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[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17755/2025
Mahavir Prasad Vaishnav, S/o Shri Ram Prasad Vaishnav, Aged
About 73 Years, R/o Gusaiyon Ka Mohalla VPO Harmara, Dist.
Ajmer-305812 (Raj.). Retired As Postal Assistant, MadanganjKishangarh Ho Under Postal Division Ajmer-305001.
----Petitioner
Versus
1.
Union Of India, Through, Secretary, Department Of Posts,
Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And
Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New
Delhi-110001.
2.
Director (VP), Department Of Posts, Government Of
India, Ministry Of Communications And Information
Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi110001.
3.
Chief Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Postal
Department, Jaipur (Rajasthan)-302007.
4.
Senior Superintendent Of Post Offices, Ajmer Division,
Ajmer (Rajasthan) -305001.
5.
Union Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary,
Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi - 110069.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10837/2025
1.
Union Of India, Through, Secretary, Department Of Posts,
Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And
Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New
Delhi-110001.
2.
Director (VP), Department Of Posts, Government Of
India, Ministry Of Communications And Information
Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi110001.
3.
Chief Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Postal
Department, Jaipur (Rajasthan)-302007.
4.
Senior Superintendent Of Post Officers, Ajmer Division,
Ajmer (Rajasthan)-305001
5.
Union Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary,
Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi- 110069.
----Petitioners
Versus
Mahavir Prasad Vaishnav, S/o Shri Ram Prasad Vaishnav, Aged
About 73 Years, R/o Gusaiyon Ka Mohalla Vpo Harmara, Dist.
Ajmer-305812 (Raj.) Retired As Postal Assistant, MadanganjKishangarh Ho Under Postal Division Ajmer - 305001.
----Respondent
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For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Agarwal
Mr. Devanshu Agarwal (for
respondent in D.B. C.W.P.
No.10837/2025)
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Bharat Vyas, ASG assisted by
Ms. Anima Chaturvedi and
Mr. Sanjay Mishra (for petitioner in
D.B. C.W.P. No.17755/2025)
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA
Order
1.
Date of conclusion of Arguments
10.02.2026
2.
Date on which the judgment was reserved
10.02.2026
3.
Whether the full judgment or only operative
part is pronounced
Full
4.
Date of pronouncement
19.02.2026
Per Hon’ble Ravi Chirania, J.
1.
The present writ petition bearing No.17755/2025 has been
filed by the petitioner - Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav, aged about
73 years, challenging the impugned order dated 07.04.2025,
passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur
Bench, Jaipur, whereby the Original Application No.784/2024
(hereinafter referred to as ‘O.A.’) was allowed and the
impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024 was quashed,
however, the learned Tribunal remanded the matter back to the
respondents to take a decision afresh on the quantum of
punishment within a period of three months. The writ petition
bearing No. 10837/2025, has been filed by the Union of India,
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challenging the punishment order dated 04.09.2024 as quashed
by the learned Tribunal.
2.
Insofar as the writ petition filed by the petitioner –
Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav is concerned, learned counsel for the
petitioner - Mr. Mukesh Agrawal, submitted that the petitioner
was initially appointed in the Postal Department in the year
1971 and was promoted from time to time on various posts by
the respondents in recognition of his unblemished service
record in the department.
3.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was
issued an impugned memorandum of charge-sheet dated
19.05.2015 in respect of a transaction which took place in the
department on 28.05.2011. The petitioner was served the
charge-sheet under sub-clause(i) of clause (b) of sub rule (2) of
Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Rules of 1972’).
4.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner
retired from service on 30.06.2011, and after retirement, he
was issued the impugned charge-sheet. He submitted that
as per the above mentioned Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972, a
charge-sheet can be issued within a period of four years from
the date of the alleged incident. In the present case, just nine
days before expiry period of four years, the memo of chargesheet was issued to him by the respondent. It is further
submitted that the respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer,
who, after conducting the enquiry, submitted his report dated
02.08.2019. Learned counsel submitted that the following
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charges were levelled against the petitioner in the said
memorandum of charge-sheet, which read as under:-
ARTICLE-I
“That the said Shri Mahavir Prasad Vaishnaw, retired
Postal Asstt., Madanganj-Kishangarh H.O. while
working
as
officiating
APM
(SB),
Madanganj
Kishangarh H.O. from 19-11-2010 and onwards
allowed/ sanctioned following withdrawal on 28-052011 from Madanganj Kishangarh HO SB account
no. 432644 through cheque, whereas no cheque
book was issued to the depositor of said amount no.
432644.
S. No.
SB A/C No.
