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signed by
SHOUGRAKPAM Digitally
SHOUGRAKPAM
DEVANANDA SINGH
DEVANANDA
Date: 2025.10.03 16:18:19
SINGH
+05'30'
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
MDS Nordon Inc., 447 March Road, Ottawa, Ontario,
K2KIX8, Canada represented by Power of Attorney holder,
Vinay Prakash Singh, s/o (L) Sh. J.P. Singh of F-1 Deepali
Apt., B-Block, Ramprastha Colony, Ghaziabad-201011.
… Petitioner
-Versus1. Central Bureau of Investigation, represented by its
Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Branch, Imphal,
Manipur.
… Respondent
2. Dr. Lallukham Fimate, S/o (L) H.L. Ngura of Langol near
Sija Hospital, Imphal, P.O & P.S. Lamphel, Imphal District,
Manipur.
3. Dr. Thoudem Tomcha Singh, S/o (L) Th. Kulladhaja Singh
of Khabam Lamkhai, Imphal, Manipur, P.O. Mantripukhri
and P.S. Heingang, Imphal East District, Manipur.
4. Dr. Sinam Sekharjit Singh, S/o S. Digendra Singh of
Singjamei Chaingamathak Pishum Leikai, Imphal,
Manipur, P.O. Imphal P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West
District.
5. Shahid Hussain S/o Muhmmad Hussain, 101 Golden
Sands Compound King Abdul Aziz Road Jubali Saudi
Arabia-31961.
6. Kirloskar Technologies Pvt. Ltd, M-26, Sector II, Noida,
UP201301/B-58, Defence Colony, 1st Floor, Bishma
Pitamah Marg, New Delhi, represented by its P.O.A
holder, Himansu Sharma s/o Sh. Kamal Kumar Sharma of
77/10, Barh Mohalla, Old Faridabad, Haryana 121001.
… Proforma Respondents
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[2]
- AND –
IN THE MATTER OF: (Special Trial Case No. 12 of 2017 of the Special
Judge (PC) Act, Imphal West)
Central Bureau of Investigation, represented by its
Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Branch,
Imphal, Manipur.
…Complainant
-Versus 1. Dr. Lallukham Fimate, S/o (L) H.L. Ngura of Langol near
Shija Hospital, Imphal, P.O & P.S. Lamphel, Imphal
District, Manipur.
2. Dr. Thoudem Tomcha Singh, S/o (L) Th. Kulladhaja
Singh of Khabam Lamkhai, Imphal, Manipur, P.O.
Mantripukhri and P.S. Heingang, Imphal East District,
Manipur.
3. Dr. Sinam Sekharjit Singh, S/o (L) S. Digendra Singh of
Singjamei Chaingamathak Pishum Leikai, Imphal,
Manipur, P.O. Imphal P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West
District.
4. Shahid Hussain S/o Muhmmad Hussain, 101 Golden
Sands Compound King Abdul Aziz Road Jubali Saudi
Arabia-31961.
5. Kirloskar Technologies Pvt. Ltd, M-26, Sector-II, Noida,
UP-201301/B-58, Defence Colony, 1™ Floor, Bishma
Pitamah Marg, New Delhi, represented by its P.O.A
holder, Himansu Sharma s/o Sh. Kamal Kumar Sharma
of 77/10, Barh Mohalla, Old Faridabad, Haryana 121001.
6. MDS Nordon Inc., 447 March Road, Ottawa, Ontario,
K2KIX8, Canada represented by P.O.A holder, Vinay
Prakash Singh, s/o (L) Sh. J.P. Singh of F-1 Deepali Apt.,
B- Block, Ramprastha Colony, Ghaziabad - 201011.
... Accused
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[3]
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
For the petitioner
::
Mr. Amit Kumar, Sr. Advocate asstd.
by Mr. Tanmay Arora, Advocate,
Mr. L. Sanamacha, Advocate,
Ms. Anindita Barman, Advocate
For the respondents
::
Mr. W. Darakishwor, Sr. Panel
Counsel
Date of hearing
::
23-07-2025
Date of judgment & order ::
03-10-2025
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[1]
Heard Mr. Amit Kumar, learned senior counsel assisted
by Mr. Tanmay Arora, Advocate, Mr. L. Sanamacha, learned counsel,
Ms. Anindita Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and
Mr. W. Darakishwor, learned senior panel counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 1. None appeared for the proforma respondents Nos. 2
to 6
The present petition has been filed under Section 397 read
with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC"),
seeking to set aside the judgment and order dated 08-09-2017 passed
by the Special Judge (PC) Act, Imphal West, in Special Trial (PC) Case
No. 12 of 2016 ("Trial Court"), whereby the Trial Court dismissed the
application for discharge filed by the petitioner and passed a separate
order on the same date whereby charges were framed against the
Petitioner (i.e., Accused No. 6) under Section 420 of the IPC.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[4]
[2]
The brief facts which culminates in filing of the present revision
petition are that in 2006, the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare,
Government of India, issued a grant of Rs. 5 crores to RIMS for
establishment of a Regional Cancer Centre. The said grant was for civil
work (construction of a building) as well as for the procurement of
Telecobalt machine with all essential accessories. Out of the said grant
of Rs. 5 crores, 1.5 crores was earmarked for construction of building
and Rs. 3.5 crore was allocated for the purchase of the said equipment.
[3]
The Director of Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS),
Shri L. Fimate, through a publication in newspaper dated 08-03-2007
invited Sealed Tenders for supply of telecobalt machine and interested
parties were required to submit their respective bids on or before
15-03-2007. Altogether five parties, including the petitioner, submitted
their tender forms along with proforma invoice with price and
specification. The Tender Opening Committee opened the five sealed
cover tenders on 23-03-2007 and the tender quotation of the petitioner
submitted by Kirloskar (Accused No. 5), which is an agent of the
petitioner company, was unanimously accepted since the other four
tenders lacked three essential features i.e. Isocentric at 100 cm, 250
RMM output source and collision detection device. As far as the rates
quoted are concerned, three firms quoted the rates ranging from Rs.
2,98,40,000/- to Rs. 3,05,15,000/- while M/s Panacea quoted Rs.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[5]
1,59,00,000/- and the petitioner’s agent M/s Kirloskar quoted Rs.
2,47,00.000/- (exclusive of taxes).
[4]
After going through the tender process, the Purchase Advisory
Board decided to procure equipment of the petitioner company as it fulfils
all the specifications of the tender and its reputation as a brand.
Thereafter, the RIMS awarded the said tender for supply of telecobalt
unit to the petitioner company by issuing supply order dated 24-09-2007.
As per the terms and conditions agreed between the parties, RIMS made
an initial payment of 90 percent of the value of the telecobalt unit at the
time of successful negotiation and the remaining 10 percent was to be
paid upon installation. The payment terms of the proforma invoice dated
08-03-2007 provides that in case installation of equipment gets delayed
for reasons beyond control of the petitioner company, then the payment
should be released to the petitioner company within 30 days of handing
over the telecobalt unit in working condition.
[5]
It is on record that the civil work for construction of the building
could not be completed on scheduled due to reasons best known to
RIMS. In addition, as per the guidelines of Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board “AERB”, adequate number of staff and uninterrupted power
supply was also needed for commissioning and functioning of the
telecobalt unit and the same was to be arranged by RIMS, which could
not be done in time. Therefore, the agent of the petitioner was unable to
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[6]
install the machine at that point of time and the equipment was finally
installed on 25-09-2011. Thereafter, by a letter dated 26-09-2011, the
agent of the petitioner requested RIMS to release the balance 10 percent
payment against the supply of the telecobalt unit and further undertook
to commission the unit satisfactory after procurement of power supply
and telecobalt source after getting necessary clearance/ No-Objection
Certificate from AERB, as required by RIMS. Pursuant to the said
request and the undertaking, RIMS released the balance payment to the
petitioner company.
[6]
Nearly five years later, it was brought to the attention of the
petitioner company that due to certain alleged irregularities in the
procurement of telecobalt unit, the CBI, respondent No. 1 herein, had
registered and FIR being FIR No. RC 5(A)/2014-IMP u/s 120-B & 420
read with Section 13(2) & Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act against only two officials of RIMS, viz. Dr. L. Fimate, the
then Director, RIMS, Imphal (as Accused No. 1) and Dr. Th. Tomcha
Singh, Head of Department (Radiotherapy), RIMS (as Accused No. 2).
In the said FIR, the petitioner company was not arrayed as an accused.
