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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Extra-ordinary Jurisdiction)
W.P. (C) No.25 of 2018
M/s Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
Sarda Building,
M.G. Marg, Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
...
Petitioner
Versus
1.
State of Sikkim and Others
Secretariat, Manan Kendra Bhawan,
Development Area, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2.
Secretary,
Land Revenue and Disaster Management Department,
Secretariat, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
3.
The District Collector, East
District Administrative Centre,
Govt. of Sikkim, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
4.
Surendra Lama
Sichey Busty,
P.O. Sichey and P.S. Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
…
Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, C.J.
For Petitioner
:
Mr. T.B. Thapa, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ranjan
Chettri, Advocate.
For Respondents :
No. 1, 2 & 3
Dr. Doma T. Bhutia, Addl. Advocate General.
For Respondent
No. 4
Mr. N. Rai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Yozan Rai,
Advocate.
:
Dates of Hearing :
27.02.2020, 25.06.2020 & 17.08.2020.
Date of Judgment :
14.09.2020
JUDGMENT
(Arup Kumar Goswami, CJ.)
The writ petitioner is a company registered on 17.05.1997
under the Registration of Companies Act (Sikkim), 1961 and the
petition was filed through one of the shareholders.
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
2.
This
Writ
Petition
is
directed
against
the
order
dated
12.04.2018 passed by the respondent no.2 dismissing the appeal
being Appeal No.03/2011 filed by the petitioner, a letter dated
28.05.2011 issued by the respondent no.3 as well as a letter dated
19.12.2003 issued by the Revenue Officer-cum-Assistant Director,
Land Revenue Department, Government of Sikkim (who is not arrayed
as party-respondent). A Writ of mandamus is also prayed for to direct
the State-respondents to register the Lease Deed dated 07.01.2000
entered in between the petitioner and respondent no.4. Prayer is also
made to call for the records of the registration proceedings relating to
the Lease Deed and records of Appeal No.03/2011. Further prayer is
made to call for the records of Misc. Case No.70/2010, wherein the
petitioner and the respondent no.4 were parties.
3.
Land measuring 20,525 sq.ft. in a portion of Khasra Plot
No.70/99 and 72/100 situated at Sichey in the Pioneer Reserve Block
– Tadong Elakha , Gangtok was the subject matter of the Lease Deed
with boundaries as indicted in the Lease Deed.
4.
Before proceeding further, though not really a subject matter
of this petition, for better understanding, it will be appropriate to take
note of the fact that Misc. Case No.70/2010 was registered in the
Court of District Collector (East) and a final order was passed in the
said proceeding on 25.06.2011.
5.
The petitioner had filed an objection before the District
Collector (East) on 16.09.2008, stating that the land forming part of
the Lease Deed was proposed to be sold by the respondent no.4 to
some other parties and that registration of the plot of land in any other
name would invite litigation and, accordingly, requesting the authority
to intimate the petitioner in case any such document of sale is
presented for registration. The said letter was taken as a standing
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
objection filed by the petitioner. On 26.05.2010, the respondent no.4
filed a petition stating, amongst others, that he had sold the plot of
land to one Ms. Tashi Ongmu Bhutia, and that a communication was
sent
to
the
petitioner
on
19.12.2003
by
the
Land
Revenue
Department, Government of Sikkim through Revenue Officer-cumAssistant Director, informing that the Lease Deed could not be
registered due to the reasons mentioned therein and that in the
meantime, he had mortgaged his landed property to the State Bank of
Sikkim in the year 2009 for a loan for constructing a dwelling house.
It was further stated that he had decided to sell out his landed
property to three individuals and the Sale Deeds to that effect had
been executed and accordingly, prayed for registration of Sale Deeds
in favour of the purchasers.
On receipt of the same, Misc. Case
No.70/2010 was registered.
6.
By an order dated 25.06.2011, the District Collector, East
directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, East not to register the Sale
Deeds presented by the present respondent no.4 in respect of the land
in dispute till the matter is disposed of by the appropriate authority or
Court of Law. The District Collector was of the opinion that when the
land was mortgaged to the State Bank of Sikkim and the mortgage has
not been cleared or cancelled, sale of the same land and its
registration cannot be allowed. The other reason assigned by the
District Collector was that the validity of the Lease Deed between the
petitioner and respondent no.4 was left to be decided by the
appropriate authority or Court of Law and therefore, till the matter is
disposed of by the appropriate authority or Court of Law, sale of the
land in question and registration of the Sale Deeds cannot be
permitted.
