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[2026:RJ-JP:4848]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 267/2026
Meenakshi daugther of Late Sh. Manohar Singh Ji Shekhawat
and wife of Shri Bhanwar Singh Ji Rajput, resident of 149, Rajput
Mohalla, Tilora, Pushkar, Ajmer (Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sunil Samdaria
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Order
02/02/2026
1.
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
challenging order dated 12.11.2025, whereby application filed by
the petitioner for seeking compassionate appointment has been
dismissed by the District & Sessions Judge, Ajmer, on account of
the fact that the application has been maintained after 11 years
from the date of death of deceased father of the petitioner.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that father
of the petitioner was holding the post of Class-IV employee and
unfortunately died on 08.12.2012 while he was in service, leaving
six daughters and one adopted son behind him. His sudden death
has put the entire family in deep financial crisis, therefore,
adopted son of deceased government servant Mr. Rajendra Singh,
initially
filed
appointment
an
application
and when
the
for
seeking
application
was
compassionate
not favourably
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considered, he filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.16582/2015 seeking
compassionate appointment.
3.
The writ petition was withdrawn by adopted son of
deceased government servant on 29.03.2023. After withdrawal of
writ petition filed by Mr. Rajendra Singh, the petitioner submitted
an
application
on
17.10.2023
for
seeking
compassionate
appointment. Along with application, she also submitted 'No
Objection Certificates' issued by other legal heirs of the deceased
government servant. When the application was kept pending by
the respondents and no order was passed, the petitioner filed S.B.
Civil Writ Petition No.13094/2025, which was disposed of by this
Court on limited prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner
that he wanted to make a representation before the Competent
Authority to decide application filed by the petitioner.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
after lapse of around two years from the date of filing of the
application, it has been rejected by District & Sessions Judge,
Ajmer, vide letter/order dated 12.11.2025 wherein by referring
Rule 10(3) of the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of
Dependents of Deceased Government Servant Rules, 1996 (for
short, 'the Rules of 1996') and taking into consideration that the
application was filed by the petitioner after 11 years, the same
has been rejected.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that
although the Rules of 1996 provides for limitation for submitting
application, yet the limitation prescribed cannot be treated as
absolute bar and the Competent Authority has got discretion to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances, which prevented the
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incumbent from moving application for seeking compassionate
appointment.
6.
in
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
the
instant
case
although
the
initial
application
for
compassionate appointment moved by adopted brother of the
petitioner was well within time and when it was not considered by
the respondents, a writ petition was also filed by him in the year
2015, although it was subsequently withdrawn on 29.03.2023.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further adds that
during these years, the financial position of the petitioner as well
as of his family has not improved and they are still striving hard
for their daily bread and butter. He also submits that the sole
object of scheme of compassionate appointment is to provide
alternative source to the family in order to tide over the crisis,
which has taken place on account of sudden death of bread-earner
in the family. However, without considering all these factors, the
application filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the
respondents in an arbitrary and illegal manner.
8.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused
the record.
9.
It is settled proposition of law that compassionate
appointment is not an alternative source of recruitment and the
scheme was objected to provide for immediate financial relief to
the family of the deceased government servant, who died while in
services by leaving the entire family in financial crisis.
10.
In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata
Tiwari & Ors. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 712, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court after appreciating the object of scheme of
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compassionate appointment and the effect of delay in making an
application has observed as under:
"32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles emerge:
32.1. That a provision for compassionate appointment
makes a departure from the general provisions providing
for appointment to a post by following a particular
procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables
appointment being made without following the said
procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general
provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve
the stated objectives i.e. to enable the family of the
deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
32.2. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a
source of recruitment. The reason for making such a
benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector
undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased
are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables
the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial
crisis.
32.3. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right
which can be exercised at any time in future.
Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered
after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over.
32.4. That compassionate appointment should be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is
improper to keep such a case pending for years.
32.5. In determining as to whether the family is in
financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind
including the income of the family, its liabilities, the
terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age,
dependency and marital status of its members, together
with the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of
compassionate employment is to enable the family of the
deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to
the death of the breadearner which has left the family in
penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure
humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the
family would not be in a position to make both ends meet,
a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one
of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for
such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it
would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment
to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the
crisis which arose on account of death of a breadwinner,
has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need
to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning
compassionate appointment because on failure to do so,
the object of the scheme of compassionate appointment
would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has
occurred since the date of death of the deceased
employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking
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[CW-267/2026]
compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus
lose its significance and this would be a relevant
circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in
determining as to whether a case for the grant of
compassionate appointment has been made out for
consideration.
34. xxxxxx
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in
the first instance, regarding whether applications for
compassionate appointment could be considered after a
delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case
where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of
the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or
the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of
immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial
circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have
changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the
government employee. In such circumstances, courts or
other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that
for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the
deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably
by availing gainful employment from some other source.
Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as
noted by this Court in Hakim Singh Haryana SEB v. Hakim
Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 would amount to treating a claim
for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter
of inheritance based on a line of succession which is
contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate
appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative
to the financial condition and hardship faced by the
dependants of the deceased government employee as a
consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate
appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a
considerable period of time since the death of the
government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a
person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for
obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for
grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes
Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 as under : (LR pp. 239-40)
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation, in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
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done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates
to the remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled
grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could
disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court
in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our
Constitution, came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R.
