Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 02-11
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 5 of 2022 with
WP(C) No. 6 of 2022
WP(C) No. 7 of 2022
WP(C) No. 8 of 2022
WP(C) No. 9 of 2022
WP(C) No. 10 of 2022
WP(C) No. 11 of 2022
WP(C) No. 12 of 2022
WP(C) No. 13 of 2022
WP(C) No. 14 of 2022
Date of Decision: 01.07.2022
Pawan Castings (Meghalaya) Private
Vs.
Limited
M/S Sriram Wire Products(Meghalaya) Vs.
RNB Cements (P) Ltd.
Vs.
Hills Cements Company Limited
Vs.
Green Valliey Industries Limited
Vs.
Meghalaya Cast and Alloys Private
Limited
Meghalaya Cements Limtied
Vs.
Vs.
M/S Ri Bhoi Ispat and Rolling
Mills
Meghalaya Steels Limited
Vs.
M/S Shillong Ispat and Rolling
Mills
Vs.
Vs.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Meghalaya Energy
Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. R. Dutta, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. A. Kharwanlang, GA.
Ms. R. Colney, GA.
Ms. S. Laloo, GA.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This batch of writ petitions being similar and on the same cause
of action are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
2.
That all the writ petitioners in these matters are members of the
Byrnihat Industries Association (BIA) engaged in the manufacture of
goods and are consumers of electricity under the respondents.
3.
These said industries under the banner of the Byrnihat Industries
Association (BIA), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on
07.10.2020, with the respondent Corporation for levy of special tariff
for the industries and upon execution of the said MoU, the respondent
No. 2 filed an application before the Meghalaya State Electricity
Regulatory Commission (MSERC) for Special Interim Tariff
proposal/offer for HT/EHT industrial consumers. This application was
registered as MSERC Case No. 10 of 2020, and the MSERC vide order
dated 19.10.2020, approved the special tariff for an initial period of 3
years as per the MoU between the BIA and the respondents.
Agreements thereafter were entered into individually by the writ
petitioners herein, with the respondents in terms of the order dated
19.10.2020, passed by the MSERC as per the special tariff on
01.11.2020.
4.
It appears that thereafter, vide letter dated 26.10.2021, the
respondent No. 3, issued a notice for termination of the MoU dated
07.10.2020, by invoking Clause 17 of the MoU, on the allegation that
the petitioners had failed to maintain the minimum average load factor
of 68%. It was further stated in the notice that the said MoU would stand
void and invalid after a lapse of 90 days from the date of issuance of the
notice. To this notice the BIA had made a reply and prayed for recall
for withdrawal of the notice dated 26.10.2021. However, by the
impugned letter dated 17.01.2022, the respondents were informed that
pursuant to the termination notice dated 26.10.2021, the agreement for
supply of power under the special tariff would come to an end on
25.01.2022. It was also indicated in the impugned letter/notice that if
the petitioners desired to avail power from the respondents, the same
would be as per the regular/normal tariff applicable to such consumers
as determined by the MSERC vide order dated 25.03.2021. It was also
further given therein that non-compliance to the impugned notice,
would lead to disconnection of electricity supply w.e.f. 26.01.2022. The
writ petitioners being aggrieved are therefore before this Court by way
of these writ petitions assailing the impugned notice dated 17.01.2022.
5.
The main contentions of the petitioners are, first that the
impugned notice dated 17.01.2022, had been issued by the respondents
inspite of the fact that individual agreements with the writ petitioners
are still subsisting and had not been determined by the respondents till
date, or any action taken upon them, and that the determination of the
MoU would not automatically annul these agreements. Secondly, that
the respondents after signing the MoU had themselves approached the
MSERC for approval of the special tariff, which was allowed vide order
dated 19.10.2020 and as such, therefore, the MoU between the parties
stood merged with the judicial order passed by MSERC, and for
withdrawal from the said MoU, the same cannot be executed
unilaterally without reference to the MSERC. Thirdly, it was contended
that under the Electricity Act 2003, it is only the concerned Electricity
Regulatory Commission which can fix tariff for supply of electricity by
a Distribution Licensee, and as the revised special tariff as per the MoU,
for a period of 3 years, having been allowed by the MSERC, unilateral
determination of the tariff by the respondents is not permissible in law.
6.