432644
Date
28.05.2011
Amount of
Cheque
withdrawal
No.
27800
242500
The said account was silent, which was fraudulently
revived by Sh. Pawan kumar Choudhary Postal Asstt
on 05-03-2011 and thereafter bogus deposit entries
were made in it through data entry module and
raised the balance of the account. Said Shri Mahavir
Prasad Vaishnaw, retired Postal Asstt. and offg Asstt.
Post
Master
passed
the
(SB),
Madanganj-Kishangarh
above
mentioned
H.O.
bogus/fraudulent
payment through cheque from the cheque book
issued for the another SB account no. 442004
irregularly without carrying out prescribed checks,
violating the provision of Rule 33 (3) (b) read with
Rule 21 of Appendix I of P.O. SB Manual Volume-I.
He also failed to obtain KYC documents from the
payee at the time of making above payment,
violating the orders contained in SB order no.
18/2010 issued by Ministry of communication and
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IT, Department of Posts, New Delhi under no. 10904/2007-SB dated 24-08-2010.
It is therefore, alleged that by doing so said Shri
Mahavir Prasad Vaishnaw, retired Postal Asstt. and
the
then
Asstt.
Post
Master
(SB)
Madanganj-
Kishangarh H.O. has failed to maintain absolute
integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner
which is unbecoming of a govt servant and also
failed to take all steps to ensure the integrity and
devotion to duty from his subordinates as supervisor
as required under Rule 3(1) (1) (ii) (iii) and 3 (2) (i)
of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964.”
5.
The Enquiry Officer submitted his report, on the basis of
which
the
Disciplinary
Authority
passed
the
impugned
punishment order without properly considering the submissions
and grounds raised by the petitioner in his representation dated
30.07.2024 and also ignoring the fact that the matter is more
than 15 years old and further the petitioner has rendered
more than 36 years of unblemished service in the
respondent - Department. It is further submitted that the
petitioner neither played any mischief nor committed any fraud
or embezzlement etc. in the alleged incident for which the
impugned charge-sheet was issued. Learned counsel further
submitted
that
the
Disciplinary
Authority,
by
impugned
punishment order dated 04.09.2024, imposed a harsh and
shockingly disproportionate punishment of withholding 30% of
the petitioner’s monthly pension for a period of 3 years from
the date of passing the punishment order.
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6.
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The said impugned punishment order was challenged by
the petitioner before the learned Tribunal by way of O.A. No.
784/2024. Thereafter, the respondent filed a detailed reply
before the learned Tribunal. After considering the submissions
and the grounds as raised in the O.A., the report of the Enquiry
Officer and the punishment order dated 04.09.2024, the
learned Tribunal allowed the O.A. vide order dated 07.04.2025
and quashed and set aside the impugned punishment order
dated 04.09.2024.
7.
Learned counsel submitted that to this extent, the learned
Tribunal passed a well considered and reasoned order after
noticing and exercising all the facts and circumstances of the
case, including the documentary evidence available on record.
However, the petitioner has been compelled to approach this
Hon’ble Court by way of the present writ petition as the learned
Tribunal, while quashing the impugned punishment order dated
04.09.2024, committed a serious error in remanding the matter
back to the respondent for re-examination in regard to the
quantum
of
punishment.
It
is
submitted
that,
despite
considering and noticing the peculiar facts of the case, that no
loss was caused to the Government by the petitioner and the
persons who caused the loss and were responsible, had already
deposited the embezzled amount and the charge against the
petitioner was only in respect of supervisory negligence.
8.
Learned counsel further submitted that the withholding of
30% of the petitioner’s monthly pension for a period of three
years was severe and harsh and was, therefore, rightly quashed
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by the learned Tribunal, however, remanding the matter back to
the respondents at this stage, when the petitioner is more than
73 years old, is unjustified, unreasonable and erroneous in the
facts and circumstances of the present case on the basis of
material available on record.
9.
Learned counsel further submitted that it is an admitted
fact that the petitioner discharged his duties in a fair and
diligent manner, however, the fraud was committed by two
employees, namely Pawan Kumar Chaudhary, Postal Assistant
and Shri Ram Narayan Meena. It is also an admitted fact that
the alleged fraud was committed by the said two persons and
the petitioner was in no manner involved in any of illegality or
fraudulent act etc.. The documents placed before the petitioner
were signed by him in a bona fide manner. This fact was also
available on record before the Enquiry Officer as well as the
Disciplinary Authority.