[7]
The respondent No. 1, i.e., CBI, submitted its Charge-Sheet
on 11-04-2016 wherein only Accused Nos. 1 to 5 were charged under
Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC and under Section 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[7]
said Charge-Sheet, the petitioner company was arrayed as Accused
No. 6, and no Charge-Sheet had been filed against the petitioner
company under any provision of the IPC or PC Act. Except for the
allegation that conduct of the petitioner company constitutes an offence
punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, nothing has been alleged or
even remotely brought on record so as to suspect that any act has been
done by the petitioner constituting an offence under Section 420 of the
IPC. Having been aggrieved, the petitioner company filed an application
on 27-03-2017 to discharge the petitioner from criminal proceedings
initiated against it on the ground that there is no case against the
petitioner company. However, by the impugned judgement and order
dated 08-09-2017 passed in Special Trial (PC) Case No. 12 of 2016, the
Trial Court dismissed the discharge application filed by the petitioner
company and charges under Section 420 of the IPC were framed against
the petitioner company. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner company filed
the present revision petition with the prayer for setting aside the
impugned judgement and order dated 08-09-2017 passed by the Trial
Court in Special Trial (PC) Case No. 12 of 2016 and to discharge the
petitioner from the said criminal proceedings.
[8]
Mr Amit Kumar, learned Senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a foreign company duly
incorporated under the laws of Canada and has more than 50 years of
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[8]
experience in manufacturing and supplying telecobalt machines all over
the world and that more than 90% of telecobalt machines available in
India have been manufactured and supplied by the petitioner company.
It has been submitted that the petitioner company had supplied the
machines to many prominent hospitals such as AIIMS, Delhi, PGI,
Chandigarh, etc.
The learned counsel further submitted that M/s. Kirloskar
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is the Indian agent of the petitioner company and
the tender bid was submitted through the said Indian agent. It has been
submitted that the selection of the petitioner's machine was made by the
Purchase Advisory Board (PAB) comprising experts from AIIMs and
RIMS after due evaluation and for reasons that it met all the technical
specifications which were advertised in the tender notice. It has the
maximum number of machines supplied in the country. RIMS is already
using a similar machine supplied by the petitioner and it has all the
features of patient safety which were critical to a life-saving machine
while all the other machines submitted by the four other bidders did not
meet the required specification advertised in the tender notice.
[9]
The learned senior counsel raised the following five grounds
in assailing the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court:(a) In the entire charge-sheet, there is no material whatsoever to
even prima facie shows that the ingredients of offence under
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[9]
Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, have been made
out against the petitioner (Accused No. 6.).
(b) No offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC can be
attributed to the petitioner company in the absence of any
allegations or materials against the Directors or Key
Managerial Personnel of the Company.
(c) There is no allegation or charge against the petitioner
company (Accused No. 6) under Section 120-B of the IPC that
it conspires with any of the remaining accused persons to
commit the offence of cheating.
(d) Total absence of prima facie materials to establish grave
suspicion against the petitioner (Accused No. 6).
(e) The decision of the coordinate bench of this court discharging
Accused No. 1 from the Trial Court proceedings ought to be
taken into consideration in deciding the present case.
[10]
Elaborating the above grounds, it has been submitted by the
learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner as under:(a-1) The petitioner, a globally recognized manufacturer of
telecobalt machines, had no direct dealings with Accused
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 apart from the submission of a single proforma
invoice through its Indian agent, M/s Kirloskar Technologies
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[10]
Pvt. Ltd. The selection of the petitioner's machine was made
by the Purchase Advisory Board (PAB), comprising experts
from AIIMS and RIMS, after due evaluation of all the tenders
submitted by five bidders and on the findings that only the
petitioner’s machine met all the technical specifications
advertised in the tender notice while the four other bids did
not met the required technical specifications. It has been
submitted that the charge-sheet itself reveals that the machine
of Panacea Medical Technology Pvt. Ltd., who submitted the
lowest bid, did not met the essential technical requirements
of the tender. Consequently, it was not even eligible for the bid,
rendering any comparison with the petitioner’s bid baseless.
As the machine of Panacea Medical Technology Pvt. Ltd.
being technically non-compliant, the price quoted by the said
company cannot be used as a benchmark to allege that the
petitioner quoted a higher price and that such a comparison is
not only misleading but also irrelevant in the context of a
disqualified bid. The learned senior counsel further submitted
that even assuming, without admitting, that the price quoted
by the petitioner was higher than the other bidders, no offence
under Section 420 IPC is made out as there is no allegation
in the charge-sheet, let alone, evidence of any dishonest
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[11]
intention or inducement on the part of the petitioner, both of
which are essential ingredients of the offence of cheating. It
has been strenuously submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
what clearly emerges from the charge-sheet is that the
machine supplied by the petitioner was the only one meeting
the tender specifications outlined in the tender notice dated
01-03-2007 and that there is complete absence of any material
in the charge-sheet indicating that the petitioner made any
inducement to any person which is fraudulent, dishonest, or
otherwise to prove the offence of cheating. It has been
submitted that to prove an offence of cheating one must
establish that there was an inducement since inception, the
inducement was fraudulent or dishonest and mens rea existed
at the time of such inducement. In support of his submission,
the learned senior counsel cited the following case laws:(i)
(2018) 14 SCC-233 “Samir Sahay Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & anr.” wherein it has been held as under:-
“16. Before we proceed further to examine the contentions of the learned
counsel for the parties, it is necessary to notice the ingredients for
establishing a charge under Section 420 IPC. Section 415 IPC
defines “cheating” which is to the following effect:
“415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently
or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so
deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do
or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[12]
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”
“17. Section 420 IPC is with regard to the cheating and dishonestly
inducing delivery of property which is to the following effect:
“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—
Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make,
alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security,
or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable
of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
“18. According to Section 415 IPC, the inducement must be fraudulent
and dishonest which depends upon the intention of the accused at
the time of inducement. This Court had occasion to consider
Sections 415 and 420 IPC in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar. This Court
after noticing the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 IPC stated the
following in paras 14 and 15: (SCC pp. 176-77)
“14. On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition
there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the
person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he may
be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property
to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section
is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person
deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived.
In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or
dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be
intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest.
“15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the
distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the
accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the
sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that
is the time when the offence is said to have been committed.
Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To
hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he
had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the
promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise
subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning,
that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.”
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[13]
“19. Again in Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh, this Court noticed the
ingredients of Section 420 IPC. In paras 9 to 11 the following was
stated: (SCC pp. 699-700)
“9.
The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are:
‘(i) Deception of any persons;
(ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver
any property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and
finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to
do anything which he would not do or omit.’
“10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to
whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has
been raised by the second respondent and whether the
appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception.
If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute
resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants
by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not
constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position
in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having
regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal
Code. (See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P.”
“11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High Court
would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when one or
the other propositions of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani
v. Janak C. Mehta [R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta is attracted,
which are as under: (SCC p. 523, para 15)
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent
jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in
particular, a first information report unless the allegations
contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be
correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very
exceptional circumstances, would not look to any
document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the
allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an
offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass
an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any
mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself
may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings
should not be allowed to continue.”
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[14]
“20. Applying the ratio laid down by this Court as noted above, it is clear
that ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not made out in the present
case, either from the first information report or from any other
material. From the first information report as extracted above only
allegation made against the appellant was that he accompanied his
father Major P.C. Sahay (Retd.) when he assured that the money of
the applicants will not be lost and it shall be the responsibility of his
father (late P.C. Sahay). The following allegations made in the first
information report need to be specially noticed:
“Along with him his son Samir Sahay, Advocate who was already
acquainted with the applicant also accompanied his father. Major
P.C. Sahay gave the abovesaid assurance, and the applicant and
his wife Smt Uma Devi deposited rupees one lakh with Major P.C.
Sahay in this regard and he gave the receipt of the same to the
applicant of which the applicant is enclosing the photocopy. Like
this Major P.C. Sahay (retired) has got deposited total amount of
Rs 86,000 from me and my wife. But after some days it came to
be known that the said Company has run away along with the
lakhs of rupees of the depositors after closing its office.”
(ii) (2024) 10 SCC-690 “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited & ors.
