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CGHC010361922023
2026:CGHC:30390
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPT No. 260 of 2023
• M/s Rakesh Kumar Jain Son Of Late Shri Bhagchand Jain, Aged
About 59 Years Police Station - Road, Aklatara, District - JanjgirChampa, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1. Union Of India Through The Secretary, Ministry Of Finance
(Department Of Revenue) New-Delhi,
2. Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise And Service Tax, Cgst
Building, Dhamtari -Road, Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3. Additional Commissioner Of Cgst, Central Excise And Service Tax,
CGST Building, Dhamtari-Road, Tikrapara, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Somnath Verma, Advocate
For Respondents
:
Mr. Maneesh Sharma, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey, Judge
Judgment on Board
17.7.2026
1.
The petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order passed by
the Commissioner (Appeals), CGST and Central Excise, Raipur
(C.G.) [hereinafter to be referred as ‘Appellate Authority’ ] dated
11.8.2023 whereby the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal
on the ground of delay.
2.
Facts of present case are that petitioner is a railway contractor
who accepted tender and was given work-order for Transportation
services for Indian Railway. A formal show-cause notice was
issued by Additional Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise
against on 17.10.2018 whereby petitioner was asked to furnish
the details of payment of service tax. Thereafter, Additional
Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise passed order-in-original
on 29.3.2022 whereby petitioner was directed to deposit Rs.
1,54,54,496/- with interest towards service tax according to
Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 [hereinafter to be referred
as ‘Finance Act’] read with Section 174 of CGST Act, 2017.
Petitioner preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority on
16.8.2022. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 11.8.2023
rejected the appeal on the ground of delay.
3.
Mr. Somnath Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that petitioner suffered from Corona-Virus infection and took two
months to return to normalcy which caused the delay of 1 month
and 11 days and the appellate authority ought to have taken
sympathetic view while dismissing the appeal on technical
ground. He further submits that petitioner had preferred
application for condonation of delay in support of his appeal but
the same was neither considered nor rejected while dismissing
the appeal on the ground of delay. He also submits that the
procedure adopted by the appellate authority is in violation to the
principles of natural justice as well as against the proviso of Sub-
Section (3) of Section 85 of the Finance Act and Section 35A of
Central Excise Act, 1944 [hereinafter to be referred as ‘Central
Excise Act’]. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on
the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Calcutta
High Court in the matter of Kajal Dutta Versus Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax1 and High Court of Chhattisgarh in
the matter of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur
Versus National Faceless Assessment Center, Income Tax
Department, Raipur2. He prays to quash the impugned appellate
order dated 11.8.2023.
4.
On the other hand, Mr. Maneesh Sharma, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents submits that period of limitation
prescribed under the Central Excise Act is 60 days and the
Commissioner (Appeals) if satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within
period of 60 days, may allow it to be presented within a further
period of 30 days. He further submits that in the present case,
order-in-original was passed by Additional Commissioner, CGST
and
Central
Excise
on
29.3.2022
and
the
same
was
communicated to the petitioner on 4.4.2022 but petitioner only
approached the Commissioner (Appeals) on 16.8.2022 with delay
of one month and 11 days. He also submits that even if the further
limitation period of 30 days is included, the appeal was barred
by 11 days and there is provision in the Central Excise Act to
1. AIROnLine 2023 CAL 388
2. AIROnLine 2025 CHH 220
condone a delay of more than 60 + 30 days. He contends that
appellate authority in its order dated 11.8.2023 has considered the
application for condonation of delay and held that the appellant
ought to have preferred the appeal on or before 3.7.2022
excluding the condonation period of one month which the
appellate authority could have condoned. He further contends that
providing a hearing to the petitioner merely because principles of
natural justice were missed, the procedure would be a mere ritual
or a futile exercise as the outcome would have been the same
anyway. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
matter
of
Assistant
Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others Versus Glaxo
Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited 3 and Hon’ble
Division Bench in the matter of M/s Brandavan Food Products
Versus Commissioner (Appeals), Central & State Goods and
Service Tax and Another passed in Writ Appeal No. 262 of
2019. He also contends that this writ petition is misconceived and
liable to be dismissed.
5.
Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length,
considered their rival submissions made herein above and
perused the documents placed on the file with utmost
circumspection
6.