10.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has
not caused any loss to the respondent Department and further
the persons, who were actually responsible for the loss have
already
deposited
the
amount,
in
such
circumstances,
therefore, the punishment order was neither fair nor justified
and was rightly quashed by the learned Tribunal. However,
remanding the matter back, without any justified reason or
cogent grounds, renders the impugned order, to that extent, as
illegal.
11.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon certain judgments passed by Hon’ble
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Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court. The first judgment as
cited is of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in D.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 245/2012 titled as Union of India & Ors.
Vs. R.P. Sharma (Rtd.) decided on 04.10.2012. In the said
judgment, in Para 6, the Court considered the issue of ‘grave
misconduct’ and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of D.V. Kapoor Vs. Union of India
reported in 1990 (4) SCC 314. The Court also considered the
judgment in the case of P.N. Bhat Vs. Union of India
reported
in
SCC
OnLine
Del
decided
on
20.09.2012. Paras No.5, 6, 7 & 8 of the judgment, as referred,
are reproduced here as under:“5. Explanation (b) following Rule 8(5) of the CCS
(Pension) Rules reads as under:-
"(b) the expression 'grave misconduct includes
the communication or disclosure of any secret
official code or password or any sketch, plan,
model, article, note, document or information,
such as is mentioned in Section 5 of the Official
Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), (which was
obtained
while
holding
office
under
the
government) so as to prejudicially affect the
interests of the general public or the security of
the State.
6. The Tribunal considered the question whether, even if
Article-II of the charge stood established against the
charged officer, it would amount to grave misconduct'? In
doing so, the Tribunal examined the above extracted
Rules as also decisions of the Supreme Court including
the decision in the case of D.V. Kapoor Vs. Union of
India: 1990 (4) SCC 314.
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Finally, the Tribunal concluded as under:-
"22. It is noted that the act of commission or
omission must be intentional or willful (mens
rea). The nature of misconduct must be serious
and
grave.
The
misconduct
like
corruption,
embezzlement. causing financial loss, Criminal
offence, moral turpitude and the like can be
termed as "grave". But error of judgment,
supervisory lapse, inadvertent negligence, delay
in taking action not causing any financial loss
and not getting nomination cannot be construed
as "grave misconduct."
23.
Thus
the
cited
Rule
and
judicial
pronouncements cast the responsibility on the
President to hold the pensioner guilty of grave
misconduct or negligence for which the findings
in the departmental enquiry must be assessed to
reach the conclusion that the misconduct or
negligence is grave. In the present case, the IO
held both charges as "not proved" and the
Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the said
findings issued the note which on consideration
we found to have violated the Rule 15(2) of the
CCS (CCA) Rules. Ultimately, the UPSC in its
advice found the Article-1 of the charge as "not
proved" and the Article-II of the charge as
"proved". In para 10 of this order, we have
reproduced the Charge-II, as per which the
Applicant failed to follow prescribed procedure in
accepting/allowing
nomination
in
MIS
accounts. This is a procedural lapse. There is no
evidence to prove his lack of integrity or financial
loss to the Respondents. Such negligence has
been explained by the Applicant in his reply
which is relevant but not properly appreciated.
There is no misappropriation by the Applicant,
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nor there is any financial loss to the Department
or to the customers and holders of the said MIS
Accounts. What best could have been done in
such a procedural lapse would have been to
impose a minor penalty. That could have been
possible when he was in service but not after his
retirement.
In
our
considered
opinion,
the
Applicant committed a simple misconduct but not
grave misconduct. By no stretch of imagination
the procedural lapse committed by the Applicant
can be termed as grave misconduct. We find that
UPSC has in a casual and routine manner
advised the President that the charge in ArticleII is a misconduct of grave nature which was
followed simply by the President. This approach,
in our opinion, is arbitrary and non-application of
mind. Hence, we find that the penalty order
dated 17.3.2010 passed by the President is
legally not sustainable and deserves to be
quashed. From the above, it can be seen that the
Tribunal noted that the UPSC in a casual and
routine manner advised the President that Article
2 of the charge amounted to misconduct of a
grave nature which was also simply followed by
the President (Disciplinary Authority)."
7. We agree with the observation of the Tribunal that the
UPSC has dealt with the issue of 'grave misconduct in a
very
casual
and
mechanical
manner.
There
is
no
discussion as to how the alleged misconduct under
Article-II of the charge could be regarded as 'grave
misconduct within the meaning of Explanation (b) after
Rule
8(5)
of
the
CCS(Pension)
Rules,
1972.
