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Page |1
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
OWP No. 2191/2015
IA No.01/2015
CM No. 937/2023
CM No. 5200/2024
Reserved on: 30.04.2026
Pronounced on: 08.05.2026
Uploaded on: 11.05.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced:
Full
Managing Director,
Hotel Grand Mumtaz, Srinagar
Through Mir Ab. Rashid
S/O Kh. Gh. Mohiuddin
R/O Soura Srinagar.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Nisar Ahmad Bhat.
Vs.
1.
Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Srinagar.
2.
Fayaz Ahmad Shah
S/O Mohammad Ashraf Shah
R/O Gupkar Nishat Srinagar.
…Respondent(s)
Through: Adv. Ateeb Kanth, for R-2.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner-management has invoked the writ jurisdiction of
this Court to challenge the impugned ex-parte Award dated
05.05.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
J&K, Srinagar (‘Tribunal’ in short), in terms whereof, the Tribunal
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directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No. 2-Fayaz
Ahmad Shah forthwith and also awarded 50% back wages from
the date of his alleged termination in May, 2005 passed in a
Claim Petition titled Fayaz Ahmad Shah Vs. Managing Director
Hotel Grand Mumtaz Srinagar, received as Reference under
Section 10 of ID Act.
2. Impugned
Award
has
been
assailed
by
the
petitioner-
management on the grounds that the Claim Petition submitted by
the respondent No.2-Fayaz Ahmad Shah before the Government
in terms of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and the proceedings
initiated thereon were not maintainable for the reason that
respondent No.2-Claim petitioner was not a “workman” within its
definition under Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act; that on receiving the
Reconciliation Order, the State Government of J&K vide
Notification dated 20.03.2006, referred the matter to the Tribunal
in terms of Section 10(1) of the Act for its adjudication on the
questions framed by the Reconciliation Officer, wrongly; that the
services of the respondent No.2-Claim petitioner were never
terminated rather he himself, after being involved in grave
misconduct, abandoned his service; that the Tribunal had
misdirected itself to order back wages which could be awarded to
a ‘workman’, who would have remained idle, whereas respondent
No.2 was working as a Pharmacist having his own medical
shop.
3. The brief facts leading to file present petition, as pleaded in this
writ petition, are that the respondent No. 2 was initially appointed
as a Sales Representative by M/S Mushtaq Trading Corporation
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(erstwhile partnership concern of the petitioner) in April, 1996.
The respondent No.2 was later discharging his duties in a
supervisory capacity specifically as a Works Supervisor and
subsequently as Housekeeping In-charge, drawing a monthly
salary of ₹4,500/-. The petitioner-management contends that the
respondent No. 2 was involved in grave misconduct i.e., theft of
guest's trousers, following which he voluntarily abandoned his
services on 23.05.2005 to avoid disciplinary action.
4. Per contra, the respondent No.2 raised an industrial dispute
claiming that he was verbally and arbitrarily terminated from
service without notice, inquiry, or compliance with Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A failure report was submitted
by the Conciliation Officer, and the Government vide SRO 96
dated 20.03.2006, referred the dispute to the Labour Court for
adjudication.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of
the Tribunal.
6. Mr. Nisar Ahmad Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, while
reiterating the grounds urged in the petition, argued that the
respondent No.2 right from his engagement was working as a
‘Works Supervisor’ to supervise the constructional work being
carried out by the petitioner-management; that the nature of the
engagement of the respondent No.2 was on monthly basis, but
he did not choose to extend his services beyond 23.05.2005
because of grave misconduct committed by him. It is being
argued that the respondent No.2 voluntarily abandoned his
services to avoid disciplinary action. Learned counsel also
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argued that the respondent No.2 was not holding any post on
regular basis and was working as Supervisor which does not
come within the ambit of the definition of ‘workman’ in terms of
the Act of 1947, which fact was not considered by the Tribunal
while passing the Award impugned. It is finally prayed that the
reference made by the Government to the respondent No.1Tribunal, in relation to the claim of the respondent No.2, be
dismissed and the impugned Award be quashed.
