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CGHC010356492026
2026:CGHC:40325-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4662 of 2026
M/s Sarvamangla Infrabuild Private Limited A Company Incorporated Under
The Companies Act, Having Its Registered/ Official Address At Plot No.
393/A, Indira Commercial And Residential Complex, Transport Nagar, Korba,
Chhattisgarh 495677, Through Its Director Shri Deepak Agrawal, S/o Shri
S.S. Agrawal Aged 46 Years, R/o Navrang Kunj, Sitamani Main Road, Ward
No. 7 Korba Town, Korba District - Korba Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - N T P C Limited A Government Enterprises, Through Its Managing
Director, Having Its Registered Office Situated At N T P C Bhawan, Scope
Complex, 7, Institutional Area, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003
2 - The General Manager (Contract And Materials) Contract Department,
Unified Shared Service Centre, C.P.G.-I, Plot No. 87, Sector-24, Atal Nagar,
Naya Raipur, Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492101
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
For Respondents
Digitally
signed by
PRAVEEN
KUMAR
SINHA
Date:
2026.09.21
11:04:13
+0530
: Mr. Vikram Sharma, Advocate
: Mr. Prafull Bharat, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate
2 / 17
D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu &
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Sushma Sawant
Order on Board
15/09/2026
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J.
1. Petitioner who submitted his application pursuant to Notice Inviting
Tender (NIT) in Government E- Market Place (GeM) Portal is aggrieved
with the alleged action on the part of respondents of not providing an
opportunity of offering the rate matching with L-1 bidder and further to
extend the said opportunity to L-3 bidder.
2. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ petition are that, petitioner is a
private limited company incorporated under the provision of the
Companies Act which is engaged in the business of civil construction, road
and highway works, ash transportation and allied work for thermal power
plant across country. Respondent No.2 floated tender bearing NIT Bid No.
GEM/2026/B/7867052
dated
04.08.2026
for
work
of
“ wasteland
development of low-lying areas at acquired land of NTPC – Lara using fly
ash from Silo-pond ash of Lara STPP”. Value of the tender was
approximately Rs.75,81,11,021/- (rupees seventy five crores eighty one
lakh eleven thousand and twenty one only) inclusive of goods and service
tax. Petitioner submitted his bid along with tender document and upon
opening of financial bid, petitioner was declared L-2 bidder. According to
the terms/clause of tender, petitioner was entitled to be offered opportunity
to match the finalized rate of L-1 bidder so as to be awarded the balance
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50% of the work/tender quantity. The opportunity was given to L-3 bidder.
Aggrieved with which this writ petition is filed seeking following reliefs:
“10.1) That this Hon'ble Court may graciously be
pleased to direct the Respondent authorities to accept
and give effect to the Petitioner's unequivocal and
unconditional
communication
dated
07.09.2026
(ANNEXURE P/8) and, accordingly, allot to the
Petitioner the remaining fifty percent (50%) of the
tendered quantity under Bid No.GEM/2026/B/7867052,
without treating the Petitioner's failure to respond to the
email dated 30.08.2026 by 02.09.2026 as a "deemed
refusal", in the interest of justice.