The judgments quoted by Mr. Somnath Verma are summarized
herein below :3. (2020) 19 SCC 681
• In Kajal Dutta (supra), Hon’ble Division Bench of Calcutta
High Court exercised its discretionary writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 to condone an appeal delay under Section 107 of
the GST Act due to medical reasons. However, the judgment
clearly speaks that ‘this order shall not be treated as a
precedent and has been passed considering the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case.’ Relevant paragraphs 3
to 5 reads as under :3. The correctness of the stand taken by the
appellant that he was sick and unable to take
steps to file the appeal within the period of
limitation is not disputed by the revenue.
However, the appellate authority was of the
opinion that the period of one month beyond the
statutory period of limitation is available to the
said authority, which expired on 30 June, 2022
and the appeal was presented only on 17
August, 2022 and therefore, the appeal is
barred by the law of limitation. It is true that in
terms of Section 107(1) read with Section 107
(4) of the G.S.T. Act, the time limit for preferring
the appeal beyond the period of three months is
30 days, which is a grace period. However, the
statute does not state that beyond the said
date, the appellate authority cannot exercise
jurisdiction. It is not a case that deliberately the
appellant had presented the appeal beyond the
condonable period. Therefore, while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
this
Court
can
examine
the
factual
circumstances and grant appropriate relief as
the appellate remedy is a very valuable remedy
since the appellate authority can re-appreciate
the factual position. Thus, for such reason, we
are inclined to exercise discretion.
4. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order
passed in the writ petition is set aside and
consequently, the writ petition is allowed and
the order passed by the appellate authority
dated 17 August, 2022 is set aside and the
delay in filing the appeal before the appellate
authority is condoned and the appellate
authority is directed to consider and decide the
4 appeal on merits in accordance with law after
affording opportunity of personal hearing to the
authorised representative of the appellant.
5. We make it clear that this order shall not be
treated as a precedent and has been passed
considering
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of the case.
• In Hidayatulla National Law University (supra), the core
dispute revolved around natural justice violations and
eligibility for tax exemption as an educational institution. In
that scenario, co-ordinate Bench exercised its writ jurisdiction
to correct a fundamental procedural illegality and breach of
natural justice by the revenue authority. However, it did not
deal with overriding an explicit, non-extendable statutory
limitation period embedded in a tax code like Section 35.
Relevant paragraph 23 reads as under :-
23.From perusal of the records, it is clear that the
impugned order dated 19.12.2023 was passed
without affording opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner and the same were not served to the
petitioner either physically or electronically. The
petitioner originally challenged the order of the
Assessment Officer on 09.01.2019 but
respondent No.2 has passed the order on
29.12.2023 after a lapse of four years. In the
instant case, the petitioner has moved a
rejoinder before the Appellate Authority
requesting for a personal hearing but the said
request was not considered by the Appellate
Authority. If the application/request was made
for personal hearing by the petitioner before the
Appellate Authority, the Income Tax authority
ought to have allowed the said application by
arranging for video conferencing argument. At
least in the instant case, it stands established
the request from the petitioner was made before
the Appellate Authority but the Appellate
Authority did not give opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered view that there is a violation of
principle of natural justice and if the defect of
principle of violation of natural justice has
occurred in the initial stage of proceedings, it
cannot be cured at the stage of appeal. No
doubt, the petitioner has a right to avail the
statutory appellate remedy but when the
impugned order was passed by the respondent
No.2 in violation of principle of natural justice, it
cannot be alleviated.
7.
Below is a summary of the judgments cited by Mr. Maneesh
Sharma :• In Glaxo Smith Kline (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly
held that when a tax statute provides a strict, non-extendable
outer limitation period for filing an appeal, the High Court
under Article 226 cannot do what the statutory appellate
authority cannot do. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 26 read as
under :22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the
facts of that case and cannot be cited as a
precedent in support of an argument that the
High Court is free to entertain the writ petition
assailing the assessment order even if filed
beyond the statutory period of maximum 60
days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is
creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by
the assessee beyond the extended statutory
limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section
31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not
entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it
would become a case of violation of
fundamental right, much less statutory or legal
right as such.
23. Arguendo, reverting to the factual matrix of the
present case, it is noticed that the respondent
had asserted that it was not aware about the
passing of assessment order dated 21-6-2017
although it is admitted that the same was
served on the authorised representative of the
respondent on 22-6-2017. The date on which
the respondent became aware about the order
is not expressly stated either in the application
for condonation of delay filed before the
appellate authority, the affidavit filed in support
of the said application or for that matter, in the
memo of writ petition. On the other hand, it is
seen that the amount equivalent to 12.5% of the
tax amount came to be deposited on 12-9-2017
for and on behalf of respondent, without filing
an appeal and without any demur after the
expiry of statutory period of maximum 60 days.
prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act.
