therefore the disaffiliation
cannot be termed to be an exercise of public function by the IGU. On
this aspect as earlier observed, the IGU is a National Federation and the
nature of duties and functions it performs and the power it exercises over
the State Golf Associations and their affiliation or recognition is
absolute. As held in the case of BCCI vs. Cricket Association of Bihar
reported in (2015) 3 SCC 251, Paras 32 to 34 thereof, which are relevant
for the instant discourse, the amenability of such a National Federation
to writ jurisdiction, has been elaborately discussed and the said
paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:“32. Having said that this Court recognised the fact that
the Board was discharging some duties like the selection
of Indian Cricket Team, controlling the activities of the
players which activities were akin to public duties or State
functions so that if there is any breach of a constitutional
or statutory obligation or the rights of other citizens, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to seek redress under the
ordinary law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32.
This Court observed: (Zee Telefilms Ltd. case, (2005) 4
SCC 649 p. 682.
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“31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the
Board does discharge some duties like the selection
of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities
of the players and others involved in the game of
cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to
public duties or State functions and if there is any
violation of any constitutional or statutory
obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved
party may not have a relief by way of a petition
under Article 32. But that does not mean that the
violator of such right would go scot-free merely
because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian
jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the
violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy
under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved
party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary
course of law or by way of a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much
wider than Article 32”
[emphasis supplied]
33. The majority view thus favours the view that BCCI is
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 even when it is not “State” within the meaning
of Article 12. The rationale underlying that view if we
may say with utmost respect lies in the “nature of duties
and functions” which BCCI performs. It is common
ground that the respondent Board has a complete sway
over the game of cricket in this country. It regulates and
controls the game to the exclusion of all others. It
formulates rules, regulations, norms and standards
covering all aspects of the game. It enjoys the power of
choosing the members of the national team and the
umpires. It exercises the power of disqualifying players
which may at times put an end to the sporting career of a
person. It spends crores of rupees on building and
maintaining infrastructure like stadia, running of cricket
academies and supporting State associations. It frames
pension schemes and incurs expenditure on coaches,
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trainers, etc. It sells broadcast and telecast rights and
collects admission fee to venues where the matches are
played. All these activities are undertaken with the tacit
concurrence of the State Government and the
Government of India who are not only fully aware but
supportive of the activities of the Board. The State has not
chosen to bring any law or taken any other step that
would either deprive or dilute the Board's monopoly in
the field of cricket. On the contrary, the Government of
India has allowed the Board to select the national team
which is then recognised by all concerned and applauded
by the entire nation including at times by the highest of
the dignitaries when they win tournaments and bring
laurels home. Those distinguishing themselves in the
international arena are conferred highest civilian awards
like the Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma
Bhushan and Padma Shri apart from sporting awards
instituted by the Government. Such is the passion for this
game in this country that cricketers are seen as icons by
youngsters, middle aged and the old alike. Any
organisation or entity that has such pervasive control
over the game and its affairs and such powers as can
make dreams end up in smoke or come true cannot be
said to be undertaking any private activity.
34. The functions of the Board are clearly public
functions, which, till such time the State intervenes to
takeover the same, remain in the nature of public
functions, no matter discharged by a society registered
under the Registration of Societies Act. Suffice it to say
that if the Government not only allows an
autonomous/private body to discharge functions which it
could in law take over or regulate but even lends its
assistance to such a non-government body to undertake
such functions which by their very nature are public
functions, it cannot be said that the functions are not
public functions or that the entity discharging the same is
not answerable on the standards generally applicable to
judicial review of State action.”
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In the instant case by applying the ratio of the above quoted
judgments the IGU in its exercise of affiliation or disaffiliation, as it
affects State Golf Associations and resultantly Golf Clubs under the
State Golf Associations and the players, no doubt is a public function of
the IGU. This however, in the considered of this Court will not enlarge
the scope to render all functions or actions of the IGU to be public
functions, but will be limited to certain actions which affect the public,
public interest, or the sport as a whole, which of course have to be
examined contextually. In the exercise of such public functions, it is
therefore expected and important that the IGU, a National Federation act
fairly and reasonably.
13.
On the aspect as to whether there exists any arbitrable
dispute, it would be apposite at this stage to refer to clause 66 of the IGU
Rules and Regulations, which have provided as follows:“66. All unresolved disputes shall be settled by the
Arbitration Commission of Indian Olympic Association
and all affiliated members of the IGU shall voluntarily
surrender their right of seeking redress in any court of
law.”
A plain reading of the above-mentioned clause shows that
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism has been put in place,
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whereby the affiliated members of the IGU are bound by. However, it
refers to unresolved disputes and it has been contended by the petitioner,
that as Regulation 66 is a contractual clause, the same shall be limited
to only disputes that the IGU has with its affiliates and as the writ
petitioner is no longer an affiliate, this provision would not be available
and further, the disaffiliation cannot be considered to be an unresolved
dispute. In this regard therefore, in the instant case though recourse to
arbitration is available, the dispute however should be arbitrable and that
the same should be efficacious. In general understanding, arbitration is
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, where parties agree to
submit and refer disputes to an arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of the
formal courts and is resorted to, as it affords expeditious disposal of
disputes. In the case of N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited vs. Indo
Unique Flame Limited & Ors. reported in (2021) 4 SCC 379, it was
recognised that when parties enter into a contract, they are entering into
two agreements namely; the main contract containing the rights and
obligations and the arbitration agreement which creates a binding
obligation of the parties to resolve the dispute through arbitration. The
aspect of the autonomy of an arbitration agreement has been elucidated
at paragraphs 4.1 to 4.4, and is reproduced hereinunder:-
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“Para 4.1 The autonomy of the arbitration agreement is
based on the twin concepts of separability and kompetenzkompetenz. The doctrines of separability and kompetenzkompetenz though inter-related, are distinct, and play an
important role in promoting the autonomy of the arbitral
process.