10.2) Any other relief, as this Hon'ble Court may deem
just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case, and in the interest of justice.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is L-2 bidder
and is Medium Scale Enterprise (MSE) and the rate mentioned by the
petitioner in the financial bid is falling within L-1 + 15 % range. Petitioner
was declared as L-2 bidder upon opening of financial bid. Respondent has
proceeded to offer L-3 bidder to match with the L-1 finalized rate, as the
petitioner failed to respond to e-mail and considering this as “deemed
refusal”, is per se arbitrary and illegal. He contended that neither of the
clauses of the tender incorporates the Evaluation Criteria with MSE
Preference for Cases with Splitting Clause, prescribing time limit for L-2
bidder’s response or provides that non-response within an administratively
fixed period shall amount to refusal. He contended that the procedure
adopted by respondent is unfair because petitioner was never informed
that failure to respond within the period stated in the e-mail would result in
forfeiture of L-2 opportunity nor was any reminder, show cause notice or
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opportunity of hearing was given to petitioner by the respondent before
proceeding to L-3 bidder. He also contended that the evaluation and
splitting criteria requires respondents to first give to L-2 bidder a real and
effective opportunity to match the finalized L-1 rate. Respondent also
failed to consider that petitioner had earlier conveyed its willingness and
immediately after learning of e-mail dated 30.08.2026/coming to its
knowledge of the e-mail dated 30.08.2026 submitted its unconditional
written acceptance on 07.09.2020. In these circumstances, the purpose of
of relevant tender provision stood fully satisfied and respondent could not
reject the petitioner’s acceptance merely on technical ground not provided
in the tender. Petitioner was regularly visiting their offices and project site
in connection with another running contract and had orally informed the
concerned official of its L-2 status and willingness to execute the
remaining 50% quantity of wok at L-1 rate. He also contended that
respondents authority being the public authority ought to have acted only
on disclosed tender conditions and apply the same standards fairly to all
bidders. By adding an unwritten deadline related consequences after
completion of the evaluation process and using it to bypass the petitioner
respondents have acted arbitrary and in contravention of the provision
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He contended that no formal
allotment has yet been issued and no third party right has been created in
favour of L-3 bidder and therefore respondents could have corrected their
decision, and ought to have considered the petitioner’s status without
disturbing any concluded contract. He also contended that respondent
could have moved to L-3 bidder only when L-2 bidder fails to match the
evaluated or negotiated L-1 price. Petitioner expressly and unconditionally
5 / 17
agreed to match the finalized L-1 rate and is willing to execute work at the
same finalized rate.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents would oppose the
submission of learned counsel fo the petitioner and would submit that the
entire tender proceeding have been initiated by the Government E-Market
place agency. That agency has not been impleaded as party respondent.
He contended that online tender was floated and the contractor have
submitted their bids online. According to documents available in GeM
portal it is apparent that there is clause under head of Evaluation Criteria
with MSE Preference for Cases with Splitting Clause. He submits that
petitioner as also L-3 are MSE and therefore as per splitting clause after
opening the financial bid, contract has to be finalized among a maximum
of two bidders as per the splitting and evaluation criteria forming part of
tender document. He contended that according to clause under tender
document, L-1 bidder shall be awarded maximum of 50% of the tendered
BOQ quantity i.e. another 50% of the tendered quantity shall be awarded
to another agency as per modalities mentioned therein. He submits that it
is not in dispute that if the top ranked L-2 MSE bidder accepts to match
the finalized ‘premium/discount’ of L-1 bidder, preference in ranking shall
be provided to the top ranked MSE bidder and they shall be considered for
award of 50% of tendered quantity. After opening of financial bid, e-mail
was issued by the agency (GEM) to petitioner on 30th August 2026 at
about 10:51 am and requested the petitioner to accept or reject proposal
by 02.09.2026 of matching with L-1 price/negotiated L-1 price for this bid.
Petitioner has not replied or responded to mail within time specified. In
GeM portal itself it is mentioned that buyer can request for L-1 price match
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with L-2/L-3 sellers and it is to be completed within 3 days time framed
from the request date. Petitioner was requested to submit the proposal for
accepting L-1 price/negotiated L-1 price but he failed to respond within the
specified time. He next contended that upon failure of petitioner to
respond to e-mail, the offer made by L-3 has been accepted and finalized.
However, no work order is issued to L-3 only because it came to
knowledge of respondents that a writ petition is filed by petitioner. He also
contended that in para-8.11 of the petition, petitioner himself has pleaded
that petitioner discovered that, e- mail inadvertently escaped the attention
of
staff member entrusted with handling such correspondence. He
submits that from the pleading as made in para 8.11 it is apparent that the
e-mail was received in the e-mail account of petitioner and therefor he
would not be permitted to take benefit of his own wrong. In support of his
submission he places reliance upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
case of W.B. State Electricity Board Vs. Patel Engineering Co.Ltd.
And Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 451. He also contended that no
equity lies in favour of petitioner . Petitioner has not impleaded the agency
floated tender i.e. GeM and the L-3 bidder whose offer was accepted, as
party respondent.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents available on record.
