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2025:KER:30290
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
TUESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 18TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 6911 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
MANURAJ, AGED 24 YEARS, S/O SURESH, NEEROKKIL
MUTHAPPANTHARA, KALYAN ROAD, BELLA VILLAGE,
HOSDURG TALUK, KASARGOD DISTRICT., PIN - 671315
BY ADVS.
M.H.HANIS
T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR
NANCY MOL P.
ANANDHU P.C.
NEETHU.G.NADH
RIA ELIZABETH T.J.
SAHAD M. HANIS
RESPONDENTS:
STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT, HOME AND VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
RANGE OFFICE, KANNUR,KANNUR DIST, PIN - 670002
THE CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM
ROAD, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA,ERNAKULAM - 682026
BY ADV.SRI.K.A. ANAS, GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN COME UP FOR HEARING
ON 03.04.2025, THE COURT ON 08.04.2025 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
WP(C) NO. 6911/2025
2025:KER:3029
JUDGMENT
Jobin Sebastian, J.
This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment passed against the
petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity].
2.
By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from
entering the limits of Kasaragode Revenue District for six months
from the date of the receipt of the order. However, after considering
the representation submitted by the externee, the Advisory Board
modified the said order, and the period of externment was reduced to
five months from the date of the service of the impugned order and it
is further directed that after the expiry of the period of five months of
externment, the petitioner shall report before the Station House
Officer, Hosdurg Police Station, for the remaining period of five
months on every Sunday between 10 a.m. and 12 noon. However, it
is apparent that the direction of the Advisory Board to appear before
the SHO for five months is only a typing error as it is mentioned that
it is for the “remaining period of five months”, the petitioner shall
appear before the SHO particularly when the remaining period is only
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one month. Therefore, the direction to appear before the SHO has to
be treated as a direction to appear for one month instead of five
months.
3.
The records available before us reveal that, it was after
considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal
activities, the District Police Chief, Kasaragode submitted a proposal
for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section
15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range. For initiation of
proceedings, the petitioner has been classified as a “known rowdy”
as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.
4.
The authority considered 8 cases in which the petitioner
was involved before passing the order of externment. The last case
considered by the authorised officer for passing the impugned order
of externment is crime No.584/2024 of Hosdurg Police Station
registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offences
punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2),
118(1), 118(2), 110, 296(b) r/w 190 BNS.
5.
Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.
WP(C) NO. 6911/2025
6.
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The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that
the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and
without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there
is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing
the order of externment, and hence the live link between the last
prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment order is snapped.
The learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner was
released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last
prejudicial activity on stringent conditions, the said fact is not
adverted to, in the impugned order and the sufficiency of bail
conditions was also not considered by the jurisdictional authority.
Moreover, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order
was passed in a casual manner without arriving at the requisite
objective and subjective satisfaction and hence warrants interference.
7.
Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted
that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority
after proper application of mind and after entering on the requisite
objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned
Government Pleader, there is no inordinate delay in passing the
impugned order and hence the petitioner could not be heard to say
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that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose
of externment was snapped. It was further submitted that all the
procedural safeguards were complied with while passing the order of
externment against the petitioner and hence, no interference is
warranted.
8. On perusal of the records, it is gatherable that the last
prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority to pass
Ext.P1 order of externment is crime No.584/2024 of Hosdurg Police
Station, registered against the petitioner alleging commission of
offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 126(2),
115(2), 118(1), 118(2), 110, 296(b) r/w 190 BNS. The petitioner is
arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case.
The last prejudicial
activity was committed on 03.07.2024 and in the said case the
petitioner was arrested on 28.07.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner
was released on bail in the said case.
It was thereafter, on
18.11.2024 the District Police Chief, Kasaragode, forwarded the
proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P)Act against the
petitioner. Thereafter, the jurisdictional authority passed the order of
externment on 24.12.2024, whereby the petitioner was restrained
from entering the limits of Kasaragode Revenue District for a period
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of six months from the date of receipt of the order.
9.
The sequence of events narrated above reveals that
there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order.
Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act is having a
significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of
an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect
the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to
comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the view
that the delay occurred in this case is only justifiable and it could not
be said that the livelink between the last prejudicial activity and the
purpose of the impugned order is snapped. Moreover, unlike in the
case of an order of detention passed under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act,
even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment,
the same has no serious bearing as the consequences of both the
orders are different.
Because an order of detention is a grave
deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. We are
cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person
concerned with an intrusion to his personal liberty within the limit of
Article 21 especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his
right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order
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under Section 3 is compared with an order of externment passed
under Section 15(1) of KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with
lesser deprivation of liberty.
Therefore, the nature of proceedings
under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different.
In this
regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of
Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852].
Moreover, an order
under Section 15 can be treated only as equivalent to a condition
imposed in a bail order especially when the same only curtails the
movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in
holding that the delay of 4 months and 13 days in mooting the
proposal and the delay of 5 months and 21 days in passing the
externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity has no
serious impact at all and the same is only liable to be discarded.
10.
One of the main contentions raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority while
passing the order did not take notice of the fact that the petitioner
was released on bail in the last case registered against him.
According to the counsel, the jurisdictional authority failed to
consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at
the time when he was granted bail. While considering the contention
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of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted
that there is no law which precludes the jurisdictional authority to
pass an order of externment against a person who is already on bail.
However, when an order of externment is passed against a person
who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the
said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such
a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the
externee from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the
above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the
impugned order itself, the fact that the petitioner was released on
bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last
prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to.
Furthermore, in the
impugned order it is specifically mentioned that the conditions
clamped on the petitioner at the time of granting bail to him, are not
sufficient to restrain him from involving in criminal activities
recurrently. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner in the above regard will certainly fail.
In short, a perusal of Ext. P1 order indicates that the Deputy
Inspector General of Police had passed the said order after proper
evaluation of the materials and arriving at the requisite objective as
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well as subjective satisfaction. All the procedural safeguards envisaged
under KAA(P) Act are seen scrupulously complied with before passing
the order. Therefore, we are of the considered view that Ext.P1 order
warrants no interference.
In the result, this petition stands dismissed.
Sd/P.B. SURESH KUMAR
JUDGE
Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
ncd
WP(C) NO. 6911/2025
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 6911/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1
A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. A3-21522/2024/KR
DATED 24.12.2024 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2
A TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit P3
. A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 13.02.2025 IN
O.P.NO.18/2025 OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT
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