Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 118 of 2017 with
WP(C) No. 119 of 2017
WP(C) No. 121 of 2017
WP(C) No. 122 of 2017
WP(C) No. 125 of 2017
WP(C) No. 217 of 2017
Date of Decision: 15.09.2023
Shri. Sebastian P. George
Vs.
Shri. Arindam Chakraborty
Vs.
Shri. Srilekha Das Purkayastha
Vs.
Shri. Bharat Prasad Yadav
Vs.
Shri. Sanwar Hussain
Vs.
Shri. Makanmi Kengoo & Ors.
Vs.
The Director General Assam
Rifles & Ors.
The Director General Assam
Rifles & Ors.
The Director General Assam
Rifles & Ors.
The Director General Assam
Rifles & Ors.
The Director General Assam
Rifles & Ors.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
In WP(C) No. 118 of 2017
In WP(C) No. 119 of 2017
In WP(C) No. 121 of 2017
In WP(C) No. 122 of 2017 and
In WP(C) No. 125 of 2017
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. T. Dkhar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. R. Debnath, CGC (For R 1 & 5)
Mr. N. Syngkon, Adv. (For R 2-4)
In WP(C) No. 217 of 2017
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. T. Dkhar, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. K.P. Bhattacharjee, GA (For R 1&2)
Mr. R. Debnath, CGC (For R 3)
Mr. N. Syngkon, Adv. (For R 4-7)
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
COMMON JUDGMENT
1.
Two sets of writ petitions involving the affairs of the Assam Rifles
Public School, Society, Laitkor, Shillong and the Assam Rifles Welfare
Education Society (ARWES) as respondents have been preferred by
petitioners, some of whom are common in both sets of petitions. The same
have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to
invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
2.
Since the issues raised in these two sets of petitions are inter-related
and a decision in one would have a bearing on the other set, therefore, this
Court find it convenient to take up both sets and to hear the parties and pass
a common order thereon.
3.
It may be mentioned that cases in WP(C) No. 118 of 2017, WP(C)
No. 119 of 2017, WP(C) No. 121 of 2017, WP(C) No. 122 of 2017 and
WP(C) No. 125 of 2017 deals with the issue of transfer of the petitioners
therein, while WP(C) No. 217 of 2017 deals with the issue of the alleged
amalgamation of ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong with ARWES.
4.
Heard Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners
who has submitted that the petitioners herein includes teaching and nonteaching staff of the Assam Rifles Public School (ARPS), Laitkor, Shillong
who have been serving in the said school for more than a decade and half.
5.
The ARPS was established in the year 1980 as a residential and
boarding educational institution in the North-Eastern part of India. It is
overseen by the Assam Rifles Public School Society, registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1980.
6.
The overall administration, supervision and control of the ARPS
vests with the Governing Body comprising of the Director General, Assam
Rifles as its Chairman and also includes some Assam Rifles Officers and
Government Officials.
7.
On the other hand, there also exists the Assam Rifles Welfare
Education Society (ARWES) which also runs and manage about 41 ARPS
schools all over the North-Eastern region with its own Board of Governors
along with its independent rules and regulations as far as management of
the schools under it are concerned.
8.
It is also the submission of the learned Sr. counsel that in terms of
the recommendation of the 6th Pay Commission, the teaching and nonteaching staff of the ARPS joined together to lay claim to the same facilities
for which a writ petition being WP(C) No. 137 (SH) of 2010 had to be filed
before the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court (as this Court then
was) for a judicial direction thereof. However, the writ petition was
dismissed by an order dated 12.08.2011 passed by a Single Bench of this
Court.
9.
Against the said order dated 12.08.2011, an intra-court appeal was
preferred before a Division Bench of this Court and the same being WA
(SH) No. 35 of 2011 was allowed vide order dated 05.09.2012, in effect,
directing the concerned authorities to implement the recommendation of the
6th Pay Commission in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the
ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong.
10.
The school authorities being aggrieved by the said order dated
05.09.2012 went on to file a Special Leave Petition No. 36962/2012 before
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court which was dismissed on 21.07.2015. Even a
Review Petition No. 2799/2015 filed thereafter also failed to yield any
result. Eventually, the decision of the court has to be accepted by the school
authorities.
11.
In a twist in the tale, the ARPS authorities feigning inability to
sustain the financial burden cast upon it by virtue of the said order of the
Apex Court, had, vide notice dated 30.12.2015 communicated the decision
to close down the school w.e.f. 01.04.2016. This again, led to the teaching
and non-teaching staff of the said school to approach this Court by way of a
writ petition being Writ Petition No. 100 of 2016 challenging the proposed
closure.
12.
The said Writ Petition No. 100 of 2016 was however, disposed of by
an order dated 10.08.2016 upon mutual agreement reached at between the
parties therein. The learned Sr. counsel has also submitted that while
disposing of the said writ petition, this Court, taking note of the affidavit
filed by the respondent/Assam Rifles therein, has observed as under:
“2. That the management of Assam rifles welfare education society
as well as the Directorate general of Assam Rifles decided to
withdraw the impugned closure notice dated 30.12.2015 for
implementing closure of the Assam Rifles public School Laitkor and
the same stands withdrawn for all practical purpose and intents.
3. That it is categorically stated that existing service conditions of
the regular permanent employees of Assam Rifles Public School
Laitkor, Shillong (Petitioners herein) cannot and will not be
changed/altered as the same has attained finality by orders passed
by this Hon’ble court and affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.”
13.
