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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 259 of 2017
Date of Decision: 11.10.2023
Smti. Maya Devi
Vs.
Union of India & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. L. Khyriem Adv. with
Mr. W. Jyrwa, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. R. Debnath, CGC
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
The case of the parties in brief is that the petitioner was initially
appointed as Female Attendant on 11.07.2002 in the Assam Rifles on
compassionate ground in place of her husband (L) Nirmal Kumar Singh,
who had predeceased her and who, during his lifetime was a personnel of
the Assam Rifles and lost his life in the line of duty in an avalanche in the
year 1992.
2.
In course of her work, the petitioner took leave for 26(twenty-six)
days including 2 days of earned leave and 6 days of transit leave from
01.10.2010 to 26.10.2010. On prayer made, the petitioner was allowed
extension of leave till 15.11.2010 for a further period of 20 days.
Admittedly, the petitioner could not resume her duties on expiry of the
said leave for which she received a letter No. 14043/A/2010/473 dated
23.12.2010 issued by the respondent authority requesting her to resume
duty immediately.
3.
Eventually, for various reasons cited by the petitioner, such as
being involved in a criminal case filed against her son and herself for
which she has to attend to and also for settling of family affairs, resulting
in her not being able to resume duty in time, the petitioner appeared on
16.10.2012 at the Transit Camp at Dimapur, Nagaland with the Assam
Rifles Unit there to rejoin her duty. She joined for duty at 44 Assam
Rifles on 21.10.2012.
4.
Vide communication dated 06.12.2012, a Show Cause notice was
issued upon the petitioner being No. 44AR/A/A3/2339(CIVIL) directing
her to show cause as to why she had overstayed her leave without any
reason and satisfactory intimation and was found to be absent from duty
till 15.10.2012, thereby being absent for more than 700(seven hundred)
days.
5.
The petitioner then filed her reply to the said show cause notice
on 07.12.2012 explaining the reason for her absence and also pointing out
that she had earlier sent a number of letters whereby she had informed the
authorities concerned about her absence. However, the respondent
authority proceeded to conduct an inquiry into the matter and set out
statement of imputations of charge in support of the articles of charges
framed against the petitioner to alleged absence from duty without prior
permission. The petitioner was served with a Memorandum to this effect
being
Memo
No.
I.12015/A(Discp)/DI-Maya
Devi/2014
dated
29.01.2014.
6.
Maj Girish Awasthy was appointed as the Inquiry Officer who
held the preliminary hearing in the matter and had requested the petitioner
to attend the same vide his communication No. 5360091/FA/44
AR/Discp/2014/026 dated 28.03.2014. The petitioner attended the inquiry
proceedings in person.
7.
The petitioner was then served with a copy of the Order bearing
No. I.12015/A(Discp)/DI-Maya Devi/2014 dated 23.05.2014 wherein the
proceedings against her was concluded with the major penalty of
“Compulsory Retirement from Service” imposed.
8.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 23.05.2014, the petitioner
approached the Hon‟ble Gauhati High Court by way of a writ petition
being WP(C) No. 517 of 2015 and the same was disposed of on
04.02.2015 with a direction to the authorities concerned to accept the
appeal to be filed by the petitioner in this regard.
9.
The petitioner then filed an appeal before the competent authority
against the impugned order dated 23.05.2014 which was rejected vide
order No. I.12015/A(Discp)/ DI-Maya Devi/2015/841 dated 04.06.2015
and the penalty of compulsory retirement from service was upheld.
10.
Again, the petitioner preferred an application dated 30.07.2016
before the concerned authority seeking reinstatement of her service but
she
was
informed
vide
letter
No.
I.14015/Rec/Adm-
IV(Civ)/Pension/2016/111 dated 08.09.2016 that she cannot be reinstated
and that she is also not entitled to any pension as she is 22 days short for
being eligible for pension as far as qualifying service under the Central
Civil Service (Pension) Rules 1972 is concerned. Again, vide letter No.
I.14015/Rec/Adm-IV(Civ)/ Pension/2017/148 dated 16.01.2017, she was
directed to sign the final settlement of her accounts and payments
pertaining to her entitlements.
