Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl. Petn. No. 40 of 2023
Date of Decision: 20.09.2023
M/s Sesami Chemicals (P) Ltd.
Vs.
Shri. Rajesh Kabra & 2 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. K.C. Gautam, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: None
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
1.
Heard Mr. K.C. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the petitioner is a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 and is represented by its Director, Shri. Gilbert
Diengdoh.
2.
The learned counsel has further submitted that this application
preferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C is made with a prayer to set aside and
quash the order dated 15.06.2022 passed by the court of the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shri. D.K. Mihsill in CR Case No. 87(S)
of 2012.
3.
It is also submitted that upon institution of this petition before this
Court, the petitioner was directed to take steps for issue of notice upon the
respondents which was accordingly done so. However, in spite of the
same having been received, the respondents have failed to appear before
this Court. Accordingly, it is prayed that this matter may proceed ex parte
against the respondents herein.
4.
Briefly citing the background facts leading to the filing of this
petition, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner/company
has business dealings with the respondents herein for which in the month
of March, 2008 four consignments of ferro-silicon valued at ₹ 46,79,890/(Rupees forty six lakh seventy nine thousand eight hundred ninety) only
was supplied to the respondents who has paid an amount of ₹ 10,00,000/(Rupees ten lakh) only with the balance of ₹ 36,79,890/- (Rupees thirty
six lakh seventy nine thousand eighty hundred ninety) only yet to be paid.
5.
On the respondents failing to make payment, the petitioner had
lodged an FIR on 12.10.2011 registered as Umiam P.S. Case No. 43(10)
of 2011 under Section 120(B)/418/420 IPC. The respondents responding
to the same had worked out the amount to be paid to the petitioner which
apart from the principle amount the accrued interest thereon comes to ₹
34,54,599/- (Rupees thirty four lakh fifty four thousand five hundred
ninety nine) only and therefore, together with the principal the total
amount comes to ₹ 71,34,489/- (Rupees seventy one lakh thirty four
thousand four hundred and eighty nine) only. The respondents have then
made a part payment of ₹ 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakh) only on
03.11.2011.
6.
For the remaining balance of ₹ 31,34,489/- (Rupees thirty one lakh
thirty four thousand four hundred eighty nine) only the respondents had
issued an account payee cheque for the said amount from Account No.
25220500000011 drawn on the Bank of Baroda in favour of the petitioner.
The cheque was signed by the respondent No. 2, Shri. Sanjay Kabra.
7.
On receipt of the said cheque, the same was deposited by the
petitioner on the company’s account with the State Bank of India,
Shillong Branch, however, the said cheque returned unpaid by the Bank of
Baroda on the ground “Payment Stopped by the Drawer”.
8.
On the respondents after being made known of the fact that the said
cheque has bounced, the respondents failing to respond to the same, the
petitioner then instituted a Complaint Petition under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before the learned court of Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Shillong which was registered as CR Case No.
87(S) of 2012.
9.
During the pendency of said CR Case No. 87(S) of 2012, the
respondents preferred two petitions before the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court
(Shillong Bench) [as this Court then was], one being registered as Crl.
Petn. (SH) No. 68 of 2011 which is a petition for quashing of the FIR
dated 12.10.2011 registered as Umiam P.S. Case No. 43(10) of 2011.
Another case being Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 40 of 2012 with a prayer for
quashing of the proceedings in CR Case No. 87(S) of 2012.
10.
This Court vide order dated 21.05.2013 had disposed of Crl. Petn.
(SH) No. 68 of 2011 allowing the prayer made therein. Similarly, vide
order dated 14.09.2012 the prayer made in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 40 of 2012
was also allowed. Being aggrieved by such orders, the petitioner then
approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court on appeal and vide order dated
26.09.2014 a common order was passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2139 of
2014 and Criminal Appeal No. 2140 of 2014 wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had set aside both the orders of the High Court
aforementioned and has directed that the case before the trial court be
proceeded in accordance with law.
11.
