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2016:SHC:167
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED : 2nd NOVEMBER, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B. : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Petitioners
:
1.
Malvika Foundation,
B-II/66, M.C.I.E.,
Delhi-Mathura Road,
New Delhi – 110 044,
through its Trustee Shri Suresh Sachdev
2.
Eastern Institute of Integrated Learning
in Management University,
th
8 Mile, Budang, Malabassey,
West Sikkim – 737 121,
through Shri Suresh Sachdev,
Trustee of Sponsoring Body of Petitioner No.2.
versus
Respondents
:
1.
Human Resource Development Department,
Government of Sikkim,
Tashiling Secretariat,
Gangtok.
2.
State of Sikkim
through Chief Secretary,
Government of Sikkim,
Gangtok.
Writ Petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Ms. Chitra Sharma, Mr. Yogesh Kumar
Sharma and Mr. S. P. Bhutia, Advocates for the Petitioners.
Mr. Karma Thinlay Namgyal, Senior Government Advocate
with Mr. S. K. Chettri and Mrs. Pollin Rai, Assistant
Government Advocates for State-Respondents.
Mr. Bhusan Nepal, Legal Retainer for Respondent No.1.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
In this Writ Petition, the Petitioners seek a
Mandamus cancelling and setting aside the Notice dated 3004-2015 bearing Ref. No.55/DIR(HE)/HRDD and letter Ref.
No.73/DIR(HE)/HRDD
dated
08-05-2015
[Annexure
P1
(Colly)] and any other ancillary proceedings which may have
been
initiated
dissolution
of
by
the
Respondents
the
Petitioner
No.2,
pursuant
and
to
to
the
direct
the
Respondents to hand over control of Petitioner No.2 to the
Petitioner No.1.
2.
The facts averred are that, the Petitioner is a
registered Charitable Trust and is the Sponsoring Body of the
Petitioner No.2, a Private University set up through the
Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning in Management
University, Sikkim Act, 2006 (in short “the Act of 2006”),
vide a Notification dated 26-05-2006 (Annexure P3), with
the object, inter alia, of imparting education in regular and
Distance Mode.
commenced
The Petitioner No.2 (for brevity “EIILMU”)
Courses
in
B.Tech,
Bachelor
of
Science,
Bachelor of Commerce, Bachelor of Business Administration,
bachelor of Computer Application, Master of Science and
Master of Business Administration and functioned as a full-
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WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
fledged University from Jorethang, South Sikkim.
Its main
Campus was at Malbassey, Budang, Soreng, West Sikkim,
duly inspected and approved by the UGC in July, 2008.
Various Authorities of the EIILMU were also constituted as
per Section 21 (Board of Management) and Section 22
(Academic Council) of the said Act, while the Respondents
were represented through its nominees in the Board of
Governors of the Petitioner No.2.
3.
On
01-09-2012,
a
suo
motu
FIR
bearing
No.51/2012 was registered against the Officials of the
Petitioner No.2 and others under Section 406/420/467/
120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) by
the Sikkim Police at Jorethang P.S. on grounds that the
Petitioner had violated the UGC and Distant Education
Council (DEC) norms as well as provisions of its own Act.
Charge-Sheet in this matter was filed and is pending before
the Court of the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South and
West, at Namchi. A second FIR No.92 of 2013, on the same
allegations, was registered at the Sadar Police Station
against the Officials of the Petitioner No.2 which was later
quashed by the Orders of this Court dated 04-06-2013 in
Crl. Misc. Case No.12 of 2013.
Meanwhile, the Sikkim Police
also referred the matter to the Enforcement Directorate for
further investigation and on 19-02-2014, an ECIR Case was
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WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
registered under Sections 420/467 and 120B of the IPC
against the Officials of the Petitioner No.2 and others.
Consequently, the Enforcement Directorate attached the
moneys of the Petitioner No.2 in its various Bank Accounts
leading to acute financial crisis, inability to pay the salary of
its staff or to meet its daily expenses and a chaotic situation
emanated where its staff and faculty were threatened,
followed by mass resignations,
disruption of academic
activities and violence within the Campus, resulting in
physical
assault
employees.
of
the
guards
and
a
few
outstation
The students boycotted the end semester
Examinations despite pleas by the Vice Chancellor and the
Registrar of the Petitioner No.2. Resultantly, the Petitioners
were constrained to request the Respondents to take over
the EIILMU, by filing Writ Petition, viz., WP(C) No.01 of 2015
before this Court, which was subsequently withdrawn, the
Petitioners having decided to make an attempt to revive the
Petitioner No.2. The Respondents were informed of this vide
letter dated 10-03-2015 and advertisements were placed in
local newspapers for appointment of Registrar and Vice
Chancellor.