11.
Not satisfied with the whole proceeding, including the passing of
the impugned order dated 23.05.2014 and the appellate order dated
04.06.2015 and also the order dated 08.09.2016 refusing reinstatement as
well as the order dated 16.01.2017 whereby she was directed to sign the
necessary documents and papers for payment of her entitlement, the
petitioner has hereby preferred this instant writ petition.
12.
Heard Mr. L. Khyriem, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that admittedly, that the petitioner has overstayed her leave for
about 700 is not denied. However, it is reiterated that the circumstances
surrounding the same have been duly communicated to the respondent
authority vide letters dated 25.12.2010, 22.02.2011, 11.05.2011,
26.07.2011 respectively. The petitioner has not retained any copy of the
said letters but has annexed (Annexure 4 Series) copies of the postal
receipts to prove the same.
13.
The first limb of argument raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that in course of the inquiry proceedings, she was asked to
take assistance of any person of her choice for her defence, but actually,
she was never allowed to be represented by any of her friends or
colleagues who are familiar with the procedure and formalities of the
inquiry. Secondly, she was never supplied with the documents relied
upon by the Inquiry Officer nor was she ever allowed to inspect such
documents, even though she was given only a list of the documents relied
upon by the authorities in the said inquiry. This is accordingly a clear
violation of her right to be heard and a breach of the principles of natural
justice which has rendered the whole inquiry or disciplinary proceedings
vitiated.
14.
The learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioner was
never given the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution‟s witnesses
which is also a clear violation of the principles of natural justice.
15.
Another limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel is that
on the alleged conclusion of the inquiry, the respondent authority has not
handed over a copy of the Inquiry Report, dated 23.05.2014 to the
petitioner thus preventing her from knowing the reasons for the Inquiry
Officer to come to the findings and conclusion whereby recommendation
for compulsory retirement from service has been made. This has also
caused prejudice to the petitioner as she could not file any show cause
before the major penalty was imposed upon her.
16.
The learned counsel has also submitted that the impugned order
dated 23.05.2014 is a cryptic and non-speaking order inasmuch as the
same has been passed without any application of mind, bereft of any
discussion and appreciation of the evidence and the materials on record
especially in view of the fact that the petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The contentions raised by the
petitioner in her show cause letter dated 07.12.2012 has also not been
considered by the said authority. Similarly, the order dated 04.06.2015
passed by the appellate authority also suffers from the same vice as there
is no evident of any application of mind resulting in the failure to address
the contentions raised by the petitioner in her relevant appeal.
17.
For violation of the fundamental and legal rights of the petitioner
as guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India as
far as the disciplinary proceedings against her is concerned, the learned
counsel has submitted that the relevant impugned orders of 23.05.2014
and the appellate order dated 04.06.2015 are liable to be set aside and
quashed and the petitioner be directed to be reinstated in service with all
consequential benefits.
18.
In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner
has cited the following authorities:
i.
Harihar Banerji & Ors. v. Ramshashi Roy & 7 Ors., AIR
1918 PC 102, para 2;
ii.
Ms. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral & Anr., (1981)
3 SC 317, para 6;
iii.
M/s Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) 1 SCC
264, para 6 and 7;
iv.
Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sungomal
Poshani, AIR (1989) 2 SCC 602;
v.
Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (Administration)
Bangalore v. V.K. Gururaj & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 275, para
1;
vi.
Basant Singh & Anr. v. Roman Catholic Mission, (2002) 7
SCC 531, para 11;
vii.
C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr., (2007 6
SCC 555, para 13 and 14;
viii.
Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. v.
Manju Jain & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 157, para 16, 17, 18 and
19;
ix.
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, para 53, 54, 55 and 56;
x.
Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545, para 17, 18
and 19.
19.
Per contra, Mr. R. Debnath, learned CGC has submitted that the
fact that the petitioner had overstayed her leave to the extent of 700 days
is not denied and that she has failed to furnish adequate reasons for such
absence is a matter of records.