Consequently, we agree with the finding of the Tribunal
that a case of *grave misconduct has not been made
out. And, unless that is made out, there can be no order
of cut in pension under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972. We have taken a similar view in Professor
P.N. Bhat Vs. UOI and Ors.; WP(C) No. 8245/2008
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decided on 20th September, 2012. We have held that
until and unless there is a clear finding of 'grave
misconduct, the provisions of Rule 9 of the CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972 cannot be invoked.
8. Thus, without going into the issue of whether the
Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary Authority did or
did not conform to the requirement of law in so far as
Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is concerned,
on this ground alone, the cut in pension cannot be
sustained.”
12.
On the basis of above judgment passed by Delhi High
Court in the case of R.P. Sharma (supra), learned counsel
submitted that the Court considered the expression grave
misconduct. The Court also considered the intentional or willful
misconduct and after considering the same, punishment of
stoppage of 10% pension for five years was held to be
erroneous and was quashed.
13.
Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed
by in Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amresh Srivastava Vs. The
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Reported in AIR 2025 SC
1746 decided on 01.04.2025 in which the Hon’ble Supreme
Court considered the delay in issuance of charge-sheet and
other issues and quashed and set aside the punishment order.
The relevant paras No. 16, 17, 18 and 19 of judgment, as
referred reads, are as under:“16. In the present case, we are of the considered view
that the charges alleged against the Appellant in the
chargesheet fall under the category of a wrongful order,
which does not appear to have been influenced by
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extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears
that the order has been passed in good faith, without any
indication of dishonesty. Furthermore, the facts outlined
in the Show Cause Notice do not suggest any such
impropriety. The power exercised by the Appellant in his
capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order of Land
Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that
would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him. The
decision relied upon by the Counsel for the Appellant as
mentioned above, supports this view. Consequently, the
first question is answered in favor of the Appellant.
17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is
a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at
the stage of the charge-sheet itself, suffice it to say that
this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case
where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating
departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct
being within the knowledge of the department, but still no
departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must
go in favour of the employee. However, there may be
cases where the department was not even aware of such
irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature
that it is indicative, based on material considerations of
factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences
and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself
would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the
process of departmental proceedings.
18. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision
of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and
Anr. 738, wherein the court noted that there was no
reason to interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary
proceedings were initiated after 12 years of delay. A
reference should also be made to the decision of this
Court in P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, where
it has been reiterated that continuing the departmental
proceedings after an undue delay would be unjust,
causing unnecessary mental distress and damaging the
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reputation of the employee for the mistakes committed by
the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings.
19. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed
and the Impugned judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and
consequently the order dated 26.04.2017 passed by the
learned Single Judge stands restored.”
14.
Learned counsel further submitted that he has annexed
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court
in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12630/2020 titled as
Sitaram Acharya Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., decided on
19.10.2023 in which the following judgments of the Hon’ble
Surpreme Court were considered and examined and noticing
the serious delay in issuing the charge-sheet, more specifically
five days before the retirement, the learned Single Judge found
the action of the employer to be arbitrary and quashed the
punishment order. The relevant paras of the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, as considered in the judgment by
Single Judge in the case of Sitaram Acharya (supra), are
reproduced here as under:“The legal principles governing the issue of delay in
initiating departmental proceeding and its effect has been
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1995 (2) SCC
570 State of Punjab Vis. Chaman Lal Goyal wherein
following principles were laid down.
"It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding
must be conducted soon after the irregularities are
committed
or
soon
after
discovering
the
Irregularities. They cannot be Initiated after lapse
of considerable time. It would not be fair to the
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delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task
of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also
in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation
of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations
of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay
is too long and is unexplained, the court may well
interfere and quash the charges. But how long a
delay is too long always depends upon the fact, of
the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to
cause
prejudice
defending
to
the
delinquent
himself,
the
enquiry
officer
has
to
in
be
interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the
court has to weigh the factors appearing for and
against the said plea and take a decision on the
totality of circumstances. In other words, the court
has to indulge in a process of balancing."
Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1998 (4) SCC 154,
State of Andra Pradesh Vis. N. Radhakishan, while
dealing with the issue of quashing the enquiry proceedings
on the ground of delay, laid down the following general
proposition of law.
"It is not possible to lay down any predetermined
principles applicable to all cases and in all situations
where there is delay in concluding disciplinary
proceedings.
