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CGHC010364512025
2026:CGHC:40859-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ARBA No. 58 of 2025
Md Inam Ullah Md Ikram Ullah Aged About 44 Years Basera, Jailor Chaal,
Raja Talab, Purani Chowk, Raipur (C.G.)
--- Appellant
versus
1 - Md Irfan Ullah S/o Md Ikram Ullah Aged About 42 Years, R/o. Block- B/1,
Flat No.201, V.I.P. Karishma, Shankar Nagar, Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Md Inayat Ullah Md Ikram Ullah Aged About 37 Years A 1, 2 Gulzar
Homes, Near Masjid, Moti Nagar, Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondents
(Cause title is taken from CIS system)
For Appellant
: Mr. Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate
For Respondent No.1
: Mr. Ashish Mittal, Advocate
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
Hon'ble Smt. Sushma Sawant, Judge
Digitally
BALRAM
signed by
PRASAD
BALRAM
DEWANGAN PRASAD
DEWANGAN
Order On Board
(17.09.2026)
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
1.
Heard on I.A. No.1, application for condonation of 26 days delay in
filing this arbitration appeal.
2.
Appellant has preferred this appeal U/s. 37 (1) (c) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) read with
Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short ‘the Act
of 2015’) questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned
order dated 05.05.2025, passed in Arb. MJC No. 04 of 2025, by the
Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Nava Raipur Atal Nagar,
Raipur, whereby Commercial Court has allowed the application filed by
respondent No.1 U/s.34 of the Act of 1996 setting aside the award
passed by the sole arbitrator for the reasons assigned therein.
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant would submit that
the delay occurred in filing the present appeal is bona fide,
unintentional on the part of appellant. He submits that after passing of
impugned order dated 05.05.2025, appellant immediately sought legal
advice and opinion with regard to the further course of action available
to him. In the meantime, appellant had gone to HAJ on 28.05.2025
and returned on 14.06.2025. During the said period, appellant
remained away and was not in a position to take necessary steps for
preparation and filing of the appeal. Thereafter, an attempt was made
between the parties to amicably settle the dispute; however,
settlement talks failed as respondent No. 1 did not accept the offer
made by appellant. He further submits that after failure of the
settlement, appellant engaged his Advocate to challenge the impugned
order before this Hon’ble Court. Thereafter, the required documents
were collected and the present appeal was prepared and filed. He
submits that the delay in filing the present appeal has occurred due to
bona fide and unavoidable circumstances, which have been sufficiently
explained. It is, therefore, prayed that the delay in filing the present
appeal may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice. In support of
his contention, the counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of M/s. SAB Industries Limited Vs. The State
of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.
21111 of 2024, decided on 07.02.2025.
4.
Learned counsel for respondent No.1 opposes the submission of
learned counsel for appellant and would submit that appeal has been
filed with inordinate delay. The period of limitation prescribed for filing
of appeal before the High Court is 60 days that will start from
06.05.2025. Appellant is well aware about passing of the impugned
order and had sufficient time to file the appeal within limitation. He
further submits that appellant has applied for certified copy of
impugned order on 14.05.2025 and certified copy of impugned order
was supplied to appellant on the same day. He also submits that the
submission of learned counsel for appellant regarding procurement of
legal opinion, Haj pilgrimage, settlement discussions, engagement of
an Advocate and the time allegedly consumed in drafting the appeal
are vague as it is not supported by any documents. He also submits
that obtaining legal advice and engaging an Advocate are routine and
voluntary acts which do not suspend the period of limitation. He further
submits that application seeking condonation of delay does not
disclose any circumstances beyond the control of appellant which
made it impossible for him to file appeal within prescribed period. He
also pointed out that object of promulgation of the legislation of the Act
of 2015 was to provide speedy disposal of the high level commercial
disputes, so that early resolution of commercial dispute shall create a
positive image. The counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Private Limited, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 and in
case of Basawaraj & Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81. He also contended that Coordinate
Bench of this Court in case of State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Cube
Engitech Consultants (P) Limited, in ARBA No. 53 of 2023, decided
on 20.12.2024 has dismissed the application for condonation of delay
of 42 days and consequently the appeal was also dismissed.
5.
We have heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the
application I.A.No.1 and the reply submitted by respondent.
6.
This appeal is filed under Section 13 (1) of the Act of 2015 read with
Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Limitation prescribed under Section 13
(1A) of the Act of 2015 for filing an appeal is 60 days from the date of
judgment or order. The order under challenge is dated 05.05.2025, the
appeal is filed only on 31.07.2025 and the office has reported that
appeal so filed by appellant is barred by 26 days.