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
7.
In the said proceeding registered as Misc. Case No. 70/2010,
in his reply dated 10.11.2010, it was contended by the petitioner that
letter dated 19.12.2003 was never received by it. As the petitioner had
denied to receive the said letter, a letter dated 28.05.2011 was issued
to
the
petitioner-company
enclosing
thereto
the
letter
dated
19.12.2003. After receipt of the letter dated 28.05.2011 along with the
letter dated 19.12.2003, the petitioner company preferred an appeal
before the prescribed authority under the provisions of the Sikkim
State Rules (Registration of Documents) 1930, (for short, Rules of
1930) praying for revising and altering the letter dated 28.05.2011 of
the District Collector, East and the letter of the Revenue Officer-cumAssistant Director, Land Revenue Department, Government of Sikkim
dated 19.12.2003.
8.
At this juncture, it will be appropriate to extract the entire
letters dated 28.05.2011 and 19.12.2003 herein below:
“GOVERNMENT OF SIKKIM
LAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GANGTOK
No. 3597 LR(R)
Dated 19/12/2003
To,
Balchand Sarda (Ex MLA, Ex Mayor, GMC)
Chairman,M/S Sangh Enterprises
M.G. Marg, Gangtok,
Sikkim.
SUB : APPLICATION FOR A 99 YEARS LEASE.
Sir,
Reference your application regarding 99 years Lease Deed
Registration of land belonging to Shri Surendra Lama of Sichey
Busty of Upper Sichey Panchayat block, East District, Sikkim. I
am directed to inform you that your request could not be
considered after careful examination of relevant provision of Law
due to the following reasons:-
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
1. This is an ancestral landed property and hence
Shri Surendra Lama’s son and daughter raised
objection to the Lease Deed Registration proposal.
2. Surendra Lama is also a Schedule Tribe and
therefore,
Schedule
Tribe
land
can
not
be
alienated as per the relevant Laws.
3. The land proposed for Lease Deed registration is
situated in Rural area and land holding is also
below 5 acres, Upper Sichey block, East District,
Sikkim.
Yours faithfully,
SD/REVENUE OFFICER-CUM-ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT
GANGTOK.
Copy for information to:Miss Pemala Lama, Upper Sichey Busty, Gangtok, Sikkim.
REVENUE OFFICER-CUM-ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
LAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT.
GANGTOK.”
XXXXXXXXXXXX
“GOVERNMENT OF SIKKIM
EAST DISTRICT COLLECTORATE
GANGTOK, SIKKIM.
Memo No. 226/DC/DCE
Dated: 28/5/2011
To,
Shri Balchand Sarda (Ex MLA),
Chairman, M/S Sangh Enterprise Pvt. Ltd.,
Sarda Building,
M.G. Marg, Gangtok.
Sub: Registration of Lease Agreement – reg.
Sir,
This is with reference to your application for registration of
lease agreement entered between you and Shri Surendra Lama
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
for 99 years lease of the land belonging to Shri Surendra Lama
of Sichey Busty, East Sikkim.
From the letter bearing no. 3597/LR(R) dated: 19.12.2003
addressed to you by Revenue Officer/Asstt. Director of Land
Revenue Department, Gangtok it is learnt that the registration of
the lease deed had not been approved by the Land Revenue
Department for the reasons given in the letter, a copy of which is
enclosed herewith for your reference.
During the course of enquiry being conducted by this office
into your objection against registration of sale deeds filed by Shri
Surendra Lama, the aforementioned letter was brought to your
notice by this Office. However, you had denied having received
any such letter.
Meanwhile this Office is in receipt of copies of Peon Book
forwarded
by
Land
Revenue
&
Disaster
Management
Department, wherein it is revealed that you had received the
aforementioned letter on 23/12/2003.
Nevertheless a copy of the letter addressed to you by
RO/AD is hereby once again forwarded to you for your
information.
sd/District Collector, East.”