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr.” wherein it has been held
as under:–
“36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal
breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have
specific ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC)
(1)
There must be entrustment with person for property or
dominion over the property, and
(2)
The person entrusted:
(a)
Dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his
own use, or
(b) Dishonestly used or disposed of the property or wilfully
suffers any other person so to do in violation of:
(i) Any direction of law prescribing the method in which
the trust is discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of trust
(see: S.W. Palanitkar)
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[15]
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the
essential ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading
representation or by other action or by omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any
property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall retain any property and
finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet
Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [Harmanpreet Singh
Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab.)”
“37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to
defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case
of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception.”
(b-1) It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the
company alone, in absence of any allegations against its
Directors or those who are controlling the affairs of the
company, cannot be made an accuse for an offence of
cheating inasmuch as, cheating involves mental element i.e.,
mens rea and that there is a legal bar to proceed against the
company for the offence of cheating in absence of material to
show that the Directors or the controlling mind and will of the
company had intention to cheat and/ or fraudulently and
dishonestly to induce someone. In the charge-sheet, the
prosecution mindlessly charged the petitioner through its Chief
Operating Officer, Scott Macintosh and presently through Best
Theatronics of Canada and its Director Andrei Criesianu and
through its Indian Agent M/s Kirloskar Technologies Private
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[16]
Limited under Section 420 of the IPC. However, by an order
dated 08-09-2017, the Trial Court, without any application of
mine, framed charges against M/s JMDS Nordon, Canada,
through its authorized representative, Vinay Prakash Singh,
s/o (L) Sh. J.P. Singh, F-1, Deepali Apt, B-Block, Ramprastha
Colony, Ghaziabad- 201011.
(b-2) It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel that the
question of mens rea cannot be attributed to a juristic person
and to establish a case of cheating against the juristic person,
the prosecution ought to have established mens rea on the
alter ego of the company i.e., the personal group of persons
that guide the business of the company and whose actions
would be imputed to the company. It has also been submitted
that in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, charges ought to have been framed against the
individuals responsible for the alleged actions and that the IPC
does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a
party who is not charged directly for commission of an offence.
The learned senior counsel further submitted that in the
absence of any provisions laid down under the statute, a
Director/ employee of a company cannot be held to be
vicariously liable for an offence committed by the company
itself.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[17]
In support of his contentions, the learned senior
counsel cited the following case laws:(i) (2024) SCC OnLine SC 2995 “HDFC Bank Ltd. Vs. State
Bank of Bihar & ors.” wherein it has been held as under:“20.
For bringing out the offence under the ambit of section 420 of
the Penal Code, 1860, the first information report must
disclose the following ingredients:
(a) That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since
inception;
(b) That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and
(c) That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement.”
“21.
The appellant-bank is a juristic person and as such, a question
of mens rea does not arise. However, even reading the first
information report and the complaint at their face value, there
is nothing to show that the appellant-bank or its staff members
had dishonestly induced someone deceived to deliver any
property to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the
time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients to attract the
offence under section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 would not
be available.”
(ii) (2015) 4 SCC 609 “Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation” wherein it has been held as under:“39. In Iridium India , the aforesaid question fell directly for
consideration, namely, whether a company could be
prosecuted for an offence which requires mens rea and
discussed this aspect at length, taking note of the law that
prevails in America and England on this issue. For our benefit,
we will reproduce paras 59-64 herein: (SCC pp. 98-100)
“59. The courts in England have emphatically rejected the
notion that a body corporate could not commit a criminal
offence which was an outcome of an act of will needing a
particular state of mind. The aforesaid notion has been
rejected by adopting the doctrine of attribution and
imputation. In other words, the criminal intent of the ‘alter
ego’ of the company/body corporate i.e. the person or
group of persons that guide the business of the company,
would be imputed to the corporation.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[18]
“60. It may be appropriate at this stage to notice the
observations made by MacNaghten, J. in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. : (KB p.
156)
A body corporate is a “person” to whom, amongst the
various attributes it may have, there should be
imputed the attribute of a mind capable of knowing
and forming an intention—indeed it is much too late in
the day to suggest the contrary. It can only know or
form an intention through its human agents, but
circumstances may be such that the knowledge of the
agent must be imputed to the body corporate. Counsel
for the respondents says that, although a body
corporate may be capable of having an intention, it is
not capable of having a criminal intention. In this
particular case the intention was the intention to
deceive. If, as in this case, the responsible agent of a
body corporate puts forward a document knowing it to
be false and intending that it should deceive, I
apprehend, according to the authorities that Viscount
Caldecote, L.C.J., has cited, his knowledge and
intention must be imputed to the body corporate.”
“61. The principle has been reiterated by Lord Denning in Bolton
(H.L.)(Engg.) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. in the
following words: (QB p. 172)
A company may in many ways be likened to a human
body. They have a brain and a nerve centre which
controls what they do. They also have hands which hold
the tools and act in accordance with directions from the
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or
will. Others are Directors and managers who represent
the directing mind and will of the company, and control
what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as
such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires
personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of
the manager will be the personal fault of the company.
That is made clear in Lord Haldane's speech in Lennard's
Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. (AC at pp.
713 & 714). So also in the criminal law, in cases where the
law requires a guilty mind as a condition of a criminal
offence, the guilty mind of the Directors or the managers
will render the company themselves guilty.”
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[19]
“62. The aforesaid principle has been firmly established in
England since the decision of the House of Lords in Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass. In stating the principle of
corporate liability for criminal offences, Lord Reid made
the following statement of law: (AC p. 170 E-G)
‘I must start by considering the nature of the
personality which by a fiction the law attributes to a
corporation. A living person has a mind which can have
knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has
hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has
none of these: it must act through living persons,
though not always one or the same person. Then the
person who acts is not speaking or acting for the
company. He is acting as the company and his mind
which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There
is no question of the company being vicariously liable.
He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or
delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one
could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of
the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his
mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind
then that guilt is the guilt of the company. It must be a
question of law whether, once the facts have been
ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to be
regarded as the company or merely as the company's
servant or agent. In that case any liability of the
company can only be a statutory or vicarious liability.”
“63. From the above it becomes evident that a corporation is
virtually in the same position as any individual and may be
convicted of common law as well as statutory offences
including those requiring mens rea. The criminal liability of
a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in
relation to the business of the corporation by a person or
body of persons in control of its affairs. In such
circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the
degree and control of the person or body of persons is so
intense that a corporation may be said to think and act
through the person or the body of persons. The position of
law on this issue in Canada is almost the same. Mens rea
is attributed to corporations on the principle of ‘alter ego’
of the company.”
“64. So far as India is concerned, the legal position has been
clearly stated by the Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement. On a detailed consideration of the entire
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[20]
body of case laws in this country as well as other
jurisdictions, it has been observed as follows: (SCC p. 541,
para 6)
‘6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be
prosecuted and punished for criminal offences.
Although there are earlier authorities to the effect that
corporations cannot commit a crime, the generally
accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes as
a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason
of the fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a
corporation may be subject to indictment or other
criminal process, although the criminal act is committed
through its agents.’”
“40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is
laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the “alter ego”
of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide
the business of the company, would be imputed to the
company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in
the aforesaid judgment in Iridium India case is that if the person
or group of persons who control the affairs of the company
commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be
imputed to the company as well as they are “alter ego” of the
company.
(iii)
Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of
the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an
accused person
“42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts
through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc.
If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it
would normally be the intent and action of that individual who
would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when
the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time,
it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is
no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.”
“43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an
offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along
with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role
coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be
implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself
attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically
incorporating such a provision.”
“44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the
Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[21]
statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada , the
Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of
the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to
the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position
is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a
deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was
applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons
that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed
to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has
to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person
allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect
that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or
on behalf of the company.”
(iii) (2008) 5 SCC 662 “S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
& ors.” wherein it has been held as under:“16. The Penal Code, save and except some provisions specifically
providing therefor, does not contemplate any vicarious liability
on the part of a party who is not charged directly for
commission of an offence.”
“19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of the Company,
even if the appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be
said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the
Penal Code. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such
a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any
provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a Company
or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any
offence committed by the Company itself. (See Sabitha
Ramamurthy v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya [(2006) 10 SCC
581: (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 621] .)”
(c-1) It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the
prosecution has not alleged any criminal conspiracy against
the petitioner (Accused No. 6) in the charge-sheet nor has any
charge under Section 120-B IPC been framed against the
petitioner. According to the learned senior counsel, this
omission is not incidental but a clear acknowledgement that no
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[22]
material exists to support such a charge. The learner senior
counsel submitted that in the absence of any allegation of
conspiracy, it is legally inconceivable that the petitioner
(Accused No. 6), a juristic person, could engage in fraudulent
or dishonest inducement and that cheating under Section 420
IPC inherently requires a mental element, i.e., mens rea, which
must be demonstrated through specific acts or intent of natural
persons controlling the company.
