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2026:CGHC:20562
NAFR
RAHUL
JHA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed
by RAHUL JHA
Date: 2026.05.01
17:27:56 +0530
SA No. 847 of 2019
Manoranjan Prasad Pandey S/o Late Mokar Prasad Pandey Aged About 45
Years Occupation Agriculture, R/o Baikunthpur Raigarh, Tehsil And Dist.
Raigarh Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
.Appellant(s)
Versus
1 - Apoorva Shukla (Died And Deleted) (As Per Honble Court Order Dated09-04-2026)
2 - Smt. Pratibha Mishra W/o Sanjeev Mishra Aged About 38 Years R/o House
No. 20/5, Compadresidency, Behind Capital Petrol Pump, Raisen Road Bhopal
Madhya Pradesh.
3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Raigarh, District Raigarh
Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
.Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate
For Resp No. 2
:
Mr. Barun Kumar Chakrabarty, Advocate
For Resp No. 3
:
Mr. Jai Prakash Tiwari, PL
Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Judgment on Board
01/05/2026
1.
The present Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the plaintiff, who is the appellant herein,
calling in question the judgment and decree dated 06.11.2019 passed in Civil
Appeal No. 35/2017 (Manoranjan Prashad Pandey v. Smt. Indira Shukla &
Others) by the learned VI Additional District Judge, Raigarh (C.G.). By the
impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court has dismissed the
appeal preferred by the plaintiff/appellant and affirmed the judgment and
decree dated 31.07.2017 passed in Civil Suit No. 704-A/2005 (Manoranjan
Prashad Pandey v. Smt. Indira Shukla & Others) by the learned Civil Judge,
Class I, Raigarh (C.G.), whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant came to
be dismissed.
2.
For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as
per their status before the Trial Court.
3.
(a)
The plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title and
cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 15.09.1952 in respect of land
situated at Village Baikunthpur, Tehsil Raigarh, bearing Khasra No. 164,
admeasuring 0.477 hectares (hereinafter referred to as the “suit land”), as
described in Schedule ‘A’ appended to the plaint. It was prayed that the said
sale deed be declared null and void and the suit land be declared to be in the
ownership and title of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the suit land was
originally belonged to the plaintiff’s grandfather, Abhayram Pandey, who was
the exclusive owner and in possession thereof during his lifetime. It was further
pleaded that Abhayram Pandey, being a benevolent person devoted to social
service, was persuaded by defendant No. 1 late Gaurishankar Shastri to permit
establishment of a “Bapu Ashram” on the suit land for charitable purposes,
including service to the poor and establishment of educational and vocational
institutions.
(b)
It was further pleaded that, acting upon such representation and reposing
trust in defendant No. 1, Abhayram Pandey executed a registered sale deed
dated 15.09.1952 in favour of defendant No. 1, showing a nominal
consideration. According to the plaintiff, no actual consideration was paid and
the transaction was subject to the condition that the land would be utilized for
establishment and development of “Bapu Ashram”. It was contended that the
said condition formed the very basis of the transaction.
(c)
It was further pleaded that despite execution of the sale deed, defendant
No. 1 never established any Ashram nor undertook any activity in furtherance
of the stated purpose. It was alleged that after getting the land mutated in his
name, defendant No. 1 and thereafter his successors remained inactive and
failed to fulfill the condition attached to the transaction, thereby rendering the
sale deed void and ineffective. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff, being
the grandson of Abhayram Pandey, became the sole legal heir and successor by
virtue of a registered Will dated 25.05.1964 executed by Abhayram Pandey in
his favour, whereby all movable and immovable properties were bequeathed to
him. It was stated that the plaintiff has been in possession and management of
the ancestral properties, including land adjoining the suit land bearing Khasra
Nos. 110, 112, 165, 113, etc., whereas the suit land has remained vacant.
(d)
It was further alleged that in recent years, certain encroachments have
been made over portions of the suit land by third parties. It was also alleged
that defendant No. 1, through his alleged power of attorney holder, is making
attempts to alienate the suit land to third parties and has issued notices dated
07.02.2005 to alleged encroachers, thereby asserting ownership and attempting
to deal with the property contrary to the original purpose.
(e)
It was the case of the plaintiff that since no consideration was ever paid
and the fundamental condition of establishing the Ashram was never fulfilled,
the sale deed dated 15.09.1952 is void ab initio and liable to be cancelled. It
was further pleaded that the plaintiff, being the legal heir and beneficiary under
the Will, is entitled to declaration of title and consequential reliefs. The cause
of action is stated to have arisen on 07.02.2005 when the alleged power of
attorney holder of defendant No. 1 issued notices regarding the suit land and
further when attempts were made to alienate the property, and it is stated to be
continuing thereafter within the jurisdiction of the Court.
(e)
On the other hand, the defendants have denied the plaint averments and
contended that the sale deed dated 15.09.1952 was executed upon payment of
full and valid consideration and was unconditional in nature. It is denied that
the transaction was subject to any condition regarding establishment of
Ashram. It was further pleaded that late Gaurishankar Shastri, being a public
figure and Gandhian, may have intended to establish an Ashram, but such
intention did not constitute a binding legal condition. It was contended that
after purchase, the suit land has remained in possession of defendant No. 1 and
thereafter his legal representatives, who have exercised ownership rights
thereon. It was also contended that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation,
having been filed after more than five decades from the date of execution of the
sale deed, and is liable to be dismissed under Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
4.