Whether
on
that
ground
the
disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each
case
has
to
be
examined
on
the
facts
and
circumstances in that case. The essence of the
matter
is
that
the
court
has
to
take
into
consideration all the relevant factors and to balance
and weigh thern to determine if it is in the interest
that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed
to terminate after delay particularly when the delay
is abnormal and there is no explanation for the
delay. The delinquent employee has a right that
disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded
expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental
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agony and also monetary loss when these are
unnecessarily prolonged without any default on his
part in delaying the proceedings. In considering
whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary
proceedings the court has to consider the nature of
charge, its complexity and on that account the delay
has occurred. If the delay unexplained prejudice to
the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of
it. It could also be seen as to how much the
disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the
charges against its employee. It is the basic
principle of administrative justice that an officer
entrusted with a particular job has to perform his
duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with
the rules. If he deviates from his path he is to suffer
a
penalty
prescribed.
Normally,
disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to take their course
as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice.
Delay causes prejudice to the charged is officer
unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the
delay or when there is proper explanation for the
delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings.
Ultimately the court is to balance considerations."
these two diverse
In the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
after 6 years and continuation of the same for a period of 7
years, prejudiced the delinquent officer and quashing the
proceedings, it has been held in para 16 as under:
"16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it
has not been shown as to what were the duties of
the Appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or
otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown
either by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority as to how and in what manner the
maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets
which were found attached to the estimate file were
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not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or
otherwise of the Appellant. The appellate authority
in its order stated that the Appellant was not
required to prepare the ACE-8 Register twice. The
Appellant might have prepared another set of
register presumably keeping in view the fact that
he was asked to account for the same on the basis
of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as
also the High Court failed to take into consideration
that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after
six years and it continued for a period of seven
years
and,
thus,
initiation
of
the
disciplinary
proceedings as also continuance thereof after such
a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent
officer."
Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra), in para 11 which
reads as under:-
“11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion
that allowing the respondent to proceed further
with the departmental proceedings at this distance
of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant.
Keeping a higher government official under charges
of corruption and disputed integrity would cause
unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer
concerned.
The
protracted
disciplinary
enquiry
against a government employee should, therefore,
be
avoided
not
only in
the
interests
of
the
government employee but in public interest and
also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the
minds of the government employees. At this stage,
it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an
end to the enquiry. The appellant had already
suffered enough and more on account of the
disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the
mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to
the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be
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much more than the punishment. For the mistakes
committed by the department in the procedure for
initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant
should not be made to suffer."
Likewise in the case of UCO Bank Vs. Rajendra Kumar Shukla
reported in 2018 (14) SCC 92, it has been held in para 12 as
under:-
"12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the
judgment and order passed by the High Court.
However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few
facts which were brought to our notice during the
course of submissions made by learned Counsel.
The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of
about 7 years in issuing a charge sheet against
Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained
delay. It appears that some internal discussions
were going on within the Bank but that it took the
Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally
unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground
itself, the charge sheet against Shukla is llable to be
set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained
delay in its issuance."
Similarly the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the
case of Bhupendra Pal Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.
reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 6073, has culled out
certain principle and the same are summarized as under in
para 32:
"32. The principles that can be culled out from the aforesaid
decisions may be summarized as below:
a.
It
would
disciplinary
always
be
proceedings
desirable
immediately
to
initiate
after
the
alleged misconduct is detected but if charge-sheet is
issued after a considerable length of time has
passed since such detection, it would be unfair to
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(18 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
the charged officer to proceed against him on the
basis of stale charges.
b. Disciplinary proceedings may not be interdicted
at the stage of charge-sheet and should be allowed
to proceed according to the relevant rules since a
charge-sheet does not affect any legal right of the
delinquent unless, of course, it suffers from an
invalidity that strikes at the root of the proceedings.
c. If there is delay in initiation of disciplinary
proceedings by drawing up charges against the
delinquent and such proceedings are challenged, the
disciplinary authority is under an obligation to
explain the reasons for the delay; and, depending
upon the worth of such reasons, the Court may
proceed to decide one way or the other.
d. There cannot be any exact measurement of the
length of delay by reference to years to fall into the
category of 'too long a delay', and what would
amount to the same has to be decided depending
upon the facts of a given case.
e. Should the delay be found to be too long and
unexplained, that would definitely have a bearing on
the seriousness of the disciplinary authority to
pursue the charges against the charged officer and
the Court may, in a fit and proper case, quash the
proceedings because prejudice to the officer in such
case would be writ large on the face of it.
f. Even if, in a given case, the delay is satisfactorily
explained, the charge-sheet could still be quashed if
the charged officer proves to the satisfaction of the
Court that he would be severely prejudiced if the
proceedings were allowed to continue, a fortiori,
lending credence to the claim of unfair treatment.