It is again the submission of the learned Sr. counsel that the
petitioners were in for a rude shock when they were served with individual
transfer and posting orders issued by the Chairman ARPS, whereby they
were directed to report to their place of postings at different Assam Rifles
Public Schools under the ARWES.
14.
Being aggrieved by such transfer and posting orders, the petitioners
has approached this Court by filing separate writ petitions, assailing the said
impugned order. While moving the said petitions, the petitioners have also
prayed for an interim order and this Court vide order dated 19.05.2017 has
accordingly suspended the orders of transfer.
15.
The respondent Assam Rifles authorities then preferred an intra-
court appeal against the said interim order before the Division Bench of this
Court and this Court vide order dated 03.07.2017 in WA No. 22 of 2017
rejected the prayer made.
16.
The learned Sr. counsel has further submitted that it is only when
the said writ appeal was filed before this Court that the petitioners came to
know for the first time that the said transfer and posting orders have been
issued on the basis of the relevant ARWES Rules and Regulations
following the purported amalgamation of the ARPS Society with the
ARWES in terms of a decision taken by the Board of Governors in its
meeting held on 28.09.2016.
17.
This was revealed from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the
respondent Assam Rifles in the said writ petitions, whereby the orders of
transfer were assailed following which the petitioners were made aware of
the sequence of events as they unfolded, wherein the whole process of
amalgamation, including obtaining of requisite approval from the Registrar
of Societies, Government of Meghalaya has taken place.
18.
This then led to the petitioners to file the WP(C) No. 217 of 2017.
19.
As to the crux of the matter in issue, the learned Sr. counsel has
submitted that the Management Committee of the ARPS Society in its
meeting held on 07.09.2016 at Chanakya Hall, HQ DGAR, Laitkor,
Shillong has passed a resolution in one of the agenda discussed as regard a
proposal to bring ARPS, Laitkor under the management of the Assam
Rifles Welfare Education Society (ARWES).
20.
The minutes of the Governing Body Meeting of the ARPS Society
held on 28.09.2016 was also referred to by the learned Sr. counsel to say
that at agenda 4 of the same, the discussion was on the issue of conversion
of ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong registration from ARPS Society to ARWES and
therein, the direction of the Chairman was noted wherein thereafter, it was
unanimously decided that the ARPS Society be amalgamated with
ARWES. This decision was taken only by the Governing Body and not by
all the members of the ARPS Society, asserts the learned Sr. counsel.
21.
Pursuant to the said resolution dated 28.09.2016, on 04.10.2016, the
Assam Rifles authority has communicated to the Registrar of Societies,
Government of Meghalaya informing him of the decision to amalgamate
the Assam Rifles Public School Society (ARPSS) with Assam Rifles
Welfare Education Society (ARWES). In the same communication, it was
also requested that the necessary „No Objection Certificate‟ for the
amalgamation be issued.
22.
The Registrar of Societies then vide letter No. SR/ARWES-
11/15/315
dated
07.10.2016
addressed
to
the
Deputy
Commandant/Administrative Officer, ARWES, has conveyed the approval
of the said amalgamation by stating that “…in pursuance to Section 12(b)
of the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act XII, 1983, this office does not
have any objection to the amalgamation of Assam Rifles Public School
Society (ARPSS)… with Assam Rifles Welfare Education Society
(ARWES)…”. The letter also went on to say that “…as decided by the
Governing Body Meeting of both societies held on 28th September, 2016 at
Conference Hall, HQ, DGAR”. This, according to the learned Sr. counsel is
factually incorrect as there was no meeting of the ARWES on 28th
September, whereas the said resolution was made only in the meeting of the
Governing Body of ARPS Society.
23.
To put into effect the resolution of the ARWES Governor Meeting
held on 05.04.2017, amendments were made in the ARWES Rule Book
which reads as follows:
“Consequent to the resolution passed during the ARWES
Governing Body Meet held on 05 Apr 2017, following
addition/alterations have been made in the Rule Book, Chapter 7
under Article No 85, Sub Paragraph (l) to (m):(a) Conduct of Suitability Test for all Principals and
Teachers. Conduct of Suitability Test for all Principals
and Teachers of ARPS on an yearly basis. Their
extension/retention in service will depend on the result of
the test. Their performance based on the Boards/Class
Result will also be taken into the account.
(b) Inter School (ARPS) transfer of Regular/Permanent.
ARPS Teacher, Inter School (ARPS) transfer of
Regular/Permanent ARPS Teacher after every three years
regular service at a location.”
24.
The
Member
Secretary,
I.14017/GS(Edn)/ARWES-01/2017/335
ARWES
vide
letter
No.
dated
21.04.2017
has
then
informed the Registrar of Societies of the decision taken in the 05.04 2017
meeting of the Governing Body(GB) whereby the said additions were
incorporated in the ARWES Rules and Regulations and has also sought
inclusion of the same by the Registrar. The Registrar in response, vide letter
dated 02.05.2017 has informed the Member Secretary, ARWES of the
approval for amendment of the said ARWES Rules and Regulations.
25.
By the introduction of the said additional rules and regulations, the
learned Sr. counsel has submitted that the service condition of the
concerned petitioners is now affected and thus being aggrieved thereto, they
have every right to approach this Court to challenge the said arbitrary act.
26.
It is also reiterated that the ARPS Laitkor is purely a residential
school and therefore, nowhere in the rules is it provided for transfer, the
new rule has cause prejudice to those petitioners who were served with the
impugned transfer order. On this premise, it is further submitted that the
introduction of the said rule of transfer is contrary to the earlier stand taken
by the school authorities that there shall not be any change of the existing
service conditions of the regular permanent employees of the ARPS,
Laitkor and which resolution was duly taken note of by the Division Bench
of this Court.
