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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED : 9th NOVEMBER, 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Petitioners
:
1.
Md. Shahid,
S/o Late Md. Ibrahim,
R/o Green Hotel,
M. G. Marg,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2.
Salima Khatoon,
W/o Karim Qazi,
R/o New Green Hotel,
Balwakhani,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
3.
Sakina Ibrahim,
D/o Late Md. Ibrahim,
R/o Green Hotel,
M. G. Marg,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
4.
Nargis Wishart,
W/o Gavin Robert Wishart,
R/o Dubai,
P.O. Box No.999,
Dubai, UAE.
5.
Zeenat Burdick,
W/o Robert Burdick,
R/o Canderra 66 Campbell Street Ainslie,
Act 2602 Australia.
6.
Nurjahan Ibrahim,
W/o Shri M. S. Manku,
R/o Flat No.104,
Villa Royale, Hiranandani Estate,
Off. Ghodbunder Road,
Thane (West).
7.
Hasina Kapadiya,
W/o Yusuf Kapadiya,
R/o P.O. Box 8508,
Dubai, UAE.
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
versus
Respondents
:
1.
Mrs. Marium Iqbal,
W/o Lt. Md. Iqbal,
R/o Green Hotel,
M. G. Marg,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2.
Madina Agarwal,
W/o Sanjay Agarwal,
C/o Darjeeling Photo Studio,
P.O. Darjeeling,
West Bengal.
3.
The Registrar/District Collector,
East District,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
Application under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. A. K. Moulik, Senior Advocate with Mrs. K. D. Bhutia, Mr.
Ranjit Prasad, Advocates for the Petitioners.
Mr. Rahul Rathi, Advocate for the Respondent No.1.
None for Respondent No.2.
Mr. S. K. Chettri, Assistant Government Advocate for the StateRespondent No.3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The Order of the Learned Civil Judge, East Sikkim, at
Gangtok, dated 20-09-2016, rejecting the prayer of the Petitioners
under Order XVIII Rule 17, read with Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) and Sections 137, 138 and
145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in Title Suit No.10 of 2013,
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
Mohd. Shahid and Others vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others, is being
questioned herein.
2.
The Petitioners aggrieved by the rejection of their
Petition under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC
and Sections 137, 138 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(for short “Evidence Act”), have filed this Petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of a writ of/or in
the nature of mandamus/certiorari and/or any other appropriate
writ, orders or directions of like nature.
3.
The grounds advanced herein are that on 16-08-2016,
the date fixed for confirmation of the evidence on affidavit and
cross-examination of the Defendants witness, Janab Ibrahim Naik,
due to a mis-communication between Learned Assisting Junior
Counsel, Mr. Manish Kr. Jain and Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. A.
Moulik, for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), the
Learned Senior Counsel was given to understand that no case was
fixed in any of the Courts in the East District of Sikkim, at Gangtok.
Consequently, the Senior Counsel proceeded to Gyalshing, West
Sikkim, to attend to a Bail hearing before the Sessions Court. Once
there, he received information from the Junior Counsel that the
aforesaid witness was present in the Court and adjournment was
declined. Counsel was permitted to inform the Senior Counsel to be
present by 5 p.m. for cross-examination of the witness. The Senior
Counsel accordingly reached the Court at Gangtok, at 3.45 p.m. by
which time the witness had been cross-examined by the Junior
Counsel, on the insistence of the opposing Counsel. It is now the
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
case of the Petitioners that, the cross-examination was conducted
by a Counsel inexperienced in such matters. That, during the course
of the cross-examination, the witness has brought out various facts
and voluntary statements which were not revealed in his “evidenceon-affidavit”. Moreover, the statements made by the witness are not
correct, as he has inserted new facts, inasmuch as on one hand, the
witness claims that the concerned property was „gifted‟, then
contradicts this stand by claiming it was „partitioned‟, leading to
anomalies. Confusion prevailed over the date fixed, leading to
unpreparedness
exacerbated
by
the
lack
of
instructions
and
requisite experience of the Junior Counsel. It is vehemently
contended that unless Senior Counsel is allowed to re-cross examine
the witness in respect of the new facts brought out by the witness,
through his voluntary statements, irreparable loss and prejudice will
be caused to the Plaintiffs. That, the Learned Trial Court ought to
have allowed the Application filed by the Plaintiffs in order to
effectively adjudicate the Suit as the Senior Counsel had been
conducting the matter. To fortify his submissions, strength was
drawn from Hoffman Andreas vs. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar1;
Municipal Corporation, Gwalior vs. Ramcharan (D) by L.Rs. and Others ;
Brij Kishore S. Ghosh vs Jayantilal Maneklal Bhatt and Another ; U.K.
