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Page No.# 1/22
GAHC010285572025
2026:GAU-AS:10293
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : RSA/89/2026
MD. KUBAD ALI AND 6 ORS.
S/O LT. SAYAD ALI, R/O VILL- BECHAMARI, MOUZA AND P.S.- DHING,
DIST.- NAGOAN (ASSAM)
2: MD. JAMAL UDDIN
S/O LT. SAYAD ALI
PREVIOUSLY R/O- BECHAMARI
MOUZA AND P.S.-DHING
DIST.- NAGAON ASSAM
PRESENT R/O FOUZDARIPATTY
MOUZA- TOWN
P.S.- SADAR
DIST- NAGAON (ASSAM)
3: BIPUL ALI
S/O LT. SAYED ALI
R/O BECHAMARI
MOUZA AND P.S.- DHING
DIST.- NAGAON
ASSAM
4: MUSST. SAFIA BEGUM
W/O JAHANUR ALI
R/O DAUGURIGAON
MOUZA- MIKIRBHETA
DIST.- MORIGAON
ASSAM
5: MUSST. SAMPA KHATUN
W/O. LT. MUSTAFA HUSSAIN
R/O BECHAMARI
MOUZA AND P.S.- DHING
DIST.- NAGAON
ASSAM
Page No.# 2/22
6: MUSST. SAKHINA BEGUM
W/O SARIF ALI
R/O SONARIGAON
MOUZA- DHING
DIST.- NAGAON
ASSAM
7: MUSST. JUSHNA BEGUM
W/O MD. MAJIBUR RAHMAN
R/O VILL- BORIBANDHA
MOUZA- LAHARIGHAT
DIST.- NAGAO
VERSUS
MD. AFJOLUR RAHMAN AND ANR
S/O AFTABUDDIN AHMED, R/O BECHAMARI, MOUZA AND P.S- DHING,
DIST.- NAGAON, ASSAM
2:MD JAHANGIR AHMED
S/O AFTABUDDIN AHMED
R/O BECHAMARI
MOUZA AND P.S- DHING
DIST.- NAGAON
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MS. S B CHOUDHURY, Z DUTTA,MR. A U CHOUDHURY
Advocate for the Respondent : ,
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
27.07.2026
Heard Mr. A.U. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants.
2.
This appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the
judgment dated 18.09.2025 and decree dated 23.09.2025, passed by the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon (first appellate court hereinafter),
in Title Appeal No. 09/2023.
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3.
It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment dated
18.09.2025 and decree dated 23.09.2025, the learned first appellate court had
upheld the judgment and decree dated 18.03.2023, passed by the learned
Munsiff No. 2, Nagaon (trial court hereinafter), in Title Suit No. 121/2007.
3.1.
It is also to be noted here that vide judgment and decree dated
18.03.2023, the learned trial court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff declaring
his right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the Schedule ‘A’ land and recovery
of possession over Schedule ‘C’ land.
4.
For the sake of convenience, the parties herein after will be referred
to by their original status in the suit.
Background facts:5.
The background facts, leading to filing of this second appeal, are
briefly stated as under:“The respondents herein, as plaintiffs, had filed one title suit, being
Title Suit No. 121/2007, against the present appellants, seeking a
decree for declaration of right, title and interest over the Schedule ‘A’
land, confirmation of possession over Schedule ‘B’ land and recovery
of possession over the Schedule ‘C’ land and for permanent
injunction and for issue of precept.
The case of the plaintiffs is that a plot of land measuring 2
bighas 1 katha 10 lechas, covered by Dag No. 10 of P.P. No. 444 of
Bechamari Kissam, under Dhing Mouza of Nagaon district, is the suit
land as described in Schedule 'A' of the plaint and the land described
in Schedule 'B' and 'C' of the plaint is part of the suit land and the
total area of land in Dag No. 10 of P.P. No. 444 was 5 bighas 1 katha
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3 lechas.
One Alimuddin Sheikh, the proforma defendant No. 9 and his
brother Naimuddin Sheikh (since deceased), the predecessor in
interest of defendant Nos. 7 and 8 were the owners and possessors
of the land measuring 4 bighas 3 kathas in the suit patta and dag
and used to possess their respective half share exclusively by an
amicable settlement.