WP(C) No. 118 of 2017, WP(C) No. 119 of 2017, WP(C) No. 121 of
2017, WP(C) No. 122 of 2017 and WP(C) No. 125 of 2017.
27.
The learned Sr. counsel has then submitted that as a consequence of
the alleged illegal amalgamation of the ARPS Society with ARWES, the
Board of Governor of the ARWES by resolution dated 05.04.2017 has
introduced two new rules and regulations(supra) and thereafter, the
impugned order for transfer of the petitioners to their respective place of
posting was issued.
28.
It is submitted that the petitioners on being appointed as teachers in
the ARPS, Laitkor were also made to execute a contract of service, page 25,
Annexure–A in WP(C) No. 118 of 2017 being one such appointment letter
and also at page 27, Annexure–B is found copy of the contract of service. In
the contract of service, a number of terms and conditions were laid down
however no condition is present to indicate that the post is a transferable
post, or that the incumbent is liable to be transferred to other ARPS schools
at any point of time.
29.
In WP(C) No. 118 of 2017, the petitioner therein was served with
the impugned posting order No. I.14017/GS (Edn)/ARWES-01/2017 dated
13.05.2017 whereby on the authority of the Chairman ARPS he was
transferred from ARPS Laitkor, Shillong to ARPS, Pallel, Manipur. This
similar situation was also present in the case of the other petitioners in other
related cases mentioned herein above, submits the learned Sr. counsel.
30.
The impugned transfer orders were issued with reference to the
ARWES rules and regulations, but in view of the fact that there is no nexus
between the ARWES and ARPS, Laitkor, the alleged merger not being
legally sustainable, the petitioners could not have been transferred under the
said ARWES rules, further submits the learned Sr. counsel.
31.
Yet again, the learned Sr. counsel has submitted that the impugned
transfer order has been passed malafide and in colourable exercise of power
in violation of the undertaking given by the respondent authorities to the
extent it was recorded in the order dated 10.08.2016 in Writ Petition No.
100 of 2016 indicating to the effect that the said authorities shall not
alter/change the service conditions of the teaching and non-teaching staff of
the school, such service conditions being also applicable to the petitioners
herein.
32.
While referring to the commitment given by the respondent/ARPS
as noted by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 10.08.2016 in
Writ Petition No. 100 of 2016(supra), the learned Sr. counsel has submitted
that the respondent school authorities are estopped from bringing in fresh
rules as regard transfer in the light of the commitment given not to make
any changes in the service conditions of the permanent employees of the
ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong. In this regard, the case of The State of Rajasthan
v. Nemi Chand Mahela & Ors.: (2019) 14 SCC 179 para 11 was cited.
33.
On the issue of transfer, the case of M/S Kundan Sugar Mills v.
Ziyauddin & Ors.: AIR 1960 SC 650 para 4 and 5 was cited to say that in a
case similar to the case of the petitioners herein, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has observed as follows:
“4. The question of law raised in this case must be considered in
relation to the said facts. The argument of the learned counsel for
the appellant that the right to transfer is implicit in every contract of
service is too wide the mark. Apart from any statutory provision the
rights of an employer and an employee are governed by the terms of
contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied
therefrom. It is conceded that there is no express agreement
between the appellant and the respondents where under the
appellant has the right to transfer the respondents to any of its
concerns in any place and the respondents the duty to join the
concerns to which they may be transferred. If so, can it be said that
such a term has to be necessarily implied between the parties?
When the respondents 1 to 4 were employed by the appellant, the
latter was running only one factory at Amroha. There is nothing on
record to indicate that at that time it was intended to purchase
factories at other places or to extend its activities in the same line at
different places. It is also not suggested that even if the appellant
had had such an intention, the respondents 1 to 4 had knowledge of
the same. Under such circumstances, without more, it would not be
right to imply any such term between the contracting parties when
the idea of starting new factories at different places was not in
contemplation. Ordinarily the employees would have agreed only to
serve in the factory then in existence and the employer would have
employed them only in respect of that factory. The matter does not
stop there. In the instant case, as we have indicated, the two
factories are distinct entities, situated at different places and, to
import a term conferring a right on the employer to transfer
respondents 1 to 4 to a different concern is really to make a new
contract between them.
5. The decisions cited at the Bar do not in the least sustain the
appellant’s broad contention. In Alexandre Bouzourou v. Ottoman
Bank, AIR 1930 PC 118, the appellant was an employee of the
respondent-bank. The bank transferred him from one branch to
another branch of the bank situated in different towns. As he refused
to comply with the order of transfer, he was dismissed. Thereafter,
he filed a suit to recover damages from the bank for wrongful
dismissal. It was argued before the Judicial Committee that under
the terms of his contract of service the sphere of his employment
included only the head office and not the branches of the bank. The
evidence in that case showed that transfer was one of the ordinary
incidents of the bank’s employment, being usually concurrent with
an increase of salary and responsibility, and suggested no more
than that the bank considered their officials’ convenience where
possible. Indeed the appellant therein did not even suggest in his
correspondence that the transfer was a breach of his contract...”
34.
Mr. N. Syngkon, learned counsel for the respondent/ARPS refuting
the submissions and contentions raised by the petitioners has not disputed
the fact that the Assam Rifles Public School (ARPS) Society, Laitkor,
Shillong was established in the year 1980 registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. It is also not denied that the petitioners herein are
teachers of the said school, except the petitioner in WP(C) No. 125 of 2017
who is a non-teaching staff.