Mr. K. Paul, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits
that the unilateral revocation of the MoU is unsustainable, inasmuch as,
the MoU is not the sole basis for determination of the tariff. He refers
to the order dated 19.10.2020, more specifically Para-21 thereof, which
he submits the MSERC has recorded that “the MoU between the
petitioners and the respondents based on a consensus agreement
between the parties was also taken into consideration”. It is contended
by the learned senior counsel that as the MoU is not the sole basis for
fixation of tariff, the respondent Corporation, is therefore bound by
Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which provides that the
appropriate Commission in this case, the MSERC, is to determine the
tariff in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In this context,
learned senior counsel had referred to the judgment in the case of BSES
Ltd. vs. Tata Power Co. Ltd. and Others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 195,
which he submits the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that tariffs can
be charged by the generating companies only after approval from the
Commission and changing of tariff which has not been approved by the
Commission is an offence under Section 45 of the Act. He therefore
submits that, the action of the respondents in seeking to discontinue the
special tariff by invoking Clause 17 of the MoU cannot be sustained in
law, and as such, the impugned notice dated 17.01.2022 being illegal is
liable to be quashed and set aside.
7.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned Advocate General for the respondents in
reply to the submissions has raised objections as to the maintainability
of the writ petition on the following grounds:
(a)
Writ remedy is not maintainable for enforcement of
commercial contract.
(b) Prayer for specific performance of contract is contrary to
provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1953.
(c)
Writ petition is not maintainable as the disputes raised by
the petitioners involves disputed facts.
(d) Notice of termination dated 26.10.2021, not challenged
and only consequential letter dated 07.01.2022 is under
challenge.
8.
On these premises of challenge, as elucidated above, the learned
AG submits that the petitioners are trying to invoke jurisdiction of
Article 226 of the Constitution, to settle a commercial dispute which is
not maintainable, as this is in the realm of private law. He submits that
even otherwise, Section 10, 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, casts
a statutory prohibition on specific performance of a contract which is
determinable in nature, and that it is equally established that there can
be no injunction to restrain a party from determining a contract. It is
also submitted that, the dispute raised by the petitioners involves
adjudication of disputed facts, inasmuch as, though no reasons were
required under the MoU for terminating the agreement, the termination
was necessitated due to the failure of the BIA members to maintain an
average load factor. This it is submitted, is sought to be contested by
the petitioners, as to whether the average load factor was maintained or
not, which are clearly factual disputes which cannot be gone into in a
writ proceeding.
9.
On merits, the learned Advocate General submits that the
MSERC had fixed the tariff for financial year 2020-2021, at
Rs.6.6/kVAh for Industrial High Tension and Rs. 6.2/kVAh for
Industrial Extra Tension, but the respondents conceived a package of
special tariff of Rs.6/kVAh for Industrial Consumers, but during the
subsistence of proceedings, the respondents had entered into the MoU
with the BIA, whereby it was agreed as a policy decision, that a special
power rate for BIA consumers at Rs.4.90/kVAh would be provided as
per Clause 4 and the same would be applicable only in case of minimum
load factor of 68% as per Clause 6. It is also submitted that, the MoU
was especially determinable with 3 months’ notice by either party as
per Clause 17 thereof.
10.
The learned AG submits that vide order dated 19.10.2020, the
MSERC had also taken note of the National Tariff Policy, 2016 which
allowed a licensee, the flexibility of charging lower tariff than the rate
approved by the State Commission, and thus, the National Tariff Policy
read with Section 62 of the Electricity Act, vested a licensee with the
power to charge lower tariff than the one fixed by the MSERC. It is also
submitted that, the MSERC simply approved the MoU as per the terms
and conditions provided therein, and that even otherwise, the special
tariff being a policy decision would be binding on the MSERC, as per
Section 108 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The MoU, it is submitted is
based on a policy decision of the respondents and it does not have a
statutory character and was entered into based only on policy
considerations.
11.
It is also contended that, the MSERC by the order dated
19.10.2020, has simply given effect to the provisions of the MoU
without any alteration and that the acceptance of the MoU, would leave
the parties to take recourse to any remedy, only under its terms. This he
submits, is evidenced in the order dated 19.10.2020 itself, wherein the
MSERC, had observed that the terms and conditions agreed between
the parties were legal and enforceable. As such, he submits the
impugned action was taken in terms of the MoU, which did not require
any sanction of the MSERC. It is also argued that, the termination of
the MoU is fully justified, as the respondent was suffering losses as a
consequence of the non-maintenance of the average load by the
petitioners. It is lastly submitted that, the petitioners has not even
challenged the notice of termination dated 26.10.2021, which is fatal to
the case of the petitioners, as the said notice in unequivocal terms stated
that the MoU stands void and invalid after a lapse of 90 days from the
date of issuance, and the same has attained finality, as there is no
challenge to the same whatsoever.