Ghosh vs. M/s. Voltas Ltd. and Another ; C. T. Muniappan vs. The State
of Madras ; K. K. Velusamy
(2000) 10 SCC 430
AIR 2003 SC 2164
AIR 1989 Gujarat 227
AIR 1994 Orissa 131
AIR 1961 SC 175
(2011) 11 SCC 275
vs. N. Palanisamy6 and S. Yuvaraj vs.
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
State .
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned Order be set aside
and quashed and the Petitioner be allowed to re-cross examine the
said witness.
4.
Resisting the arguments advanced for the Petitioners,
Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted that, the
Petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands.
Nowhere in the Application filed before the Learned Civil Judge have
they stated that the Learned Counsel cross-examining the witness
was not instructed sufficiently and neither was it mentioned that
confusion emanated about the date fixed. The incompetence of the
Learned Junior Counsel found no mention. That, averments to the
effect that the Learned Court below had afforded time to the
Counsel to inform the Senior Counsel is untrue. In fact, learned
Junior Counsel did not pray for any adjournment, neither did he
made
any
prayers
for
further
cross-examination
and/or
re-
examination. The records would reveal that the authorised Junior
Counsel was conducting the matter from its inception, i.e., from 2602-2010, and on 21-07-2016, undertaking to personally conduct the
case in future even in the Senior‟s absence.
That, the record of
cross-examination of the witness indicate that the Junior Counsel
had indeed put a specific question in cross-examination on the
alleged voluntary statements. The reply being found unsuitable, the
Plaintiffs now seek to fill the lacuna by raising the ground of
inexperience of the Junior Counsel. That, the Evidence Act envisages
MANU/TN/2062/2013 : Crl. O.P. No.7142 of 2013 of the Madras High Court
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
no right to further cross-examine or re-cross examine a witness on
completion of cross-examination. Thus, allowing the Petition would
open a Pandora‟s box, as parties who replace their Counsel, raising
the ground of incompetence of their previous Counsel would seek to
re-examine the witnesses, against the principles of natural justice
and fair play. The Respondent No.1 fortified his arguments with the
ratio in Ram Rati vs. Mange Ram (D) through LRs and Others8; Om
Prakash
Vani
vs. Vinod Kumar9; Nagumothu Sriharinath vs. Nagumothu
; Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (deceased by L.Rs.) vs. Sharad
Chand Prabhakar Gogate
Mr. Lalit Bagai
; M/s. Bagai Construction Thr. its proprietor
vs. M/s. Gupta Building Material Store12; Allumalla
Kannam Naidu vs. Smt. Allumalia Simhachalam
Girish
and Gayathri vs. M.
. It is prayed that the Application filed by the Petitioners be
dismissed.
5.
The opposing submissions of Learned Counsel have been
heard at length. I have also perused the documents relied on by the
Counsel, the impugned Order and the decisions cited at the Bar.
6.
In order to understand the matter in its correct
perspective, we may briefly surf through the relevant facts. The
Plaintiffs are the sons and daughters of one Late Mohd. Ibrahim.
The Respondent/Defendant No.1 (hereinafter “Defendant No.1”) is
his daughter-in-law, being the wife of Mohd. Iqbal, son of Mohd.
(2016) 3 Scale 219
(2014) 2 RCR (Civil) 603
(1997) 5 ALD 237
AIR 2009 SC 1604
AIR 2013 SC 1849
AIR 2003 AP 239
2016 (3) RCR (Civil) 942
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
Ibrahim.