(d-1) It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the
prosecution has miserably failed to establish even prima facie
suspicion against Accused No. 6 and that the charges along
with its documents are not sufficient to create even a prima
facie suspicion against the petitioner. It has also been
submitted that there is no material whatsoever to create even
a strong suspicion in the mind of the court that the petitioner
(Accused No. 6) has committed the offence of cheating and as
such, the impugned judgment and order rendered by the Trial
Court is not sustainable in view of the settled legal principle of
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In support of his
contentions, the learned senior counsel relied on the following
case laws:-
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[23]
(i)
(1979) 3 SCC 4 “Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal
& anr.” wherein it has been held as under:-
“7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:
“If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.”
The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to
frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise
his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In
assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of
evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial
starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the
evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would
take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police
or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose
that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as
to frame a charge against him.”
“8.
The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent
decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh
Singh where Untwalia, J., speaking for the Court observed as
follows:
“Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in
the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his
guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there
is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there
is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at
the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial
of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to
be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the
purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should
proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[24]
accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in crossexamination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot
show that the accused committed the offence, then there will
be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may
not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be
sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame
a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court
has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh
the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a
case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out.”
“9.
In the case of K.P. Raghavan v. M.H. Abbas this Court observed as
follows:
“No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209
CrPC is not to act as a mere Post Office, and has to come to a
conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment
of the accused to the Court of Session.”
To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case
of Almohan Das v. State of West Bengal where Shah, J., speaking for
the Court observed as follows:
“A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely
as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the
materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is
sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is
sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie
evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his
duty to discharge the accused: if there is some evidence on
which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit
the case.”
In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and
ambit of Section 209 of the Code of 1898.”
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the
following principles emerge:
(1)
That the Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
(2)
Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[25]
(ii)
(3)
The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend
upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule
of universal application. By and large however if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence
produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but
not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within
his right to discharge the accused.
(4)
That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code
the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and
experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean
that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
(2019) 16 SCC 547 “Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs.
State of Gujarat & anr.” wherein it has been held as under:“Law relating to framing of charge and discharge
“15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court
in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh wherein this Court has laid down
the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows:
(SCC pp. 41-42, para 4)
“4.
… Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as
they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and
the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the
evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to
be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the
probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the
Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and
weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The
standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied
before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of
the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding
the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that
stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground
for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end
in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place
of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[26]
initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court
to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused
has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is
to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law
governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the
accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved.
But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether
the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence
which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of
the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in
cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,
cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then
there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
… If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial,
then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his
acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of
making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such
a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to
be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section
227.”
“16. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, after survey of case law,
this is what the Court has laid down: (SCC p. 9, para 10)
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above,
the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application. By and large however
if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied
that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to
some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the
accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the
accused.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[27]
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the
Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior
and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office
or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the Court,
any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This
however does not mean that the Judge should make a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
“17. It is the case of the State that the appellant had knowledge that
the notes were counterfeit and fake notes and was in conscious
possession of the fake notes for 15 days. For framing charges,
what is required is prima facie satisfaction. Offence relating to
counterfeit notes is a grave offence and not to be viewed lightly.”
“18. In the statement by the first accused, he has stated that he had
come to Ahmedabad 15 days earlier. At that time, he had told the
appellant that the fake notes are to be sold at cheap price and at
present he may keep those notes with him. He further states that
he had brought these notes from the residence of the appellant
and that he had been caught while he was selling the notes at
cheap price.”
“19. In the first statement given by the appellant dated 11-4-1996 relied
upon by the State, the appellant is credited with knowledge of the
fact that the bag containing counterfeit notes was left by the first
accused at the appellant's residence and they were to be sold at
cheap price and it was kept at his residence for some days.”
“20. Subsequently, his statement was again recorded on 10-7-1996.
Therein, he inter alia states that the first accused told him that the
bag contains files relating to land deals and it contained
valuables.”
“21. In further questioning on 30-8-1996, he inter alia states that
because of his acquaintance with Ravi, he became acquainted
with the first accused and that he had left the bag at his residence
saying that the bag contained important documents.”
“22. These are the materials, in short, which were relied on by the State
to sustain the order framing the charge against the appellant. That
is to say, the statements given by the appellant under Section 161
and the statement also given by the co-accused.”
“23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the
principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the
court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office.
The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[28]
be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon
by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the
sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing
arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a fullfledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has
made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is
required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials
available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A
strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be
founded on some material. The material must be such as can be
translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion
cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral
notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that
the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must
be the suspicion which is premised on some material which
commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima
facie view that the accused has committed the offence.”
(iii) (2022) 9 SCC 577 “Kanchan Kumar Vs. State of Bihar”
wherein it has been held as under:“17. The first objection pertains to the inclusion of an amount of
Rs 55,000, recorded as the balance amount in the appellant's bank
account during the check period, and accordingly counted as an
expenditure in the charge-sheet. However, the bank passbook filed
by the appellant, which was available to the investigating officer and
the Special Judge (Vigilance), evidently records a balance amount of
only Rs 11,998 during the check period. The difference in the figures
was not explained by the prosecution. Accordingly, the Special
Judge (Vigilance) and the High Court failed to reconcile such a
simple and straightforward inconsistency in the prosecution's
evidence. We are of the opinion that only an amount of Rs 11,998,
recorded in the appellant's bank passbook during the check period
as the balance amount, is validly admissible as expenditure under
this head.”
“18. The second objection relates to the inclusion of an amount of Rs
53,467 as expenditure towards repayment of the loan from BSFC.
However, the amount repaid towards loan instalments was already
deducted from the appellant's gross salary, and the deducted figure
was recorded as the total disposable income with the appellant
during the check period. Hence, the loan repayment cannot be
separately counted as an expenditure yet again. This is a glaring
mistake. The Special Judge (Vigilance) as well as the High Court did
not consider this objection on the ground that a roving inquiry is not
permissible at the stage of discharge.”
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[29]
“19. The third objection relates to the inclusion of Rs 1,58,562 as the value
of the articles found during a search conducted in the appellant's
house on 21-2-2000, twelve years after the check period of 1974 to
1988. There is nothing to indicate, even prima facie, that these
articles found during the search in the year 2000 were acquired
during the check period. In the absence of any material to link these
articles as having been acquired during the check period, it is
impermissible to include their value in the expenditure. We are
therefore of the opinion that the appellant's objection about inclusion
of this amount in the list of expenditure is fully justified.
Unfortunately, even this objection, which did not require much
scrutiny of the material on record, was not considered by the Special
Judge (Vigilance) or the High Court.”
“21. The conclusions that we have drawn are based on materials placed
before us, which are part of the case record. This is the same record
that was available with the Special Judge (Vigilance) when the
application under Section 227CrPC was taken up. Despite that, the
Special Judge (Vigilance) dismissed the discharge application on the
simple ground that a roving inquiry is not permitted at the stage of
discharge. What we have undertaken is not a roving inquiry, but a
simple and necessary inquiry for a proper adjudication of an
application for discharge. The Special Judge (Vigilance) was bound
to conduct a similar inquiry for coming to a conclusion that a prima
facie case is made out for the appellant to stand trial. Unfortunately,
the High Court committed the same mistake as that of the Special
Judge (Vigilance).”
“23. For the reasons stated above, we allow the criminal appeal arising
out of SLP (Crl) No. 9601 of 2016, and set aside the judgment and
order of the High Court of Patna in Kanchan Kumar v. State of
Bihar [Kanchan Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2016 SCC OnLine Pat 10208]
dated 5-10-2016, and that of the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance),
Patna in Special Case No. 09 of 2000, dated 28-3-2016, and discharge
the appellant.”