4.2. The doctrine of separability of the arbitration
agreement connotes that the invalidity, ineffectiveness, or
termination of the substantive commercial contract,
would not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement,
except if the arbitration agreement itself is directly
impeached on the ground that the arbitration agreement
is void ab initio.
4.3. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz implies that
the Arbitral Tribunal has the competence to determine
and rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections with
respect to the existence, validity, and scope of the
arbitration agreement, in the first instance, which is
subject to judicial scrutiny by the courts at a later stage of
the proceedings. Under the Arbitration Act, the challenge
before the Court is maintainable only after the final
award is passed as provided by sub-section (6) of Section
16. The stage at which the order of the tribunal regarding
its jurisdiction is amenable to judicial review, varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The doctrine of kompetenzkompetenz has evolved to minimise judicial intervention
at the pre-reference stage, and reduce unmeritorious
challenges raised on the issue of jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal.
4.4. The doctrine of separability was expounded in the
judgment of Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. 1942 AC 356 (HL)
by the House of Lords wherein it was held that English
common law had been evolving towards the recognition
of an arbitration clause as a separate contract which
survives the termination of the main contract. Lord
Wright in his opinion stated that : (AC p. 377)
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“… an arbitration agreement is collateral to the
substantial stipulations of the contract. It is merely
procedural and ancillary, it is a mode of settling disputes,
though the agreement to do so is itself subject to the
discretion of the court.”
Lord MacMillan in his opinion stated that : (Heyman
case 1942 AC 356 (HL , AC p. 374)
“… It survives for the purpose of measuring the claims
arising out of the breach, and the arbitration clause
survives for determining the mode of their settlement. The
purposes of the contract have failed, but the arbitration
clause is not one of the purposes of the contract.”
What can be gleaned from the above quoted judgment is
that an arbitration clause survives for determining the claims and
counter-claims of the parties notwithstanding the fact that the affiliation
has since been cancelled. The position of law therefore being clear on
this aspect, the writ petitioner would otherwise be bound by Regulation
66 of the IGU Rules and Regulations, and an arbitral tribunal on its own
can rule on the question of whether there exists an arbitrable dispute.
14.
On the last question as to whether the impugned letter of
dis-affiliation is arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the principles of
natural justice, from a careful examination of the materials as placed,
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what is apparent, coupled with the fact that no grounds or materials have
been put up by the respondents to rebut the same, is that the disaffiliation
of the writ petitioner was effected without notice, or any opportunity of
hearing being given to the writ petitioner. Another aspect which points
towards the arbitrary nature and character of the impugned order, is that
it is clearly reflected therein, that the same was based on a visit report,
alongwith the due consideration of the documents and reports available
with the IGU, which however, the writ petitioner at no point of time
admittedly, was ever privy to. All these factors and circumstances
clearly point to the fact that the principles of natural justice have been
breached by the respondent IGU in discharge of a public function. This
therefore, in the considered view of this Court, notwithstanding the
availability of alternative remedy, the writ petitioner being relegated to
arbitration at this stage, would not meet or satisfy the ends of justice,
inasmuch as, the impugned order suffers from a grievous violation of
the principles of natural justice. As held in the case of Hanbanslal
(supra) that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of
an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion,
in the instant case also this Court in exercise of discretionary powers
2025:MLHC:680
finds the same on the facts and circumstances, to be a fit case for the
invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15.
It may be also recorded herein that in the reply arguments
of the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 to the submission made by Mr. Philemon
Nongbri, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, and submissions
made by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the petitioner Society,
considering the nature of the case and its implications, Mr. H.L.
Shangreiso, learned Senior counsel has submitted that the respondents
No. 2 & 3 on the question of disaffiliation and affiliation, are prepared
to examine the matter afresh, by giving the petitioner Society adequate
opportunity to present its case. The submissions are duly noted, and as
such in view of this development, this Court accepts the concession
made by the respondents Nos. 2 & 3, and it is accordingly directed that
the said respondents shall examine the matter afresh by giving the
parties in contention adequate opportunity to present their respective
cases.
16.
As this Court has also come to a finding that the impugned
order is unsustainable, in view of the same being visited by arbitrariness
2025:MLHC:680
and there being a breach of the principles of natural justice, the same is
set aside and quashed. However, as no interim orders had been passed,
and the impugned order having been passed as far back as on
28.04.2025, it is ordered that status quo as on today shall be maintained
by the parties till the matter is disposed of, or further orders passed by
the respondents Nos. 2 & 3.
17.
It is further expected that the matter shall be dealt with most
expeditiously by the respondents Nos. 2 & 3, and the same be disposed
of within a period of 2(two) weeks from the date the parties are put to
notice.
18.
Accordingly, as per the discussions and directions made
hereinabove, the instant writ petition is closed and disposed of.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
05.08.2025
“V. Lyndem PS”
VALENTINO LYNDEM
Date: 2025.08.05 16:00:52 IST
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