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
Respondent/Defendant
No.2
(hereinafter
“Defendant
No.2”) is the former wife of Mohd. Shahid, son of Late Mohd.
Ibrahim. The parties are Sunni Muslims and governed by the Shariat
Law. The home of the Plaintiffs and their parents used to be a hotel
at M. G. Marg, named “Green Hotel”, in the two self-acquired
buildings of their father Mohd. Ibrahim, owned by him. After Mohd.
Ibrahim‟s death, the property was looked after by Mohd. Iqbal, and
in August 2006, was leased out to the Axis Bank but no partition
was effected. On 20-09-2009, the Plaintiff No.1 was handed over a
document, purportedly a Partition Deed Agreement, dated 10-021989. The document was alleged to have been executed amongst
Mohd. Ibrahim, Mohd. Iqbal and the Defendants No.1 and 2,
partitioning the Schedule „A‟ property, being a six storied RCC
building, measuring 30' x 65' and a five storied RCC building,
measuring 20' x 30', of which, the Defendants No.1 and 2 were also
allegedly allotted property mentioned in Schedule III and IV of the
Plaint, while those in Schedule I and II went to Mohd. Ibrahim and
Mohd. Iqbal, respectively. The Plaintiffs contend that the signatures
of all the executors to the alleged agreement were not found on the
reverse page of the document and although the Register reflects the
name of Mohd. Ibrahim as the presenter, but the reverse of the
document reveals that it was presented by Mohd. Iqbal.
The
Plaintiffs, therefore, have reason to believe that the Deed of
Partition, dated 10-02-1989, is a false and fabricated document,
resulting in the Title Suit before the Learned Trial Court with prayers
for cancelling the document allegedly a manufactured one.
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
Firstly,
7.
I
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
deem
it
appropriate
to
consider
the
maintainability of the Petition filed by the Petitioners invoking the
provisions of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for
issuance of a writ of/or in the nature of mandamus/certiorari and/or
any other appropriate writ, orders or directions of like nature, while
assailing the aforesaid Order of the Learned Trial Court in a Title
Suit.
8.
By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act) Act
1999 (Act 46 of 1999), Section 115 of the CPC was amended w.e.f.
1.7.2002. We may briefly look at the provisions of Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as they stood before this amendment
and after.
Section 115
Section 115
(before amendment)
(after amendment)
“115. (1) The High Court may call for
the record of any case which has been
decided by any court subordinate to
such High Court and in which no appeal
lies thereto, and if such subordinate
court appears—
“115. (1) The High Court may call for
the record of any case which has been
decided by any court subordinate to
such High Court and in which no appeal
lies thereto, and if such subordinate
court appears—
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction
not vested in it by law, or
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction
not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of
its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity, the High Court may make
such order in the case as it thinks fit:
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its
jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity, the High Court may make
such order in the case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall
not, under this section, vary or reverse
any order made, or any order deciding
an issue, in the course of a suit or
other proceeding, except where—
Provided that the High Court shall not,
under this section, vary or reverse any
order made, or any order deciding an
issue, in the course of a suit or other
proceeding, except where the order, if
it had been made in favour of the party
applying for revision, would have
finally disposed of the suit or other
proceedings.
(a) the order, if it had been made in
favour of the party applying for
revision, would have finally disposed of
the suit or other proceeding, or
(2) The High Court shall not, under this
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
(b) the order, if allowed to stand,
would occasion a failure of justice or
cause irreparable injury to the party
against whom it was made.
section, vary or reverse any decree or
order against which an appeal lies
either to the High Court or to any court
subordinate thereto.
(2) The High Court shall not, under
this section, vary or reverse any
decree or order against which an
appeal lies either to the High Court or
to any court subordinate thereto.
(3) A revision shall not operate as a
stay of suit or other proceeding before
the court except where such suit or
other proceeding is stayed by the High
Court.
Explanation.—In this section, the
expression „any case which has been
decided‟ includes any order made, or
any order deciding an issue, in the
course of a suit or other proceeding.”
Explanation.—In this section, the
expression „any case which has been
decided‟ includes any order made, or
any order deciding an issue, in the
course of a suit or other proceeding.”
