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2026:CGHC:5898-DB
SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
Date:
2026.02.03
17:59:11 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 52 of 2026
1 - Manoj Kumar Dhruv S/o Shri Jethuram Dhruv Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward
No. 9, Nagar Palika Naharpur Tehsil Naharpur, District Kanker Chhattisgarh.,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Shivcharan Baghel S/o Shri Bisruram Baghel Aged About 46 Years R/o Ward No.
01, Nagar Palika Naharpur, Tehsil Narharpur, District Kanker Chhattisgarh., District
Kanker, Chhattisgarh
3 - Balmukund Chakradhari S/o Bideshram Chakradhari Aged About 50 Years R/o
Ward No. 08, Nagar Palika Naharpur, Tahsil Naharpur, District Kander
Chhattisgarh., District Kanker, Chhattisgarh
4 - Dhirendra Kumar Kashyap S/o Bhavsingh Kashyap Aged About 36 Years R/o
Manjhapara
Ward,
Kanker,
District
Kanker
Chhattisgarh.,
District
Kanker,
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant (s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Town Administration Department
And Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Directorate Of Town Administration Department And Development,
R.D.A. Building, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Chief Municipal Officer Nagar Panchayat Narharpur, Tahsil Narharpur, Civil And
Revenue District Kanker, Uttar Bastar Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant (s)
:
Mr. Somkant Verma, Advocate
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Prasoon Bhadhuri, Dy. Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
03/02/2026
1.
Heard Mr. Somkant Verma, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as Mr. Prasoon Bhadhuri, learned Deputy Advocate
General, appearing for respondents/State on I.A. No. 1, which is an
application for condonation of delay of 864 days in preferring the
instant appeal.
2.
Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants
have filed this writ appeal against an order dated 02.05.2023, passed
by learned Single Judge, in WPS No. 5366/2019 (Manoj Kumar Dhruv
& Others Vs. State of C.G. & Others), by which the learned Single
Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. He
further submits that another writ appeal, being W.A. No. 835/2025, filed
against the same order, was dismissed by this Court on account of
various defaults. However, the present writ appeal does not suffer from
any such default.
3.
On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the
appellants as to why he has approached this Court against the
impugned order dated 02.05.2023, after an inordinate delay of 864
days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent
reason for delay in filing the writ appeal.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that
the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no
cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches
application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not
liable to be entertained.
5.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant writ appeal.
6.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is
whether the delay of about 864 days in preferring the present writ
appeal deserves to be condoned or not.
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as
follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner
has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021
SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that
even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of
a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to
the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram,
2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC
81]
while
rejecting
an
application
for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause
has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient
cause”
which
means
an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on
his
part
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition whatsoever. The application is
to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning
the
delay
putting
without
any
any
justification,
condition
whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation
of
the
statutory
provisions
and
it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake
in dismissing the delay condonation application
of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone
the
delay
has
to
be
exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case and that, the expression 'sufficient
cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted,
if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The relevant passage of the
same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going
to look into the merits of the matter as
long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for
condonation
of
such
a
long
and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is
a private party or a State or Union of
India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court
long
after
the
lapse
of
the
time
prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are
in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree.
It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158
days and once again ask the respondent
to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the
appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate
delay
and
in
such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical
considerations.
While
considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes
a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question
of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’
hanging over the head of the respondent
for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of
the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was
exercising
its
supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this
Court, it has been said that delay should
not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The appellants have failed to prove that
they
were
reasonably
diligent
in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test
for condoning the delay is not satisfied in
this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that
the
High
Court
correctly
refused
to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by
observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason
was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are
inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery. Though
the
Government
handling
the
adopts
legal
systematic
issues
and
approach
preferring
in
the
petitions/applications/ appeals well within the time, due
to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct
the State to streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility
on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s),
who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc.,
if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be followed by
all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a
delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of
the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90
days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the way of
the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st
day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to
wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of some
event or circumstance arising before the limitation
expired it was not possible to file the appeal within
time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry
of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances subsequent to
the expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been
allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must
be traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in
the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to
condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a
clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is
well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not
constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing
substantial justice.
9.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
864 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the appellant, i.e. financial constraints, lack of
legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, though invoking
sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is
now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not
constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the
valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of
limitation be lightly taken away.
10.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances
which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has
not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of
limitation which disabled them from approaching this Court. On the
contrary, the record reveals that they remained inactive for a long
period and sought to revive their claim only after consulting legal aid
services. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and
unexplained for a substantial period.
11.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ
appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches.
d/-
sagrika
S
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Sd/-
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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