35.
On their being appointed as such, the petitioners in these writ
petitions had signed the respective contract of service as under:
Sl. Name
No.
Writ Petition No.
Contract of
signed on
1.
Sebastian P. George
WP(C) No. 118 of 2017
07.03.1994
2.
Arindam Chakraborty
WP(C) No. 119 of 2017
01.05.2004
3.
Srilekha Das Purkayastha WP(C) No. 121 of 2017
01.06.2004
4.
Bharat Prasad Yadav
WP(C) No. 122 of 2017
31.10.1988
5.
Sanwar Hussain
WP(C) No. 125 of 2017
31.10.1988
36.
service
The learned counsel has then submitted that clause 15 of the said
Contract of Service has clearly stipulated that the petitioner will conform to
all the rules and regulations in force in the school and shall carry out all
such orders and directions as he/she shall, from time to time received from
the Managing Committee/Principal or any authorized member of the staff.
37.
One such order is the impugned order of transfer which, according
to the learned counsel, falls within the ambit of the contract stipulation at
clause 15 and therefore, the petitioners could not have assailed such transfer
order before this Court.
38.
The learned counsel has also raised the issue of maintainability of
these petitions and has submitted that the ARPS, Laitkor is a private school
and not a public body but a non-aided private educational institution looked
after by the ARWES, the school is neither a limb of Assam Rifles nor of the
Union of India through the Ministry of Home Affairs and as such, is not a
„State‟ or an instrumentality of State as envisaged under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India.
39.
To further clarify on this aspect, the learned counsel has submitted
that the source of fund for running the school is derived from the fees paid
by the students and contribution or grant-in-aid out of the regimental fund
managed by the Director General, Assam Rifles. Regimental Fund
comprises of individual subscription from serving personnel of the Assam
Rifles, profit earned from commercial ventures run by Combatants on
government accommodations, profits received from CSD Canteen, etc. No
public funds have been received or utilized by the ARPS in the running of
its school at Laitkor.
40.
On the contention of the petitioners that the ARPS cannot be
considered a private educational institution, since the management of the
said school lies with the Director General, Assam Rifles and the Governing
Body as well as the Managing Committee consists of members who are
mostly Officers of the Assam Rifles with adequate number of teachers and
parents representative, the learned counsel has contended that having
Assam Rifles Officers as members of the Managing Committee would not
make the institution a government institution as such.
41.
Stressing on the issue of maintainability, the learned counsel has
submitted that writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution will
not lie against a private educational institution, which fact was asserted and
determined in the case of St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra
Prasad Bhargava & Ors.; (2023) 4 SCC 498 where at paras 3, 11, 12, 27,
28, 30, 33, 34, 69 and 70 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court dealing with the said
issue also touching on the aspect of the consequences of a school being
affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) has, at the
relevant paragraphs that is, paras 28 and 34 observed as follows:
“28. We may at the outset state that the CBSE is only a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the school
affiliated to it is not a creature of the statute and hence not a
statutory body...
34. It needs no elaboration to state that a school affiliated to the
CBSE which is unaided is not a State within Article 12 of the
Constitution of India [See : Satimbla Sharma v. St. Pauls Senior
Secondary School [(2011) 13 SCC 760]. Nevertheless the school
discharges a public duty of imparting education which is a
fundamental right of the citizen [See : K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri
Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering, (1997) 3 SCC 571].
The school affiliated to the CBSE is therefore an “authority”
amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India [See : Binny Ltd. and another v. V. Sadasivan and others,
(2005) 6 SCC 657]. However, a judicial review of the action
challenged by a party can be had by resort to the writ jurisdiction
only if there is a public law element and not to enforce a contract of
personal service. A contract of personal service includes all matters
relating to the service of the employee – confirmation, suspension,
transfer, termination, etc. [See : Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P. Sebastian,
(2009) 14 SCC 360]. ”
42.
Noting that a Division Bench of this Court had earlier decided on
the issue of maintainability of a writ petition before this Court as far as the
ARPS is concerned and that such issue was also raised before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, the same having been
decided in the affirmative, the learned counsel has submitted that in the
light of the decision in the case of St. Mary’s Education Society (supra) the
issue of maintainability is required to be revisited. The case of Canara
Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr.: (2018)16 SCC 228 para 5 was cited
in support of his contention, the same reads as follows:
“5. Res judicata is, thus, a doctrine of fundamental importance in
our legal system, though it is stated to belong to the realm of
procedural law, being statutorily embodied in Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, it is not a mere technical
doctrine, but it is fundamental in our legal system that there be an
end to all litigation, this being the public policy of Indian law. The
obverse side of this doctrine is that, when applicable, if it is not
given full effect to, an abuse of process of the court takes place.
However, there are certain notable exceptions to the application of
the doctrine. One well-known exception is that the doctrine cannot
impart finality to an erroneous decision on the jurisdiction of a
court. Likewise, an erroneous judgment on a question of law, which
sanctions something that is illegal, also cannot be allowed to
operate as res judicata. This case is concerned with the application
of the last mentioned exception to the rule of res judicata. The brief
facts necessary to appreciate the applicability of the said exception
to the doctrine of res judicata are as follows. In the present case,
Respondent 1 availed a credit facility from the petitioner Bank
sometime in 2001. Respondent 2, his son, stood as a guarantor for
repayment of the said facility. As respondent 1 defaulted in
repayment of a sum of Rs 53,49,970.22, the petitioner Bank filed OA
No. 440 of 2002 before the DRT, Bangalore, against Respondent 1
and 2. Respondent 1, in order to repay the dues of the Bank, signed
an assignment deed dated 8-10-2003 with the Chief Manager,
Basavanagudi Branch, Bangalore for assignment of the trademark
“EENADU” in respect of agarbathis (incense sticks) on certain
terms and conditions.”