The above would reveal that following the amendment
restrictions have been put in place with regard to revision under
Section 115 and the consequent powers of the High Court.
9.
The Calcutta High Court while dealing with this matter in
Mrityunjay Sen vs. Shrimati Sikha Sen
in Paragraph 32, inter alia,
observed as follows;
“32. My reading of the present provisions of
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that with
effect from July 1, 2002, when the amended provisions
have come into force, the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court has been materially restricted. In order to
invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, the
party concerned is not only to satisfy the High Court
that by the order impugned subordinate Court
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed
to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or acted in
the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity, but, also, to satisfy the High Court that if
the order had been made in his favour that would have
finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding. I am
not suggesting for a moment that the interlocutory
orders or orders passed in supplemental proceedings
cannot be challenged under present Section 115 of the
Code. The section does not make any differentiation
between the classes of orders, which can be
challenged. It only provides that for invoking the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, the petitioner
must satisfy the requirements of the proviso to Section
115. The legislature in its wisdom introduced
AIR 2003 Calcutta 165
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
amendments for imposing restrictions on the powers of
revision by the High Court. In view of deletion of
Clause (b) from the proviso, which was introduced by
1976 Amendment, the revisional power can be
exercised by the High Court only when the order
impugned, if had been made in favour of the party
applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the
suit, or other proceeding. Now by the proposed
amendment the legislature suggested that no revision
would lie against such orders, which do not finally
decided the lis. The High Court can, therefore, revise
any order of any Court subordinate to it when it
appears to the High Court that the said Court has
exceeded jurisdiction vested in it by law or refused to
exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or acted
illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of
the jurisdiction, but in invoking the revisional
jurisdiction it is incumbent, as required by the proviso,
that the impugned order, if it had been made in favour
of the party applying for revision, would have finally
disposed of the suit or other proceeding. The
legislature consciously deleted the power of the High
Court to interfere with any kind of order, which, if
allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice of
cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it
was made.”
10.
It was thus explained that for invoking the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court, the Petitioner must satisfy the
requirement of the proviso to Section 115 of the CPC.
Reference
was made to the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
of Prem Bakshi and Others vs. Dharam Dev and Others16 which while
considering the power of the High Court under Section 115 of the
CPC, as it stood prior to amendment of 1999, observed as under;
“34. Therefore, it can never be suggested that
the High Court can interfere with each and every order
passed by a Court subordinate to it only if the
requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 115 are
satisfied or for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of
the process of the Court can refused to look into the
proviso to said sub-section (1). I hold that amendment
was introduced by the amending Act of 1999 to restrict
the power of revision only in respect of cases where
the order would have finally disposed of the suit or the
proceeding if it had been made in favour of the party
applying for revision.”
(2002) 2 SCC 2 : AIR 2002 SC 559
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
11.
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
While discussing the meaning of the expression “other
proceeding” referred to in the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section
115 of the Code, the Calcutta High Court opined that from a reading
of the statute it was never the intention of the makers of the law
that by inclusion of the expression “other proceeding” they intended
to vest the High Court with the power of revision even in respect of
order that may be passed in interlocutory or supplementary
proceeding to a suit. It was analysed that by insertion of the
expression “other proceeding”, the Legislature intended to vest the
High Court with the power of revision in respect of order passed in
the civil proceedings, which are registered other than the suits. It
was thus concluded that, now revisional application will only lie
against such final or interlocutory order, which if it had been made
in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally
disposed of the suit or the proceeding.
I am in respectful agreement with the above ratiocination.
12.
In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur vs. Swaraj
Developers and Others
, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court took up the
question of law involving the effect of the amendment to Section
115 of the CPC and discussed in Paragraph 32 as follows;
“32. A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands
makes it clear that the stress is on the question
whether the order in favour of the party applying for
revision would have given finality to suit or other
proceeding. If the answer is “yes” then the revision is
maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is “no”
then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the
impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally
decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable.