Despite knowledge of the intention and the
efforts of the Petitioner No.2, the Respondents in utter
disregard of the statutory provisions of the Act of 2006 and
in complete violation of Section 47(2) and (3) approved the
dissolution
of
the
Petitioner
No.2
on
28-04-2015
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
communicated to the Petitioners vide letter dated 08-052015. The official website of the Respondent No.1 revealed
the public Notice dated 30-04-2015.
4.
The Petitioners’ case is that the Respondents No.1
and 2 have unilaterally without notice to the Petitioners
approved the proposal for dissolution of the Petitioner No.2,
vide Notice dated 30-04-2015 bearing Ref. No.55/DIR(DE)/
HRDD and for the first time, vide letter dated 08-05-2015 of
the Respondent No.1, informed the Petitioners of the
Cabinet’s decision and approval for dissolving the Petitioner
No.2 under Section 47 of the Act of 2006 without Notice to
the Vice Chancellor and Board of Governors of the Petitioner
No.2. Hence, the aforesaid prayers.
5.
Countering the contentions of the Petitioners, the
Respondents averred that the EIILMU has been under
controversy since 2012 when the Sikkim Police registered an
FIR against the Sponsoring Body of the EIILMU on account
of sale of fake Degrees and Certificates.
Secondly, the
Enforcement Directorate had issued a provisional attachment
order on the property and Bank Accounts of the EIILMU
under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
while the UGC had also issued directions to the EIILMU to
immediately close down its Distance Education Centres
which were opened without the approval of the Statutory
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
Bodies.
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
The activities of the EIILMU came to a standstill
after the suspension of the examination by the Management
of EIILMU on 24-12-2014, the reason being the absence of
Management
Authorities
including
the
Vice
Chancellor,
Registrar, Deputy Controller of Examination, Faculty, etc. A
visit to the Campus of the Petitioner No.2 by the Director,
Technical
Education and
interaction with
the students
revealed that they had been left in the lurch by the
Management without any information. A Report was filed by
the said Officer on 29-09-2014 indicating the shortcomings,
but no clarification was forthcoming from the Petitioner
No.2. Following this, on 05-01-2015, a meeting was held in
the Chamber of the Minister, HRDD along with Principal
Secretary, HRDD, concerned Officers of the Department and
students’ representatives of the EIILMU, but the EIILMU
went unrepresented. Nevertheless, the Principal Secretary,
HRDD telephonically contacted and informed the Acting Vice
Chancellor (henceforth for brevity “AVC”) Mr. R. P. Sharma
of the students’ grievances to which an assurance was given
that examinations would be conducted immediately and
Faculty deputed to manage the affairs.
Despite the
assurance, a letter dated 08-01-2015 was received on 1601-2015
from
the
Petitioner
No.1
requesting
the
Government of Sikkim to take over the EIILMU.
The
Director of Higher Education on 12-01-2015 requested the
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
AVC to conduct the examinations immediately and on 28-012015 Mr. P. C. Rai, Dean of EIILMU was summoned to
enquire about the situation. A meeting ensued between the
Minister of HRDD and the Dean where the latter was
instructed to immediately conduct the examination. On 2901-2015 (Annexure R-5), a second e-mail was sent to AVC
directing him to conduct the examination within 15 days of
the receipt of mail from the Director and to authorise the
Dean for this purpose.
same letter
that
It was also communicated by the
on failure/non-compliance,
the State
Government would take necessary action as per Section
47(2) of the Act of 2006. On 31-01-2015 (Annexure R-6),
the AVC through e-mail authorised the Department to
conduct the examination.
On
09-02-2015,
AVC
was
requested by the Department to provide the Reports as per
Sections 44(3) and 45(4) of the Act of 2006, to which no
response was received. On 14-02-2015, the Director, Higher
Education, visited the Campus and met with 190 students in
the presence of the Panchayat and Officers of the HRDD and
Dean of the EIILMU and found that the Management had
suspended
the examinations and
had
failed
to
make
necessary arrangements for them despite realising all tuition
and hostel fees. The Department assured reimbursement of
the
students’
fees
and
to
safeguard
their
interest.