43.
As to the challenge to the amalgamation of the ARPS Society with
the ARWES, the learned counsel has submitted that it was a unanimous
decision of the Governing Body of the ARPS Society along with the
Chairman of the Governing Body of the ARWES taken on 28.09.2016 to
amalgamate the ARPS Society, Laitkor with ARWES and the same having
been issued with a No Objection Certificate from the Registrar of Societies,
Meghalaya, the process of amalgamation is thus completed and there can be
no challenge to the same.
44.
The decision of the Board of Governors, ARWES to incorporate
additions to the existing rules and regulations of the ARWES to provide for
conducting of suitability test for all teaching staff as well as the provision
for transfer of such staff within the Assam Rifles Public Schools, about 41
in numbers located in different parts of the North-East, the same having
been duly approved by the Registrar of Societies vide communication dated
02.05.2017, the issuance of the impugned order of transfer cannot be
faulted, further submits the learned counsel.
45.
Mr. K.P. Bhattacharjee, learned GA appeared for the State
respondents No. 1 and 2 in WP(C) No. 217 of 2017 has submitted that the
issue of amalgamation of the ARPS Society with the ARWES was taken up,
the process of the said amalgamation being challenged, the role of the State,
particularly the Registrar of Societies in such process was also questioned.
46.
Defending the stand of the State, the learned GA has at the outset,
challenged the locus of the petitioners by submitting that the petitioners not
being members of either the ARPS Society or the ARWES, they are
precluded from interfering with the said amalgamation process.
47.
It is also submitted that the respondent No. 2/Registrar of Societies
is made aware of the Governing Body meeting of the ARPS Society held on
28.08.2016 wherein a decision was taken to amalgamate the ARPS Society
with ARWES and also that such decision was not opposed by the members
of either of the said Society aforementioned, on receipt of a communication
dated 04.10.2016 seeking „No Objection Certificate‟ to the said proposed
amalgamation, the respondent No. 2 has accordingly issued such NOC, the
same being communicated vide letter dated 07.10.2016.
48.
It is further submitted that some additions were made in the
ARWES rules and regulations and the same was also intimated to the
Registrar vide letter dated 02.04.2017 who has duly responded positively by
way of the approval being granted and communicated vide letter dated
02.05.2017.
49.
Accordingly, the learned GA has submitted that there being no
infirmity in the process of amalgamation, the approval to the same by the
Registrar of Societies is a valid process and cannot be questioned by the
petitioners in these proceedings.
50.
Mr. R. Debnath, learned CGC appearing for the Union of India
through the Director General, Assam Rifles has submitted that the
submission of the learned counsel for the respondents No. 4-7, that is,
ARPS Society and ARWES and their Officials on the issue of
amalgamation or even in the cases regarding transfer of the said petitioners
therein is hereby endorsed inasmuch as it is reiterated that the Assam Rifles
has no direct control in the management of the ARPS Society and ARWES
and no public or Government fund has been utilized in the running of the
said Societies, therefore, there is no relief that can be claimed as regard the
Union of India/DGAR.
51.
On consideration of the submission and contentions raised by the
respective parties in this set of similar and almost identical cases, this court
would first deal with the issue of maintainability of the writ including the
locus of the petitioners as regard WP(C) No. 217 of 2017.
52.
It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent ARPS
authorities that the said school being a private non-aided school, meaning
that it is not receiving any grant-in-aid from the Government, therefore the
management of the said school being run by an independent body, the
ARPS Society is not amendable to writ jurisdiction. The case of St. Mary’s
Education Society(supra) was cited to stress on this point.
53.
It is the contention of the petitioners that it is no longer res integra
that the ARPS and its constituent bodies are amenable to writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The authority for the same
was the order dated 05.09.2012(supra) passed by a Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court in the case of Shri. Makanmi Kengoo & Ors. (which
also includes all the petitioners herein except Sanwar Hussain) against the
respondent/ARPS & Ors., in a case seeking implementation of the benefits
of the recommendation of the 6th Pay Commission, the petitioners therein
have moved the Gauhati High Court, Shillong Bench(as this court then
was), with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and on
the same being rejected by a Single Bench on the ground that a writ petition
is not maintainable under Article 226 as against the ARPS, the aggrieved
petitioners appealed before the Division Bench in an intra-court appeal
against the said dismissal order. The Division Bench of this Court, as stated
above has allowed the appeal and in effect held that the ARPS Society is
amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Special Leave Petition filed before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in this regard was dismissed with the Supreme
Court upholding the said order of the Division Bench. Even on review, the
same was dismissed.
54.
In the abovementioned case, the Division Bench of this Court had
reversed a decision of a Single Bench which has held that a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable since the
respondent/ARPS is a non-aided private educational institution and
therefore, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.
55.
The Division Bench after considering the appeal before it has come
to the conclusion that since the teachers of ARPS are entitled to the pay
scale as is admissible to Central Government Employees, they are
accordingly entitled to the benefits of the 6th Pay Commission
Recommendations. This is in line with the instructions of the Central Board
of Secondary Education (CBSE) as far as those educational institutions
which are affiliated to it are concerned.