The legislative intent is crystal clear. Those orders,
which are interim in nature, cannot be the subject17
(2003) 6 SCC 659
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
matter of revision under Section 115. There is marked
distinction in the language of Section 97(3) of the Old
Amendment Act and Section 32(2)(i) of the
Amendment Act. While in the former, there was a clear
legislative intent to save applications admitted or
pending before the amendment came into force. Such
an intent is significantly absent in Section 32(2)(i). The
amendment relates to procedures. No person has a
vested right in a course of procedure. He has only the
right of proceeding in the manner prescribed. If by a
statutory change the mode of procedure is altered, the
parties are to proceed according to the altered mode,
without exception, unless there is a different
stipulation.”
13.
In view of the above extracted pronouncements, it is
evident that a Petition under Article 115 would be maintainable only
if the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have
given finality to a suit or other proceeding.
Obviously, an
Application under Order XVIII Rule 17 would not fulfil the required
condition of Section 115 of the CPC. It is in this eventuality that the
provisions of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution have been invoked
by the Petitioner.
14.
It
needs
no
reiteration
that
Article
of
the
Constitution deals the power of the High Court to issue certain writs,
while Article 227 of the Constitution of the Constitution deals with
the power of the High Court of superintendence over all Courts
within its jurisdiction.
Therefore, the question now arises as to
whether Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution can be
invoked together, for matters such as the instant one. In this regard
the following decisions bear relevance.
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
5.
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
In Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others vs. Smt. Radhikabai
and Another
, a
two Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
while determining a question “Whether an appeal lies under Cl. 15
of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court to a Division Bench
of two Judges of that High Court from the Judgment of a Single
Judge of that High Court in a petition filed under Art.226 or 227 of
the Constitution of India?”, reference was made to the decision in
Jagannath Ganbaji Chikkale vs. Gulabrao Raghobaji Bobde19, wherein it
was observed, inter alia, as follows;
“99. ....................................... Under Article
226 the High Courts have power to issue directions,
orders and writs to any person or authority including
any Government. Under Article 227 every High Court
has the power of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. The power to issue writs is not
the same as the power of superintendence. By no
stretch of imagination can a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus or mandamus or quo warranto or
prohibition or certiorari be equated with the power of
superintendence. These are writs which are directed
against persons, authorities and the State. The power
of superintendence conferred upon every High Court by
Article 227 is a supervisory jurisdiction intended to
ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within
the limits of their authority and according to law (see
State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Veghela,
AIR. 1968 SC 1481, 1487, 1488 and Ahmedabad Mfg.
& Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramnand, (AIR 1972
SC 1598)). The orders, directions and writs under
Article 226 are not intended for this purpose and the
power of superintendence conferred upon the High
Courts by Article 227 is in addition to that conferred
upon the High Courts by Article 226. Though at the
first blush it may seem that a writ of certiorari or a writ
of
prohibition
partakes
of
the
nature
of
superintendence inasmuch as at times the end result is
the same, the nature of the power to issue these writs
is different from the supervisory or superintending
power under Article 227. The powers conferred by
Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and
operate in different fields. The fact that the same
result can at times be achieved by two different
AIR 1986 SC 1272
(1965) 67 Bom LR 609 : 1965 Mh LJ 426
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
processes does not mean that these processes are the
same.
(Emphasis supplied)
16.
In Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others20 a two
Judge Bench was presented with a matter in which the Appellant
had filed a suit for issuance of permanent preventive injunction,
based on his title and possession over the suit property, in the Court
of the Civil Judge.
He also sought for relief by way of ad interim
injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The prayer
was rejected by the Trial Court as also by the Appellate Court.
Aggrieved the Appellant approached the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution, which was summarily dismissed with the
observation that the Petition was not maintainable as the Appellant
was seeking interim injunction against private respondents.
The
Supreme Court in Paragraph 24 discussed the difference between
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as brought out in Umaji
Keshao Meshram19 but went on to observe at Paragraph 25 that the
distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost „obliterated‟
in practice. In the end result, the said Judgment allowed the Appeal
setting aside the Order of the High Court.
17.