9.
The Appellate Authority (the respondent no.1 herein) passed a
final order dated 31.08.2013 upholding an order dated 25.06.2011
passed by the District Collector, East and directed the aggrieved party
to approach appropriate Court of Law for relief, if any.
10.
Aggrieved by the said order dated 31.08.2013, the letter dated
28.05.2011 and the letter dated 19.12.2003, the petitioner filed a writ
petition
before
this
Court,
which
was
registered
as
W.P.
(C)
No.02/2015. This Court, by an order dated 16.03.2017, while setting
aside the order dated 31.08.2013, remitted the matter to the
Appellate
Authority,
Secretary,
Land
Revenue
and
Disaster
Management Department, Government of Sikkim to decide the appeal
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
considering the grounds raised therein, on its own merit, in accordance
with law. This Court noted that though the order dated 31.08.2013
upheld the order dated 25.06.2011, it did not state as to whether
impugned communications dated 19.12.2003 and 28.05.2011, which
were the subject matter of the appeal, were upheld or set aside.
11.
The order of 25.06.2011, which was upheld by the order dated
31.08.2013, was not the subject matter of the said appeal and it does
not appear that the said order has been assailed in any forum by
either of the parties.
12.
After the matter was remitted back by this Court, the
Appellate Authority, after hearing the representatives of both the
parties, dismissed the appeal by an order dated 12.04.2018.
The
Appellate Authority held that it would not be necessary to go into the
issue as to whether the Government was justified in refusing to
register the Lease Deed on the grounds stated in the letter dated
19.12.2003 as some of the terms and conditions of the Lease Deed
dated 07.01.2000 do not conform to the present requirements
stipulated
by
the
State
Government
vide
Notification
dated
03.12.2014, whereby period of lease had been curtailed to 33 years.
Liberty was, however, granted to the parties to the Lease Deed dated
07.01.2000 to re-negotiate the terms of the Lease Deed to bring it in
conformity with prevailing guidelines and to re-submit the same for
registration to the appropriate authority. The Appellate Authority also
observed,
with
reference
to
ground
no.2
of
the
letter
dated
19.12.2003, that there is no bar on the alienation of scheduled tribe
land and that there is restriction only on transfer of land belonging to
the Bhutia and Lepcha communities. It was also recorded that during
the course of hearing it was admitted by the parties that though it was
recited in the Lease Deed that total lease amount of ₹32,80,500/- was
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
paid and receipt thereof was acknowledged, such amount had not
been paid in full. The Appellate Authority declined to pass any order or
make any comment on the order dated 25.06.2011 as the same was
not in appeal before him. Lordshiip
13.
Mr.T.B.Thapa,
learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
petitioner
submits that there was no restriction on the period of lease for which
land could be leased out when the Lease Deed was presented for
registration before the respondent no.3 on 07.01.2000 and therefore,
the Appellate Authority committed manifest error of law and acted
without any application of mind in placing reliance on the notification
dated 29.02.2008, whereby period of lease was restricted to 99 years
and the notification dated 16.08.2014,whereby period of lease was
restricted to 33 years. It is submitted that such notifications are
prospective in nature and cannot be applied retrospectively and
therefore, when the Appellate Authority had failed to advert to the
issue in its correct perspective, on that short ground alone the order
dated 12.04.2018 is liable to be set aside and the matter is required to
be sent back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration in
accordance with law. He has submitted that the letter dated
19.12.2003 was passed in gross violation of principles of natural
justice and the said letter was also not issued by the competent
authority as it is the Sub- Registrar or Sub-Divisional Officer, who is
the appropriate authority. He has submitted that the respondent no.4
had leased out his own share of ancestral property and not that of his
son and daughter and this aspect of the matter was not even
considered by the Appellate Authority. He has submitted that grounds
cited for refusing to register the Lease Deed in the letter dated
19.12.2003 are wholly untenable in law and are perverse. He has
relied on a decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
C.I.T(Central)-1, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., reported in
(2015) 1 SCC 1.
14.