56.
To make the matter more comprehensible, it would not be out of
place to refer to certain portions of the said judgment dated
05.09.2012(supra), the same being as follows:
“15. In view of the above, the question to be considered now is,
whether the appellants can insist that such benefits of pay scales
and dearness allowance admissible under the 6th Central Pay
Commission be extended to them in toto. In our opinion, the answer
must be in the affirmative for more than one reason. As found by the
learned Single Judge, with which we are in respectful agreement,
the condition precedent for affiliation of any school to CBSE is that
such school do pay the salaries and allowances to their staff which
shall not be less than the correspondent categories of employees in
the State Government Schools or as per scales etc. prescribed by the
Central Government. In the instant case, the ARPS had already
opted to pay the appellants the salaries and allowances payable to
the corresponding categories of employees in the Central
Government schools like KVS and JNV vide Annexure-C, AnnexureD and Annexure-E to the writ petition, and not the salaries and
allowances payable to the corresponding categories of employees in
the State Government. In our judgment, the refusal on the part of the
respondent authorities to the appellants to pay the salaries and
other allowances payable to the correspondent categories of
employees in the Central Government is contrary to the affiliation
rules of the CBSE and is, therefore, unfair, unjust and illegal.
Moreover, such consistent past practice of paying the salaries and
allowances to the appellants on par with their corresponding
counterparts in the Central Government such as the staff of KVS
and JNV cannot be set at naught at this stage without reasonable
justification as that would be arbitrary. Once the claim of the
appellants is found to be justified, financial constraints can hardly
be a ground to deny the benefits payable to the appellants. That was
the submission urged on behalf of the State-appellant in State of
Mizoram v. Mizoram Engg. Service Assn., (2004) 6 SCC 218. The
answer of the Apex Court is found at para 7 of the judgment: this is
what it said:
“7. The learned counsel for the appellant also argued
that if the scale of Rs. 5900-6700 is to be allowed to the
Chief Engineers, the State government will have to allow
the same scale to other heads of departments in the
service of the State government which will be heavy
burden on the financial resources of the State
Government and for that reason we should restrict the
scale for the post of Chief Engineer and Additional Chief
Engineer to Rs. 5700 and Rs. 4100-5300 respectively. In
our view this is hardly any ground to interfere with the
decision of the High Court. It has been found that the
claim of the respondents is fully justified by the facts on
record. The Central Government as well as the State
government accepted the recommendations of the Fourth
Central Pay Commission and the scales being allowed to
the members of the respondent-Association are based on
those recommendations.”
16. No other contentious issue survives for consideration. In our
considered view, the learned Single Judge, having found that the
respondent authorities are under obligation to pay the appellants
the salaries and allowances payable to the corresponding
categories of employees in KVS and NVS in terms of the Bye-laws of
CBSE regulating affiliation of schools to it, however, should not
have stopped there but should have applied principles laid down by
the Apex Court in K. Krishmachalyulu (supra) and allowed the writ
petition: she has in the process failed to exercise her writ
jurisdiction of mandamus vested in her by the Constitution. After
all, the legitimate expectation of the appellants that the past and
consistent practice of the school allowing them to enjoy the salaries
and allowances payable to the schools run by or through the
Central Government will continue cannot be discontinued without
reasonable justification.”
57.
At this juncture it would be apt to look at the lis between the parties
to see if the principle of res judicata will be applicable to the case of the
parties herein, with reference to the issue of transfer. The case of Nemi
Chand Mahela(supra) at para 11 cited by the petitioners would give a
glimpse of the impact the concession given by the ARPS authorities would
have, as far as the conditions of service of teaching and non-teaching staff
of ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong is concerned and the propriety of the effect of
the later rule which provides for transfer. The said para is reproduced herein
below as:
“11. The learned counsel for the petitioners had drawn our attention
to para 24 of the decision in Manmohan Sharma’s case [(2014) 5
SCC 782] which refers to the case of one Danveer Singh whose writ
petition had been allowed and the order had attained finality as it
was not challenged before the Division Bench or before the Supreme
Court. Termination of services in the case of Danveer Singh, it was
accordingly held, was not justified and in accordance with law. The
reasoning given in paras 22 and 23 in Manmohan Sharma’s case
[(2014) 5 SCC 782] relating to the case of Danveer Singh would
reflect the difference between the doctrine of res judicata and law of
precedent. Res judicata operates in personam i.e. the matter in issue
between the same parties in the former litigation, while law of
precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is binding on all
under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Res
judicata binds the parties to the proceedings for the reason that there
should be an end to the litigation and therefore, subsequent
proceeding inter se parties to the litigation is barred. Therefore, law
of res judicata concerns the same matter, while law of precedent
concerns application of law in a similar issue. In res judicata, the
correctness of the decision is normally immaterial and it does not
matter whether the previous decision was right or wrong, unless the
erroneous determination relates to the jurisdictional matter of that
body. (See Makhija Construction and Engineering (P) Ltd. v. Indore
Development Authority [(2005) 6 SCC 304].”
58.
In the case of St. Mary‟s Education Society & Anr. (surpa), the
learned counsel for the respondent has referred to certain paragraphs of the
judgment to say that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in this case has held that a
private and aided school affiliated to the CBSE is not a State within Article
12 of the Constitution of India and is thus, not amenable to writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Some of the paragraphs referred to by the learned counsel for the
respondent/ARPS which are found relevant are reproduced herein as under:
“3. In the present appeal, two pivotal issues fall for consideration
of this Court:(a) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is maintainable against a private
unaided minority institution?