Examinations were thus conducted by the Department from
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
20-03-2015 to 24-03-2015 and the results declared. As per
the authorisation of the AVC, the Department relocated
regular students of the Budang Campus, within and outside
the State. Meanwhile classes were conducted at Chisopani to
complete the Semester ending on 30th June. On a Report of
the Fact Finding Committee and in view of the mismanagement and mal-administration, the State Cabinet
decided to initiate dissolution of EIILMU under Section 47 of
the Act of 2006, in the interim Management was looked after
by the Government.
6.
In its Rejoinder, the Petitioners, inter alia, denied
that there was any FIR pending against the Petitioner No.1
and that both the Petitioners have not been named as
Accused in the FIR No.51 of 2012. They denied knowledge
of the inspection by the Director, Higher Education of the
EIILMU and also deny that the students were left in the lurch
and reiterate that as the Enforcement Directorate had
attached their Bank Accounts, a financial crisis ensued
leading to delay in the examinations as the Petitioner No.2
was trying to arrange funds for normalising the activities of
the University.
The request to the Government for taking
over the EIILMU was made bearing the best interest of the
students, but the Petitioners denied awareness about any
meetings as stated by the Respondents.
They also denied
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
receipt of any letter dated 09-02-2015 (Annexure R-7) and
that a bare perusal of the address would indicate its
vagueness making its service in Kolkata impossible. Besides
the above, the averments as laid out in the Writ Petition
were reiterated.
7.
The arguments canvassed by Learned Counsel for
the Petitioners was that it is a settled principle of Law that
no one should be condemned unheard, hence, the act of
passing the impugned Notice is arbitrary, illegal, biased and
the Petitioners had no opportunity of rebutting the findings
of the Respondents which is contrary to the principle of audi
alteram partem.
That, although Section 47 of the Act of
2006 mandates that reasonable opportunity to Show Cause
shall be given to the Petitioner No.1 in the event of a
decision to wind up the Petitioner No.2 by the Respondents,
no such Notice or Show Cause was served upon the
Petitioners or the Officers and the Authorities of the
Petitioners. That, in view of the non-compliance of Section
47 of the Act of 2006, it is prayed that as the aforesaid
letters issued to the Petitioners do not fulfil the conditions of
Section 47 of the Act of 2006 as required apart from which
the Petitioners now seek to run the EIILMU, hence, the
Notice be quashed and the Sponsor be allowed to be heard.
To buttress his submissions, reliance was placed on Olga
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WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
Tellis and
Others
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and
Others , S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and Others , Mohammad
Jafar vs. Union of India
and C. B. Gautam vs. Union of India
and Others .
8.
Per contra, Learned Counsel for the Respondents
while reiterating the averments made in the opposing
Affidavit urged that vide letter dated 08-01-2015 the
Petitioners
had
filed
a
representation
before
the
Respondents in which they had requested the Respondents
to take over the EIILMU to make it functional. The grounds
for making such a prayer were put forth in detail in the said
letter and it was categorically pleaded that the University
had made all attempts and tried its level best through the
AVC to hold the End Semester Examinations in the month of
December, 2014, but failed. Apart from which, the EIILMU
was facing financial constraints which had led to suspension
of teaching activities at the Campus and the students had
launched an agitation. Thus, as the Petitioners themselves
had requested the Respondents to take over the EIILMU due
to the difficulties explained in the letter, there was in fact no
necessity of issuing any Notice.
That, as evident from a
perusal of the letters, the impugned Notice was issued in the
month of April, 2015, subsequent to the letter of request,
sent by the Petitioners in the month of January, 2015.
It
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
1.
2.
(1985) 3 SCC 545
(1980) 4 SCC 379
3.
4.
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
1994 Supp (2) SCC 1
(1993) 1 SCC 78
was further contended that the UGC had also constituted a
Fact Finding Body to look into the complaints and allegations
made against the Petitioners with regard to the numerous
Programmes
run
through
unauthorised
Study
Distance
Centre(s),
etc.
Mode,
The
opening
of
Committee
observed that though the EIILMU was not authorised to even
open Study Centres on franchise mode within Sikkim, it was
done so in India and abroad, thus violating not only its
jurisdiction in opening its Study Centres, but also the mode
in which it had been done.