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(19 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
g. For the mistakes committed by the department in
the procedure for initiating disciplinary proceedings,
the charged officer should not be made to suffer.
h. Delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings per
se may not be a vitiating factor, if the charges are
grave and in such case the gravity of the charges
together with the factors, for and against the
continuation of the proceedings, need to be balanced
before arriving at a just conclusion."
The respondents have failed to satisfy this Court that why
no disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner for
a considerable time and why they have waited for a
considerable period of ten years and why the chargesheet was served upon the petitioner on 26.07.2012 just
five days before his retirement which was due on
31.07.2012 such action of the respondent is quite
arbitrary.
The
departmental
enquiry
was
completed
after
retirement of the petitioner and it took a considerable
period of eight years. The petitioner has been punished
for the alleged misconduct which is occurred 18 years
back, therefore, such action of the respondents is quite
unjustified.
In view of the above, the impugned punishment order is
not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is
quashed and set aside. The amount deducted from the
pension of the petitioner be refunded to the petitioner
with interest @9% per annum within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this
order.”
15.
Learned counsel submitted that in the said case, the
charge-sheet was issued with a delay of five days prior to the
retirement of the concerned employee, whereas in the present
(20 of 29)
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
[CW-17755/2025]
case, the charge-sheet was issued almost four years after the
petitioner’s retirement. He further submitted that impugned
order passed by the learned Tribunal, to the extent it remands
the matter for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment,
is perverse, particularly considering the fact that the petitioner
is now 73 years of age. On this ground also, the impugned
order, to the extent of remand, deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
16.
Per Contra, learned ASG, Mr. Bharat Vyas, counsel for the
respondent submitted that, being aggrieved by the order dated
07.04.2025, they have also filed a writ petition bearing
No.10837/2025, challenging the impugned order whereby the
learned
Tribunal
quashed
the
punishment
order
dated
04.09.2024.
17.
The learned ASG further submitted that the learned
Tribunal
committed
a
serious
mistake
in
quashing
the
punishment order by ignoring the fact that there was no
illegality
or
irregularity
in
conducting
the
departmental
proceedings. It is submitted that the punishment was rightly
imposed, as the case pertains to supervisory negligence on the
part of the petitioner employee. Therefore, the order of the
learned Tribunal is bad in law and deserves to be quashed.
18.
Learned counsel further submitted that the charge framed
against the petitioner employee pertained to supervisory
negligence, which was found to be proved by the Enquiry
Officer in his report. It is further submitted that the disciplinary
authority, after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing,
(21 of 29)
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
[CW-17755/2025]
passed the punishment order, whereby the petitioner was
punished/penalized with the stoppage of 30 percent of his
monthly pension for a period of three years.
19.
Learned
counsel
submitted
that
in
the
matters
of
departmental proceedings, the Courts have only limited powers
while exercising judicial review of the orders passed by the
Tribunals or authorities. In the absence of any violation of
Rules, procedural irregularity or illegality or no allegation of
violation of principles of natural justice, the learned Tribunal
committed
a
serious
error
in
quashing
the
impugned
punishment order.
20.
In support of the submissions, the learned ASG cited the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
B.M. Shastri Vs. Karnataka Gramin Bank reported in
(2023) 18 SCC 197 decided on 23.02.2023.
21.
Learned counsel submitted that in the case of B.M.
Shastri (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to
interfere with the punishment order on the ground that there
was no procedural irregularity committed by the disciplinary
authority, and that the charges leveled against the employee
were proved by cogent evidence on record. Paras No.7 & 8 of
the judgment, being relevant, as cited, reads as under:“7. After having heard learned counsel for both the
parties and on perusal of the allegations as levelled
against the appellant, it is apparent that he has not
verified the genuineness of the debits of interest on
deposit; not noticed the non genuine/fraudulent
transactions;
not
verified
or
noticed
the
(22 of 29)
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
[CW-17755/2025]
fraudulent/unauthorized alterations, inflating of the
amounts; failed to check/verify vouchers, sub-Day
Books, cash scrolls, Day Book, General Ledger and
Trial Balance; failed to notice the crediting of the
amounts to BCC and SB Heads. There were fraudulent
reduction
and defalcation of the balance
under
interest account, diversion of funds from interest
income received by the Bank, fraudulent diversion of
funds out of interest income received/receivable on
the loan accounts. Therefore he has facilitated V.S.
Shetty to commit such fraud resulting into misappropriation of money. The working of the Bank is
required to be of the highest standards, otherwise,
the trust and confidence reposed in the customers
would be shaken.
8. In view of the foregoing, the article of charges
levelled
against
the
appellant
has
been
proved
considering the cogent evidence brought on record.