(b) Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving a
private educational institution and its employee can be
adjudicated in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution?
15. The appellant No. 1 is a Society registered under the Madhya
Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. The Society runs
an all-girls school in Mhow, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, by the name
St. Mary’s Higher Secondary School, which was founded by a group
of French Catholic Nuns in 1893. The school is a private unaided
minority educational institution, which enjoys the protection
guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. There is
absolutely no Governmental control over the functioning and
administration of the school. The respondent No. 1 herein was
employed in this school prior to his termination. The school is
presently affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education
(CBSE) and is thus governed by its Rules and Byelaws. Further, the
Society has its own Byelaws, namely, (1) the Service Conditions for
the Employees of St. Mary’s School and (2) Service Rules for
Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff. The appellant No. 1-Society and
the school are absolutely private institutions, without any aid or
control of the Government or any instrumentality of the
Government, and therefore, not a “State” within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution.
28. We may at the outset state that the CBSE is only a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the school
affiliated to it is not a creature of the statute and hence not a
statutory body…
30. The contention canvassed by the respondent No. 1 is that a Writ
Petition is maintainable against the Committee of Management
controlling the affairs of an institution (minority) run by it, if it
violates any rules and byelaws laid down by the CBSE. First, as
discussed above, the CBSE itself is not a statutory body nor the
regulations framed by it has any statutory force. Secondly, the mere
fact that the Board grants recognition to the institutions on certain
terms and conditions itself does not confer any enforceable right on
any person as against the Committee of Management.
33. Thus, where a teacher or non-teaching staff challenges action of
Committee of Management that it has violated the terms of contract
or the rules of the Affiliation Byelaws, the appropriate remedy of
such teacher or employee is to approach the CBSE or to take such
other legal remedy available under law. It is open to the CBSE to
take appropriate action against the Committee of Management of
the institution for withdrawal of recognition in case it finds that the
Committee of Management has not performed its duties in
accordance with the Affiliation Byelaws.
34. It needs no elaboration to state that a school affiliated to the
CBSE which is unaided is not a State within Article 12 of the
Constitution of India [See : Satimbla Sharma v. St. Pauls Senior
Secondary School [(2011) 13 SCC 760]. Nevertheless the school
discharges a public duty of imparting education which is a
fundamental right of the citizen [See : K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri
Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering, (1997) 3 SCC 571].
The school affiliated to the CBSE is therefore an “authority”
amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India [See : Binny Ltd. and another v. V. Sadasivan and others,
(2005) 6 SCC 657]. However, a judicial review of the action
challenged by a party can be had by resort to the writ jurisdiction
only if there is a public law element and not to enforce a contract of
personal service. A contract of personal service includes all matters
relating to the service of the employee – confirmation, suspension,
transfer, termination, etc. [See : Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P. Sebastian,
(2009) 14 SCC 360].
69. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the learned
single Judge of the High Court was justified in taking the view that
the original writ application filed by the respondent No. 1 herein
under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The
Appeal Court could be said to have committed an error in taking a
contrary view.”
59.
What can be deduced from the above is that the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the case of Chairman, Assam Rifles Public School & Anr. v.
Mekanmi Kengoo & Ors. vide order dated 21.07.2015(supra) has, after
hearing the parties and on perusal of the record declined to interfere with
the impugned order dated 05.09.2012 passed in WA No. 35 of 2011(supra)
which in effect, would mean that it is the view of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court that though the ARPS is affiliated to the CBSE, yet it is still
considered a State under Article 12 of the Constitution and is accordingly
amenable to writ jurisdiction.
60.
It is, therefore, apparent that on the same issue, there are two
conflicting judgments of the Apex Court as noticed above.
61.
It may be reminded that courts, including the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court have held that each case depends on its own facts and a close
similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a
single significant detail may alter the entire aspect.
62.
When it comes to a decision to be made when a court as in this case
is faced with two conflicting judgments of a superior court of equal bench
strength, particularly of the Supreme Court, one school of thought
propounds that the High Court is not necessarily bound to follow the
decision later in point of time, but may follow the one which in its view is
appropriate to the facts and circumstances and issues raised in the case
under consideration.
63.
In view of the above, this Court would respectfully hold the view
that the respondent/ARPS though being a private unaided educational
institution, however, because of what was held in the case of Chairman,
Assam Rifles Public School & Anr. v. Mekanmi Kengoo & Ors.(supra)
therefore, it is deemed to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution and accordingly, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. Most of the parties involved in the earlier case are
also parties in these proceedings. Another factor which would weigh with
this Court is that since this Court itself in the Division Bench has held that
the ARPS is amenable to writ jurisdiction, no departure can be made in this
regard by a Single Bench of the same Court. Under such premise, this Court
would hold that these petitions are accordingly maintainable.
64.
Before proceeding with the facts and circumstances of the case of
the petitioners in WP(C) No. 118 and others(supra), the issue of
amalgamation raised in WP(C) No. 217 of 2017 is required to be answered
first since according to this Court the decision thereof would affect the
outcome of the other related writ petitions aforementioned.
65.
Without reiterating the facts as stated, a look at the relevant
provisions of the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act, 1983 as far as
amalgamation is concerned, would show that under Section 12 the
provision and procedure of amalgamation of societies has been laid down.
The said provision reads as follow:
“12. (1) Whatever two or more societies desire to amalgamate, the
Governing Body of each society shall submit the proposal in writing
to the member thereof and such proposal shall be considered in a
general meeting of the society convened for the purpose.