(e-1) It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel that the
unequivocal findings of a coordinate bench of this Court in
Criminal Revision Petition No. 19 of 2017, wherein Accused
No. 1 was discharged from criminal proceedings, are directly
relevant and binding. It has been submitted that in the said
judgment & order rendered by a coordinate bench of this court,
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[30]
it has been held that the CBI itself admitted that there is
nothing which has been received or taken by the first accused
in the whole transaction and that as there is no allegation that
Theatronics Equinox 100 SAD of M/s MDS Nordon was
purchased at a price higher than the market rate, there is no
issue of wrongful gain by the petitioner or wrongful loss by
RIMS, etc. Taken all together, these findings conclusively
established that the essential ingredients of the offence of
cheating, including dishonest inducement, wrongful gain and
mens rea are entirely absent in the present case. The learned
senior counsel submitted that the case of the petitioner
(Accused No. 6) stands on even a stronger legal footing than
that of the Accused No. 1. The learned senior counsel further
submitted that it is a settled principle of law that a company
cannot be prosecuted for offence involving mens rea in the
absence of specific allegations against its Directors or those
who are in control of its affairs. In the present case, the
admitted position is that there is no mental element, no
dishonest or fraudulent intent attributed to any Director or
Officer of the petitioner company and as such, this creates a
clear legal bar to proceed against the company for offence of
cheating under Section 420 IPC.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[31]
(e-2) It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that it is a
well-settled principle of law that the decision of a coordinate
bench is binding on subsequent benches deciding the same
or similar issues, unless the latter bench is of the considered
view that the matter warrants reconsideration by a larger
bench. Mere pendency of the Special Leave to Appeal (Cril.)
No. 10109 of 2023 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against
the judgment and order passed by the coordinate bench of this
court does not dilute the binding nature of the coordinate
bench’s findings, especially in the absence of any stay of the
judgment and that the prosecution remains bound by the
conclusion drawn therein. Accordingly, there exists no
compelling reason for this court to depart from the view already
taken by the coordinate bench of this court. It has been
submitted that the case of the petitioner stands on an entirely
independent and stronger footing, both factually and legally,
and deserves to be considered on its own merit. In support of
his contentions, the learned senior counsel cited the following
case laws:(i)
(2010) 13 SCC 336 “Sant Lal Gupta & ors. Vs. Modern
Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. & ors.” wherein it
has been held as under:-
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
[32]
“17. A coordinate Bench cannot comment upon the discretion exercised
or judgment rendered by another coordinate Bench of the same
court. The rule of precedent is binding for the reason that there is a
desire to secure uniformity and certainty in law. Thus, in judicial
administration precedents which enunciate the rules of law form the
foundation of the administration of justice under our system.
Therefore, it has always been insisted that the decision of a
coordinate Bench must be followed. (Vide Tribhovandas
Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel , Sub-Committee of
Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and State of
Tripura v. Tripura Bar Assn.”
(ii) (2003) 5 SCC 480 “Rajasthan Public Service Commission
& anr. Vs. Harish Kumar Purohit & ors.” wherein it has been
held as under:“12. Before parting with the case we would like to point out one disturbing
feature which has been brought to our notice. On 13-12-2001 a
Division Bench dismissed an application containing identical
prayers. Even before the ink was dry on the judgment, by the
impugned judgment, another Division Bench took a diametrically
opposite view. It is not that the earlier decision was not brought to
the notice of the subsequent Division Bench hearing the subsequent
applications. In fact, a reference has been made by the submissions
made by the Commission where this decision was highlighted.
Unfortunately, the Division Bench hearing the subsequent
applications did not even refer to the conclusions arrived at by the
earlier Division Bench. The earlier decision of the Division Bench is
binding on a Bench of coordinate strength. If the Bench hearing
matters subsequently entertains any doubt about the correctness of
the earlier decision, the only course open to it is to refer the matter
to a larger Bench.”
“13. The position was highlighted by this Court in a three-Judge Bench
decision in State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Assn. in the following
words : (SCC p. 639, para 4)
“4.
We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court
which has delivered the impugned judgment being a
coordinate Bench could not have taken a view different from
that taken by the earlier Division Bench of the High Court in the
case of Durgadas Purkayastha v. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court.
If the latter Bench wanted to take a view different than that
taken by the earlier Bench, the proper course for them would
have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We have
perused the reasons given by the learned Judges for not
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[33]
referring the matter to a larger Bench. We are not satisfied that
the said reasons justified their deciding the matter and not
referring it to the larger Bench. In the circumstances, we are
unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court
insofar as it relates to the matter of inter se seniority of the
Judicial Officers impleaded as respondents in the writ petition.
The impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates
to the matter of seniority of the respondent Judicial Officers is
set aside. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.”
“14. In the instant case, the position is still worse. The latter Bench did
not even indicate as to why it was not following the earlier Bench
judgment though brought to its notice. Judicial propriety and
decorum warranted such a course indicated above to be adopted.”
(iii) (2024) 3 SCC 224 “Mary Pushpam Vs. Relvi Curusumary &
ors.” wherein it has been held as under:“19. The doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine that is rooted in the
idea of maintenance of the decorum of hierarchy of courts and
tribunals. The doctrine is based on the simple reasoning that
there cannot be, at the same time, more than one operative order
governing the same subject-matter. The same was aptly summed
up by this Court when it described the said doctrine
in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala : (SCC p. 383, para 44)
“44. … (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order
passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before
superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or
affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the
subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior
forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and
is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law.”
“20. The legal position on coordinate Benches has further been
elaborated by this Court in State of Punjab v. Devans Modern
Breweries Ltd. : (SCC p. 157, paras 339-340)
“339. Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow
the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate
Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by
another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger
Bench.
***
“340. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 26 at pp. 297-98,
para 578, it is stated:
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[34]
‘A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted
in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court
of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before
it, in which case it must decide which case to follow.’ ”
[11]
Mr. W. Darakishwor, learned senior panel counsel appearing
for the respondent No. 1 (CBI) submitted that there was collision
between the RIMS officials and the petitioner company through its Indian
agent, i.e., Kirloskar Theratronics. It has been submitted that Dr. Th.
Tomcha Singh, Professor and Head of Department of Radiotherapy,
RIMS, Imphal (Accused No. 2) proposed for purchase of telecobalt
machine and submitted the requisite technical specifications under a
letter dated 29-12-2006. Thereafter, the said Accused No. 2 again
resubmitted the revised technical specifications for the proposed
telecobalt machine under a letter dated 09-02-2007 with a note that the
equipment with specified features is available with M.S. Kirloskar
Theratronics only (Indian Agent of the petitioner company). It has been
submitted that the subsequent technical specifications were nothing but
a general features of telecobalt equipment manufactured by the
petitioner company and that those specifications were incorporated in
the tender notice and as such, the tender specifications were tailor-made
only to suit the petitioner company.
[12]
The learned senior panel counsel appearing for the CBI
submitted that all the formalities for purchase of equipment were
completed hurriedly by violating the provisions of General Financial
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[35]
Rules (GFR) even though there was no exigency for procuring the
machine and even when no room for keeping the said machine was even
ready. It has also been submitted by the learned senior panel counsel
that all the tender formalities were completed by M/s Kirloskar
Theratronics (Accused No. 5), which was an authorized agent of the
petitioner company, and that the sealed tender quotation on behalf of the
petitioner company was submitted to RIMS by self-courier as managed
by Mr. Shahid Hussain (Accused No. 4), which was the then Regional
Manager of M/s Kirloskar Theratronics (P) Ltd. in the bidding process of
the tender by visiting RIMS, Imphal.
[13]
It has also been submitted on behalf of the CBI that copies of
tender notice with enclosures for supply of telecobalt machine dated
01-03-2007 was sent to the Indian agent of the petitioner company by a
staff of RIMS on the instruction of the then Director, RIMS (Accused
No. 1) by courier against the instruction of the tender notice. It has been
submitted that the Accused No. 1, through the said dealing Assistant of
RIMS, violated the relevant provisions of the GFR when the NIT was
issued for supply of telecobalt machine to RIMS in order to favour M/s
Kirloskar Theratronics (Accused No. 5).