Mr.N.Rai, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.4
submits that it was rightly held by the Appellate Authority that at this
point of time, it is of no consequence as to whether grounds of
rejection for registration of the Lease Deed were justified in view of
the fact that as per the law/guidelines holding the field at the time of
consideration pursuant to the direction of the Court a Lease Deed in
perpetuity could not have been registered as the period of lease is
limited to 33 years by notification dated 16.08.2014. He submits that
though in the Lease Deed it was recited that the possession of the
property was handed over to the petitioner, the same was never
handed over and the respondent no.4 still continues to retain
possession of the same. Similarly, though it was also recited in the
Lease Deed that one time lease amount of ₹32,80,500/- was paid in
advance and the same was duly acknowledged, in reality, it was not so
and the Appellate Authority had also taken note of the submissions of
the parties that full amount was not paid. In this connection, he has
also drawn the attention of the Court to paragraphs 15 and 18 of the
affidavit-in-opposition. He has further submitted that the Peon Book
annexed at page 125 by the petitioner demonstrates that letter dated
19.12.2003 was received by the son of Bal Chand Sarda, Chairman of
the petitioner company. However, no step was taken by the petitioner
till the time when the respondent no.4 wanted to sell the land to three
parties. He submits that there is an inordinate delay in preferring the
Writ Petition and furthermore, there are disputed question of facts
because of which this Court may not go into legality or otherwise of
the order dated 12.04.2018. It is also submitted by him that in the
appeal preferred by the petitioner, no ground was raised by the
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
petitioner regarding competency or jurisdiction of the Revenue Officercum-Assistant Director to issue the letter dated 19.12.2003. He has
submitted that letter dated 28.05.2011 does not provide any cause of
action as, by the said letter, only the letter dated 19.12.2003 was
forwarded. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Jagdish Narain Maltiar vs State of
Bihar and Others, reported in AIR 1973 SC 1343, (ii) Jharkhand
Mazdoor Sangh vs. Presiding Officer and Others, reported in (2002) 10
SCC 703, (iii) State of Bihar and Others vs. Jain Plastics and Chemicals
Ltd., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 216, (iv) Orissa Agro Industries Corpn.
Ltd. and Others vs. Bharati Industries and Others, reported in (2005)
12 SCC 725, (v) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs.
Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti, reported in (2006) 9
SCC 524, (vi) Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Shimla vs. Prem
Lata Sood and Others, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 40 and (vii) State of
Kerala and Others vs. M.K. Jose, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 433.
15.
Dr. Doma. T. Bhutia, learned Additional Advocate General,
Sikkim, endorses the submissions of Mr. Rai and submits that the writ
petition deserves to be dismissed.
16.
I have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for
the parties and have perused the materials on record.
17.
It will be appropriate, at the first instance, to take note of the
submissions of Mr. Rai that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed
on the ground of delay alone.
18.
In Jagdish N. Maltiar (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had
observed that the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellant after three years of his removal from service. In
Jharkhand Majdoor Sangh (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court upheld
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
the judgment of the High Court, whereby the writ petition filed by the
appellant was dismissed on the ground of inordinate and unexplained
delay of five years. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it was
sought to be contended by Mr. Rai that when the cause of action had
arisen in the year 2003, there is inordinate delay in pursuing the
remedies in accordance with law and therefore, the writ petition filed
in the year 2018 suffers from inordinate delay. The submission is
without any merit. The petitioner had taken a plea that he had not
received the letter dated 19.12.2003 and after receipt of the said
letter, which was enclosed with the letter dated 28.05.2011, the
petitioner had preferred an appeal within a period of one month. After
the appeal was disposed of by an order dated 31.08.2013, the
petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ petition numbered and
registered as WP(C) No.02 of 2015. While disposing of the said writ
petition by an order dated 28.02.2017, this Court had directed the
Appellate Authority to decide the appeal on its own merit considering
the grounds raised therein in accordance with law. The appeal having
been dismissed on 12.04.2018, the present writ petition was filed on
05.06.2018. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the
present writ petition suffers from delay and laches.
19.