Thereafter, Alimuddin sold 4 kathas of land from his share to
proforma defendant Nos. 11 and 12, namely Mobarak Hussain and
Rafija Khatun and 1 bigha to defendant No. 19, namely Ahabulla
Ahmed and their names have been mutated in the patta.
Naimuddin Sheikh (since deceased), the predecessor in
interest of the proforma defendants Nos. 7 and 8, while owning and
possessing the suit land in his own exclusive right, sold the same to
the plaintiffs, vide Registered Sale Deed No. 65, dated 18.01.2003
and delivered possession to the plaintiffs and while writing the
schedule of the Deed, due to bonafide mistake of the scribe, the
dag and patta number of the land was written wrongly. However,
the boundary of the land was written correctly. Thereafter, on
03.02.2004, vide Rectification Deed No. 123, said mistake was
rectified by both the parties.
Then, after purchasing the land, the plaintiffs got their names
mutated in respect of the suit land by way of Field Mutation and in
the meantime, the principal defendants, in a league without any
sort of right, title, interest or possession over the suit land, forcibly
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dispossessed the plaintiffs from the Schedule 'C' land, i.e. land
measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas, on 25.12.2005 and constructed a
thatched house over the same and while the plaintiffs protested
against such illegal action of the principal defendants, they denied
the title of the plaintiffs over the suit land and also in illegal manner
cancelled the Field Mutation of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit
land. But, subsequently, the plaintiffs, through an appeal, were able
to restore the mutation of their names.
The further case of the plaintiffs is that they are the rightful
owners and possessors of the suit land and the principal defendants
have no any legal right or possession over the same. They are only
trespassers with respect to the 'C' Schedule land and as such, they
are liable to be evicted from the suit land and therefore, the
plaintiffs had instituted the suit, claiming the relief as stated above.
The defendants entered appearance in the suit, on receipt of
notice, contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein they
had taken a plea that there was no cause of action and the suit was
not maintainable in its present form and manner and also denied all
the statements and averments made in the plaint.
The case of the defendants is that land measuring 52 bighas,
which includes different Dags and Pattas of Bechamari Kissam,
under Dhing Mouja in the district of Nagaon, including a plot of land
measuring 5 bighas 1 katha 3 lechas, covered by Dag No. 10 of
Patta No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam, under Dhing Mouja in the
district of Nagaon, originally belongs to one Sarumura Gaonburah,
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who died about 50 years back leaving his heirs/successors, i.e. two
grand-sons and two grand-daughters, namely Alimuddin Seikh (the
performa defendant No. 9), Naimuddin Seikh, Hamida Khatun (the
present defendant No. 1) and Amina Khatun, as their father Numal
died prior to the death of Sarumura Gaonburah and as such, said
land devolved into them by right of inheritance.
Thereafter, an amicable family settlement was made amongst
them with regard to the entire landed property left by their
predecessor in interest, Late Sarumura Gaonburah. The suit land
falls into the share of Alimuddin Seikh (the present performa
defendant No. 9) measuring 3 bighas 3 kathas 3 lechas and rest of
the land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas fell into the share of Hamida
Khatun (the present defendant No. 1).
According to the aforesaid family settlement, Hamida Khatun
possessed the said land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas, covered by
Dag No. 10 of Patta No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam, under Dhing
Mouja in the district of Nagaon, which is bounded by North Naimuddin, South - P.W.D. Road, East - Ahmed Shah, West Ahabullah and they have been occupying the said land with their
dwelling houses, since the aforesaid amicable family settlement
about 45 years back and subsequently, a relinquishment deed was
also registered by the defendant No. 9 in favour of defendant No. 1.
Further case of the defendants is that Alimuddin Seikh, (the
proforma defendant No. 9) as per the aforesaid amicable family
settlement and partition, got his share in some other pattas also,
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out of which he had sold some portion of land to other persons,
one of them is the defendant No. 19.
In fact Alimuddin Seikh (the performa defendant No. 9)
neither had possessed and occupied any portion of land covered by
the suit Dag and Patta nor claimed his right over the land in the
suit Dag and Patta.