Recommendations were
consequently made by the Committee of which, one was
dissolution of EIILMU in accordance with the relevant Section
of the Act of 2006.
Thus, in view of all of the above, no
Notice under Section 47 of the Act of 2006 was required. To
buttress his submissions, reliance was placed on S. L.
Kapoor
(supra) and Aligarh Muslim University and Others vs.
Mansoor Ali Khan .
9.
In response, the Petitioners apart from denying
the statements of the Respondents argued that there has to
be compliance of the mandatory provisions and issuance of
Notice cannot be circumvented by any means.
Moreover,
the Report of the UGC was not received by the Petitioners.
Hence, the Petition be allowed.
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Malvika Foundation and Another
5.
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
(2000) 7 SCC 529
10.
Careful and anxious consideration has been given
to the submissions made at the Bar, the documents which
Learned Counsel have walked this Court through during the
hearing have also been carefully perused and considered, so
also the Judgments relied on.
11.
The question germane to the matter is whether
the letter dated 29-01-2015 (Annexure R-5) issued by the
Respondent No.1 can be treated as a Notice under Section
47 of the Act of 2006 or whether the Notice bearing Ref.
No.55/DIR(HE)/HRDD, dated 30-04-2015 (Annexure P-1),
was issued by the Respondents without affording the
Petitioners an opportunity of being heard.
12.
To
appreciate
the
matter
in
its
correct
perspective, it would be expedient to refer to the relevant
provision, i.e., Section 47 of the Act of 2006, which is
extracted hereinbelow and provides as follows;
“Dissolution of 47. (1) If
University
the Sponsor proposes dissolution
of the University in accordance with the
law governing its constitution or
corporation, it shall give at least 12
(twelve) months notice in writing to the
State government and it shall ensure
that no new admissions to the
University are accepted during the
notice period.
(2) On identification of mismanagement,
mal-administration, in-discipline, failure
in the accomplishment of the objects of
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
University and economic hardships in
the
management
systems
of
University, the State Government
would
issued
directions
to
the
management system of University. If
the direction are not followed within
such time as may be prescribed, the
right to take decision for winding up of
the University would vest in the State
Government.
(3) The manner of winding up of the
University would be such as may be
prescribed by the State Government in
this behalf:
Provided that no such action will be initiated
without affording a reasonable opportunity to
show cause to the Sponsor.
(4) On receipt of the notice referred to in
sub-section (1), the State Government
shall in consultation with the AICTE and
UGC make such arrangements for
administration of the University from
the proposed date of dissolution of the
University by the Sponsor and until the
last batch of students in regular
courses of studies of the University
complete their courses of studies in
such manner as may be prescribed by
the Statutes.”
13.
What emerges on a bare reading of the provision
is that, Section 47(1) of the Act of 2006 pertains to steps to
be taken by the Sponsor if it is decides to dissolve the
EIILMU. Section 47(2) and (3) pertains to steps to be taken
by the State Government in the event of the contingencies
detailed in the said Section.
The proviso to Section 47(3)
requires that no such action shall be initiated without
affording the Sponsor a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause. Section 47(4) provides, inter alia, for arrangements
to be made by the State Government, i.e., the Respondents,
in consultation of the All India Council for Technical
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
Education (AICTE) and UGC for administration of the
University from the proposed date of dissolution of the
University by the Sponsor to enable the last batch of
students to complete their studies.
14.
The documents on record would reveal that vide
e-mail dated 07-01-2015 (Annexure R-2) issued by Shri
Gyan Upadhyaya, HRDD, to AVC of the EIILMU, a request
was made to him to take immediate action for conducting
the remaining examinations and that the Director, Higher
Education may be contacted for assistance. In turn, the said
AVC had issued a letter through e-mail dated 06-01-2015
(Annexure R-2) to the Dean directing him to hold the
examinations as per schedule on the assurance of the
Principal Secretary that the administration would make
arrangements for law and order in the Campus. This letter
was followed by letter dated 08-01-2015 (Annexure R-3)
written by the AVC requesting the Respondents to take over
the EIILMU. On the heels of this communication was an email dated 12-01-2015 from the Director, Higher Education
to the AVC requesting him to take steps to safeguard the
interest of the students and exhibit some responsible
behaviour. This communication was followed by letter dated
29-01-2015 (Annexure R-5) wherein the Respondent No.1
informed the AVC that it had been brought to the notice of
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
the Respondents that the University was not able to function
smoothly due to problems of internal management resulting
in suspension of the examination and disorderly situation in
the University.