7.
The appellant has sought condonation of delay in filing this appeal
pleading as under :“3. That, after passing of the impugned Order dated
05.05.2025 passed by the Ld. Commercial Court, the
Appellant sought legal opinion regarding further course
of action. In the meantime, the Appellant had gone for
HAJ on 28.05.2025 and had returned on 14.06.2025.
Upon returning from HAJ, an attempt was made
between the parties to arrive at the settlement,
however, the offer given by the Appellant to the
Respondent No. 1 was not agreed upon by the
Respondent and as such upon failure of the settlement
talks, the Appellant engaged an Advocate for filing the
instant appeal. Thereafter, the Advocate took the task of
drafting and the instant appeal is being filed on this day.
4. That the Appellant has good case on merits. It is
submitted that the Appellant shall suffer irreparable loss
and damage if the delay is not condoned.
5. It is respectfully submitted that the delay in the filing
of the present Appeal is bonafide and not at all
intentional. It is in the interests of justice that the delay
of 26 days in filing the present appeal is condoned.”
8.
Perusal of the application in which the pleadings have been made to
assign reasons for delay would show that after passing of impugned
order, the appellant sought legal opinion regarding further course of
action and in the meantime, he had gone for HAJ on 28.05.2025 and
had returned on 14.06.2025. From the pleading it also shows that an
attempt was made between the parties to arrive at settlement,
however, the offer given by the appellant to the respondent No. 1 was
not agreed upon by the respondent and settlement was failed.
However, the aforesaid averments made in application for condonation
of delay remain wholly unsupported by any documentary evidence. No
material has been placed on record to substantiate the alleged seeking
of legal opinion, visit for Haj, or the efforts purportedly made between
the parties for settlement of the dispute. The explanation offered by the
appellant remains unsubstantiated. Appellant is well aware with regard
to provisions of law and the limitation as provided under the Act of
2015 of filing of appeal before High Court.
9.
The object of promulgation of the Act of 1996 as also the Act of 2015 is
to decide the commercial dispute between the parties at the earliest.
The reasons assigned in the application seeking condonation of delay,
whether to be sufficient cause or not is to be considered keeping in
mind the object of the Act of 2015.
10.
If the pleadings made in the application is to be considered along with
the provisions of the Act of 2015 and its object, we are of the view that
no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay of 26 days in
filing of this appeal. As after passing of the impugned order on
05.05.2025; an application for certified copy thereof was filed on
14.05.2025 and certified copy of the order was supplied on the same
day. Appellant thereafter proceeded on Haj pilgrimage on 28.05.2025
and returned on 14.06.2025. Although the period of limitation for filing
the appeal expired on 04.07.2025, the appeal has been filed only on
31.07.2025, which demonstrates that even after returning from Haj on
14.06.2025, the appellant had sufficient time of about 15 days to file
the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation but appellant failed
to do so.
11.
Hon’ble Supreme Court In case of Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Private Limited, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 has
observed that sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Act of 2015
provides the forum for appeals as well as limitation period to be
followed. Section 13 of the Act of 2015 being a special law as
compared with the Limitation Act, which is a general law, which follows
from a reading of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13 (1-A)
of the Act of 2015 lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly
for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the Act of 1996.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has also considered
as to whether delay can be condoned or not, if appeal under Section
13 (1-A) of the Act of 2015 is filed with delay, and observed thus:“34. The vexed question which faces us is whether,
first and foremost, the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the
Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr
George. The first important thing to note is that Section
13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain
any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act only
provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date
of the judgment or order appealed against, without
further going into whether delay beyond this period can
or cannot be condoned.
***
41. Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act was also
pressed into service stating that the non obstante
clause contained in the Commercial Courts Act would
override other Acts, including the Limitation Act, as a
result of which, the applicability of Section 5 thereof
would
be
excluded.
This
argument
has
been
addressed in the context of the IBC in B.K. Educational
Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates [B.K.
Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta &
Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ)
528] , as follows : (SCC p. 664, para 41)
“41. Shri Dholakia argued that the Code being
complete in itself, an intruder such as the
Limitation Act must be shut out also by
application of Section 238 of the Code which
provides
that,
‘notwithstanding
anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law
for the time being in force’, the provisions of the
Code would override such laws. In fact, Section
60(6) of the Code specifically states as follows:
‘60. Adjudicating authority for corporate
persons.—(1)-(5)***
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other
law for the time being in force, in computing the
period of limitation specified for any suit or
application by or against a corporate debtor for
which an order of moratorium has been made
under this Part, the period during which such
moratorium is in place shall be excluded.’