It is also pleaded that, the plaintiffs have neither right, title
and interest over the suit Patta and Dag, nor Naimuddin had
acquired right to alienate or otherwise sell any portion of land to
plaintiffs as claimed or rectify the original so called Sale Deed vide
Rectification Deed No. 123/2004, showing the land alleged to be
purchased from Naimuddin, to be bounded by as described above
and in fact, the said portion of land was illegally and forcefully
possessed by the plaintiffs in the year 2003, as alleged to be
purchased land, vide Sale Deed No. 65/2003, dated 18.01.2003
and subsequently, rectified on 03.02.2004, vide Deed No.
123/2004, dated 03.02.2004. The said deeds confer no title to the
plaintiffs as Naimuddin got no share over the suit land as alleged
and Alimuddin Seikh (the performa defendant No. 9) after the
family settlement, got land measuring 3 bighas 3 kathas 3 lechas,
covered by Dag No. 10 of P.P. No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam, under
Dhing Mouza in the district of Nagaon, as his share and out of his
share he sold 1 bigha to one Ahabullah Ahmed (the proforma
defendant No. 19) and 4 kathas to Mubarak Hussein and Rabiya
Khatun and remaining land measuring 4 kathas 3 lechas belongs to
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Allimuddin Seikh which is now possessed by the plaintiffs alleging
that the same was purchased from Naimuddin, whereas Naimuddin
had not acquired right to alienate or otherwise sell any portion of
the aforesaid land.
It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs’ claim in the suit is
vexatious, malafide and involves concealment of material facts and
as such, the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs.
Thereafter, the learned trial court after hearing learned
counsel for both the parties, had framed the following issues:i.
hether the suit
present form?
is
maintainable
in
its
ii. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and
non-joinder of necessary parties?
iii. Whether the suit is barred by any principle
of law?
iv. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the
suit land?
v.
Whether the plaintiff has right, title and
interest over the suit land?
vi. Whether the plaint is defective in material
particulars?
vii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any
relief, if so, what?
Thereafter, upon examining the witnesses and also the
documents exhibited, the learned trial court had decided the issue
No. i, iv, v & vii in affirmative in favour of the plaintiffs and issue
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Nos. ii, iii & vi in negative. Thereafter, decreed the suit of the
plaintiffs declaring their right, title and interest over the Schedule
‘A’ land of the plaint and also a decree for recovery of khas
possession over the Schedule ‘C’ land of the plaint and to put the
plaintiffs in possession of the suit land by evicting the principal
defendant and his men and agents by removing any construction
of the defendant over the said schedule land and also a decree for
permanent injunction with cost.
Then, being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal,
being Title Appeal No. 09/2023, upon which the learned first
appellant court had formulated following points for determination:i.
Whether the learned trial court has rightly
decided the issues taken for determination
from i – vi in M.S. No. 204/2021 (sic T.S. No.
121/2007) and dismissed (sic decreed) the
suit?
ii. Whether the orders were rightly passed?
Thereafter, having examined the record as well as the
evidences and the documents exhibited, the learned first appellant
court had decided both the points in favour of the plaintiffs and
affirmed the decision of the learned trial court, dated 18.03.2023.
6.
Then, being aggrieved, the defendants (the present appellants)
preferred the present appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, by suggesting
following substantial questions of law:i.
This second appeal raises a substantial question of
law as to whether a co-owner can sell/transfer his
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share of land without any valid partition?
ii. This second appeal raises a substantial questions
of law as to whether a Suit claiming land on the
basis of a sale-deed in respect of a joint
property without claiming partition is sustainable
in the eye of law?
iii. This second appeal raises a substantial question
of law as to whether the respondent/plaintiffs
have lawfully discharged their liability to prove
their claim for right, title and interest over the
suit property as required under Section 101 of the
CPC?
iv. This second appeal raises a substantial question
of law as to whether the impugned judgment and
decree dated 18.09.2025, passed in Title Appeal
No. 09/2023, is violative of the Order 41 Rule 31
of the CPC?
v.
This second appeal raises a substantial question
of law as to whether the findings of the Learned
Courts below suffer from perversity?