That, the activities of the University has
been affected due to mal-administration, mis-management,
indiscipline, failure in accomplishment of the objects of the
University and economic hardships in the management of
the University.
Therefore, in order to safeguard the
students’ interest and restore discipline in the University, the
Petitioner/AVC was directed to conduct the examinations
immediately within fifteen days of the receipt of this letter
and on failure to comply, the State Government would take
necessary action as per Section 47(2) of the Act of 2006.
15.
In the context of the above correspondence and
the facts and circumstances, we may now examine as to
what “audi alteram partem” means. Natural Justice has two
main limbs (i) the right to a fair hearing, also known as the
audi alteram partem rule, viz., that no one should be
condemned unheard and (ii) the rule against bias and nemo
judex in causa sua, i.e., no one may be a judge in this own
cause.
In other words, these two concepts tantamount to
fairness and impartiality and are pillars supporting natural
justice.
The principles of natural justice are not embodied
rules and, therefore, it is not practicable to precisely define
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Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
the parameters of natural justice.
Union of India and Another
In Maneka Gandhi vs.
it was held that “The rules of
natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rules
of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend
to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that
case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is
held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made
before a Court that some principle of natural justice has
been contravened the Court has to decide whether the
observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on
the facts of the case.” This succinctly lays down that there
can be no variable standard for reasonableness except that
the Court’s conscience must be satisfied that the person
against whom an action is proposed has had a fair chance of
convincing the authority who proposes to take action against
him. The decision of the Court will depend upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances of each case.
16.
That having been said, the word ‘Notice’ is
necessarily to be understood,
latin
word
“Notifia”
which originates from
meaning
“a being known” or
the
“a
knowing”, therefore, something is made known by a Notice
of what a man was or might be ignorant of before. The
importance of notice in adjudicatory proceedings has been
2016:SHC:167
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Malvika Foundation and Another
6.
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
(1978) 1 SCC 248
underlined by the Supreme Court in the decision relied on by
the Petitioners, i.e., Olga Tellis1 (supra).
The Bombay
pavement dwellers challenged the procedures prescribed by
Section 314 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, as
unreasonable vis-à-vis Article 21 of the Constitution of India
insofar as the provision not only did not require giving of
notice to the dwellers before demolition of their huts on the
pavements but it expressly provided that the Corporation
may cause encroachment to be removed “without notice”.
The Supreme Court upholding the validity of the provision
ruled that it was merely an enabling provision. In Paragraph
45 of the said Judgment, it was held as follows;
“45. It must further be presumed that, while
vesting in the Commissioner the power to act
without notice, the Legislature intended that the
power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of
urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases, no
departure from the audi alteram partem rule (‘Hear
the other side’) could be presumed to have been
intended. Section 314 is so designed as to exclude
the principles of natural justice by way of exception
and not as a general rule. There are situations
which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural
justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place
the apprehended danger and so on. The ordinary
rule which regulates all procedure is that persons
who are likely to be affected by the proposed action
must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as
to why that action should not be taken. The hearing
may be given individually or collectively, depending
upon the facts of each situation. A departure from
this fundamental rule of natural justice may be
presumed to have been intended by the Legislature
only in circumstances which warrant it. Such
circumstances must be shown to exist, when so
required, the burden being upon those who affirm
their existence.”
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Malvika Foundation and Another
17.
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
Hence, in view of the above, it follows that a
notice is for the purposes of making something known to a
person who might be ignorant of it before and which could
produce diverse effects.
The notice is to be adequate as
regards the details of the case against the concerned person.
Therefore, any proceedings initiated against a person without
adequate notice to him infringes the concepts of natural
justice rendering it invalid.
18.
Consequently, to address the issue at hand, it
would be essential to bear in mind the provisions of Sections
47(2) and 47(3) and the proviso therein, of the Act of 2006,
which is already extracted hereinabove and for brevity is not
being reiterated and to consider the letter of the Director,
Higher
Education,
Human
Resource
Development
Department, dated 29-01-2015 (Annexure R-5), which reads
as follows;
“...............................................................