7. Mr. Ateeb Kanth, learned counsel for respondent No.2, ex
adverso, contends that the case of respondent No. 2 is that the
nature of duties performed by him was clerical and mere
designation or salary is not determinative of “workman” status. It
is contended that the respondent No. 2 was verbally and
arbitrarily terminated from service without notice, inquiry, or
compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, and this action on the part of the petitioner was illegal, as
such, the learned counsel supported the impugned Award
passed by the Tribunal, in accordance with law which does not
warrant any interference by this Court.
8. Mr. Kanth, further argued that the Court issuing a writ of certiorari
acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction
and that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the
inferior court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. In this
regard, learned counsel has relied upon the verdict reported as
AIR 1955 SC 233 in case titled ‘Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed
Ahmad Ishaque & Ors.’
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9. Next contention of learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is
that the petitioner could have challenged the Reference as and
when it has been made to the Tribunal, but he did not choose to
challenge the same, instead participated in the proceedings
before the Tribunal, as such, it cannot challenge the Reference
after passing of the Award. Finally, it is prayed that the Award
being a reasoned one requires no interference from this Court,
same be upheld and the writ petition be dismissed.
10.
Mr. Nisar Ahmad Bhat petitioner’s counsel, while rebutting the
contentions of Mr. Kanth, submitted that if the finding of a
Tribunal is perverse, same is liable to be set aside in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226, and in this regard has relied upon
the judgment reported as (2019) 13 SCC 82 titled ‘Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd. vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola & Ors’.
Further
rebutting
the
contention
of
learned
counsel
for
respondent No.2 with regard to challenge of Reference made to
the Tribunal, he submits that the petitioner does not need to
challenge the Reference as forming an opinion as to whether an
industrial dispute exists or not, is not the same thing as to
adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. In this regard reliance is
placed on law laid down by the Apex Court in a case reported as
AIR 1989 SC 1565 titled ‘Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor
Sangh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.’
11.
The present petition raises fundamental questions regarding the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and the substantive
application of labour laws. The primary issues are:
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i)
Whether respondent No. 2 falls within the definition of
a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, thereby conferring jurisdiction
upon the Tribunal?
ii)
Whether the Tribunal erred in law by retrospectively
applying the 2010 amendment of the Industrial
Disputes Act to a cause of action that arose in the
year 2005?
iii)
Whether the termination of service amounted to
illegal retrenchment under Section 25-F or voluntary
abandonment?
12. It is an admitted fact on record that respondent No. 2 was
working as a Housekeeping In-charge/Works Supervisor and was
drawing a salary of ₹4,500/- per month at the time of the
termination of his service in May, 2005. Respondent No.2 while
raising an industrial dispute against the petitioner, pleaded that
initially he was engaged as ‘Marketing Representative’ for
fertilizer in the year 1996 by M/S Mushtaq Trading Corporation
under the proprietorship of Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Chaya, and in
the year 1998 he was deployed in Hotel Regina, Srinagar, owned
by the same proprietor as ‘Works Supervisor’, and finally as
‘House Keeping Incharge’ at Hotel Grand Mumtaz, Srinagar, from
where he claimed to have been retrenched on a false accusation
of misconduct on 27.05.2005, allegedly without following the
provisions of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
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13. The foundation of the petitioner's challenge is that the Tribunal
inherently lacked jurisdiction because the respondent No. 2 was
employed in a supervisory capacity and drew wages exceeding
the statutory threshold, thereby excluding him from the definition
of a "workman".
14. Under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a
"workman" is defined to include any person employed to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or
supervisory work. However, the exclusionary clause in Section
2(s)(iv) states that the definition does not include any such
person: "who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws
wages exceeding the specified amount per mensem..."