6. The undisputed facts are that petitioner along with others submitted
tender documents and the bid, pursuant to tender notification issued by
the GeM (Govt. E-market place). Tender was floated online and
undisputedly bids were also submitted online by the parties. In the tender
document under the head of “Evaluation Criteria with MSE Preference
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for Cases with Splitting Clause” there is mentioned of 6 clauses which
reads thus:
“(1) The subject destination-based contract will be
finalized among a maximum of Two (02) Bidders as per
below mentioned splitting and evaluation criteria.
(2) The tendered quantity will be split amongst Two (02)
Agencies. The L-1 bidder shall be awarded a maximum
of 50% of the tendered BOQ quantity i.e., another 50%
of the tendered BOQ quantity shall be awarded to
another agency as per modalities mentioned below.
(3) The Evaluated Bid Price (EBP) of the Bidders would
be ranked in ascending order as L-1, L-2, L-3, L4 & so
on based on the Total Quoted Amount on Lumpsum
Basis, Inclusive of GST.
(4) Among all qualified and substantially responsive
bids, the Lowest Evaluated Bid Price will be termed as
L1 and 50% of the total tendered quantity shall be
awarded on the lowest evaluated bidder (L1).
(5) In case L1 is an MSE Bidder, then Conditions No.
6.& mentioned below shall NOT be applicable and
further MSE purchase preference will not be applicable.
Condition stipulated at Point Now (9) will be applicable
for such cases,
(6) If L1 is Non-MSE Bidder and MSE Bidders are
falling in the range of L1+15% then the Order of
Preference in Ranking to MSE Bidders shall be given
as follows subject to matching of L1 price:
a) First Preference to SC/ST & Women MSEs
i.e. Women SC-ST MSE.
b) Second preference to SC/ST -MSE Only
c) Third Preference to Women-MSE only.
d) Others MSES.
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The above category/classification of MSE Bidder shall
be verified through their submitted Udyam Certificate.
No other document will be referred to for the same.”
7. It is also not in dispute that after opening of financial bid and finalizing
the rate GeM issued e-mail to the petitioner and the other bidders falling
as L-3, L-4 etc. E-mail notice talks of information given to petitioner that
buyer
has
shown
interest
in
his
submission
for
bid
No.
GEM/2026/B/7867052 provided he matches L-1 price/negotiated L-1 price
of this bid and it further mentions that petitioner was requested to accept
or reject proposal by 02.09.2026 by 10:50 am. This e-mail is dated 30 th
August 2026 at about 10:51 am.
8. In the writ petition petitioner has categorically pleaded that petitioner
has received the e-mail in his e-mail account however it escaped attention
of staff member, entrusted with handling such correspondences.
9. From the aforementioned facts pleaded by the petitioner and accepted
that e-mail was forwarded by GeM, then the submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner that respondent authority or the GeM has not
acted fairly is misconceived and not sustainable. Petitioner has not offered
in writing, but in pleading it only mentioned that petitioner has orally
conveyed its willingness. Unconditional written acceptance was submitted
only on 07.09.2026. However, period by which the acceptance is to be
submitted is till 02.09.2026 only, as specifically mentioned in e-mail
forwarded to petitioner and others.
10. Law with regard to interference in the tender proceeding is well settled
by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India
9 / 17
reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
thus:
“77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the
question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority
exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural
justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable
tribunal would have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a
particular policy or particular decision taken in the
fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with
the manner in which those decisions have been taken.
The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to
case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an
administrative action is subject to control by judicial
review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker
must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.
(ii)
Irrationality,
unreasonableness.
namely,
Wednesbury
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not
rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As
a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696] , Lord Diplock
refers specifically to one development, namely, the
possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In
all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court
10 / 17
should, “consider whether something has gone wrong of
a nature and degree which requires its intervention”.
