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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
I.A. 2/2022
In RSA 47 /2019
Md. Chunu Miah
----Appellant(s)
Versus
Hazi Mahammad Rushan Ali and ors.
For the Applicant(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
----Respondent(s)
Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, Sr. Advocate
Mr. J. Debbarma, Advocate
None
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Order
03/03/2022
Heard Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. J.
Debbarma, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant.
The appellant has challenged the judgment and decree dated 29.08.2019
and 03.09.2019 respectively passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Unakoti Judicial District, Kailasahar in connection with case no. Title
Appeal 24 of 2019, whereby and whereunder the learned Additional District
Judge had dismissed the judgment and decree dated 04.04.2019 and
10.04.2019 respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division),
Kailasahar, Unakoti Judicial District in connection with case no. Title Suit
28 of 2016.
At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial
questions of law have been formulated:
“(i) Whether non-consideration of fact that the Easement Act has not
been extended to the State of Tripura has vitiated the consequential
finding?
(ii) Whether there is any necessity of easement of the plaintiffrespondents No. 1 & 2 over the suit path and whether might compel the
appellant to allow the respondents No. 1 & 2 draw the electricity line or
water line through or over the suit pathway?”
The appeal was listed for hearing on several dates. When the matter
came up on 07.02.2022, since none appeared for the appellant, the matter
was dismissed for default. Today, the appellant has filed an application for
re-admission of the appeal. Since, the matter relates to the year 2019, this
court has requested Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel to argue the
case on merit to determine as to whether any substantial question of law is
involved at all in this appeal which may be worthy for re-admission of the
appeal.
Responding to such request, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel
has argued the case on merit.
Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel has argued that Easementary
Act is not applicable in the State of Tripura.
In response to this submission, in the opinion of this court, it is now well
settled that though Easementary Act is not directly applicable in the State of
Tripura, but, in a case of this nature, the principle and spirit of Easement Act
and its provisions are applicable in the State of Tripura. For the purpose of
adjudication of the suit relating to the establishment of one’s easementary
right over certain land for rendering justice to the parties. Accordingly, the
first substantial question of law formulated by this court has been answered.
Now, to deal with the second substantial question of law, I do not find
that it is at all a substantial question of law much less to say, it is a question
of law.
Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel, in respect of the second
substantial question of law has tried to persuade this court that the plaintiffrespondent, who has claimed easementary right over the suit pathway
described in the schedule of the plaint is a jote land of the defendant. He has
brought to my notice the Sale Deed (Exbt.1) wherein there is no mention of
any road.
On the basis of this argument, I have gone through the judgments of
both the courts below.
I find that the learned trial court only had taken note of the last sale
transaction whereby Ranjit kumar Acharjee sold his purchased land
(including second schedule land) to the defendant no.1 by Exbt. 5/Exbt. B
and finally, vide Sale Deed no. I-687, dated 12.04.2002, and since there was
no mention of said pathway in the last Sale Deed, the learned trial court had
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, but, in appeal, this point was well-taken by
the learned first appellate court. It was noticed that in all the sale
transactions between the parties previous to the sale deed no. I-687, the
vendors of those sale deeds had mentioned the suit pathway while describing
the schedules in the respective sale deeds.
Having noticed of this fact, the learned first appellant court came to a
finding that non-mentioning of the suit pathway in the last sale transactions
will not exclude the right of the plaintiff to use the said pathway as by way
of using the suit pathway for last several decades he has acquired the right
to use the said pathway following the principle and spirit of the provisions of
the Easementary Act. A few relevant findings of the learned first appellate
court may be reproduced here-in-below, for convenience, in extenso:“14. On perusal of the record, I find, the land purchased by plaintiffs(1st
schedule land) and the land purchased by defendant No.1(including 2nd
schedule land), both, originally belong to one and common owner Aswini
Kumar Das. First sale by Aswini Kumar Das was of eastern side
land(including 2nd schedule land) by Ext.6, the sale deed No.1-3090
dated 15.05.1971 to one Harendra Kumar Acharjee,(hereinafter called
as 'first purchaser of suit land/servient heritage'). Therefore, Harendra
Kumar Acharjee sold the said purchased land(including 2nd schedule
land) to Ranji Kumar Acharjee(hereafter called as 'second purchaser of
suit land/servient heritage') by Ext.12, the sale deed No.1-2377 dated
01.12.1983. Thereafter, Ranjit Kumar Acahrjee sold his purchased
land(including 2nd schedule land) to defendant No.1(hereafter called as
'last/ultimate purchaser of suit land/servient heritage') by Ext.5/Ext.B, the
sale deed(mortgage deed) No.1-777 dated 18.04.2001 and final sale deed
No.1-687 dated 12.04.2002.
Similarly, western side land(1st schedule land) was sold by original
owner Aswini Kumar Das to Adarini Bala Dey(hereinafter called as 'first
purchaser of dominant heritage') by Ext.1, the sale deed No.1-3841 dated
25.09.1972.Thereafter, Adarini Bala Dey sold the said purchased
land/dominant heritage to Jaman SHG/defendant No.2 & 3 (hereinafter
called 'second purchaser of dominant heritage') by Ext.2, the sale deed
No.1-520 dated 13.05.2008. Thereafter, Jaman SHG/defendant No.2 & 3
sold the dominant heritage to plaintiffs(hereinafter called 'last/ultimate
purchaser of dominant heritage') by Ext.3, the sale deed No.1-790 dated
25.05.2010.