15. At the relevant time in 2005, when the cause of action arose and
the dispute was referred (in the year 2006), the statutory wage
ceiling for exclusion under Section 2(s)(iv) was ₹1,600/- per
month, which was substituted and enhanced to ₹10,000/- per
month by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 with
effect from September 15, 2010.
16. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in “Management of
May & Baker (India) Ltd. vs. Their Workmen” reported as AIR
1967 SC 678 had dealt with an identical case and observed as
follows:“…the undisputed nature of the duties of the
employee and found that his main work was that
of canvassing sales. Any clerical or manual work
that he had to do was incidental to the said main
work, and could not take more than a small
fraction of the time for which he had to work. In
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the circumstances, the Court held that the
Tribunal's conclusion that the employee was a
workman under the ID Act, was incorrect. The
Court also observed that the Tribunal in that
case seemed to have been led away by the fact
that the employee had no supervisory duties and
had to work under the direction of his superior
officers. The Court further held that would not
necessarily mean that the employee's duties were
mainly manual or clerical. The Court held that from
what the Tribunal itself had found, it was clear that
the employee's duties were mainly neither clerical
nor manual and, therefore, he was not a workman.
Hence the Court set aside the Tribunal's direction
for reinstating the employee…”
17. The Apex Court in a case titled ‘Lenin Kumar Ray Vs. M/S
Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd.’ reported as 2024 INSC
802 held in paragraph No.15 that “the law is well settled that the
determination factor for ‘workman’ covered under section 2(s) of
the ID Act, is the principal duties and functions performed by an
employee in the establishment and not merely the designation of
his post and that the onus of proving the nature of employment
rests on the person claiming to be a ‘workman’ within the
definition of Section 2(s) of the ID Act.”
18. It is the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that
substantive laws, particularly those determining the jurisdiction of
a forum, operate prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise
by the legislature. The learned Tribunal, in its Award impugned herein,
noted that there was no evidence showing the petitioner was drawing
wages
exceeding
₹10,000/-. This
demonstrates a
patent
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error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal
applied
amended
threshold
to
a
dispute,
retrospectively.
19. Applying the correct, un-amended law of 2005, the respondent
No. 2, earning ₹4,500/- per month in a supervisory capacity, was
explicitly
excluded
from
the
purview
of
a
"workman".
Consequently, the Industrial Tribunal lacked the threshold
jurisdiction to entertain the claim, rendering the impugned Award
a nullity, in the eyes of the law.
20. The Tribunal held that the management failed to issue a notice,
frame a charge-sheet or conduct an inquiry, thereby violating
Section 25-F of the Act. However, the mandate of Section 25-F,
which outlines conditions precedent to retrenchment, applies
exclusively to a "workman." Since this Court has already held
that the respondent No. 2 did not qualify as a ‘workman’ under
the 1947 Act at the relevant time, the statutory protections of
Section 25-F are inapplicable.
21. Furthermore, the petitioner-management consistently pleaded
that the respondent No.2 abandoned his services voluntarily on
being involved in the theft of a customer's belongings. If an
employee voluntarily abandons service to avoid disciplinary
proceedings, it does not constitute "retrenchment" under Section
2(oo) of the Act. The Tribunal failed to appreciate this defense
and respondent No.2 also failed to produce any order before the
Tribunal which indicates that respondent No.2 was retrenched or
he was not allowed to work by written order. As such, the plea
that order of retrenchment was made verbally does not suffice
P a g e | 10
unless supported by material evidence. Thus, the Tribunal
proceeded under the erroneous assumption that the cessation of
work was an active termination by the employer requiring Section
25-F compliance.
22. The conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative act and cannot be
assumed by a Tribunal beyond the strict contours of the
governing statute. Because the respondent No. 2 was employed
in a supervisory capacity drawing ₹4,500/- per month in 2005, he
fell squarely within the exclusionary clause of Section 2(s)(iv) of
the un-amended Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal's
reliance on 2010 amendment was legally flawed and vitiates the
entire
proceedings.