NO: 3379/Dir.(HE)/HRDD
Date : 29.01.2015
To
Mr. R P. Sharma,
Acting Vice Chancellor,
EIILM University,
Malbassey, West Sikkim.
Sub. - REQUEST FOR CONDUCT OF EXAMINATION.
Sir,
It has come to the notice of the State
Government that EIILM University is not been able
to function smoothly due to internal management
problems thereby resulting in suspension of
examination and disorderly at atmosphere in the
University.
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vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
Whereas, it has further been reported that
activities of the University has been affected due to
maladministration, mismanagement, indiscipline,
failure in accomplishment of the objects of the
University
and
economic
hardships
in
the
management of the University.
Now, therefore, in order to safeguard the
students’ interest and restore discipline in the
University, you are hereby directed to conduct the
examinations immediately within 15 days of the
receipt of this letter.
In failure of non-compliance, the State
Government would take necessary action as per
Section 47(2) of EIILM Act, 2006.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully
Sd/JITENDRA SINGH RAJE (IAS)
DIRECTOR, HIGHER EDUCATION
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT”
19.
The contents of the letter need
no
further
elucidation, it is evident that an inchoate situation was
persisting in the Petitioner No.2 Campus as detailed in
Paragraph 2 of the letter supra.
In view of the said
situation, a direction was issued to the Petitioners to conduct
the examinations on failure of which the Respondents would
take necessary action as per Section 47(2)of the Act of
2006.
No Notice could be more categorical and clear than
the above. The argument canvassed by Learned Counsel for
the Petitioner that the subject reflected therein, viz; “Sub. REQUEST FOR CONDUCT OF EXAMINATION.” does not reveal that it
was infact a Notice as contemplated under Section 47 is to
say the least preposterous and puerile and brooks no
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vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
consideration. The contents of the letter as common sense
would tell us would have to be considered in its totality and
the intention culled out from the contents and not be guided
solely by the subject at the top of the letter.
20.
Although it was vehemently argued by Learned
Counsel for the Petitioners that, this letter was not received
by
the
Petitioners,
but
the
e-mail
dated
31-01-2015
(Annexure R-6) sent by the AVC to Shri Gyan Upadhyaya
Director, Higher Education, would belie this stand.
This e-
mail is undoubtedly a response to the letter dated 29-012015
(Annexure
R-5),
the
last
paragraph
is
being
reproduced for convenience;
“………………………………………………..
However I have full faith in you and the HRDD Sir
and keeping in mind the interest of the students I
have no hesitation in saying that I am agreeable to
your/HRDD appointing any independent person or
any person other than Mr. P. C. Rai to get the
examinations conducted. You may have the locks
opened in due process of law under your supervision
and security only. Mr. P. C. Rai is not authorised to
take charge of anything in view of all the complaints
received against him.
………………………………………………….”
This, therefore, controverts the stand of the Petitioners
that no communication was made to them with regard to the
intent of the Respondent.
The Notice is only to make a
party aware of something it does not have to follow a certain
format. It suffices if it conveys the intent to the other party.
It is also apparent that the Petitioner was well-aware of the
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
prevailing situation in its Campus, therefore, elaborate
details in the Notice were obviously not a requirement.
In
this context, it would be apposite to refer to the decision in
Aligarh Muslim University (supra) wherein it was held that―
“21. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237], there can be
certain situations in which an order passed in
violation of natural justice need not be set aside
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For
example, where no prejudice is caused to the person
concerned, interference under Article 226 is not
necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order
which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result
in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as
in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR
1966 SC 828] it is not necessary to quash the order
merely because of violation of principles of natural
justice.
22. In M.C. Mehta it was pointed out that at
one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin [(1963) 2
ALL ER 66 (HL)] that breach of principles of natural
justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no
other “de facto” prejudice needed to be proved. But,
since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed
not only in England but also in our country. In S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980 4 SCC 379], Chinnappa
Reddy, J. followed Ridge v. Baldwin and set aside
the order of suppression of the New Delhi
Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that
there was no prejudice though notice was not given.
The proceedings were quashed on the ground of
violation of principles of natural justice. But even in
that case certain exceptions were laid down to which
we shall presently refer.
23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor
case laid two exceptions (at SCC p.395) namely, if
upon admitted or indisputable facts only one
conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the
principle that breach of natural justice was in itself
prejudice, would not apply. In other words, if no
other conclusion was possible on admitted or
indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the
order which was passed in violation of natural
justice. Of course, this being an exception, great
care must be taken in applying this exception.