In this backdrop, the matter was pursued by the petitioner before
the trial court as far as CR Case No. 87(S) of 2012 is concerned and steps
were taken for issue of notice upon the respondents therein.
12.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has again submitted that the
petitioner was surprised to know that the court of the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Shillong vide order dated 15.06.2022 had dismissed
the complaint filed by the complainant/petitioner on the ground that the
learned counsel appearing for the complainant had failed to appear before
the said court on the date fixed for the matter. The order was apparently
passed under Section 256 Cr.P.C which had effectively not only dismissed
the claim of the complainant but has also in the process, acquitted the
accused persons who are the respondents in this case.
13.
Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order dated
15.06.2022, the petitioner/company has now approached this Court by way
of this instant petition seeking relief in the form of quashing of the said
impugned order.
14.
The first limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the petitioner/company has always been diligent in
pursuing the case inasmuch as it has gone to the extent of approaching the
Apex Court when the application filed before this Court was allowed by
the relevant orders which in effect, has affected the cause of the petitioner.
In fact, pursuant to the order of the Apex Court dated 26.09.2014 the
petitioner had diligently followed the proceedings in the said CR Case No.
87(S) of 2012.
15.
However, unbeknownst to the petitioner the learned counsel
entrusted to pursue the matter had failed to do so leading to the passing of
the impugned order. It is reiterated that for the fault of the counsel the
parties should not suffer. In support of this contention, the case of
Secretary, Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh & Anr. v. Raghu
Raj: (2008) 13 SCC 395 at paras 25 and 27 was cited in this regard.
16.
The second limb for argument advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the learned trial court had erred in law and facts in
recording its finding in the impugned order by resorting to the provision of
Section
Cr.P.C
while
dismissing
the
case
of
the
complainant/petitioner.
17.
The learned counsel has submitted that the stage of the case at the
relevant point of time is for issue of summons to the accused
persons/respondents which could not be affected in view of the fact that
the correct address of the accused persons was not known. Even then, the
learned trial court had caused issuance of bailable warrant of arrest against
the respondents but yet again, the same has returned unserved for want of a
proper address.
18.
Maintaining that the case is only at the stage of appearance of the
accused persons/respondents the matter not having been heard in its
entirety, the learned trial court could not have dismissed the complaint
petition under Section 256 Cr.P.C.
19.
In support of his contention, the case of M/s Viswak Garments v.
M/s Woodstock Merchandising Private Ltd. & Anr. in Criminal Original
Petition No. 6905 of 2022 wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Madras vide
order dated 06.06.2022 at paras 8 and 9 of the same had dealt with the
import and impact of the provision of Section 256 Cr.P.C and has come to
the conclusion that the court may resort to this provision only when the
accused has entered appearance and on his/her appearance the complainant
is absent, then necessary orders for dismissal of the complaint may be
made.
20.
The object of the provision of Section 256 Cr.P.C is to discourage
frivolous and unnecessary complaint or litigation, however, in the case of
the petitioner herein the same would not apply since as has been submitted,
the petitioner/company has been diligently pursuing the matter right
through except for the fact that the fault of the counsel the petitioner was
made to suffer on the Complaint Petition being dismissed.
21.
It is, therefore, prayed that this petition may be allowed and the
impugned order dated 15.06.2022 be set aside and quashed with a direction
to the trial court to continue with the proceedings.
22.
This Court having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, facts
and circumstances of the case having been recounted herein above, the
same need not be repeated.
23.
Before proceeding further, on the basis of the record and the
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the respondents
in spite of having received the notice issued upon them have failed to
appear before this Court, therefore, this matter shall proceed ex parte
against the respondents herein.
24.