[14]
Mr. W. Darakishwor, learned senior panel counsel appearing
for the CBI submitted that after quotation of the tender, the total of five
companies viz., (i) M/s Alliance Biomedica Pvt. Ltd., Chennai, (ii) M/s
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[36]
Syscop Impex Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata, (iii) M/s Mehta Agencies Ltd., Kolkata,
(iv) M/s Panacea Medical Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and (v) M/s MDS
Nordon, Canada, submitted their tender bids and all of them offered the
required machine by quoting different amounts. It has also been
submitted that M/s Panacea Private Limited proposed to supply the
telecobalt machine quoting a price of Rs. 1.59 crore inclusive of all taxes,
almost 1 crore less than the quoted amount of Rs. 2.47 crores by the
petitioner company excluding taxes. The learned senior panel counsel
further submitted that when M/s Panacea Medical Technologies Pvt. Ltd,
informed the Director, RIMS (Accused No. 1) that their machine complies
all the requisite technical specifications, the Accused No. 1 wrote letters
to various authorities including BARC in between May and June, 2007
to inquire about the technical compatibility of the machine to be supplied
by the said M/s Panacea Medical Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Associate
Director, Division of Remote Handling & Robotics, Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre
(BARC) categorically stated that it is possible to
implement Isocentric at 800 cm, the unit has 250 RMM output source
and collision detection device was available, the Accused No. 1 made
no further correspondence in that regard and issued the supply order in
favour of the petitioner company for supply of the said telecobalt
machine by ignoring the low price quoted by the M/s Panacea Medical
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. representing BARC.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[37]
[15]
The learned senior panel counsel appearing for the CBI also
submitted that Mr. Shahid Hussain, the then Regional Manager and
DGM (Sales) of Kirloskar Technologies Pvt. Ltd., was camping in Imphal
and had visited four times and was instrumental in securing the tender
in favour of the petitioner company. The learned counsel further
submitted that M/s Kirloskar Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Accused No. 5) had
benefited from the award of the tender to the petitioner company
(Accused No. 6) by way of commission from the petitioner company.
[16]
It has been submitted on behalf of the CBI that Dr. S. Sekharjit
Singh (Accused No. 3) with full knowledge of the equipment lying idle
without installation and commissioning for a long period in RIMS
requested the Director, RIMS to issue a certificate for release of the
remaining 10% payment by certifying that the unit was installed and
commissioned as per LC Payment Clause and advising the United Bank
of India to make payment of 10% from the Letter of Credit (LC) Account
on the basis of the endorsement made by the Accused No. 2 without
physically checking whether the machine was installed properly or not
thereby favouring the petitioner company by abusing his official position.
It has also been submitted that on a joint check conducted in the room
of Radiotherapy, RIMS where the telecobalt machine was placed, it was
found that the machine was installed physically but yet to be
commissioned and as such, in making payment of the remaining 10%
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[38]
before the full installation of the machine, the accused officials of RIMS
have abused their official position in order to favour the petitioner
company.
[17]
The learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner
company has the requisite mens rea from the very inception of the
transaction and that the conduct of its authorized Indian agent clearly
reflects a deliberate and conscious act done with full intent and
knowledge of the petitioner company. It has been submitted that in a
corporate criminal liability, the intent and actions of the authorized agents
are attributable to the company. Therefore, the mala fide intention was
invented in the petitioner company's action right from the beginning
making it liable for attracting offence under Section 420 of the IPC. The
learned counsel submitted that the pre-planned nature of the act, the
concealment of true facts and the subsequent benefits derived by the
petitioner company demonstrated that this was not a mere omission or
error but a deliberate act with fraudulent knowledge which attracted
Section 420 of the IPC. Thus, there is prima facie case made out against
the petitioner company that the petitioner company might have
committed the offence under Section 420 IPC which is enough to frame
charge against it.
[18]
It has been strenuously submitted by the learned senior panel
counsel that RIMS was allegedly misled into purchasing the machine
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[39]
worth Rs. 1 crore more than the alternate telecobalt machine with same
specifications manufactured by M/s Panacea Limited and that the
petitioner company paid a commission of Rs. 67,81,866/- to its Indian
Agent (Accused No. 5) implying collision and resulting in wrongful gain.
It has also been submitted that RIMS was induced to accept an
overpriced machine based on manipulated tactics by passing more
economically and equally capable product. Thus, there is element of
deception and involvement of selection of costly machine which
suggests their dishonest intention attracting offence under Section 420
of the IPC.
[19]
The learned senior panel counsel appearing for the CBI
submitted that the learned Special Judge rejected the petition of the
petitioner company file under Section 227 of the CrPC and framed
charge against the Accused No. 2 after observation of facts on records
minutely with considered view that there was sufficient prima facie or
grave suspicion of the conspiracy hatched between Accused No. 1 and
Accused No. 3, who have misused their official position as public servant
in favouring Accused No. 4, Accused No. 5 and Accused No. 6 in the
award of tender of telecobalt machine, i.e., Theratron Equinox 100 SAD
manufactured by Accused No. 6 costing Rs. 2,34,38,437/- over the
Indian
machine
Bhabhatron-II
manufactured
by
M/s
Panacea
Technologies and costing Rs. 1 crore less and in the process of helping
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[40]
Accused No. 5 getting a commission of Rs. 67,81,866/- for supply of a
machine that is still lying idle and yet to be functional in RIMS thereby
depriving the facilities to be provided to the cancer patient for medical
treatment.
[20]
The learned counsel for the CBI cited the following case laws.
I.
Charge can be framed against the accused when there is
prima facie grave suspicion from the material on record
from the charge-sheet.
(i) (1977) 4 SCC 39 “State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh”
wherein it has been held as under:“2. When the case was opened in the Court of the Third Additional
Sessions Judge at Motihari m Sessions Trial 66 of 1975 by the
Additional Public Prosecutor in accordance with Section 226 of
the Code, a plea was raised on behalf of the respondent that
there was not any sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial
against him and he should be dis- charged in accordance with
Section 227. The Additional Sessions Judge accepted the plea
and discharged the accused by his order dated April 30, 1975.
The State of Bihar — the appellant in this appeal, went in revision
before the Patna High Court to assail the order aforesaid of the
Sessions Court. The High Court by its order dated February 18,
1976 dismissed the revision. Hence this appeal.”
“4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the
prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge
against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to
prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial
stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf.
The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section
227 or Section 228 of the Code. If “the Judge considers that there
is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, “the
Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[41]
accused has committed an offence which— … (b) is exclusively
triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against
the accused”, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two
provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it
would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the
trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously
judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence
of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of
the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance
whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and
judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding
regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to
be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227
or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see
whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused
or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong
suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the
region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at
the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a
strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at
the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial
of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to
be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the
purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should
proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor
proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or
rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the
accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the
circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion
or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just
illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the
scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are
something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the
theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But
if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order
under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation
ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will
be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.”
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[42]
“5. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal — Shelat, J.
delivering the judgment on behalf of the majority of the Court
referred at p. 79 of the report to the earlier decisions of this Court
in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose — where this
Court was held to have laid down with reference to the similar
provisions contained in Sections 202 and 203 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 “that the test was whether there was
sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was
sufficient ground for conviction, and observed that where there
was prima facie evidence, even though the person charged of an
offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to
be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate
stage and issue of a process could not be refused”. Illustratively,
Shelat, J., further added “Unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds
that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory, or
intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot be refused if that
evidence makes out a prima facie case”.
(ii) (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3805 “State of Orissa Vs. Pratima
Behera” wherein it has been held as under:“4. The respondent and her husband Sh. Anil Kumar Sethi, thereupon
moved applications for discharge under Section 239, Cr. P.C.,
before the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore. As noted
earlier, it is the dismissal of the said petition that led to the filing
of the Criminal Revision before the High Court and ultimately
leading to impugned judgment. Evidently, the Trial Court found
that there is a potential prima facie case against the appellant and
her husband and the same could not be interfered with at the
nascent stage. The High Court, as per the impugned judgment,
held that there is no clinching material to show that the appellant
abetted her husband or made any conspiracy or instigation for
the alleged acquisition of disproportionate assets. After allowing
the Revision Petition qua the respondent, the High Court
observed and held that the impugned judgment should not
influence the mind of the learned Trial Court in adjudicating the
trial qua the co-accused Anil Kumar Sethi in accordance with law.
It is in the said circumstances that the captioned Appeal has been
preferred.”
“9. Before considering the rival contentions on merits in order to
consider the sustainability or otherwise of the impugned
judgment, we think it only appropriate to consider certain relevant
position of law in relation to certain aspects involved in the case
on hand. We will firstly consider the scope of Section 239, Cr. P.C.
In the decision in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, this Court held that
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[43]
the obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises
only when the Magistrate considers the charge against the
accused to be groundless. In the decisions in State of Delhi v.
Gyan Devi, this Court held thus:—
“7. In the backdrop of the factual position discussed above, the
question formulated earlier arises for our consideration. The
legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of
charge the Trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail
the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for
the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to
establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At
the stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only
with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of
commission of offence alleged has been made out against the
accused persons. It is also well settled that when the petition
is filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC seeking for
the quashing of charge framed against them the court should
not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to
hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the
process of the court a charge framed against the accused
needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in
exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in
mind that once the Trial Court has framed a charge against an
accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary
interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from
the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt
by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire
prosecution evidence has come on record should not be
entertained sans exceptional cases.”