Therefore,
Tribunal
was
not
having
jurisdiction to entertain an industrial dispute related to employee
who was not a ‘workman’ under the Act. Under these
circumstances
this
Court,
under
the
writ
jurisdiction
is
empowered to interfere with the Award passed by the Tribunal.
23. The limits of jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of
certiorari
under Article
226 of
the
Constitution
has
been
frequently considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the true
legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of
certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or Tribunals.
24. In ‘Syed Yakoob vs. K.S.Radhakrishan & Ors.’, reported as
AIR 1964 SC 477, the Apex Court delineated the scope of writ of
certiorari in the following manner:"The question about the limits of the
jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ
P a g e | 11
of
certiorari
under Article
226 has
been
frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer
in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction committed
by inferior courts or tribunals: these are
cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is
in excess of it, or as a result of failure to
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally or properly, as for instance, it
decides
a
question
without
giving
an
opportunity of being heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure
adopted in dealing with the dispute is
opposed to principles of natural justice.
There
is,
however,
no
doubt
that
the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory
jurisdiction
and
the
Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an
appellate Court. This limitation necessarily
means that findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error
of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued
if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had
erroneously
admitted
inadmissible
P a g e | 12
evidence which has influenced the impugned
finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based
on no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category
of cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal
cannot
be
challenged
in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the
ground
that
the
relevant
and
material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned
finding.
The
adequacy
or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ Court. It is within these
limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ
of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”
25. Similarly in a case ‘B.S.N.L Vs. Bhurumal’ reported as (2014) 7
SCC 177, the Supreme Court observed that:“…It is apparent that the aforesaid findings
are findings of fact. Such findings are not to
be
interfered
with
by
the
High
Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution or by
this
Court
under Article
136 of
the
Constitution. Interference is permissible only
in case these findings are totally perverse or
based on no evidence. Insufficiency of
evidence cannot be a ground to interdict
P a g e | 13
these findings as it is not the function of this
court to re-appreciate the evidence. It was
because of this reason that learned counsel
for the appellant made frontal attack on the
findings of the courts below endeavoured to
demonstrate that there was perversity in the
fact finding by the CGIT which was glossed
over by the High Court as well…”
26. In the aforestated factual background, supported by the
witnesses examined before the Tribunal-cum-Labour court that
the petitioner was working with the management on a monthly
consolidated wages @ ₹4500/-, as such, he was not a ‘workman’
entitled to seek an industrial reference as his salary was much
beyond the monthly statutory salary @ ₹1600/- to qualify as a
‘workman’ to seek Reference by the Government to the Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour court or any adjudication by it. The
Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour
court,
while
passing
the
impugned Award, seems to have lost right of this aspect of the
case.
27. Viewed thus, the impugned Award passed by Industrial Tribunalcum-Labour court, in favour of respondent No.2/claimant, for the
reason that he did not qualify to be a ‘workman’, so as to be
entitled to what has been granted, seems to have been passed
arbitrarily in a mechanical manner, regardless of the fact that
respondent No.2 was not a ‘workman’ as defined in terms of the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
P a g e | 14
28. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the writ petition is
allowed. The impugned Award dated 05.05.2015 passed by the
J&K Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Srinagar, in a Claim
Petition titled ‘Fayaz Ahmad Shah vs. Managing Director Hotel
Grand Mumtaz’, , is hereby quashed and set aside. It is further
directed
that
any
amounts
deposited
by
the
petitioner-
management in the Registry of this Court pursuant to the interim
direction passed on 07.12.2015 and not released in favour of the
respondent
No.2,
shall
be
refunded,
to
the
petitioner-
management forthwith. A copy of this order be sent down, alongwith record for information and record.
29. The Writ Petition is, thus, disposed of as allowed, along-with
connected applications.
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
Srinagar
08.05.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable:
Yes / No
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