Submissions:7.
Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that
though as many as five substantial questions of law are suggested herein this
appeal, he would mainly press upon the substantial question Nos. i, ii, iii & v. Mr.
Choudhury, taking this Court to the plaint, which is annexed with the memo of
appeal, submits that there is no claim for partition of the suit property although
the same is a joint family property and that unless the suit land is partitioned,
the joint family property cannot be sold. Mr. Choudhury further submits that
while decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs, the learned trial court did not grant the
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relief of partition. Mr. Choudhury also submits that without claiming partition,
the plaintiffs cannot claim the right, title and interest on the basis of the sale
deed and that the plaintiffs have failed to discharge their liability to prove their
claim for right, title and interest over the suit property. Mr. Choudhury also
submits that the finding of both the learned courts below suffers from perversity
and under such circumstances, Mr. Choudhury has contended to admit this
appeal on the afore stated suggested substantial questions of law.
Consideration and Analysis of this Court:8.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants,
this Court has carefully gone through the memo of appeal as well as the
suggested substantial questions of law and the judgment and decree passed by
the learned trial court and also the impugned judgment and decree passed by
the learned first appellate court.
9.
As discussed herein above, the learned trial court had framed as
many as seven issues and out of the same, issue Nos. iv & v appear to be vital
issues and will clinch the entire suit. Notably, the said issues are related to
whether the plaintiffs are in possession and whether the plaintiffs have right,
title and interest over the suit land. The learned trial court after discussing the
evidences held that the claim of the plaintiffs over the suit land is based on the
sale deed No. 65/2003 and rectification deed No. 123/2004 and the said
documents were marked as Exhibit Nos. 2 & 3 by the PW1 and the said
documents are also proved by PW3 and PW4 and the said two witnesses are
official witnesses, one is scribe of the deed, being sale deed No. 65/2003 and
witness of rectification deed No. 123/2004 and the defendants side failed to
bring out anything during the cross-examination to contradict the evidences of
these official witnesses as well.
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9.1.
The learned trial court had also observed that these two documents,
whereby the plaintiffs claimed to have obtained their title over the suit land, are
only valid if their vendor, namely Naimuddin, had acquired the right over the suit
property. It has been observed that the defendants have also admitted in their
written statement that the suit land originally belonged to the predecessor of
the defendant No. 1, pro-forma defendant No. 9 and the vendor of the plaintiffs.
However, the plea of the defendant is that Naimuddin had no share in the suit
land as per a family settlement between the heirs of the original pattadar. It has
further been held that the certified copy of the jamabandi of the suit patta No.
444 reveals that in Dag No. 10 of the patta, Alimuddin and Naimuddin were the
original pattadars. The said jamabandi also reveals that as per order dated
23.02.2004, the names of the plaintiffs were mutated in place of Naimuddin
with respect to 2 bighas 1 katha 10 lechas land of the suit Dag and Patta by
right of purchase.
9.2.
It was also observed by the learned trial court that mere entry in
revenue records does not give rise to right in favour of a person. But, the
entries in revenue records cannot be outrightly rejected and the same is to be
given due consideration and weightage.
9.3.
In holding so, the learned trial court relied upon a decision of this
Court, in the case of Amiya Bala Dutta vs. Mukut Adhikari, reported in
(1999) 1 GLR 229. It was further observed that the defendant side, in their
written statement as well the DWs in their evidence have stated that the vendor
of the plaintiffs had no share in the suit land by way of a family settlement and
the defendants have failed to adduce any evidence in support of that and also
to rebut the version of the plaintiffs.
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9.4.
Further, it is observed that DW2 and DW3 admitted having no
knowledge about the suit land and the share of the defendants and the vendor
of the plaintiffs. DW1 stated that both Alimuddin and Naimuddin had their land
adjacent to each other, but he does not know the number of Dag and Patta and
he also does not know whether there was any partition between them. DW2, on
the other hand, stated that Naimuddin and Alimuddin had their land at different
places and both of them sold their land. DW2 further stated in his cross
examination that Naimuddin had sold his share of the land to the plaintiffs, but
he does not know the land in possession is of the plaintiffs. The learned trial
court further held that there is some contradiction in the versions of the DW1
and DW2 and it is also partly revealed from the deposition of DW2 that
Naimuddin had sold his share of the land to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the
learned trial court had held that the plaintiffs had succeeded by adducing his
oral evidence and documentary evidence in establishing his claim over the
Schedule ‘C’ land in the plaint and thereby decided both the issues in affirmative
in favour of the plaintiffs.