20.
It is also submitted that several correspondences were issued upon
the petitioner directing her to rejoin her duty after the expiry of her
sanctioned leave but the petitioner did not respond to any of these
correspondences and instead, has physically reported before the Transit
Camp at Dimapur on 16.10.2012 and has joined her duty on 21.10.2012.
Mention is made to the dates on which the correspondences were sent to
the petitioner being 23.12.2010, 30.01.2011, 27.04.2011 and 28.09.2011
[Annexure-1 (series) of the counter affidavit].
21.
Again, the learned CGC has submitted that the petitioner was
issued with a notice to show cause being No. 44AR/A/A3/2339/(CIVIL)
dated 06.12.2012 to which she has accordingly replied vide her reply
dated 07.12.2012 wherein she has stated that during the period of her
absence her son Chandan Singh was an accused in a criminal case under
the Dowry Act and she was also implicated in the said case and was
arrested by the police but was eventually granted bail on 16.09.2011. Her
son was also granted bail only on 16.01.2011 (sic 2012).
22.
The learned CGC went on to submit that the respondent authority
had initiated the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner by
following the relevant rules under the Central Civil Service
(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1972, firstly by initiating the
preliminary inquiry and on the basis of the said preliminary inquiry, a
memorandum
No.
I.12015/A(Discp)/DI-Maya
Devi/2014
dated
29.01.2014 was issued to the petitioner and handed over to her.
23.
It is also submitted that the petitioner in her statement before the
Inquiry Officer had categorically admitted that she did not inform the unit
about her absence from duty since 16.11.2010 to 15.10.2012 that is, for
700 days and has also admitted to the charges framed against her.
24.
The learned CGC while contradicting the claim of the petitioner,
has submitted that as per provision of law all the relevant copies of the
documents including the Memorandum of Charges dated 29.01.2014, the
statement of Article of Charges, Statement of Imputation of overstaying
on leave as well as the list of documents and the list of witnesses have all
been handed over to the petitioner. Again, in accordance with rules, the
petitioner was given an opportunity to nominate a serving government
employee or a retired government employee to assist her in her defence
but she declined to do so.
25.
The allegation that the petitioner was not given adequate
opportunity to defend her case is also refuted by the respondent authority
and as submitted by the learned CGC, the entire enquiry was conducted in
utmost transparency with the petitioner being made to understand the
conduct of the same wherein she had also verified such proceeding by
putting her signature wherever necessary. The petitioner was also handed
over relevant documents for her defence in course of the said inquiry and
the statement of the witnesses were also read over to the petitioner in
presence of all the witnesses.
26.
The learned CGC has also submitted that the contention of the
petitioner that the imposition of the major penalty of „compulsory
retirement from service‟ is excessive and disproportionate to the alleged
offence, cannot be accepted as the petitioner has failed to suitably answer
to as to why she has overstayed her leave for about 700 days and in view
of the provision of Rule 25 of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, such absence
from duty without permission is an act of misconduct and the penalty
imposed is therefore, just and proper.
27.
This Court having heard the submission and contention of the
learned counsels for the respective parties would proceed to discuss the
same on the basis of the materials on record, that is, the writ petition, the
affidavit-in-opposition, the rejoinder to the same and also from whatever
is found relevant from the records produced by the respondent/Assam
Rifles before this Court.
28.
At the outset, what could be ascertained from the proceedings
before the respondent authority/Assam Rifles is that the petitioner has
admitted to have gone on leave and overstayed the sanction accorded.
Steps have also been taken by the authority concerned to compel her to
rejoin her duties. Correspondences in this regard have been duly
acknowledged by the petitioner. That she finally rejoined her Unit at 44
Assam Rifles on 21.10.2012 is not denied by either parties.
29.
The dispute arose when the petitioner was served with the show
cause notice dated 06.12.2012 to explain as to why she had absented
herself without any reason and satisfactory intimation, effectively from
16.12.2010 to 15.10.2012, about 700 days or so.
30.