24. The principle that in addition to breach
of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has
been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v.
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
State Bank of India [(1984) 1 SCC 43], Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the
principle that not mere violation of natural justice
but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of
notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting
Wade’s Administrative Law (5thh Edn., pp.472-75)
as follows: (SCC p.58 para 31)
“[I]t is not possible to lay down rigid
rules as to when principles of natural justice
are to apply, nor as their scope and extent. ...
There must have been some real prejudice to
the complainant; there is no such thing as a
merely technical infringement of natural
justice. The requirements of natural justice
must depend on the facts and circumstances
of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the
rules under which the tribunal is acting, the
subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth.”
Since then, this Court has consistently applied the
principle of prejudice in several cases. The above
ruling and various other rulings taking the same
view have been exhaustively referred to in State
Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364].
In that case, the principle of 'prejudice' has been
further elaborated. The same principle has been
reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.
[(1996) 5 SCC 460].
25. The “useless formality” theory, it must
be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of
cases of “admitted or indisputable facts leading only
to one conclusion” referred to above, there has been
considerable debate of the application of that theory
in other cases. The divergent views expressed in
regard to this theory have been elaborately
considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta referred to
above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in
various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord
Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J,
and Straughton L.J. etc. in various cases and also
views expressed by leading writers like Profs.
Garner, Craig, De. Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc.
Some of them have said that orders passed in
violation must always be quashed for otherwise, the
Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have
said, that there is no such absolute rule and
prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have
applied via-media rules. We do not think it
necessary, in this case, to go deeper into these
issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on
the facts of a particular case.
26. It will be sufficient, for the purpose of
the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan, to show that his
case will fall within the exceptions stated by
Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.C. Kapoor v. Jagmohan,
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
namely, that on the admitted or indisputable facts,
only one view is possible. In that event, no prejudice
can be said to have been caused to Mr. Mansoor Ali
Khan though notice has not been issued.”
21.
On the touchstone of the principles enunciated
supra, from the communication between the parties, it
emerges without doubt that in the first instance, it is the
Petitioners who have requested the Respondents to take
over the University, thereafter, it is evident that the Notice
has been issued vide letter dated 29-01-2015 (Annexure R5).
It is apparent that the Petitioner did not deem it
essential to respond to the intent of the communication
despite receipt of the letter (supra).
The decision of Olga
Tellis (supra) may also be usefully referred to wherein it is
laid down that, the ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is
that persons who are likely to be affected by the proposed action
must
be afforded an
opportunity of being
heard
as to
why
that action should not be taken. The hearing may be given
individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each
situation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural
justice may be presumed to have been intended by the
Legislature
only
in
circumstances
which
warrant
it.
Such
circumstances must be shown to exist, when so required, the
burden being upon those who affirm their existence. Thus, any
steps taken without abiding by the principles of audi alteram
partem have to be only in circumstances which warrant it.
Here, it may be argued that vide letter dated 08-01-2015
the prayer was for the Petitioners to take up the EIILMU
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
instead of which they embarked on steps to close down the
University, but the contents of the letter dated 29-01-2015
is categorical on the intention of the State Government
which has been communicated to the AVC who despite a
lapse of almost three months, failed to take steps and,
therefore, cannot now be heard to cry foul. It is not as if the
Petitioners
were
in
the
dark
about
the situation
prevailing in their Campus due to mismanagement and the
consequent unrest of the students, their letter dated 08-012015
stands
sentinel
to
the
above position, therefore,
the question of prejudice to the Petitioners finds no place. It
is no one’s case that arrangements for completion of
the semester
was
not
made
for
the
last
batch
of
students in the regular Courses of studies of the University
by the Respondents.
In fact, it is admitted by the
Petitioners that alternative arrangements were made for the
students of the University and they were admitted to other
colleges.
22.
Hence, considering the entirety of the facts and
circumstances and the aforesaid discussions, I find that not
only was Notice issued to the Petitioners vide letter dated
29-01-2015 (Annexure R-5), no prejudice whatsoever was
also caused to them. Consequently, their prayers merit no
consideration.
2016:SHC:167
WP(C) No.33 of 2015
Malvika Foundation and Another
vs.
Human Resource Development Department and Another
23.
In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
24.
No order as to costs.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
02-11-2016
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