This provision would have been wholly unnecessary if
the Limitation Act was otherwise excluded either by
reason of the Code being complete in itself or by virtue
of Section 238 of the Code. Both, Section 433 of the
Companies Act as well as Section 238-A of the Code,
apply the provisions of the Limitation Act “as far as may
be”. Obviously, therefore, where periods of limitation
have been laid down in the Code, these periods will
apply
notwithstanding
anything
to
the
contrary
contained in the Limitation Act. From this, it does not
follow that the baby must be thrown out with the
bathwater. This argument, therefore, must also be
rejected.”
42. For all these reasons we reject the argument made
by Shri George that the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is excluded given the scheme of the
Commercial Courts Act.
***
50. From this paragraph, what was sought to be
argued was that the limitation of power on a civil court
at the initial stage can be read as a limitation onto the
appellate court, as was done in the aforesaid
judgments. We are afraid that we are unable to agree.
This sentence was in the context of a decree passed in
a civil suit for a sum of rupees 3.09 lakhs with interest,
without taking into consideration the fact that an
amount of rupees 2.10 lakhs had already been
deposited by the appellant in criminal proceedings. The
Court relied upon Section 357(5) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 to hold that “the court” shall
take into account any sum paid or recovered as
compensation at the time of awarding compensation in
any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter.
“The court” would obviously include an appellate court
as well. It was only in this context that the aforesaid
observation of limitation of power on a civil court being
“borne in mind” by the appellate court, was made.
51. Shri George's reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar [P. Radha Bai
v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 773] (at paras 36.2-36.3) on the doctrine of
unbreakability when applied to Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration Act, also does not carry the matter much
further, as the question is whether this doctrine can be
bodily lifted and engrafted onto an appeal provision
that has no cut-off point beyond which delay cannot be
condoned.
52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating
arguments made in these appeals, we are of the view
that N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of
Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275]
has been wrongly decided and is therefore overruled.
53. However, the matter does not end here. The
question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a
uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we
have
the
judgment
in
N.V.
International
[N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow
condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other
extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which
any amount of delay can be condoned, provided
sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two
extremes that we have to steer a middle course.”
12.
In the aforementioned case Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the
law as to when delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 13
of the Act of 2015 can be condoned. It was observed as follows:“55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37
of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or
117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided
by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the
speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act
consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to
discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause”
means in the context of condoning delay in filing
appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
56. The expression “sufficient cause” contained in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield
different results depending upon the object and context
of a statute. Thus, in Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab
[Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381] , this
Court, in the context of Section 11(5) of the Punjab
Land Reforms Act, 1972, held as follows : (SCC pp.
386-87, paras 10-11)
“10. Permitting an application under Section 11(5)
to be moved at any time would have disastrous
consequences. The State Government in which
the land vests on being declared as surplus, will
not be able to utilise the same. The State
Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely
before putting the land to use. Where the land is
utilised by the State Government, a consequence
of the order passed subsequently could be of
divesting it of the land. Taking the facts of the
present case by way of an illustration, it would
mean that the land which stood mutated in the
State Government in 1982 and which was allotted
by the State Government to third parties in 1983,
would as a result of reopening the settled
position, lead to third parties being asked to
restore back the land to the State Government
and the State Government in turn would have to
be divested of the land. The land will in turn be
restored to the landowner. This will be the result
of the land being declared by the Collector as not
surplus with the landowner. The effect of
permitting such a situation will be that the land
will remain in a situation of flux. There will be no
finality. The very purpose of the legislation will be
defeated. The allottee will not be able to utilise
the land for fear of being divested in the event of
deaths and births in the family of the landowners.
Deaths and births are events which are bound to
occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to read a timelimit in sub-section (5) of Section 11. The concept
of reasonable time in the given facts would be
most appropriate. An application must be moved
within a reasonable time. The facts of the present
case demonstrate that redetermination under
sub-section (5) of Section 11 almost 5 years after
the death of Kartar Kaur and more than 6 years
after the order of the Collector declaring the land
as surplus had become final, has resulted in
grave injustice besides defeating the object of the
legislation which was envisaged as a socially
beneficial piece of legislation. Thus we hold that
the application for redetermination filed by Daya
Singh under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the
Act on 21-6-1985 was liable to be dismissed on
the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector
was wrong in reopening the issue declaring the
land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh
and Kartar Kaur.