The petitioner in her reply to the said show cause on 07.12.2012
has generally stated the reasons why she was absent and has particularly
stated that she has also intimated the concerned authority on about four
occasions, that is, on 25.12.2010, 22.02.2011, 11.05.2011 and 26.07.2011
about her inability to join duty.
31.
The respondent/Assam Rifles has acknowledged the receipt of the
letters dated 22.02.2011 and 26.07.2011 and reply was accordingly sent
to the petitioner on 27.04.2011 and 28.09.2011 respectively with a
reminder to her to join her duty. In fact, in the reply dated 27.04.2011, it
was clearly mentioned that the content of the letter of the petitioner shows
that she could not rejoin duty on account of her ill health, to which a
query was made as to when she will be fit to join since she has
continuously been absent since 15.11.2010. Therefore, on this front the
respondent authority cannot be faulted to say that no intimation was sent
to the petitioner asking her to join her duties.
32.
The authorities cited by the petitioner as listed at paragraph 18
hereinabove all speaks of one thing, that is, the principle or rather the
consequence of what could be presumed as communication in the form of
registered letter issued by post to have been duly affected even if the
receiver is not found at the given address or may have caused
circumstances to give a picture that he was not at home or in station at the
relevant point of time. This situation is, however, not present in these
proceedings as has been pointed out above. Therefore, there is no
question to be answered as to whether the said letters of the petitioner
were ever received by the respondent authority.
33.
The next objection raised by the petitioner is that due to the fact
that the copy of the inquiry report not being given to the petitioner, she is
prejudiced by the same to the extent that she was not able to file any
response to such report and to the proposed penalty to be imposed on her,
and as such, without such opportunity being given, the principle of
natural justice was violated.
34.
In response to this, the respondent authority in its affidavit-in-
opposition has denied the averment made in this regard and has stated
that all possible opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend
herself right from the time she was informed of the initiation of the
disciplinary proceedings against her. She was allowed to file her show
cause, to nominate a serving or retired government employee to assist her
in the proceedings, but she chose not to nominate anyone in this respect
but has personally participated in the whole proceedings, her signature
being attested to the relevant papers throughout the whole process.
However, the respondent authority has not made any categorical
statement that after the conclusion of the inquiry, upon the Inquiry
Officer having prepared and filing his report to the authority concerned,
copy of such report was given to the petitioner.
35.
This Court on perusal of the records of the proceedings available
with the department has noticed that the recording of the proceedings is
present in the file. Even the final report filed by the said Inquiry Officer
with the recommendation that stringent disciplinary action be taken
against the delinquent/petitioner which has probably influenced the
disciplinary authority to passed the impugned dismissal order is also
found in such records. There is, however, no indication that a copy of
such report was ever handed over to the petitioner before the impugned
order was passed.
36.
In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan,
(1991) 1 SCC 588, a three Judge bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
dealing with the issue arising out of the amendment of Article 311(2) by
the forty-second Amendment of the Constitution vis-à-vis furnishing of
the report of the Inquiry Officer in an inquiry proceeding to the
delinquent officer and the consequence thereof, the Court has at many
places in the judgment, made relevant observations. In the context of the
case herein, paras 10, 13, 14 and 18 of the judgment would be relevant.
The same are reproduced herein as under:
“10. A three Judge bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. R.G.
Teredesai [(1969) 2 SCC 128] has indicated that the Inquiry
Officer was under no obligation or duty to make any
recommendations in the matter of punishment to be imposed on
the government servant against whom the departmental inquiry is
held and his function merely is to conduct the inquiry in
accordance with law and to submit the record along with the
findings or conclusions on the delinquent servant. But if the
Inquiry Officer has also made recommendations in the matter of
punishment, that is likely to affect the mind of the punishing
authority with regard to penalty or punishment to be imposed on
such officer which must be disclosed to the delinquent officer.