Meher, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117. In the said case, it was
regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of
relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566
this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier
pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-95,
para 24)
24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does
not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect
of
inflicting
not
only
hardship
and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of thirdparty rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period
of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be
filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9
SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ
petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant
authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that
they diligently pursued the matter and had not slept over
their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to
the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the
following observations were made: (SCC p. 184, para 19)
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as
crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating to a stale
claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot
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[CW-267/2026]
rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority does not
arrest time.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case,
we hold that the respondent-writ petitioners, upon
submitting their applications in the year 2006-2005 did
nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e.
for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy
approach of the authorities of the appellant State in
dealing with their applications, the respondent-writ
petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a
writ in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of
the State. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching
the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a
remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the respondentwrit petitioners. Such a delay would disentitle the
respondent-writ petitioners to the discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the
High Court dated 17-3-2015 [Debabrata Tiwari v. State of
W.B., WPA No. 3243 of 2015, order dated 17-3-2015
(Cal)], whereby the writ petition filed by some of the
respondents herein was disposed of with a direction to the
Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal to
take a decision as to the appointment of the respondentwrit petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of
revival of the cause of action.
42. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the
following observations of this Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy
v. State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766, as to the manner in
which the authorities must consider and decide
applications for appointment on compassionate grounds:
(SCC paras 14-16)
“14. Before parting with the present order, we are
constrained to observe that considering the object
and purpose of appointment on compassionate
grounds i.e. a family of a deceased employee may be
placed in a position of financial hardship upon the
untimely death of the employee while in service and
the basis or policy is immediacy in rendering of
financial assistance to the family of the deceased
consequent upon his untimely death, the authorities
must consider and decide such applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds as per the
policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not beyond a
period of six months from the date of submission of
such completed applications.
15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have
found that in several cases, applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds are not
attended in time and are kept pending for years
together. As a result, the applicants in several cases
have to approach the High Courts concerned seeking
a writ of mandamus for the consideration of their
applications. Even after such a direction is issued,
frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting
the applications. Once again, the applicants have to
challenge the order of rejection before the High Court
which leads to pendency of litigation and passage of
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time, leaving the family of the employee who died in
harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further,
for reasons best known to the authorities and on
irrelevant considerations, applications made for
compassionate appointment are rejected. After
several years or are not considered at all as in the
instant case.
16. If the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds as envisaged under the
relevant policies or the rules have to be achieved then
it is just and necessary that such applications are
considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We
have come across cases where for nearly two decades
the controversy regarding the application made for
compassionate appointment is not resolved. This
consequently leads to the frustration of the very
policy of granting compassionate appointment on the
death of the employee while in service. We have,
therefore, directed that such applications must be
considered at an earliest point of time. The
consideration must be fair, reasonable and based on
relevant consideration. The application cannot be
rejected on the basis of frivolous and for reasons
extraneous to the facts of the case. Then and then
only the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds can be achieved.”
(emphasis supplied)
43. In Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the claim of the
appellant-applicant therein for compassionate appointment
was directed by this Court to be considered by the
competent authority. This Court noted that in the said
case, there was no lapse on the part of the appellantapplicant therein in diligently pursuing the matter. The
delay in considering the application of the appellant therein
was held to be solely attributable to the authorities of the
State, and no part of it was occasioned by the appellantapplicant. Further, in the said case, the appellant-applicant
was prejudiced not only because of the prolonged delay in
considering his application but also by the fact that in the
interim, the policy of the State governing compassionate
appointment had changed to his detriment. Therefore, the
facts of the said case were distinct from the facts involved
herein. In the present case, the conduct of the respondentwrit petitioners cannot be said to be blameless in that they
did not pursue their matter with sufficient diligence.
However, the observations made in the said case as to the
manner
in
which
applications
for
compassionate
appointment are to be considered and disposed of are
relevant to the present case.
44. As noted in Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the operation of
a policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded
on considerations of immediacy. A sense of immediacy is
called for not only in the manner in which the applications
are processed by the authorities concerned but also in the
conduct of the applicant in pursuing his case, before the
authorities and if needed before the courts.
45. In the present case, the applications for
compassionate
appointment
were
made
by
the
respondent-writ petitioners in the year 2005-2006.
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Admittedly, the first concrete step taken by the Chairman
of Burdwan Municipality was in the year 2013, when the
said authority forwarded a list of candidates to be
approved by the Director of Local Bodies, Burdwan
Municipality. The respondent-writ petitioners knocked on
the doors of the High Court of Calcutta only in the year
2015 i.e. after a lapse of nearly ten years from the date of
making the application for compassionate appointment.
The respondent-writ petitioners were not prudent enough
to approach the courts sooner, claiming that no concrete
step had been taken by the appellant State in furtherance
of the application by seeking a writ in the nature of
mandamus.
46. The sense of immediacy in the matter of
compassionate appointment has been lost in the present
case. This is attributable to the authorities of the appellant
State as well as the respondent-writ petitioners. Now,
entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the
year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the
respondent-writ petitioners have been able to eke out a
living even though they did not successfully get appointed
to the services of the Municipality on compassionate
grounds. Hence, we think that this are therefore not fit
cases to direct that the claim of the respondent-writ
petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds,
be considered or entertained."
11.
In view of the above, where admittedly the application
has been filed by the petitioner after a delay of 11 years, in the
light of above judgment and settled proposition of law, no case for
interference is made out and the writ petition filed by the
petitioner is hereby dismissed.
12.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
DAKSH/19
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