11. The above reasoning is in consonance with
the provision in sub-section (7) of Section 11 of
the Act. Sub-section (7) uses the words ‘where
succession has opened after the surplus area or
any part thereof has been determined by the
Collector…’. The words “determined by the
Collector” would mean that the order of the
Collector has attained finality. The provisions
regarding appeals, etc. contained in Sections 8082 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made
applicable to proceedings under the Punjab Land
Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum
period of limitation in case of appeal or review is
ninety days. The appeal against the final order of
the Collector dated 30-9-1976 whereby 3.12 ha of
land
had
been
declared
as
surplus
was
dismissed on 27-3-1979. The order was allowed
to become final as it was not challenged any
further. Thus the determination by the Collector
became final on 27-3-1979. The same could not
be reopened after a lapse of more than 6 years
by order dated 23-7-1985. The subsequent
proceedings before the Revenue Authorities did
not lie. The order dated 23-7-1985 is non est. All
the
subsequent
through.
The
proceedings
issue
could
therefore
not
have
fall
been
reopened.”
(emphasis supplied)
***
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both
the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that
is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient
cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in
Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC
81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate”
or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the
word “sufficient” embraces no more than that
which provides a platitude, which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended
in the facts and circumstances existing in a case,
duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from
prosecuting
his
case,
and
unless
a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR
1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] ,
Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3
SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good
cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that
every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than
that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter
between
two
asterisks
has
been
emphasised in original.] so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed
to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter between
two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] ,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v.
Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao
v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress
resulting
from
its
operation.’
The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is
not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts
have
expressed
at
least
three
differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes
of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3)
that persons with good causes of actions
should
pursue
them
with
reasonable
diligence.’
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity
and
uncertainty,
and
therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been
lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or
laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh
v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh,
(1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
[P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
***
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in
Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.
[Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] [“Postmaster
General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29)
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court.
They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government
bodies,
instrumentalities
that
their
agencies
unless
they
and
have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform
their
duties
with
diligence
and
commitment.
Condonation
of
delay
is
an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated
benefit
for
the
government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Borse Brothers (supra), has
considered unexplained delay of 75 days to be long delay and further
observing
that
reasons
assigned
in
the
application
seeking
condonation of delay to be short of making out sufficient cause and the
delay condoned by High Court was set aside. Coordinate Bench of this
Court in case of Cube Engitech Consultants (P) Ltd. (supra) has
dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay of 42 days.
14. In case of Chief Engineer Public Works Department, National
Highway Zone Vs. Rohit Sidar and Ors. In Arb. No.75 of 2025,
decided on 23.02.2026, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court
dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay observing that
obtaining legal opinion, administrative approvals, superannuation of
the officer-in-charge and procedural delays did not constitute sufficient
cause.
15. In case of East Central Railway & Ors. Vs. Pratibha Royal (JV),
reported in MANU/BH/0146/2026, the High Court of Patna has refused
to condone the delay of 85 days observing that explanation based on
the file movement, inter-departmental deliberations, legal opinions and
multi-level administrative approvals were vague, routine and did not
constitute bonafide or sufficient cause.
16. In case of Postmaster General vs Living Media India Ltd., reported
in (2012) 3 SCC 563, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is
right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red
tape in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be
used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few. The decision in Postmaster General (supra)
has been followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in cases
of State of Rajasthan vs Balkishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592; State of
UP vs Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422; State of T.N. vs. N.
Suresh Rajan, (2014) SCC 11 709 and State of MP vs Bherulal, (2020)
10 SCC 654.
17. It is not the period of delay only relevant factor for consideration of
application for condonation of delay, but what is of prime consideration
is that whether cause shown for condonation of delay is sufficient
cause so as to condone the delay or not. When it comes to
commercial matters, Courts have to keep in mind the object sought to
be achieved by the law makers by framing Act of 1996 and Act of
2015. Condonation of delay in commercial dispute matter in view of
the decision in case of Borse brothers (supra) can only be in
exceptional cases and not in routine manner.
18. For the foregoing discussions in the facts of the case and also in view
of the law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above
we are of the considered view that appellant acted in a negligent
manner and failed to make out a case of sufficient cause to condone
the delay of 26 days in filing of appeal.
19. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 application seeking condonation of delay of 26
days is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal filed U/s. 37 (1) (c) of the
Act of 1996 read with Section 13 (1-A) of the Act of 2015 is also
dismissed as barred by limitation.
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Balram
Sd/(Sushma Sawant)
Judge
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