II.
Quashing of FIR/ framing of charge under Section 482 of
CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with caution in rare of
the rarest cases.
(i) (2002) 3 SCC 89 “State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa
& anr.” wherein it has been held as under:“9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of
the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based
on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised
to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[44]
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,
more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding
at any stage. (See : Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, and Raghubir
Saran (Dr) v. State of Bihar. It would not be proper for the High
Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess
the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise
of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only
in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has
been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash
the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be
meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether
the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has
to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the
allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the
complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is
mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of
secondary importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be
the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See : Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Rupan Deol Bajaj
v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan, State of
U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada,
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Rajesh Bajaj v.
State NCT of Delhi.)”
(ii)
(2020) 3 SCC 317 “Rajeev Kourav Vs. Baisahab & ors.”
wherein it has been held as under –
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[45]
“8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section
482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an
allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the
ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in
his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very
exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal
proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark
upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the
petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal
proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court
that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients
of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot
quash a criminal proceeding.”
(iii) (2021) 11 SCC 191 “State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar
Kashyap” wherein it has been held as under:“11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and
few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to.
“11.1. In P. Vijayan, this Court had an occasion to consider
Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at
the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the
discharge application has been considered elaborately
in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the
stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the
evidence in order to find out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It
is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of
grounds would take within its fold the nature of the
evidence recorded by the police or the documents
produced before the court which ex facie disclose that
there are suspicious circumstances against the
accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further
observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that
there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a
charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge
the accused. It is further observed that while exercising
its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by
the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter
into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[46]
and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is
really the function of the court, after the trial starts.”
III.
Company can be prosecuted for commission of offence
under Section 420 of IPC.
(i) (2005) 4 SCC 530 “Standard Chartered Bank & ors. Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement & ors.” wherein it has been held
as under:“6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and
punished for criminal offences. Although there are earlier
authorities to the effect that corporations cannot commit a crime,
the generally accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes
as a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason of the
fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may
be subject to indictment or other criminal process, although the
criminal act is committed through its agents.”
(ii) (2011) 1 SCC 74 “Iridium India Telecom Limited Vs.
Motorola Incorporated & ors.” wherein it has been held as
under:“65. This Court also rejected the submission that a company could
avoid criminal prosecution in cases where custodial sentence is
mandatory. Upon examination of the entire issue, it is observed
as follows: (Standard Chartered Bank case, SCC pp. 548-50,
paras 27-28 & 30-32)
“30. As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the
court has to resort to punishment of imposition of fine which
is also a prescribed punishment. As per the scheme of
various enactments and also the Penal Code, mandatory
custodial sentence is prescribed for graver offences. If the
appellants' plea is accepted, no company or corporate
bodies could be prosecuted for the graver offences whereas
they could be prosecuted for minor offences as the
sentence prescribed therein is custodial sentence or fine.”
…
“31. As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the
court cannot impose that punishment, but when
imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment the
court can impose the punishment of fine which could be
enforced against the company. Such a discretion is to be
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[47]
read into the section so far as the juristic person is
concerned. Of course, the court cannot exercise the same
discretion as regards a natural person. Then the court would
not be passing the sentence in accordance with law. As
regards company, the court can always impose a sentence
of fine and the sentence of imprisonment can be ignored as
it is impossible to be carried out in respect of a company.
This appears to be the intention of the legislature and we find
no difficulty in construing the statute in such a way. We do
not think that there is a blanket immunity for any company
from any prosecution for serious offences merely because
the prosecution would ultimately entail a sentence of
mandatory imprisonment. The corporate bodies, such as a
firm or company undertake a series of activities that affect
the life, liberty and property of the citizens. Large-scale
financial irregularities are done by various corporations. The
corporate vehicle now occupies such a large portion of the
industrial, commercial and sociological sectors that
amenability of the corporation to a criminal law is essential
to have a peaceful society with stable economy.”
“32. We hold that there is no immunity to the companies from
prosecution merely because the prosecution is in respect of
offences for which the punishment prescribed is mandatory
imprisonment (sic and fine). We overrule the views
expressed by the majority in Velliappa Textiles Ltd. on this
point and answer the reference accordingly. Various other
contentions have been urged in all appeals, including this
appeal, they be posted for hearing before an appropriate
Bench.”
“66. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a
company/corporation cannot escape liability for a criminal
offence merely because the punishment prescribed is that of
imprisonment and fine. We are of the considered opinion that in
view of the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the conclusion
reached by the High Court that the respondent could not have the
necessary mens rea is clearly erroneous.”
“67. The next important question which needs to be examined is as to
whether the averments made in the complaint if taken on their
face value would not prima facie disclose the ingredients for the
offence of cheating as defined under Section 415 IPC. The
aforesaid section is as under:
“415. Cheating.—Whoever,
by
deceiving
any
person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[48]
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit
to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.
Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of the section.”
“78. In our opinion, the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in
quashing the criminal proceeding in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case. The High Court noticed that while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC “the complaint in
its entirety will have to be examined on the basis of the allegations
made therein. But the High Court has no authority or jurisdiction
to go into the matter or examine its correctness. The allegations
in the complaint will have to be accepted on the face of it and the
truth or falsity cannot be entered into by the Court at this stage”.
Having said so, the High Court proceeded to do exactly the
opposite.”
(iii) (2015) 4 SCC 609 “Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. CBI” wherein it
has been held as under:“39. In Iridium India, the aforesaid question fell directly for
consideration, namely, whether a company could be prosecuted
for an offence which requires mens rea and discussed this
aspect at length, taking note of the law that prevails in America
and England on this issue. For our benefit, we will reproduce
paras 59-64 herein: (SCC pp. 98-100)
“59. The courts in England have emphatically rejected the notion
that a body corporate could not commit a criminal offence
which was an outcome of an act of will needing a particular
state of mind. The aforesaid notion has been rejected by
adopting the doctrine of attribution and imputation. In other
words, the criminal intent of the ‘alter ego’ of the
company/body corporate i.e. the person or group of persons
that guide the business of the company, would be imputed
to the corporation.”
“60. It may be appropriate at this stage to notice the observations
made by MacNaghten, J. in Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd.
A body corporate is a “person” to whom, amongst the
various attributes it may have, there should be imputed
the attribute of a mind capable of knowing and forming
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[49]
an intention—indeed it is much too late in the day to
suggest the contrary. It can only know or form an
intention through its human agents, but circumstances
may be such that the knowledge of the agent must be
imputed to the body corporate. Counsel for the
respondents says that, although a body corporate may be
capable of having an intention, it is not capable of having
a criminal intention. In this particular case the intention
was the intention to deceive. If, as in this case, the
responsible agent of a body corporate puts forward a
document knowing it to be false and intending that it
should deceive, I apprehend, according to the authorities
that Viscount Caldecote, L.C.J., has cited, his knowledge
and intention must be imputed to the body corporate.
“61. The principle has been reiterated by Lord Denning in Bolton
(H.L.)(Engg.) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. in the
following words: (QB p. 172)
A company may in many ways be likened to a human
body. They have a brain and a nerve centre which
controls what they do. They also have hands which hold
the tools and act in accordance with directions from the
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or
will. Others are Directors and managers who represent
the directing mind and will of the company, and control
what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as
such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires
personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of
the manager will be the personal fault of the company.
That is made clear in Lord Haldane's speech in Lennard's
Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.. So also in
the criminal law, in cases where the law requires a guilty
mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind
of the Directors or the managers will render the company
themselves guilty.”
“62. The aforesaid principle has been firmly established in
England since the decision of the House of Lords in Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass. In stating the principle of
corporate liability for criminal offences, Lord Reid made the
following statement of law : (AC p. 170 E-G)
‘I must start by considering the nature of the personality
which by a fiction the law attributes to a corporation. A
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[50]
living person has a mind which can have knowledge or
intention or be negligent and he has hands to carry out
his intentions. A corporation has none of these : it must
act through living persons, though not always one or the
same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking
or acting for the company. He is acting as the company
and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the
company. There is no question of the company being
vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant,
representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment
of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks
through the persona of the company, within his
appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the
company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of
the company. It must be a question of law whether, once
the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing
particular things is to be regarded as the company or
merely as the company's servant or agent. In that case
any liability of the company can only be a statutory or
vicarious liability.’