Later in time however, contrary to the ratiocination
above, in Radhey Shyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others21 a
three Judge Bench had to decide a matter placed before them, in
pursuance of an Order of two Hon‟ble Judges, to consider the
correctness of the Law laid down by the Court in Surya Dev Rai21, that
(2003) 6 SCC 675
AIR 2015 SC 3269
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
an Order of a Civil Court was amenable to writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court went on
to discuss the decisions in T. C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Another22;
Election Commission, India
Pillai
vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao23; Veerappa
vs. Raman & Raman Ltd.24; Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another25 and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
and Others vs.
State of Maharashtra26; Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Another 27
and a plethora of other decisions and observed that while the above
Judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could
violate a fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that the
challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of Appeal or Revision or
under Article 227 of the Constitution but not by way of a writ under
Article 226 and Article 32.
It also discussed the Judgment dated
06-12-1989 in Civil Appeal No. 815 of 1989 : Qamaruddin vs. Rasul
Baksh and Another which had been cited in the Allahabad High Court
Judgment in Ganga Saran vs. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad and
Others
, which considered the issue of writ of certiorari and
mandamus against interim order of civil court and held;
“If the order of injunction is passed by a competent
court having jurisdiction in the matter, it is not
permissible for the High Court Under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the same by issuing a writ of
certiorari. In the instant case, the Learned Single Judge
of the High Court further failed to realise that a writ of
mandamus could not be issued in this case. A writ of
mandamus cannot be issued to a private individual
unless he is under a statutory duty to perform a public
AIR 1954 SC 440
AIR 1953 SC 210
AIR 1952 SC 192
AIR 1962 SC 1621
AIR 1967 SC 1
(2002) 4 SCC 388
AIR 1991 Allahabad 114
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
duty. The dispute involved in the instant case was
entirely between two private parties, which could not
be a subject-matter of writ of mandamus Under Article
226 of the Constitution. The Learned Single Judge
ignored this basic principle of writ jurisdiction conferred
on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
There was no occasion or justification for issue of a writ
of certiorari or mandamus. The High Court committed
serious error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order
of the District Judge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
That, it had thus been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court
that an Order of a Civil Court could be challenged under Article 227
of the Constitution but not under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court went on to observe as follows;
“22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed
in Para 25 of its judgment that distinction between
Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para
24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles
has been noted. In view thereof, observation that
scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not
correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in
Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though
despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction Under
Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure by Act 46 of 1999,
jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 227 remains
unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain
quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded.
Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several
decisions including Waryam Singh and Anr. v.
Amarnath and Anr.: AIR 1954 SC 215 : Ouseph Mathai
v. M. Abdul Khadir: 2002 (1) SCC 319, Shalini Shyam
Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil: 2010 (8) SCC 329
and Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal:
2013 (9) SCC 374.
.............................................................
23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders
of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari
under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the
view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus
does not lie against a private person not discharging
any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from
Article 226.
25. Accordingly,
referred as follows:
we
answer
the
question
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
“(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not
amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the
Constitution;
(ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from
jurisdiction from jurisdiction Under Article 226.
Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” ”
18.
In view of the above stated judicial pronouncement that
presently rules, it is evident that while seeking revision of any
orders of the Learned Trial Court, the party if so advised is required
to approach the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and
not under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it is now crystal clear
that orders of a Civil Court are not amenable to a writ jurisdiction
under
Article
of
the
Constitution
of
India.
In
such
circumstances, what would be the fate of this Petition under
consideration?
19.
Having carefully perused the contents of the Petition, I
find that in pith and substance, it is a Petition invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and consequently for this
one time is being considered. Henceforth, all Petitions that seek to
invoke such a jurisdiction shall be expected to be filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, unless the conditions as laid down
in Section 115 stand fulfilled, in which case the petition would
obviously lie under the said provision.
20.
The cloud having been cleared on this aspect, I may now
attend to the provisions of Order XVIII Rule 17 of the CPC. For the
purpose of convenience, the said provision is extracted hereinbelow;
“17. Court may recall and examine witness.—
The Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness
who has been examined and may (subject to the law of
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
evidence for the time being in force) put such
questions to him as the Court thinks fit.”