The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner
pointing to the fact that the petitioner/company has been diligently
pursuing its case throughout but for the default on the part of its counsel at
the relevant point of time, which fact was not known to the petitioner, this
Court is in agreement with the submission made and in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case, would hold that the complainant/petitioner
cannot be held responsible for the action or inaction of the appointed
counsel who has failed to appear before the court concerned without any
specific instructions from the said complainant. In the case of Secretary,
Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh(supra) the relevant portion, that
is, paras 25 and 27 of the same are found acceptable by this Court in as far
as the applicability of the principle stated therein to the facts of this case
are concerned. The said paras are reproduced herein as:
“25. In Rafiq v. Munshilal, [(1981) 2 SCC 788], the High Court
disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellant in absence of his
counsel. When the appellant came to know of the fact that his
appeal had been disposed of in absence of the advocate, he filed an
application for recall of the order dismissing the appeal and to
permit him to participate in the hearing of the appeal. The
application was, however, rejected by the High Court, inter alia, on
the ground that there was no satisfactory explanation why the
advocate remained absent. The aggrieved appellant approached
this Court. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the order passed by
the High Court and remanding the matter for fresh disposal in
accordance with law, this Court stated:
"3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present
adversary legal system where the parties generally appear
through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to
select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him
and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things.
The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and
may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After
engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident
that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the
hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is
not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party
having done everything in his power to effectively participate
in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to
the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High
Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog
of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is
listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a
practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad
amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not
like a particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on this
matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not
put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by
dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency,
would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What
is the fault of the party who having done everything in his
power and expected of him would suffer because of the default
of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi
invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be
the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he
represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is
proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate
omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously
is in the negative. Maybe that the learned advocate absented
himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for
ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on
that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an
innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen
advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside
the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and
refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be
restored to its original number in the High Court and be
disposed of according to law."
27. In Mangilal v. State of M.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 564] an appeal
against conviction recorded by the trial court was dismissed by the
High Court for non-appearance of counsel for the appellant due to
“strike” by lawyers. This Court held that dismissal of appeal by the
High Court was improper. The appeal was directed to be restored
to file and be heard on merits. [see also Tahil Ram Issardas
Sadarangani v. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani [1993 Supp (3)
SCC 256].”
25.
The other aspect of the matter is the interpretation of the provision
of Section 256 Cr.P.C. The said Section reads as follows:
“256. Non-appearance or death of complainant.–(1) If the
summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed
for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to
which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not
appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything
hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason
he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other
day: Provided that where the complainant is represented by a
pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the
Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the
complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his
attendance and proceed with the case.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply
also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due
to his death.”
26.
As referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, paras 8 and
9 of the case of M/s Viswak Garments(supra) has adequately interpreted
the said provision to which this Court respectfully agrees to. The said paras
are reproduced herein below as:
“8. Section 256 Cr.P.C. is the only provision which deals with the
dismissal of the complaint leading to the acquittal of the accused.
As per the provision, it will be applicable only if the complaint is
taken on file and summons is issued to the accused and on the date
appointed for the appearance of the accused, on his/her
appearance, if the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate
shall acquit the accused unless, if, for some reason, he thinks
proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date.
9. The object of the provision is that the court should take serious
note of the absence of the person who approached the court to set
the law in motion, when the accused person makes himself present
before the court for enquiry.”
27.
In view of the fact that the accused persons/respondents are yet to
enter appearance the proceedings in the said CR Case No. 87(S) of 2012
have not yet actually started and as such, the learned court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Shillong has misconstrued the import of Section
256 Cr.P.C and has dismissed the Complaint Petition without even
ascertaining that the accused persons are in attendance before the court on
the relevant date when the impugned order was passed. The summons
therefore, having yet to be issued, in a sense that the summons are to be
duly affected, to ensure that on the appointed date the appearance of the
accused is made, therefore, the letter of the aforesaid provision is deemed
to have not been complied with, the same could not have been resorted to
by the learned court.
28.
On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances in this
case, this Court is convinced that the petitioner has made out a case for
interference and exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
the impugned order dated 15.06.2022 passed in CR Case No. 87(S) of
2012 is hereby set aside and quashed.
29.
The case before the trial court is restored to file and the trial court is
directed to proceed with the proceedings on appearance of the petitioner,
who shall appear before the said court on 05.10.2023.
30.
Let copy of this order be issued upon the court concerned for due
compliance.
31.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
20.09.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review