There is no procedural Irregularity while holding the
departmental enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority, on
the basis of the material brought in enquiry, rightly
recorded a finding proving charge levelled against the
appellant. In the facts of the present case, in our
view, the penalty of dismissal is not shockingly
disproportionate. Therefore, we do not find any
perversity in the impugned order passed by the
Division Bench warranting interference by this Court.
There is no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly
dismissed. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any,
stands disposed of.”
22.
In view of the above submissions, the learned ASG
submitted
that
the
writ
petition
filed
by
the
petitioner
employee, Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav, to the extent of seeking
(23 of 29)
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
[CW-17755/2025]
a remand, be dismissed and further the writ petition filed by
Union
of
India,
07.04.2025,
challenging
whereby
the
the
impugned
order
dated
learned
Tribunal
quashed
the
punishment order dated 04.09.2024, as being perverse and
contrary to the law
settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, with
regard to interference in matter of departmental proceedings
and punishment orders be allowed and said impugned order
dated 07.04.2025 be quashed and set aside.
23.
Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
24.
This Court noted the fact that the petitioner employee was
appointed in the Postal Department in the year 1971 and
retired on 13.06.2011, after rendering 36 years of unblemished
service record.
25.
As noted from the pleadings before the learned Tribunal,
the petitioner was granted timely and regular promotions by
the respondents, considering his clean service record and he
retired while serving as Postal Assistant. After his retirement on
30.06.2011, the petitioner was issued the impugned chargesheet dated 19.05.2015, just nine days short of the four years
period prescribed under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972, in respect
of an incident which took place on 28.05.2011, where some
illegal transactions and embezzlement were committed by two
other employees of the respondent Department namely, Pawan
Kumar Chaudhary and Shri Ram Narayan Meena. Rule 9 of the
Rules of 1972 is reproduced here as under:-
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(24 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw
pension (1) The President reserves to himself the right of
withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in
full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in
part, whether permanently or for a specified period,
and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity
of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to
the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial
proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave
misconduct or negligence during the period of
service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement :
Provided that the Union Public Service Commission
shall be consulted before any final orders are
passed:
Provided further that where a part of pension is
withheld or withdrawn the amount of such pensions
shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees
three hundred and seventy-five per mensem.
(2) (a) The departmental proceedings referred to in
sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government
servant was in service whether before his retirement
or during his re-employment, shall, after the final
retirement of the Government servant, be deemed
to be proceedings under this rule and shall be
continued and concluded by the authority by which
they were commenced in the same manner as if the
Government servant had continued in service :
Provided that where the departmental proceedings
are instituted by an authority subordinate to the
President, that authority shall submit a report
recording its findings to the President.
(b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted
while the Government servant was in service,
whether before his retirement, or during his reemployment, (i) shall not be instituted save with the
sanction of the President,
(ii) shall not be in respect of any event which
took place more than four years before such
institution, and
(iii) shall be conducted by such authority
and in such place as the President may
direct and in accordance with the procedure
applicable to departmental proceedings in
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(25 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
which an order of dismissal from service
could be made in relation to the
Government servant during his service.
(3) omitted
(4) In the case of Government servant who has
retired on attaining the age of superannuation or
otherwise and against whom any departmental or
judicial proceedings are instituted or where
departmental proceedings are continued under subrule (2), a provisional pension as provided in Rule
69 shall be sanctioned.
(5) Where the President decides not to withhold or
withdraw pension but orders recovery of pecuniary
loss from pension, the recovery shall not ordinarily
be made at a rate exceeding one-third of the pension
admissible on the date of retirement of a
Government servant.
(6) For the purpose of this rule, (a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be
instituted on the date on which the statement of
charges is issued to the Government servant or
pensioner, or if the Government servant has been
placed under suspension from an earlier date, on
such date ; and
(b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be
instituted(i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date
on which the complaint or report of a police officer,
of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made,
and
(ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date the
plaint is presented in the court.
26.
This Court noted that the two employees were found to be
involved in the embezzlement of the public money and had
deposited the said amount stated to be Rs.27,800/-. It is not in
dispute rather admitted fact that no ill motive, mala fide intent,
manipulation,
dishonesty,
undue
favour
or
any
other
misconduct was alleged or levellled against the petitioner,
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(26 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
however, the only allegation against the petitioner was of
supervisory negligence. The respondent, Union of India, has
consistently maintained, both in its writ petition before this
Court as well as in reply before the learned Tribunal, that the
case against the petitioner pertains to supervisory negligence,
due to which the fraudulent withdrawal happened. However,
this fact cannot be denied that the petitioner neither gained any
undue benefit nor took any money while performing his official
duties in respect of the alleged incident.