10.
Further, in the impugned judgment and decree, the learned first
appellate court had held that the onus to prove or show that the title to the suit
land rests on the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have contended that the total area
of land in Dag No. 10 of P.P. No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam, under Dhing Mouza
of Nagaon district, is 5 bighas 1 katha 3 lechas and Alimuddin Sheikh, i.e. the
proforma defendant No. 9 and his brother Naimuddin Sheikh (since deceased),
the predecessor in interest of defendant Nos. 7 and 8, were the owners and
possessors of land measuring 4 bighas 3 kathas in the suit patta and dag and
used to possess their respective half share exclusively by amicable settlement.
In the meantime, Alimuddin sold 4 kathas of land from his share to proforma
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defendant Nos. 11 and 12, namely Mobarak Hussain and Rafija Khatun and 1
bigha to defendant No. 19, namely Ahabulla Ahmed and their names have been
mutated in the patta.
10.1.
It is also stated that Naimuddin Sheikh (since deceased), the
predecessor in interest of the proforma defendants Nos. 7 and 8, while owning
and possessing the suit land in his own exclusive right, sold the same to the
plaintiffs, vide Registered Deed of Sale No. 65, dated 18.01.2003 and delivered
possession of the same to the plaintiffs. It is also stated that while writing the
schedule of the deed, due to bonafide mistake of the scribe, the Dag and Patta
number of the land was written wrongly. However, the boundary of the land was
written correctly. Thereafter, on 03.02.2004, vide Rectification Deed No. 123,
said mistake was rectified by both the parties.
10.2.
The learned first appellate court had also observed that the principal
defendants claimed that originally the land in the suit Dag and Patta belonged
to one Sarumura Gaonburah, who died about 50 years back, leaving his
heirs/successors, two grand-sons and two grand-daughters, namely Alimuddin
Seikh (the performa defendant No. 9), Naimuddin Seikh, Hamida Khatun (the
present defendant No. 1) and Amina Khatun, as their father Numal died prior to
the death of Sarumura Gaonburah, the said land devolved into them by right of
inheritance. Thereafter, an amicable family settlement was made amongst them
with regard to the entire landed property left by their predecessor in interest,
Late Sarumura Gaonburah.
10.3.
The learned first appellate court had also observed that the
defendants further claimed that the suit land falls into the share of Alimuddin
Seikh (the performa defendant No. 9) measuring 3 bighas 3 kathas 3 lechas and
rest of the land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas falls into the share of Hamida
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Khatun (the present defendant No. 1). According to the aforesaid family
settlement, Hamida Khatun possessed the said land measuring 1 bigha 3
kathas, covered by Dag No. 10 of Patta No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam, under
Dhing Mouza in the district of Nagaon and they have been occupying the said
land with their dwelling houses since the aforesaid amicable family settlement
that took place about 45 years back and subsequently, a Relinquishment Deed
was also registered by the defendant No. 9 in favour of defendant No. 1.
10.4.
The learned first appellate court has further observed that the
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs have no right, title and interest over the
suit Patta and Dag land, as Naimuddin had not acquired right to alienate or
otherwise sell any portion of the suit land to the plaintiffs as claimed. It was
asserted that in fact the said portion of land was illegally and forcefully taken
into possession by the plaintiffs in the year 2003, as alleged to be their
purchased land, vide Sale Deed No. 65/2003, dated 18.01.2003 and
subsequently, rectified on 03.02.2004, vide Rectification Deed No. 123/2004 and
the said deeds confer no title to the plaintiff, as Naimuddin did not get any
share over the suit land as claimed.
10.5.