11. In case of Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and
Ors reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:
“23. From the above decisions, the following principles
emerge:
(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness
in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in
essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair
play. These actions are amenable to the judicial
review only to the extent that the State must act
validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically
for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the
bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate
to take into consideration the national priorities;
(b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely
within the purview of the executive and the courts
hardly have any role to play in this process except
for striking down such action of the executive as is
proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the
Government acts in conformity with certain
healthy standards and norms such as awarding of
contracts
by
inviting
tenders,
in
those
circumstances, the interference by courts is very
limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a
tender document and awarding a contract, greater
latitude is required to be conceded to the State
authorities unless the action of the tendering
authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of
its statutory powers, interference by courts is not
warranted;
11 / 17
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders
have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has
the capacity and the resources to successfully execute
the work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably,
fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here
again, interference by court is very restrictive since no
person can claim a fundamental right to carry on
business with the Government.”
12. In case at hand, procedure adopted by GeM for offering their
acceptance to match L-1 rates/L-1 finalized premium /discount is not
specifically questioned by petitioner. However, during course of argument
learned counsel for the petitioner made an attempt to submit that
respondents have acted arbitrary in issuing letter not only to L-2 bidder ie.
petitioner but also to L-3 bidder and according to the clauses of tender
document, first opportunity is to be given to L-2 bidder. When Court posed
specific question to learned counsel for the petitioner as to in which clause
of tender document it is mentioned that first letter is to be issued
/information is to be given only to L-2 bidder to match L-1 finalized
premium/discount rate, he could not able to point out such clause. In
absence of any specific clause in this regard the only consideration would
be that even if the e-mail is sent to others including L-2 bidder then
preference is to be given to L-2 bidder subject to his acceptance of the
proposal to match L-1 price/negotiated L-1 price. When petitioner failed to
submit its acceptance or rejection to proposal by the time specified then in
the opinion of this Court, decision taken by competent authority that
12 / 17
petitioner is not interested, and accepted the acceptance forwarded by L-3
bidder after time prescribed, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unfairness
on the part of respondent or that agency who floated tender document .
The action adopted by the agency floated tender is fair and not arbitrary.
13. In case of Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while considering the argument that the mistakes or errors occurred
due to fault of computer are unintentional, has observed thus:
“23. The mistakes/errors in question, it is stated, are
unintentional and occurred due to the fault of computer
termed
as
“a
repetitive
systematic
computer
typographical transmission failure”. It is difficult to
accept this contention. A mistake may be unilateral or
mutual but it is always unintentional. If it is intentional it
ceases to be a mistake. Here the mistakes may be
unintentional but it was not beyond the control of
Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the same before
submission of the bid. Had they been vigilant in
checking the bid documents before their submission,
the mistakes would have been avoided. Further,
correction of such mistakes after one-and-a-half
months of opening of the bids will also be violative of
clauses 24.1, 24.3 and 29.1 of the ITB.”
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of AGMATEL India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Resoursys Telecom and Ors. reported in
(2022) 5 SCC 362 while
considering argument raised on interpretation of the tender document has
held as under :
13 / 17
“24. The scope of judicial review in contractual
matters, and particularly in relation to the process
of interpretation of tender document, has been
the subject-matter of discussion in various
decisions of this Court. We need not multiply the
authorities on the subject, as suffice it would be
refer to the three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Galaxy Transport Agencies [Galaxy
Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, Fleet
Owners & Transport Contractors, (2021) 16 SCC
808 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1035] wherein,
among others, the said decision in Afcons
Infrastructure
[Afcons
Infrastructure
Ltd.
v.
Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC
818] has also been considered; and this Court
has disapproved the interference by the High
Court in the interpretation by the tender inviting
authority of the eligibility term relating to the
category of vehicles required to be held by the
bidders, in the tender floated for supply of
vehicles
for
the
carriage
of
troops
and
equipment.
25. This Court referred to various decisions on
the subject and stated the legal principles as
follows : (Galaxy Transport Agencies case
[Galaxy
Transport
Roadways,
Fleet
Agencies
v.
New
J.K.
Owners
&
Transport
Contractors, (2021) 16 SCC 808 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 1035] , SCC paras 14-20)
“14. In a series of judgments, this Court
has held that the authority that authors
the tender document is the best person
to understand and appreciate its
requirements,
and
thus,
its
interpretation should not be secondguessed by a court in judicial review
proceedings. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd.
