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2026:CGHC:1375-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
ACQA No. 464 of 2018
Manoj Thakur S/o Ram Ayodhya Thakur Aged About 42 Years
Occupation Business, R/o House No. LIG- 115, R.P. Nagar, Korba,
Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - Abdul Rahmaan S/o Md. Sulemann Aged About 41 Years R/o M I
G- 1/56, Rabishankar Nagar, Korba, Purana Chowk, Maanikpur,
Police Station- Kotwali, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba,
Chhattisgarh
Digitally signed
by VASANT
VASANT KUMAR
Date:
KUMAR 2026.01.12
18:13:00
+0530
2 - Yogesh Suryavanshi S/o Gajanand Suryavanshi R/o L I G -86,
Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Korba, Purani Chowk, Rampur, Korba,
Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
3 - Abdul Sultan S/o Md. Sulemaan Aged About 35 Years R/o
Ravishankar Shukla Nagar, M I G-1/56, Purani Chowk, Maanikpur,
Police Station - Kotwali, District - Korba, Chhattisgarh, District :
Korba, Chhattisgarh
4 - Shekh Imraan S/o Abdul Majid R/o House No. 286, Subash
Block, S E C L , Korba, Purani Chowk, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District :
Korba, Chhattisgarh
5 - Manish Singh S/o Krishna Kumar Chatri Aged About 41 Years
R/o M I G 1/143, Maharana Pratap Nagar, Korba, Chhattisgarh,
District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
6 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Korba ,
District - Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
(Cause title is taken from the CIS)
For Appellant
: Shri Divyanand Patel, Advocate appears
on behalf of Mr. Rishikant Mahibia, Advocate
For Respondent No.6/State : Shri Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy, GA
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and
Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
09.01.2026
1.
Heard Shri Divyanand Patel, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr.
Rishikant Mahibia, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard
Shri Nitansh Jaiswal, Dy. Government Advocate for the
State/Respondent No.6.
2.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that
the impugned order dated 18.02.2016 has been assailed by way
of the present acquittal appeal. It is contended that the appellant
could not approach this Court within the period of limitation and
that there is a delay of about one year in filing the appeal.
Explaining the delay, it is argued that the appellant was not
having knowledge about passing of the judgment of acquittal as
the same has not informed to him. In the month of February,
2017, he came to know about judgment of acquittal then he has
moved application on 14.02.2017 for getting certified copy of the
judgment
and
other
documents
which
he
received
on
25.02.2017. He would further submit that the appellant wants to
engage a senior counsel to argue the present appeal on behalf
of the appellant. Thus, his inability to file the acquittal appeal
within time cannot be attributed to deliberate negligence or
malafide conduct, but is the result of unavoidable circumstances
coupled with poverty and ignorance of legal remedy. The delay,
therefore, is bona fide and stands sufficiently explained.
Accordingly, he prays for condoning the delay in the interest of
justice and proceed to hear the appeal on merits.
3.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Staterespondent No.6 opposes the prayer for condonation of delay
and submits that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the
prescribed statutory period. It is contended that a delay of about
one year is inordinate and cannot be brushed aside lightly, as
condonation of such prolonged delay defeats the very object of
the law of limitation, which is to ensure certainty and finality in
litigation. It is further argued that the reasons assigned by the
appellant, namely financial hardship, lack of guidance, and
ignorance of the remedy, do not constitute sufficient cause in the
eye of law. Poverty or ignorance of law, it is submitted, cannot be
pleaded as a justification for circumventing statutory provisions.
Learned counsel stresses that the appellant has not acted with
due diligence and has failed to show that he was prevented by
circumstances beyond her control. It is also urged that the
explanation furnished is vague and does not satisfactorily
account for the long period of delay. Therefore, it is prayed that
the application for condonation of delay be rejected, and
consequently the acquittal appeal itself be dismissed as barred
by limitation.
4.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant acquittal appeal.
5.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether the delay of about one year in preferring the
present acquittal appeal deserves to be condoned or not ?