In Orissa Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. (supra), the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court had laid down that where a complicated question of
fact is involved and the matter requires thorough proof on factual
aspect, High Court should not entertain a writ petition. Whether or not
the High Court should exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India largely depends upon the nature of the dispute
and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual
controversy, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. In
New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (supra), the Hon‟ble
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
Supreme Court had observed that High Court has jurisdiction to try
issues both of fact and law but when the petition raises complex
questions of fact requiring oral evidence to be taken, the High Court
should ordinarily decline to try the petition. In M.K Jose (supra), the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court had laid down that a writ court should
ordinarily not entertain a writ petition, if there is a breach of contract
involving disputed question of facts. In Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd.
(supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had laid down that seriously
disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach
of contract are to be determined in a properly instituted civil suit
rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.
20.
Mr. Rai had contended that the writ petition raises disputed
questions of facts regarding payment of consideration amount as well
as receipt or non-receipt of the letter dated 29.12.2013 by the
petitioner and therefore, this Court may not exercise its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. So far as receipt or nonreceipt of the letter dated 29.12.2013 is concerned, in view of the
order of this Court dated 16.03.2017 passed in WP(C) No.02 of 2015
whereby direction was issued to the Appellate Authority to consider
the appeal preferred by the petitioner on merit, the issue pales into
insignificance and it will not be necessary for this Court to go into that
arena.
21.
The Appellate Authority in the order dated 12.04.2018 had
recorded that the parties had submitted that they had not paid and
received the full payment of the lease amount despite reciting to the
contrary in the Lease Deed dated 07.01.2000. In
the
writ
petition,
there is no averment that such observation of the Appellate Authority
is not correct and the same is perverse. In paragraph 18 of the
affidavit, the respondent no.4 categorically stated that due to not
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
making full payment of the lease amount, property was still in the
possession of respondent no.4. Such assertion made in paragraph 18
of the counter affidavit was not denied in the affidavit-in-reply.
Assuming that there is a dispute with regard to payment of the
amount and
possession of the land in question, the same will not
have any bearing while deciding the writ petition. This court is of the
considered opinion that decisions noticed above will not be applicable
in the facts of the present case.
22.
In the letter dated 19.12.2003, subject was written as
“Application for a 99 years lease”, which is not correct. In Clauses 2
and 5 of the Lease Deed, it was categorically recited that the lease was
in perpetuity. Under General Conditions of Lease at (i), it was provided
that lessor shall not under any circumstance foreclose the lease for a
basic minimum period of 99 years. Though Mr. Thapa has sought to
raise a contention that the Revenue Officer-cum Assistant Director,
Land Revenue Department, Government of Sikkim, was not the
competent authority to either accept or reject the registration of the
Lease Deed as it was either the Sub-Registrar or the Sub Divisional
Officer who was competent officer under the Rules of 1930 and
Circular dated 29.10.1984, it is to be borne in mind that the said plea
was not taken in the appeal preferred by the petitioner. That apart,
Rule 6 of the Rules of 1930 provides that the Registrar would be
empowered to revise or alter any order of any Sub-Registrar refusing
to admit a document if an appeal against such order was presented to
the Registrar within a month from the date of order. There is a
categorical assertion of the petitioner in paragraph 19 of the writ
petition that the appeal was preferred under Rule 6 of the Rules of
1930. The appeal at page 133 bears the stamp of Appellate Authority
showing the same as Land Revenue and Disaster Management
Department, Government of Sikkim. In paragraph (ii) of the writ
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
petition the petitioner states that the Secretary, Land Revenue and
Disaster Management Department, Government of Sikkim, is the
Appellate Authority under the Rules of 1930. This Court also, in the
order passed in WP(C) No.02 of 2015, had remitted the matter to the
Secretary, Land Revenue and Disaster Management Department,
Government of Sikkim, as the Appellate Authority. When the point was
not taken at the first instance by the petitioner and when this Court by
order dated 15.06.2013 passed in WP(C) No.02 of 2015 had directed
to decide the appeal considering the grounds raised therein, I am of
the considered opinion that this Court need not go into that aspect of
the matter. It is also relevant to note that the Chairman of the
petitioner company himself had written a letter to the Chief Minister,
Government of Sikkim, who had no role to play in matters of
registration, on 21.07.2000, for a direction to be issued to the
authorities for registration of the long term Lease Deed executed in
favour of the petitioner company.
23.