It may be recapitulated here that previously the Code had a
specific provision in Order XVIII Rule 7 A for production of evidence
which was previously unknown or for evidence which could not be
produced despite due diligence. The provision enabled the Court to
permit a party to produce any evidence even after the conclusion of
evidence, if the aforesaid conditions were fulfilled and the Court
stood satisfied. This provision was however deleted from 1.7.2002,
nevertheless such an exclusion does not now prevent the Court from
receiving evidence or recalling any witness who has been examined,
if such requirement exists and the Court thinks fit. Besides the
above provision, Section 151 of the CPC which has also been
invoked by the Petitioners envisages that nothing in the Code shall
be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This,
provision empowers the Court to make orders ex debito justitiae.
In K. K. Velusamy6 while discussing the provision of
21.
Section 151 of the CPC, the Supreme Court relying on a catena of
decisions pertaining to the scope of Section 151 of the CPC held
that, they were unable to accept the submission of the Respondent
therein that Section 151 could not be used for reopening evidence
or for recalling witnesses. The Court was of the opinion that Section
151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any
power
or
jurisdiction
on
courts,
it
merely
recognises
the
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
discretionary power inherent in every Court as a necessary corollary
for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is „right‟ and
undo what is „wrong‟. In other words, to do all things necessary to
secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its provisions.
Nevertheless, the powers under Section 151 or for that matter Order
XVIII Rule 17 of the Code are not intended to be used routinely at
the drop of a hat.
22.
On this line of reasoning, in my considered opinion, we
may refer to the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mahadev
Govind Gharge and Others
vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper
Krishna Project, Jamkhandi, Karnataka
where the Supreme Court
while considering the provision of Order XL1 Rule 22 of the CPC
observed as follows;
“29. Thus, it is an undisputed principle of law
that the procedural laws are primarily intended to
achieve the ends of justice and, normally, not to shut
the doors of justice for the parties at the very
threshold. We have already noticed that there is no
indefeasible divestment of right of the cross-objector in
case of a delay and his rights to file cross-objections
are protected even at a belated stage by the discretion
vested in the courts. But at the same time, the court
cannot lose sight of the fact that the meaning of “ends
of justice” essentially refers to justice for all the parties
involved in the litigation. It will be unfair to give an
interpretation to a provision to vest a party with a right
at the cost of the other, particularly, when statutory
provisions do not so specifically or even impliedly
provide for the same.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23.
On the same lines in S. Nagaraj and Others vs. State of
Karnataka and Another
(2011) 6 SCC 321
1993 Supp (4) SCC 595
, it was held that;
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all
barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor
technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of
the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of
stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as
inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even
the law bends before justice. ..................................”
24.
In Rupa Ashok Hurra28 it was opined as hereunder;
69. True, due regard shall have to be had as
regards opinion of the Court in Ranga Swamy [(1990) 1
SCC 288] but the situation presently centres around that
in the event of there being any manifest injustice
would the doctrine of ex debito justitiae be said to be
having a role to play in sheer passivity or to rise above
the ordinary heights as it preaches that justice is above
all. The second alternative seems to be in consonance
with time and the present phase of socio-economic
conditions of the society. Manifest injustice is curable in
nature rather than incurable and this Court would lose
its sanctity and thus would belie the expectations of
the founding fathers that justice is above all. There is
no manner of doubt that procedural law/procedural
justice cannot overreach the concept of justice and in
the event an order stands out to create manifest
injustice, would the same be allowed to remain in
silentio so as to affect the parties perpetually or the
concept of justice ought to activate the Court to find a
way out to resolve the erroneous approach to the
problem? ............................................ In the event
there is any affectation of such an administration of
justice either by way of infraction of natural justice or
an order being passed wholly without jurisdiction or
affectation of public confidence as regards the doctrine
of integrity in the justice delivery system, technicality
ought not to outweigh the course of justice — the same
being the true effect of the doctrine of ex debito
justitiae. The oft-quoted statement of law of Lord
Hewart,
C.J.
in R. v. Sussex
Justices,
ex
p
McCarthy [(1924) 1 KB 256 : 1923 All ER Rep 233 : 93 LJKB
129] that it is of fundamental importance that justice
should not only be done, should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done, had this doctrine
underlined and administered therein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The above extracted pronouncements lend succour to the
expectation that technicality should not come in the way of meting
out even handed justice. Procedure is to be seen as a mechanism to
advance the course of justice and by no means to thwart the
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
process. In other words, technicalities should not draw a veil on
achieving the ends of justice.