The learned trial first appellate court also held that it is stated that
Alimuddin Seikh, after the family settlement, got land measuring 3 bighas 3
kathas 3 lechas, covered by Dag No. 10 of P.P. No. 444 of Bechamari Kissam in
the district of Nagaon, as he, out of his share, sold out 1 bigha to one Ahabullah
Ahmed (the proforma defendant No. 19) and 4 kathas to Mubarak Hussein and
Rabiya Khatun and remaining land measuring 4 kathas 3 lechas, belongs to
Allimuddin Seikh, now possessed by the plaintiffs alleging that the same was
purchased from Naimuddin, whereas Naimuddin had not received any share in
the suit patta and thereby, had not acquired right to alienate or otherwise sell
Page No.# 16/22
any portion of the aforesaid land.
10.6.
The learned first appellate court had again observed that the plaintiff
as PW1, in his evidence, has reiterated the averments made in the plaint and
PW2, corroborated the evidence of PW1. PW3 is the Deed Writer, who scribed
the Sale Deed (Exhibit – 6) and PW4 is the witness to the Rectification Deed
(Exhibit – 7). The witnesses were duly cross-examined by the defendants side,
but they failed to elicit anything in their favour. These two witnesses, PW3 &
PW4, prove the fact of execution of Registered Sale Deed No. 65, dated
18.01.2003 and the Rectification Deed, dated 03.02.2004, vide which the
plaintiff had purchased the suit land from Naimuddin and though the defendants
had disputed the said fact, the defendants could not produce any evidence in
support of their claim that the Sale Deed is a forged one and Naimuddin had
never executed the same as he had no share in the suit patta.
10.7.
The learned first appellate court further observed that the learned
counsel for the defendants/appellants has argued that the vendor of the
plaintiffs could not make a valid sale in favour of the plaintiff, as he had no land
in the suit patta, as per the amicable family settlement of the landed property
amongst the legal heirs of Late Sarumura Gaonbura. Further, the defendants,
though averred that the plaintiff has illegally and forcefully taken possession
over the suit land, the defendants failed to produce any evidence in respect of
the same and there is no proof of the amicable family settlement, whereby only
the defendant No. 1, Hamida Khatun and proforma defendant No. 9, Alimuddin
got share in the suit patta and on the contrary, perusal of Exhibit – 1, the
Jamabandi of P.P. No. 444, reveals that the names of Alimuddin and Naimuddin
have been recorded therein as pattadars along with one Wahab and Usman Ali,
but the name of Hamida Khatun does not appear therein. And in the Exhibit – 1,
Page No.# 17/22
plaintiffs' names have been mutated as per order dated 23.02.2004, in place of
Naimuddin and that the defendants had neither filed any petition for
cancellation of such mutation, nor they had agitated their position in any legal
forum and the defendants have not produced any single evidence (either oral or
documentary) of amicable settlement. When the alleged family settlement on
the basis of which the right, title and interest are being claimed by the
defendants, was never produced in evidence and proved, by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that the defendants had succeeded in establishing the
same.
10.8.
The learned first appellate court has also observed that though the
Sale Deed No. 65, dated 18.01.2003, is claimed to be fraudulently executed, the
same was never challenged by the defendants despite their admission that the
plaintiffs have been claiming the suit land since 2003, as their purchased land
on the strength of the said Sale Deed. Thereafter, decided both the issues in
affirmative and upheld the finding of the learned trial court in respect of Issue
Nos. iv & v.
10.9.
Thus, there appears to be concurrent finding of facts by both the
learned court below in respect of the issues Nos. iv & v. The finding of fact by
both the learned courts below is based upon proper appreciation of materials on
record and supported by decision of this Court.
11.
Though Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants, has
contended that the suggested substantial question of law Nos. i, ii, iii & v are
involved, yet his submission left this Court unimpressed, in view of the provision
of Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, a co-owner can sale his share of
land without any valid partition. The said Section read as under:-
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"44. Transfer by one co-owner.
Where one of two or more со-owners of immoveable
property legally competent in that behalf transfers
his share of such property or any interest therein,
the transferee acquires as to such share or interest,
and so far as is necessary to give effect to the
transfer, the transferor's right to joint possession
or other common or part enjoyment of the property, and
to enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the
conditions and liabilities affecting, at the date of
the transfer, the share or interest so transferred.