On the basis of pleadings and evidence, the Trial Court, upon
appreciation of the material on record, held while deciding Issue Nos. 1 and 2
together that the plaintiff failed to prove that the sale deed dated 15.09.1952
was without consideration or subject to any enforceable condition regarding
establishment of “Bapu Ashram”, as the recital therein did not prescribe any
binding condition, time limit, or consequence of non-fulfilment so as to
invalidate the transaction, and accordingly the said issues were held not proved;
further, in respect of Issue No. 3, it was held that since the suit property had
already been alienated in the year 1952 prior to execution of the Will dated
25.05.1964, the testator had no subsisting title to bequeath the same and the
Will did not specifically include the suit land, while the revenue records also
reflected possession in the name of Gaurishankar Shastri, thereby disentitling
the plaintiff from claiming title or possession; however, Issue No. 4 was
decided in favour of the plaintiff holding the suit to be within limitation as
knowledge of the transaction arose in 2004–05 and the suit was filed in 2005,
and Issue No. 5 relating to valuation and court fee was also decided in his
favour, but in view of failure to establish title and invalidity of the sale deed,
the suit was ultimately dismissed.
5.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the
plaintiff preferred a first appeal before the Appellate Court. However, the
learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence
available on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and
dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment, thereby confirming the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Hence, the present second
appeal has been filed.
6.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Courts have erred in
law in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the true object and nature of the
sale deed dated 15.09.1952 (Ex.P/2), inasmuch as the document itself clearly
reflects that the suit land was transferred on nominal consideration for the
specific purpose of establishment and management of “Bapu Ashram”, and
such recital has not been properly appreciated. It is contended that the
transaction, being founded upon a specific charitable object, could not have
been treated as an absolute sale, and the failure to give due effect to the said
object vitiates the findings recorded. It is further submitted that the said
transaction is hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, as the object and
consideration, when tested in light of the recitals in the document and
surrounding circumstances, render the transaction opposed to public policy,
particularly when the land has not been utilized for the stated purpose. It is also
contended that the findings recorded are perverse, being based on improper
appreciation of evidence and by ignoring material recitals of the document.
Learned counsel thus submits that the case gives rise to substantial questions of
law as formulated and prays that the appeal be admitted on the said questions
or on such other substantial question of law as this Court may deem fit in the
facts and circumstances of the case.
7.
I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of
admission and have carefully perused the impugned judgments and decrees
passed by both the Courts as well as the material available on record.
8.
At the outset, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to the examination of
substantial questions of law. Interference with concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate
Court is permissible only where such findings are shown to be perverse, based
on no evidence or suffering from an error of law.
9.
Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and upon perusal of the
judgments and record, it is evident that the entire case of the appellant rests on
the plea that the sale deed dated 15.09.1952 (Exh. P/2) was executed without
consideration and subject to a binding condition for establishment of “Bapu
Ashram”. However, both the Courts have, on proper appreciation of the
document, concurrently held that the said instrument is a registered sale deed
reflecting payment of consideration and effecting transfer of ownership. The
appellant himself has admitted in cross-examination that the document records
consideration of Rs. 500/- and does not contain any stipulation that in the event
of non-construction of the Ashram, the property would revert to the vendor.
The plea that the transaction was without consideration or in the nature of a
conditional transfer is thus contrary to the express terms of the document and
unsupported by any cogent evidence.
10.
Further, the recital relating to construction of “Bapu Ashram”, even if
accepted, does not constitute an enforceable condition affecting the validity of
the transfer. Once an absolute transfer of ownership is made for consideration,
any direction as to the manner of use of the property, which is inconsistent with
the nature of the transfer, is rendered ineffective in law. In absence of any
stipulation providing for reversion or consequence of non-fulfilment, such
recital cannot invalidate the sale. The Appellate Court has rightly applied the
settled principles governing transfer of property and has correctly held that the
condition, being repugnant to an absolute transfer, is unenforceable and does
not affect the validity of the sale deed.
11.
The contention regarding applicability of Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act is also misconceived. There is nothing on record to demonstrate
that the object or consideration of the transaction was unlawful or opposed to
public policy. Mere non-utilization of the property for the stated purpose does
not render the transaction void. Likewise, the findings recorded cannot be
termed as perverse, as they are based on proper appreciation of documentary as
well as oral evidence, including admissions of the plaintiff.
12.
So far as the claim of title based on the Will dated 25.05.1964 is
concerned, it has been rightly held that the testator had already divested himself
of the suit property in the year 1952 and, therefore, had no subsisting right to
bequeath the same. The revenue records consistently reflect the name and
possession of the purchaser and his successors, further negating the claim of
the appellant.
13.
It is well settled, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of
Rajasthan and Others v. Shiv Dayal and Another, (2019) 8 SCC 637, that
interference in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact is permissible
only when such findings are shown to be based on misreading of material
evidence, contrary to pleadings, or such as no reasonable judicial mind could
have arrived at. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the findings
recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court suffer from any such
infirmity.
14.
Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has
held thus at paras 31 to 35 :“31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever
erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second
appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the
substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the
argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to
have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the
findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand
and fails.
32.
Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the
case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if
findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly
inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to
interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear
error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan
Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been
laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an
error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a
ground for the High Court to upset the same.
33.
In
Kashibai
w/o
Lachiram
and
Another
vs.
Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition
of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the
High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere
with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of
law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided.
The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous
findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant
evidence.
34.
Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High
Court has not found any substantial question of law or a
question of law worth consideration in the second appeal
and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have
reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different
conclusion.
35.
Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh
Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact
remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if
erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it
stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for
interference has been made out in the present case. “
15.
In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court finds that the findings
recorded are pure findings of fact based on due appreciation of evidence and
settled principles of law. No perversity, illegality, or substantial question of law
arises for consideration in the present appeal. The submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellant essentially seek re-appreciation of evidence, which is
impermissible in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
16.
Consequently, the present Second Appeal is hereby dismissed at the
admission stage itself.
Sd/(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Rahul/Gowri
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