25.
Addressing the argument of learned Counsel for the
Respondent that Sections 137 and 138 of the Evidence Act do not
contemplate recalling the witness, we may briefly walk through the
provisions of Sections 137 and 138 of the Evidence Act for clarity.
“137. Examination-in-chief.—The examination of
a witness by the party who calls him shall be called his
examination-in-chief.
Cross-examination.—The
examination of a
witness by the adverse party shall be called his crossexamination.
Re-examination.—The examination of a witness,
subsequent to the cross-examination by the party who
called him, shall be called his re-examination.
138. Order of examinations.—Witnesses shall be
first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so
desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him
so desires) re-examined.
The examination and cross-examination must
relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need
not be confined to the facts to which the witness
testified on his examination-in-chief.
Direction
of
re-examination.—The
reexamination shall be directed to the explanation of
matters referred to in cross-examination; and, if new
matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in reexamination, the adverse party may further crossexamine upon that matter.”
26.
On contemplating on the above provisions, nowhere in
Section 137 it is stated that cross-examination has to be limited
only to what has been stated by the Prosecution witness in
examination-in-chief. But I hasten to add that this reasoning cannot
be utilised routinely, circumspection by the Courts is to be
exercised. Section 138 categorically provides that cross-examination
need not necessarily be confined to the facts to which the witness
testified on his examination-in-chief. True, it is, that, both Sections
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
do not speak specifically of a further round of cross-examination, at
the same time, there is no provision in the Evidence Act to bar the
party from exercising his right to cross-examination afresh, if the
statement of the witness of the opposing party is prejudicial. Of
course, it is for the Court to decide this aspect, with the ends of
justice in sight. That, having been said, in the instant case, it is not
disputed that a Senior Counsel had been engaged to conduct the
matter.
This is obviously with an eye on his experience. Cross-
examination is a powerful tool in the hands of a Counsel, which
requires a great deal of experience to hit the nail on the head. It is
undoubtedly for the purposes of drawing out the truth latent in the
witness for the purposes of reaching the bottom, or the crux of the
matter and to enable the Court to reach a decision based on justice,
equity and good conscience. In the case at hand, the Petitioner did
engage a Senior Counsel to have the advantage of his experience
and in the absence of an opportunity for the Senior Counsel to
cross-examine the witness on the grounds put forth, it flies in the
face of the reasons for his appointment. In my considered opinion,
the Learned Trial Court ought to have taken into consideration all
these circumstances as also the fact that the Senior Counsel
reached the Court premises much before the time afforded by it.
There was nothing to be gained by the party by keeping the Senior
Counsel at bay on a date fixed, neither would it have benefitted the
Senior Counsel. No doubt both the learned Counsel ought to have
been vigilant but its absence under no circumstance justifies
suffering or prejudice to a party. The statements made by the
witness indubitably did not appear in his evidence on affidavit and
WP(C) No.47 of 2016
Md. Shahid and Others
vs. Mrs. Marium Iqbal and Others
were of a voluntary nature requiring cross-examination, which could
not be effectively met on account of the grounds already discussed.
27.
In view of the spectrum of discussions that have ensued
supra, and the reasons as made out therein, the impugned Order of
the learned Trial Court deserves to be and is set aside and quashed,
accordingly the Petition is allowed.
28.
The learned Trial Court shall allow re-cross examination
of the Defendants witness, Janab Ibrahim Naik, and complete it
within a month from today.
29.
However, the observations in this Judgment are by no
means to be construed as expressions on the merits of the case.
The fate of the Suit shall be decided by the Learned Trial Court on
merits duly analysing the evidence that surfaces in course of the
trial.
30.
The records of the learned Trial Court be remitted
forthwith.
31.
In the circumstances, no order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
9.11.2017
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