Since such recommendation forms part of the record and
constitutes appropriate material for consideration of the
government, it would be essential that that material should not be
withheld from him so that he could while showing cause against
the proposed punishment make a proper representation. The
entire object of supplying a copy of the report of the Inquiry
Officer is to enable the delinquent officer to satisfy the punishing
authority that he is innocent of the charges framed against him
and that even if the charges are held to have been proved the
punishment proposed to be inflicted is unduly severe. At p. 254 of
the reports Grover, J. speaking for this Court stated: (SCC p.131,
para 5)
“The requirement of a reasonable opportunity, therefore,
would not be satisfied unless the entire report of the Enquiry
Officer including his views in the matter of punishment are
disclosed to the delinquent servant.”
Another three Judge bench decision of this Court is that of Uttar
Pradesh Government v. Sabir Hussain [(1975) 4 SCC 703] where
this Court held: (SCC p. 708, para 16)
“In view of these stark facts the High Court was right in
holding that the plaintiff (respondent) was not given a
reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action
proposed to be taken against him and that the non-supply of
the copies of the material documents had caused serious
prejudice to him in making a proper representation.”
13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article
311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural
justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one
occasion has stated that two phases of the inquiry contemplated
under Article 311(2) prior to the Forty-second Amendment were
judicial. That perhaps was a little stretching the position. Even if
it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute
that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and a denial
followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of
the material before conclusion is reached. The facets do make the
matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice.
As this Court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case [(1969) 2
SCC 128], the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by
the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the
recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be
inflicted. With the Forty-second Amendment, the delinquent
officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the
recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of
the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his
conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the
delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions
with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent
is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such
material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The
report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a
finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the
delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the
delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against
him though the same is made available to the punishing authority
in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice
would be affected. Prof. Wade has pointed out (Administrative
Law, 6th Edn., p. 10)
“The concept of natural justice has existed for many centuries
and it has crystallised into two rules: that no man should be
judge in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without
first being given a fair hearing…. They (the courts) have been
developing and extending the principles of natural justice so
as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure,
to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this
once again, by assuming that Parliament always intends
powers to be exercised fairly.”
14. This Court in Mazharul Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P. [(1979)
4 SCC 537] pointed out:
“Every person must know what he is to meet and he must have
opportunity of meeting that case. The legislature, however,
can exclude operation of these principles expressly or
implicitly. But in the absence of any such exclusion, the
principle of natural justice will have to be proved.”
18. We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry
Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority
at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all
or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment
or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will
also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so
desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to
violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable
to challenge hereafter.”
37.
The proposition of law as found in the case of Mohd. Ramzan
Khan(supra) has also found place in a number of subsequent judgments
passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court relating to the subject matter of the
importance of the copy of the inquiry report to be handed over to the
charged officer, one of such instance is found in the case of Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., (1993) 4
SCC 727 relevant paras being 25, 27 and 29 which are reproduced as
under:
“25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report
is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first
stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes
into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show
cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage
when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the
report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of
the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its
conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The
second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty
although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the
second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken
away by the Forty-second Amendment.
27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than
the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into
two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority
arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry
officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The
second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to
impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary
authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second
stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the
report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending
himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to
him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove
his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.
29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to
receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the
guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges
levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to
defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial
of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority
takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a
breach of the principles of natural justice.”
38.
In the light of the above observations, this Court is convinced that
the petitioner/delinquent has not been furnished with a copy of the said
inquiry report and therefore, was prevented from filing a response to the
same. Violation of natural justice has occurred. The subsequent action
taken by the concerned authority including imposition of the penalty of
“Compulsory Retirement from Service” as is found in the impugned order
dated 23.05.2014, cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. The same is
accordingly hereby set aside and quashed.
39.
This Court need not dwell on the corresponding fate of the
decision made in the appeal filed by the petitioner which has upheld the
order dated 23.05.2014 since it will no longer be of any consequential
value in view of the fact that the initial impugned order has been set aside
and quashed.
40.
Consequently, the authority concerned is hereby directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service with all due benefits including back
wages to which she is entitled to in accordance with law, had she not been
issued with the said impugned order for which she was compulsorily
retired from service.
41.
Registry is to send back the records of the respondent
authority/Assam Rifles.
42.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
11.10.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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