Where the transferee of a share of a dwellinghouse belonging to an undivided family is not a member
of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed
to entitle him to joint possession or other common or
part enjoyment of the house."
12.
Thus, in view of the provision of Section 44 of the Transfer of
Property Act, this Court finds that the suggested substantial question of law No.
(i) is not flows out of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned
first appellate court. Being the co-owner, the vendor of the plaintiff had the right
to transfer his share although the same was not partitioned between the vendor
of the plaintiff, namely, Naimuddin and Alimuddin, pro-forma defendant No.9
and they possessed their respective share after amicable settlement as held by
the learned first appellate court. In holding so this Court derived authority from
a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.K. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal
Shaw @ Nand Lal Keshri reported in (2024 INSC 676), wherein it has
been held that a sale by a co-owner is valid only to the extent of the selling coowner’s own undivided share.
13.
Further, going through the plaint of the title suit, which is annexed
Page No.# 19/22
with the memo of appeal, it appears that the plaintiffs in the prayer number (d)
has made a prayer that a precept may be issued directing the Revenue
Department, Nagaon, to grant perfect partition in the names of the plaintiffs
with respect to the suit land and correct the revenue records as per decree of
the suit.
14.
In view of above, the submission of Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel
for the appellants, seems to be not based on the record and the suggested
substantial question of law No. ii, appears to be not flowing out of the impugned
judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court.
15.
Further, the suggested substantial question of law No. iii, which
according to Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellants, is involved in
this appeal, yet this Court finds that there is concurrent finding of fact in respect
of right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land and sitting in second
appeal, this Court is not entitled to appreciate the evidence again in view of the
concurrent finding of fact unless perversity is demonstrated, which the appellant
herein could not demonstrate and as such, the said substantial question of law
also not flows out of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned
first appellate court.
16.
Coming to the last substantial question of law, which Mr. Choudhury
emphasized regarding the perversity, yet he failed to demonstrate from the
impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court and
also by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court that the same
are suffering from any perversity.
17.
It appears that the learned trial court as well as the learned first
appellate court had considered the evidence of both oral and documentary in its
Page No.# 20/22
proper perspective and arrived at a reasoned finding and the same warrants no
interference of this Court. Reference in this context can be made to a decision
of
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
Pertap
Chunder
Ghose vs. Mohendranath Purkait, reported in ILR (1890) 17 Cal 291
(PC),the Privy Council has observed that the limitation as to the power of the
Court imposed by Sections 100 and 101, in a second appeal, ought to be
attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of
the
first
appellate
court
upon
a
matter
of
fact.
In the
case
of
Ramgopal vs. Shamskhaton, reported in ILR (1893) 20 Cal 93 (PC), the
Privy Council emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to
entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts
below. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad vs. Baijnath,
reported in ILR (1893) 15 All 367. The Court observed that a judge, to
whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission, is entitled
to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply
to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily.
17.1.
In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead)
By Lrs, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court has delineated the scope of Section 100 CPC, and held that the
High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the
case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. It was
also held that the word substantial, as qualifying ‘question of law’, means—of
having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It
is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no
substance or consequence, or academic merely.
Page No.# 21/22
17.2.
In the case of H.P. Pyarejan vs. Dasappa, reported in (2006)
2 SCC 496, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the judgment of High Court
suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High
Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of
the Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to
hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by
the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence.
17.3.
It is also to be noted here that in the case of Thiagarajan vs. Sri
Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 762, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under :“The High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100
C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the
findings of fact. The court observed that to say the
least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It
is the obligation of the courts of law to further the
clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate
it by excluding the same. This court in a catena of
decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower
appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court
in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on
re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that
another view was possible.”
17.4.
Similar observation was made by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case
of State of Kerala vs. Mohd. Kunhi, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 139, has
held as under:“The High Court is not justified in interfering with
the concurrent findings of fact. This court observed
that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the
Page No.# 22/22
scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
18.
In view of above, the suggested substantial questions of law appear
not to be flowing out of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the
learned first appellate court and as well as the learned trial court.
19.
Accordingly, this second appeal stands summarily dismissed, at this
motion stage itself.
JUDGE
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