6.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and
observed as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the Court within limitation. In
Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC
Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect the
rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its
rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference
was also made to the decision of this Court in
Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81] while rejecting an application for condonation
of delay for lack of sufficient cause has
concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent
a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake
in dismissing the delay condonation application
of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case and that, the expression 'sufficient
cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted,
if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J)
was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should
not be excused as a matter of generosity and
rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant
passage of the same is profitably extracted
below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to look
into the merits of the matter as long as we are
not convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India when it
comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach
the court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions of the
law, then he cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by the
delay being condoned. This litigation between
the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However,
till date the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12
years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach
of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered
on merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the
plea for condonation of delay, the court must not
start with the merits of the main matter. The
court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona
fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition
of the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of
equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed no
error much less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to prove that
they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the delay
is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts
of the present case, we are of the opinion that
the High Court correctly refused to condone the
delay and dismissed the appeal by observing
that such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for
the same, and no plausible reason was put forth
by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject
this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical
attitude on the part of the officials functioning in
the State machinery. Though the Government
adopts systematic approach in handling the legal
issues
and
preferring
the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in
merely communicating the information on time,
huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is one
such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788
days occasioned in preferring the second appeal
due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion,
filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc.,
fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and
penalize
the
officer(s),
who
is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if
any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of
the same. For example if the period of limitation
is 90 days then the party seeking condonation
has to explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is
of no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that
it was unable to file it between the 1st day and
the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to
wait until the last day of limitation for filing an
appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal
earlier,
the
sufficient
cause
must
establish that because of some event or
circumstance
arising
before
the
limitation
expired it was not possible to file the appeal
within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of
limitation which may further delay the filing of the
appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed
to expire without the appeal being filed must be
traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
7.
From the order-sheets of the case, it transpires that the present
appeal was filed and came up before a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court on 18.05.2017 and the present appeal was reported to
be suffering from certain defaults and the appellant counsel was
given time again to remove the default, but ultimately on
22.11.2018, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court found that as the
appeal has been preferred by the victim, hence, in view of the
pronouncement of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mallikarjun
Kodagali
(Dead)
represented
through
Legal
Representavives Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. decided on
12.10.2018, the victim in the present case is not required to seek
leave to appeal. Hence, the said appeal default was carved out
and the appeal was directed to be registered listed for
admission. Today, the same has been listed for admission.
8.
From the perusal of the memo of appeal and documents
annexed with the present appeal, it transpires that the present
appeal is beyond time by one year and the application filed for
condonation of delay goes to show that a vague averment has
been made in para No.3 that the appellant was not having
knowledge about passing of the judgment of acquittal as the
same has not informed to him. In the month of February, 2017,
he came to know about judgment of acquittal then he has moved
application on 14.02.2017 for getting certified copy of the
judgment
and
other
documents
which
he
received
on
25.02.2017.
9.
It is very surprising that the appellant who was one of the injured
person has did not have knowledge about the passing of the
order
passed
by
the
trial
Court
acquitting
the
accused/respondents and when the same was confronted with
the counsel for the appellant, he initially submitted that because
of financial hardship, the appellant could not file his appeal and
the said argument and the ground which was argued by the
counsel for the appellant initially is not averred in the delay
condonation application and the prayer which has been made
today for adjourning the matter for engaging a senior counsel
appears to be also unfounded as the appeal has been pending
before this Court and was directed to be listed for admission
since 2018. Hence, the prayer for engaging a senior counsel is
accordingly rejected.
10.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident
that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with
great
caution
and
only
upon
a
clear
and
satisfactory
demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that
poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute
such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing
substantial justice.
11.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the
delay of about one year in filing the present acquittal appeal is
grossly inordinate. The explanation offered by the appellant,
namely financial constraints, lack of legal guidance, and
ignorance of the remedy, though invoking sympathy, cannot be
treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is now wellsettled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not
constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the
valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the
law of limitation be lightly taken away.
12.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that
seeks to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the
statutory period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the
Court must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain
satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In
the present case, the appellant has not been able to point out
any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which
disabled his from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the
record reveals that he remained inactive for a long period. Such
explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged
and unexplained for a substantial period.
13.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for
condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence,
the instant acquittal appeal, being hopelessly barred by
limitation, also stands dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches.
Sd/(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
Vasant
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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