(2) No such proposal shall have any effect unless(a) it has been delivered or sent by registered post to the
members of each of the societies at least ten days before
the date of the meeting at which it will be considered;
(b) it has been sent to the Registrar before the meeting and
he communicates his approval thereto, with or without any
modifications;
(c) the proposal, with the modifications, if any, suggested
by the Registrar, is agreed to by three-fourths the members
of each of the societies concerned and confirmed by like
votes of members at the subsequent general meeting of the
amalgamated society.
(3) An appeal shall lie to the State Government against any
order of Registrar refusing to accord his approval to the
proposal or to his suggestions for any modification and the
decision of the State Government on such appeal shall be final.
(4) On the proposal being confirmed(a) the amalgamated society shall be registered under its
new name;
(b) the registration of the amalgamating societies shall be
cancelled; and
(c) the assets and liabilities of the amalgamating societies
shall be the assets and liabilities of the amalgamated
society.”
66.
As has been submitted by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners,
sub-section 1 of Section 12 provides that before the process of
amalgamation is completed, the Governing Body of each society should
submit the proposal in writing to the members of such societies and such
proposal shall be considered in a meeting of such societies.
67.
From the minutes of the meeting of the Governing Body of the
ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong held on 28.09.2016, one of the decisions taken was
that the ARPS Society be amalgamated with ARWES for better
administration of ARPS, Laitkor. This was followed by the communication
dated 04.10.2016 issued upon the Registrar of Societies, Shillong,
Meghalaya by the Deputy Commandant on behalf of the ARPS, Laitkor,
Shillong with a request for issuance of necessary No Objection Certificate
for the amalgamation in view of the resolution to this effect dated
28.09.2016.
68.
Nothing in the above procedure followed is seen the implementation
or adherence of the statutory provision as far as sub-section 1 of Section 12
of the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act is concerned. There is no
record of any general meeting of all the members of ARPS, Laitkor,
Shillong being held to consider the proposal for such amalgamation. There
is also no record to show that there was a corresponding meeting of the
members of ARWES to consider such proposal, such procedure being
mandated by law.
69.
The decision of the Registrar of Societies vide his letter dated
07.10.2016 communicated to the Deputy Commandant/Administrative
Officer, ARWES indicating his No Objection to such amalgamation
purportedly under the provision of Section 12(b) of the said Meghalaya
Societies Registration Act, is also found to be irregular and without any
substance inasmuch as there was no attempt by the said Registrar to inquire
as to whether the proper procedure was followed by the Societies concerned
before such No Objection can be given. Therefore, the No Objection given
cannot stand the test of legal scrutiny and the same is nonest in the eye of
law.
70.
Under such circumstances, the resolution dated 05.04.2017 passed
in the Annual ARWES Board of Governors Meeting wherein at point No.
13 additions have been made in ARWES rules and regulations, such
additions being to provide for suitability/competence test for Principal and
Teachers teaching in ARPS to be conducted on a yearly basis and another
addition to the rule is the provision for transfer of all permanent teachers of
ARPSs after three years of regular service, may be applicable to all the
ARPSs under ARWES but, would not be applicable as far as teaching and
non-teaching staff of the ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong are concerned.
71.
On the observations made above, this Court would hold that no
effective and legal amalgamation has taken place as far as ARPS, Laitkor,
Shillong and ARWES are concerned.
72.
The objection of the respondents that the petitioners in WP(C) No.
217 of 2017 have no locus standi to prefer the petition before this Court as
far as the process of amalgamation is concerned cannot be accepted by this
Court since it is evident that the decision made post amalgamation as far as
the impugned order of transfer is concerned has directly affected the
petitioners concerned and therefore, they are deemed to be aggrieved parties
and are entitled to seek judicial relief as has been done in this case.
73.
Coming back to the case in WP(C) No. 118 and others, the
contention of the learned Sr. counsel that the petitioners therein on being
appointed to such post in the ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong, they were also made
to execute the contract of service which they have accordingly done so, the
fact that there is no specific provision for transfer set out in the said contract
of service would only reinforced the fact that the ARPS, Laitkor, Shillong is
a residential school and there is no question of transfer, this contention is
also found acceptable by this Court since the issue of transfer more often
than not, is required to be specifically laid down under relevant rules and
regulations as was done in the one sought to have been introduced by
ARWES.
74.
On this ground alone and on the accompanying facts and
circumstances considering that the impugned posting order was made with
reference to the ARWES rules and regulations which is without authority as
has been observed herein, the impugned posting order cannot be enforced
as far as the petitioners herein are concerned.
75.
In the light of the above, this Court on careful considerations of the
issues raised herein and the observations made pursuant thereto, firstly is
inclined to respectfully agree with the decision of the Division Bench of
this Court in WA No. 35 of 2011 that ARPS is a State within the meaning
of Article 12 of the Constitution and is therefore amenable to writ
jurisdiction, the issue of maintainability is therefore decided in the
affirmative.
76.
As to the case of amalgamation, as pointed out, the process and
procedure carried out by the ARPS and ARWES is not in accordance with
the relevant provision of law and the same is declared null and void.
77.
Again, as observed above, the petitioners as far as the case of
transfer is concerned, has made out a case for the impugned transfer order
to be set aside and quashed, which is done so herein.
78.
The interim order dated 19.05.2017 is hereby made absolute.
79.
Only relevant authorities cited by the parties have been taken into
account, the question raised in these petitions being adequately answered.
80.
These petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
15.09.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review