In the letter dated 28.05.2011 issued by the District Collector,
East addressed to Shri Balchand Sarda, it is recorded that „from the
Peon Book forwarded by the Land Revenue and Disaster Management
Department, Government of Sikkim, it is revealed that you had
received the aforementioned letter on 23.12.2003‟. As noted earlier, it
is the contention of the respondent no.4 itself that the letter was
received by the son of Balchand Sarda. Whether the same would
amount to receipt of the letter by Shri Balchand Sarda himself may not
detain us for the purpose of the proceeding. The petitioner in his reply
had disputed that the son of Balchand Sarda had not received the said
letter.
However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that no enquiries
were made by the petitioner regarding the fate of the Lease Deed for
long 8 years prior to issuance of letter dated 16.09.2008, which was
already taken note of supra.
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
24.
As noticed earlier, the Appellate Authority did not find it
necessary to go into the issue whether the authority was justified in
refusing registration of Lease Deed on the grounds stated in the letter
dated 19.12.2003 in view of the fact that the Lease Deed dated
07.01.2000 does not conform to requirements as laid down in the
notifications dated 29.02.2008 and 16.08.2014, which have laid down
guidelines for registration of land on lease basis. Except ground no.2 of
the letter dated 19.12.2003, other two grounds for refusing to register
the lease deed were not considered.
25.
The question, therefore, arises as to whether the Appellate
Authority was justified to take note of the said notifications. although
the Lease Deed was presented for presentation in the year 2000.
26.
In Vatika Township (P) Ltd. (supra), on which strong reliance
was placed by Mr. Thapa, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that
legislations which modified accrued right or which impose obligations
or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as
prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the
enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose
of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a
former legislation. It was also observed that unless the terms of a
statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective
operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair
an existing right or create a new obligation or impose new liability
otherwise than as regards matters of procedure.
27.
In Prem Lata Sood (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had
observed that while statute provides for a right and enforcement
thereof is in several stages, unless and until the conditions precedent
laid down therein are satisfied, no right can be said to have invested in
the person concerned. In that connection, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
had also occasion to consider the case of Howrah Municipal Corpn. and
others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and others, reported in (2004) 1 SCC
663. The question that had fallen for consideration was whether by the
order of the Court in which a period was fixed for the corporation to
take a decision on the application for sanction of construction of
additional floors, any vested right had been created in favour of the
company to seek sanction of the construction of additional three floors
irrespective of the subsequent amendment of Building Rules and the
Resolution of the corporation putting restrictions on the height of highrise buildings on the particular road in which the building was
constructed.
The
Hon‟ble
Supreme
Court
held
that
merely
by
submission of application for sanction of construction, no vested right
is created in favour of any party, by statutory operation of the
provisions. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court also negated the argument
that a vested right can be deemed to have been created by the
fixation of time-limit by the Court. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held
that Building Rules and Regulations prevailing at the time of sanction
would govern the subject of sanction and not the Rules and Regulation
existing on a date of application for sanction.
28.
No vested right had accrued to the petitioner on presentation
of the Lease Deed dated 07.01.2000. The order of rejection also does
not create any right in favour of the petitioner for him to contend that
at the appellate stage grounds of rejection have to be considered on
the touchstone of norms existing at the time of such rejection and
changes in applicable law and /or norms have to be shut out from
consideration by the Appellate Authority. In that light,the notifications
dated 29.02.2008 and 16.08.2014 will have to be taken note of when
a consideration is made by the Appellate Authority as to whether the
Lease Deed is to be registered or not. It is not retrospective
WP(C) No.25 of 2018
(M/S Sangh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Sikkim & Ors.)
application of the notifications to existing vested right of the petitioner
as is sought to be contended by Mr.Thapa. When, admittedly, the
Lease Deed dated 07.01.2000, which was a lease in perpetuity, do not
meet the requirement of the period for which a Lease Deed can be
executed under the notifications dated 29.02.2008 and 16.08.2014, I
am of the considered opinion that the order dated 12.04.2018 was
passed by the Appellate Authority taking into consideration relevant
consideration and the view taken by the Appellate Authority cannot be
said to be arbitrary or irrational.
28.
Accordingly, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is
dismissed.
29.
No cost.
Chief Justice
Avi/
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