27.
This Court is of the considered view that an employee who
serves an institution with utmost dedication, integrity and an
unblemished service record cannot be punished without any
basis and specific/serious allegation. His unblemished service
record cannot be tarnished on the basis of an unfounded or
baseless isolated incident, particularly when he is neither
involved directly nor indirectly.
28.
The facts of the present case are apt for the above
observation. If employees with an unblemished service record
are not taken care of by their employer then the same would
discourage and demoralize such employees. It is for this reason
that this Court, in the given facts and circumstances of the
case, is inclined to interference in the present case while
exercising its powers of judicial review in the matters of
departmental proceedings, considering the above discussed
settled law.
29.
This Court has considered the findings recorded by the
learned Tribunal in its order dated 07.04.2025, by which the
(27 of 29)
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
[CW-17755/2025]
O.A. filed by the petitioner was allowed and the punishment
order was quashed. However, the Tribunal remanded the matter
back to the respondents for reconsideration of the quantum of
punishment. As regards the writ petition filed by the Union of
India challenging the said order is concerned, this Court finds
that the learned Tribunal, after considering of the complete
record, rightly quashed the impugned punishment order dated
04.09.2024. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the Union of
India is dismissed as devoid of merit.
30.
This Court shall now considered the challenge made by
the petitioner employee to the order of the Tribunal dated
07.04.2025, to the extent of remanding the matter. As
discussed above, the petitioner employee was not involved in
any kind of fraud, embezzlement or any misconduct etc. He had
rendered an unblemished service of 36 years and retired from
the service of the respondent on 30.06.2011, without having
been served with any show-cause notice or charge-sheet.
However, after his retirement, he was issued the impugned
memorandum of charge dated 19.05.2015, just nine days short
of four year limitation period prescribed under Rule 9 of the
Rules of 1972.
issuance
of
There is no justification on record for the
the
impugned
charge-sheet
and
initiating
departmental proceedings nearly four years after the date of
retirement. The delay, as noted, remained unexplained and
highly unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case.
31.
Further, the allegation against the petitioner related only
to alleged supervisory negligence. This Court finds that an
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(28 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
employee like the petitioner, who had been granted regular
promotions from time to time throughout in his 36 years of
unblemished service and who was not involved in any improper
or illegal activity had acted in faith and belief, while signing
certain cheques and documents. Such conduct cannot be said
to have committed even in supervisory negligence. In day to
day office work, the employees are required to act with faith
and confidence in each other in the office environment and
documentation as prepared by the subordinates and other
employees is generally treated and considered to be true with
no unfairness or fraud.
32.
It is reasonably not possible for a senior officials or staff
to scrutinize all documents or transactions carried out by
subordinate staff, even after due diligence and taking due care
and caution in each case in day to day official work and in case
any subordinate employee commits any fraud, embezzlement
etc. by misrepresenting the facts, then for such acts the
senior/higher official or staff who had no ill motive, negligence
etc. cannot be penalized/punished in terms of above settled law
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the learned Tribunal
rightly quashed the punishment order, however, the delay of
almost four years as occurred in issuance of charge-sheet, after
the petitioner’s retirement and considering that no benefit was
taken by the petitioner employee and the fact that petitioner is
now over 73 years of age, renders the delay inordinate and
unjustified. This Court considering the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ambrish Shrivasta (supra),
[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB]
(29 of 29)
[CW-17755/2025]
RP Sharma (supra) and other judgments finds that the order
passed by the learned Tribunal of remanding the matter back to
the respondents on the quantum of punishment is unjustified
sfter so many years when the petitioner has retired in the year
2011 (15 years back) and deserves interference by this Court in
the facts and circumstances of the present case.
33.
This Court is of the view that if honest, dedicated and
devoted government employees, who are made scapegoats or
unnecessarily involved in departmental proceedings without any
involvement, are not protected, then and the same would
demoralize such employees and would affect the overall
working of an institution.
34.
The above observations are made in light of the fact that
the petitioner has served for 36 years with an unblemished
record and the respondent has failed to point out any
misconduct except the one mentioned in the case.
35.
In view of the above discussion, this Court finds the order
of remand to be erroneous and, being perverse, is quashed and
set aside. The writ petition filed the by the petitioner employee
is allowed and the writ petition filed by Union of India is
dismissed.
(RAVI CHIRANIA),J
PAYAL/AMAN/13-14
(INDERJEET SINGH),J
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