“63. From the above it becomes evident that a corporation is
virtually in the same position as any individual and may be
convicted of common law as well as statutory offences
including those requiring mens rea. The criminal liability of
a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in
relation to the business of the corporation by a person or
body of persons in control of its affairs. In such
circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the
degree and control of the person or body of persons is so
intense that a corporation may be said to think and act
through the person or the body of persons. The position of
law on this issue in Canada is almost the same. Mens rea is
attributed to corporations on the principle of ‘alter ego’ of
the company.”
“64. So far as India is concerned, the legal position has been
clearly stated by the Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement. On a detailed consideration of the entire body
of case laws in this country as well as other jurisdictions, it
has been observed as follows: (SCC p. 541, para 6)
‘6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be
prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although
there are earlier authorities to the effect that corporations
cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern
rule is that except for such crimes as a corporation is held
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[51]
incapable of committing by reason of the fact that they
involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may be
subject to indictment or other criminal process, although
the criminal act is committed through its agents.”
[21]
I have heard the rival submissions advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties at length and also carefully examined
the materials available on record. I have also carefully gone through the
entire charge-sheet submitted by the CBI and also carefully perused the
impugned judgment and order dated 08-09-2017 passed by the Special
Judge, Imphal West in Special Trial (PC) Case No. 12 of 2016.
In the present case, it is an undisputed fact and on record that
in response to the NIT issued by RIMS, altogether five bidders, including
the petitioner company, submitted their tender forms along with proforma
invoice with prices and specifications. It is also an undisputed fact that
the Accused No. 5, which is the Indian agent of the petitioner company
submitted the tender form on the petitioner’s behalf and that none of the
Directors or Key Managerial Personnel of the company was involved in
the tender process representing the petitioner company. It is also an
undisputed fact and on record that the Tender Opening Committee
unanimously accepted the tender quotation submitted by the Indian
agent of the petitioner company (Accused No. 5) as the other four
tenders did not met the specifications notified under the NIT, specifically
as they lack three essential features, i.e., Isocentric at 100 cm, 250 RMM
output source and collision detection device. Faced with such
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[52]
undisputed facts, this court cannot find any fault in the action of either
the Tender Opening Committee or on the part of the concerned
authorities of RIMS in accepting the tender bids submitted on behalf of
the petitioner company and in not accepting the remaining four bids
submitted by the four other bidders even though they quoted lower price
of the machine than the price quoted on behalf of the petitioner company.
The contentions on behalf of the prosecution that the
specifications of the telecobalt machine as notified in the NIT was a
tailor-made in order to favour the petitioner company remains just a mere
allegation in the absence of any material to support such allegation. On
examination of the entire charge-sheet submitted by the CBI, no material
is found on record to support such allegation and to prima facie establish
grave suspicion against the petitioner company. In my considered view,
in the total absence of prima facie materials to establish grave suspicion
against the petitioner, framing of charges for committing offence of
cheating as provided under Section 420 IPC is unwarranted and unjust.
[22]
It is quite true that M/s Panacea Medical Technologies Private
Limited quoted a lower price than the petitioner company and proposed
to supply the telecobalt machine at a much lower price, however, it is
found on record that the telecobalt machine proposed to be supplied by
M/s Panacea Private Limited did not met the technical specifications
notified in the NIT more particularly, three essential features, viz.,
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[53]
Isocentric at 100 cm, 250 RMM output source and collision detection
device. In this regard, the then Director, RIMS (Accused No. 1) wrote
letters to various authorities including Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
(BARC) to inquire about the technical compatibility of the machine to be
supplied by M/s Panacea Medical Technologies Private Limited and only
after verifying the fact that the telecobalt machine to be supplied by M/s
Panacea Medical Technologies Private Limited are yet to be met the
technical specifications or lacks the said technical specifications, the
supply order was issued in favour of the petitioner company. In such a
situation and given the undisputed facts and materials available on
record, this court cannot agree with the submission made on behalf of
the CBI that there is prima facie material or strong suspicion of the
petitioner company committing the offence of cheating as provided
under Section 420 of the IPC.
[23]
This court is also satisfied that the petitioner company had not
done any act of deception or dishonest inducement leading to wrongful
gain or had mens rea to cheat from the very outset. Given the fact that
the petitioner company had already supplied the said telecobalt
machines all over the world including to many renowned medical
institutions in India and especially when there is no allegation that the
petitioner company quoted a much higher price for the said machine than
the price it had already fixed earlier, this court cannot agree with the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[54]
submission made on behalf of the CBI that the petitioner company
deceived with dishonest inducement leading to wrongful gain and that it
had committed any act of cheating.
[24]
A plain reading of the charge-sheet reveals that there is a
complete absence of any material indicating that the petitioner company
or the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company
made any inducement, fraudulent, dishonest or otherwise to any person
resulting in wrongful gain to the petitioner company or loss to RIMS. The
entire foundation of the alleged "prime facie" or "grave suspicion" against
the Accused No. 6 is raised on a vague and unsubstantiated claim that
some fraudulent or dishonest act was committed even before the tender
process began. However, a thorough examination of the charge-sheet
and accompanying documents reveals not a single instance of any
inducement, fraudulent, dishonest or otherwise by the Accused No. 6
and in the absence of any specific act of inducement, the very basis for
invoking Section 420 IPC collapses. In fact, in the entire charge-sheet,
there is no material whatsoever to even prime facie shows that the
ingredients of offence under Section 420 of the IPC have been made out
against Accused No. 6. The prosecution's attempt to proceed against
Accused No. 6 is not only speculative but also contrary to the settled
principles of law, which requires clear, cogent and credible material to
justify the framing of charges.
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[55]
[25]
Considering the materials available on record, this court finds
force and merit in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner
company and this court also respectfully agrees with the principle of law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the abovementioned
judgments cited by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner. This court also respectfully agrees with the unequivocal
findings of the coordinate bench of this court in Cri. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of
2017 that as there is no allegation that Theratron Equinox 100 SAD of
the petitioner company was purchased at a higher price than the market
rate and that there is no issue of wrongful gain by the petitioner or
wrongful loss by RIMS and the said findings are directly relevant in the
present case and binding to this court. In my considered view, the said
findings strike at the very foundation of the allegation under Section 420
of the IPC which requires proof of dishonest inducement resulting in
wrongful gain or loss thereby negating any element of personal benefit
or dishonest intention. These findings conclusively establish that the
essential ingredients of the offences of cheating, including dishonest
inducement, wrongful gain and mens rea are entirely absent in the
present case.
[26]
This court also finds force and merit in the submission made
on behalf of the petitioner that in the absence of any allegations against
its Director or those who are controlling the affairs of the company, the
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[56]
company alone cannot be made an accused for an offence of cheating
inasmuch as cheating involves mental element, i.e., mens rea. This view
is strongly supported by principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases of “HDFC Bank Limited Vs. State of Bihar” (supra),
Sunil Bharti Mittal” (supra) and Iridium India Telecom Limited”
(supra).
In the case of “Sunil Bharti Mittal” (supra), both the principle of
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of “Standard
Chartered Bank” (supra) and “Iridium India Telecom Limited” (supra)
were considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paras. 37 to 40 and
explained the principle of law which has been laid down in the above two
judgments to the effect that the criminal intent of the “alter ego” of the
company that is the personal group of persons that guide the business
or control the affairs of the company would be imputed to the company.
In the present case, M/s Kirloskar Technologies Private Ltd.
(Accused No. 5) is merely an agent of the petitioner company for
marketing the telecobalt machine manufactured by the petitioner
company in India and as such, the Accused No. 5 cannot be included
within the definition of the persons or group of persons who control the
affairs of the company. By no stress of imagination, it can be said that
the Accused No. 5 represent the directing mind and will of the petitioner
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
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[57]
company and the Accused No. 5’s state of mind and will cannot be said
to be the state of mind and will of the company.
[27]
For the findings and reasons stated hereinabove, I am of the
considered view that there is no sufficient ground for trying the Accused
No. 6 in the instant criminal case. Accordingly, the present petition is
allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated
08-09-2017 passed by the Special Judge (PC) Act, Imphal West in
Special Trial (PC) Case No. 12 of 2016 and the petitioner will stands
discharged.
In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case,
there will be no order as to cost.
JUDGE
FR / NFR
Devananda
Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 19 of 2017
Contd…/-
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