15. From Ext.6, the sale deed No.1-3090 dated 15.05.1971 executed by
original owner of both dominant heritage and servient heritage, I find, in
the said sale deed in the north side of the sold land there is mentioning of
own road of original owner Aswini Kumar Das and thereafter in the
further north there is land of Rashamoy Chanda. Hence, it can be found
that while selling eastern side land (including suit path) to Harendra
Acharjee original owner kept the provision of road (suit path) in the
northern side of sold land. At the time of the said first sale of eastern side
land to Harendra Acharjee, the original owner was the owner of western
side land (1st schedule land) and thus, it can be said that keeping of
provision of road in the north side of the sold land is for the benefit and
enjoyment of the 1st schedule land. Harendra Acharjee being party to the
said sale deed is bound by the said condition, encumbrance and
limitation created, provided and imposed upon his purchased land by
original owner. As first purchaser of servient heritage Harendra
Acharjee was bound the said encumbrance, the second purchaser of
servient heritages namely Ranjit Acharjee was also bound by the said
encumbrance as mentioned in his sale deed marked Ext.12 as to the fact
that in the north side of his purchased there is two cubits breadth
pathway of Adarini Bala Dey(first purchaser of dominant heritage/1st
schedule land from original owner) and in the further north there is land
of Rabindra Kumar Acharjee. In the similar way, the defendant No.1, the
last/ultimate purchaser of the said land including suit pathway is bound
by the said encumbrance being purchaser of servient heritage.
From Ext.1, the sale deed No.1-3841 dated 25.09.1972, it can be
found that while selling dominant heritage/1st schedule land by original
owner Aswini Kumar Das he mentioned in the said sale deed that in the
east side of the sold land there is purchased land of Harendra Achajree
from him(original owner) measuring 0.40 acre and there in the north
side of the said boundary there is two cubit road lying east to west. Thus,
it is clear that while transferring 1st schedule land by original owner, the
original owner also transferred his right to enjoy suit path to the Adarani
Bala Dey. From Ext.2, the sale deed No.1-520 dated 13.05.2008 executed
by Adarini Bala in favour of defendant No.2 & 3 and Ext.3, the sale deed
No.1-790 dated 25.05.2010 executed by defendant No.2 & 3 in favour of
plaintiffs there is also mentioning of road in the east side of the sold land.
From Ext.7, the gift deed No.1-1530 dated 21.05.1983, it also can be
found that in the south side of gifted land there is mentioning of two cubit
road of Adarini Bala Dey. Ext.8 and Ext.9, the resolution of the meeting
also corroborated about the existence, use and right of suit path.
16. Considering the fact situation of this case as stated above, I find, the
present case is covered by quasi easement. Aswini Kumar Das being the
original owner of both the land had right to impose condition on the sold
land at the time of sale for enjoyment of retained(non-sold) land in view
of Section 8 of the Easement Act. Accordingly, Aswini Kumar Das at the
time of sale of his eastern side land to Harendra Kumar Achajee imposed
condition of road on the north side of sold land and the same is
enforceable and binding on purchaser Harendra Kumar
Achajee.
The creation of easement and authority of Aswini Kumar Das to
create and impose such condition, limitation and restriction as easement
can be understood from Section 8 read with Section 13(d) and
illustration (b) of Section 13 of the Easement Act. Section 13 (d) of the
Easement Act provided that “(d) If such an easement is apparent and
continuous and necessary for enjoying the said property as it was
enjoyed when the transfer or bequest took effect, the transferor, or the
legal representative of the testator, shall, unless a different intention is
expressed or necessarily implied be entitled to such easement.”
Illustration (b) of Section 13 of the Easement Act, even though related
to easement of necessity, runs as follows:
“(b) A, the owner of two fields, sells one to B, and retains the other.
The field retained was, at the date of the sale, used for agricultural
purposes only, and is inaccessible except by passing over the field sole
to B. A is entitled to a right of way, for agricultural purposes only, over
B’s field to the field retained.”
In this case, it can be found that Aswini Kumar Das having ownership
of whole(both eastern and western side) land enjoyed suit path(within
eastern side land) for his western side land and accordingly imposed
condition, limitation and restriction and created his right to use suit path
while transferring land eastern side land(including suit land) to
Harendra Kumar Acharjee for enjoyment of western side land(1st
schedule land) and, thus, it can be said that the present case is covered
by quasi easement and easement by grant.
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22. That apart, from the evidence of PWS, it is also clear that originally
Aswini Kumar Das and thereafter Adarini Bala Dey and lastly plaintiffs
have been using the suit path as their pathway for beneficial enjoyment of
1schedule land. Mentioning of road in the sale deeds of plaintiffs and
their predecessors and predecessors of defendant No.1(vendor of
defendant No.1) proofs the fact that the suit path has been in use
continuously, openly and peacefully and without any interference.
Therefore, alternatively, it also can be said that the plaintiffs have
easement right over the suit path described in 2nd schedule of plaint by
way of acquiescence as per Section 15 of the Easement Act and easement
by prescription as per Section 25 of the Limitation Act.
I am also of the view that non mentioning of road of Adarini Bala Dey
in north side in the sale deed of defendant No.1 by his vendor Ranjit
Acharjee for the reason best known to the party is not a factor to
extinguish easement right created in favour of plaintiffs and their
predecessor even though there is alternative pathway as in the sale deed
of the vendor of defendant No.1 and vendor of vendor of defendant No.1
have mentioning of such road.”
On careful appreciation of the above discussions and findings, I find no
ground which may call for interference with the judgment and decree passed
by the first appellate court, which has correctly dismissed the judgment and
decree passed by the learned trial court.
Since, the essential elements required to establish substantial question of
law are absent in this appeal, I am not inclined to re-admit this second
appeal. Accordingly, the application for re-admission of the appeal stands
dismissed. Consequently, the second appeal also stands dismissed.
JUDGE
Saikat
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