12.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties. When the matter had
earlier been reserved for judgment, with the leave of the Court, the
petitioner had filed an affidavit on 24.05.2022, enclosing a copy of
Tariff Order dated 25.03.2022, whereby in Tariff Order Case No. 29 of
2021, for the financial year 2022-2023, the Regulatory Commission had
approved the tariff as per the previous rate that is, Rs.4.90/KvAh. This
was then refuted by the respondents who have stated in their reply
affidavit that there was no such approval nor any proposal by the
respondents, but rather had only indicated with reference to the records
about the special tariff, and the fact that the matter is pending before
this Court. In this view of the matter, this Court will not dwell or take
into record these affidavits but will consider this matter on the pleadings
as made out in the writ petition and the reply thereto.
13.
The main issue that has to be examined in this matter, is only
with regard to the MoU, to determine its enforceability before this Court
in this proceeding under Article 226, its purport thereof, and whether
the same stood independent of other conditions or restrictions in the
execution of the same, to enable the respondents to invoke the
termination clause, or whether the same has the character of an order
approving tariff by the Regulatory Commission.
14.
It is an undisputed position that, the Regulatory Commission by
the operation of Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is the body
which has been vested with the authority to determine the tariff in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the instant case, as has
been noted earlier, by the MoU a special tariff had been entered into
between the units under the BIA and the respondent Corporation for
supply of electricity at Rs.4.90/KvAh. It is to be noted that, this MoU
received the approval of the MSERC which incorporated the said MoU
in its order dated 19.10.2020, fixing the tariff below the rate which had
been approved at Rs.6.6/KvAh, for Industrial High Tension and
Rs.6.2/KvAh for Industrial Extra Tension, on the consideration that the
petitioner would maintain a minimum load factor of 68% as per the
MoU.
15.
In the said order, the MSERC had also taken note of the National
Tariff Policy, 2016 which provided that a licensee had the flexibility of
charging of lower tariff than approved by the State Commission, if
conditions requires so, without having a claim on this count in
accordance with Section 62 of the Act. Further, the order of MSERC
also observed that “………………the terms and conditions agreed upon
between the parties are legal and enforceable between the parties and
accordingly the MoU dated 07.10.2020, is allowed, accepted and
incorporated in the present order.
In the result the Commission approves the petition for special
tariff for an initial period of 3 years to the industrial consumers of the
Respondent, BIA as per the terms and conditions provided in details of
the MoU executed between MePDCL and BIA, as reproduced at para
20 above”.
16.
It is pertinent to note herein that, the approval of the MoU by the
MSERC was after due consideration of the terms contained therein, and
in fact, while passing the order had also noted “The MoU between the
Petitioner and the Respondent based on a consensus agreement
between the parties was also taken into consideration”. Other factors,
it appears regarding protection of consumer interest and the
Commissions duty to ensure that the distribution and supply of
electricity was done on commercial principles and that the cost of
electricity was recovered in a reasonable manner, as also the objective
of the special tariff as an impetus for industrial growth, were also taken
into consideration. The MSERC in the order had further stipulated that
“Amendment or modification of any clause in the MOU will only
be done with the mutual consent of the parties involved and with the
approval of MSERC. In case of any disputes the Electricity Act, 2003
will apply and shall be within the jurisdiction of MSERC”.
17.
The order of the MSERC therefore, took other relevant factors
into consideration while approving the MoU and the special tariff
agreed upon therein. The respondents apart from their objections as to
the non-maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of the MoU
not being statutory in character, and that a commercial contract cannot
be enforced by way of a writ petition, had also sought to project the
MoU as an independent, stand-alone agreement and that the parties
were exclusively bound by the terms contained therein and that the
invocation of Clause 17 of the MoU was an action strictly in terms of
the MoU.
18.
After noting the circumstances by which the special tariff came
to be implemented and further the order of the MSERC which has been
passed in exercise of its statutory functions as provided under Section
86 of the Electricity Act, 2003, together with the conditions for
determination of tariff as given in Section 62 of the Act, the arguments
as advanced by the respondents that the parties are bound by a mutually
exclusive contract in the form of the MoU cannot be accepted. Relevant
extracts of Section 62 and of Section 86 for the sake of convenience are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“62. Determination of tariff.- (1) The Appropriate
Commission shall determine the tariff in accordance
with the provisions of this Act for(a) Supply of electricity by a generating company to a
distribution licensee:
Provided that the Appropriate Commission may, in
case of shortage of supply of electricity, fix the
minimum and maximum ceiling of tariff for sale or
purchase of electricity in pursuance of an agreement,
entered into between a generating company and a
licensee or between licensees, for a period not
exceeding one year to ensure reasonable prices of
electricity;
(b) transmission of electricity;
(c) wheeling of electricity;
(d) retail sale of electricity:
Provided that in case of distribution of electricity
in the same area by two or more distribution licensees,
the Appropriate Commission may, for promoting
competition among distribution licensees, fix only
maximum ceiling of tariff for retail sale of electricity.
(2) ………………………..