14 / 17
v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. [Afcons
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail
Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] , this Court
held : (SCC p. 825, para 15)
‘15. We may add that the owner or the
employer of a project, having
authored the tender documents, is the
best person to understand and
appreciate its requirements and
interpret
its
documents.
The
constitutional courts must defer to this
understanding and appreciation of the
tender documents, unless there is
mala fide or perversity in the
understanding or appreciation or in
the application of the terms of the
tender conditions. It is possible that
the owner or employer of a project
may give an interpretation to the
tender documents that is not
acceptable to the constitutional
courts but that by itself is not a
reason for interfering with the
interpretation given.’
x
x
x
16. Further, in the recent judgment in Silppi
Constructions Contractors v. Union of India
[Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of
India, (2020) 16 SCC 489] , this Court held as
follows : (SCC pp. 501-02, para 20)
‘20. The essence of the law laid down in the
judgments referred to above is the exercise
of restraint and caution; the need for
overwhelming public interest to justify
judicial intervention in matters of contract
involving the state instrumentalities; the
courts should give way to the opinion of the
experts unless the decision is totally
arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does
not sit like a court of appeal over the
appropriate authority; the court must realise
that the authority floating the tender is the
best judge of its requirements and,
15 / 17
therefore, the court's interference should be
minimal. The authority which floats the
contract or tender, and has authored the
tender documents is the best judge as to
how the documents have to be interpreted.
If two interpretations are possible then the
interpretation of the author must be
accepted. The courts will only interfere to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias,
mala fides or perversity. With this approach
in mind we shall deal with the present case.’
15. In case of Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“22. Judicial review of administrative action
is intended to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and
mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether
choice or decision is made “lawfully” and
not to check whether choice or decision is
“sound”. When the power of judicial review
is invoked in matters relating to tenders or
award of contracts, certain special features
should be borne in mind. A contract is a
commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders
and awarding contracts are essentially
commercial functions. Principles of equity
and natural justice stay at a distance. If the
decision relating to award of contract is
bona fide and is in public interest, courts
will not, in exercise of power of judicial
review, interfere even if a procedural
aberration or error in assessment or
prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The
power of judicial review will not be
permitted to be invoked to protect private
interest at the cost of public interest, or to
decide contractual disputes. The tenderer
or contractor with a grievance can always
seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by
unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary
grievances, wounded pride and business
rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills
16 / 17
of some technical/procedural violation or
some prejudice to self, and persuade courts
to interfere by exercising power of judicial
review,
should
be
resisted.
Such
interferences, either interim or final, may
hold up public works for years, or delay
relief and succour to thousands and millions
and may increase the project cost manifold.
Therefore, a court before interfering in
tender or contractual matters in exercise of
power of judicial review, should pose to
itself the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision
made by the authority is mala fide or
intended to favour someone;
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision
made is so arbitrary and irrational that the
court can say:“the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and
in accordance with relevant law could have
reached”;
(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should
be no interference under Article 226. Cases
involving blacklisting or imposition of penal
consequences
on
a
tenderer/contractor
or
distribution of State largesse (allotment of
sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and
franchises) stand on a different footing as they
may require a higher degree of fairness in
action.”
16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shilpi Constructions Contractors
Vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489 observed
that the essence of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above is
the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public
17 / 17
interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the
state instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of the
experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court
does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court
must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its
requirements and, therefore, the court’s interference should be minimal.
17. In the case at hand, the facts pleaded and argued by parties show that
procedure was followed, to give petitioner an opportunity to submit
acceptance and offer to match L-1 rate within prescribed time. E-mail sent
in this regard was received in e-mail account of petitioner and therefore in
the opinion of this Court, petitioner failed to make out a case of
arbitrariness, unfairness, or malafide.
18. In the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to above, we are of the considered
view that petitioner could not make out a case for interference in the
subject tender proceedings.
19. Before parting with the case, we also want to point out that petitioner
has also not impleaded GeM or L-3 bidder as party respondent, who were
necessary party in the facts of the case.
20. For the foregoing discussions, writ petition being sans merit is liable to
be and is accordingly dismissed.
S
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Praveen
Sd/- /(Sushma Sawant)
Judge
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