(3) ………………………….
(4) ………………………….
(5) …………………………
(6) ………………………..”
86. Functions of State Commission.-(1) The State
Commission shall discharge the following functions,
namely:(a) determine the tariff for generation, supply,
transmission and wheeling of electricity, wholesale, bulk
or retail, as the case may be, within the State:
Provided that where open access has been
permitted to a category of consumers under section 42,
the State Commission shall determine only the wheeling
charges and surcharge thereon, if any, for the said
category of consumers;
(b) regulate electricity purchase and procurement
process of distribution licensees including the price at
which electricity shall be procured from the generating
companies or licensees or from other sources through
agreements for purchase of power for distribution and
supply within the State.”
19.
Further, as observed earlier, the MoU dated 07.10.2020 was
accepted and incorporated and taken into consideration by the MSERC
while passing its order, wherein it was specifically noted that any
amendment or modification of the MoU was to be only with the
approval of the MSERC. This fact denotes the necessity of reverting to
the MSERC for any change in the arrangement that had been entered
into by the petitioners and the respondent Corporation, which however
was sought to be done unilaterally by the respondents.
20.
This unilateral revocation in the manner sought to be done by the
respondent, in the backdrop of the nature of the order of the MSERC
and the mandate of the Electricity Act renders the said action
unsustainable. The instant case as put up by the petitioners, cannot be
said to be one only for the enforcement of a commercial contract, as it
questions and assails the impugned notice dated 17.01.2022 informing
the petitioners about the discontinuation of the special tariff and the
manner in which the same was done. It is also neither a case of
imposition of lower tariff than approved by the Commission as allowed
by the National Tariff Policy, inasmuch as, approval was sought from
the MSERC for the special tariff as agreed by the MoU. Section 108 of
the Electricity Act as urged by the respondent to try and bring the action
of the respondent Corporation within the scope of a policy decision,
will have no application, as there exists no such direction to the MSERC
by the State Government. The question of disputed facts being raised
and that the notice of termination dated 26.10.2021 is not challenged,
are but ancillary issues, when looking at the totality of the
circumstances of the case and will have no effect on its outcome.
21.
In this context, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of BSES Ltd. vs. Tata Power Co. Ltd and Ors. (supra)
as cited by the Senior counsel for the petitioners is applicable in the
instant case as regards the approval of tariff by the Commission before
imposing the same upon the customers. Para 16 which is of relevance
is quoted herein below:“16. The word “tariff” has not been defined in the Act. “Tariff”
is a cartel of commerce and normally it is a book of rates. It will
mean a schedule of standard prices or charges provided to the
category or categories of customers specified in the tariff. Subsection (1) of Section 22 clearly lays down that the State
Commission shall determine the tariff for electricity
(wholesale, bulk, grid or retail) and also for use of transmission
facilities. It has also the power to regulate power purchase of
the distribution utilities including the price at which the power
shall be procured from the generating companies for
transmission, sale, distribution and supply in the State.
“Utility” has been defined in Section 2(l) of the Act and it
means any person or entity engaged in the generation,
transmission, sale, distribution or supply, as the case may be,
of energy. Section 29 lays down that the tariff for the intra-State
transmission of electricity and tariff for supply of electricity –
wholesale, bulk or retail – in a State shall be subject to the
provisions of the Act and the tariff shall be determined by the
State Commission. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 shows that the
terms and conditions for fixation of tariff shall be determined
by Regulations and while doing so, the Commission shall be
guided by the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) thereof.
The Regulations referred to earlier show that generating
companies and utilities have to first approach the Commission
for approval of their tariff whether for generation,
transmission, distribution or supply and also for terms and
conditions of supply. They can charge from their customers
only such tariff which has been approved by the Commission.
Charging of a tariff which has not been approved by the
Commission is an offence which is punishable under Section
45 of the Act. The provisions of the Act and Regulations show
that the Commission has the exclusive power to determine the
tariff. The tariff approved by the Commission is final and
binding and it is not permissible for the licensee, utility or
anyone else to charge a different tariff.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(Note: The Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998
referred to in the judgment above, has since been replaced by the
Electricity Act of 2003, wherein the provisions are in pari
materia as to the powers and functions of a State Commission.
The Meghalaya State Electricity Regulatory Commission
MSERC, has been set up in accordance with the provisions of the
Electricity Act, 2003 and exercises its powers accordingly).
22.
The authorities as placed by the respondents dealing with
interference in contractual matters, cancellation of Government
contracts and the inapplicability of the Specific Relief Act are not
applicable in the facts of the instant case and are disregarded.
23.
For the foregoing reasons, these writ petitions stand allowed and
are accordingly disposed of.
24.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
01.07.2022
“D.Thabah-PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review