Not only that, the respondent filed a formal
application under Rule 60 of the 2005 Rules on
8-5-2018 and pursued the same in appeal,
which was rejected on 17-8-2018. Furthermore,
the appeal in question against the assessment
order came to be filed only on 24-9-2018
without disclosing the date on which the
respondent in fact became aware about the
existence of the assessment order dated 21-62017. On the other hand, in the affidavit of Mr
Sreedhar Routh, Site Director of the respondent
Company (filed in support of the application for
condonation of delay before the appellate
authority), it is stated that the Company became
aware about the irregularities committed by its
erring official (Mr P. Sriram Murthy) in the month
of July 2018, which presupposes that the
respondent must have become aware about the
assessment order, at least in July 2018. In the
same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent
Company was not aware about the assessment
order, as it was not brought to its notice by the
employee concerned due to his negligence. The
respondent in the writ petition has averred that
the appeal was rejected by the appellate
authority on the ground that it had no power to
condone the delay beyond 30 days, when in
fact, the order examines the cause set out by
the respondent and concludes that the same
was unsubstantiated by the respondent. That
finding has not been examined by the High
Court in the impugned judgment and order¹ at
all, but the High Court was more impressed by
the fact that the respondent was in a position to
offer some explanation about the discrepancies
in respect of the volume of turnover and that the
respondent had already deposited 12.5% of the
additional amount in terms of the previous order
passed by it. That reason can have no bearing
on the justification for non-filing of the appeal
within the statutory period. Notably. the
respondent had relied on the affidavit of the Site
Director and no affidavit of the employee
concerned (P. Sriram Murthy, Deputy ManagerFinance) or at least the other employee
[Siddhant
Belgaonker,
Senior
Manager
(Finance)], who was associated with the erring
employee during the relevant period, has been
filed in support of the stand taken in the
application for condonation of delay. Pertinently,
no finding has been recorded by the High Court
that it was a case of violation of principles of
natural justice or non-compliance of statutory
requirements in any manner. Be that as it may,
since the statutory period specified for filing of
appeal had expired long back in August 2017
itself and the appeal came to be filed by the
respondent only on 24-9-2018, without
substantiating the plea about inability to file
appeal within the prescribed time, no
indulgence could be shown to the respondent at
all.
24. Reverting to the contention that the respondent
having failed to assail the order passed by the
appellate authority, dated 25-10-2018 rejecting
the application for condonation of delay, the
assessment order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, dated 21-6-2017 stood merged,
need not detain us in view of the exposition of
this Court in Raja Mechanical Co. (P) Ltd. v.
CCE29. It is well settled that rejection of delay
application by the appellate forum does not
entail in merger of the assessment order with
that order.
25. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the
High Court ought not to have entertained the
subject writ petition filed by the respondent
herein. The same deserved to be rejected at the
threshold.
26. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside
the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court and dismiss the writ petition.
There shall be no order as to costs. Pending
interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of.
• In M/s Brandavan Food Products (supra), Hon’ble Division
Bench held that High Courts cannot exercise writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 to condone delay or entertain a challenge
on merits once the absolute statutory outer ceiling for filing an
appeal has expired. Relevant paragraph 20 reads as under :20. After a threadbare analysis of the provisions of
law and the precedents, it was declared in
categorical terms by the 'three member Bench'
that, once the period of limitation is specifically
prescribed in a statute and stipulates the
maximum period/extent of delay which can be
condoned, it cannot be condoned by the Apex
Court even in exercise of the power under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Having
said so, the Appellants cannot be heard to say
that the High Court is still having power to
condone the delay beyond the prescribed
extent under the statute, by invoking the power
under Article 226 of the Constitution, which in
fact will be amounting to re-writing the law and
contrary to the verdict passed by the Apex
Court, which is having a binding effect all over
India in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of
India. There is no answer from the part of the
Appellants to the law declared by the 'three
member Bench' of the Apex Court in Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra) but for
stating that the said judgment is not applicable,
despite the fact that it has been rendered with
reference to the judgments sought to be relied
on by the Appellant, as discussed above.
8.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid factual position and the legal
principles established by the Apex Court, we will now advert to the
facts of the case.
9.
In the present case, order-in-original was passed against the
petitioner on 29.3.2022 and same was communicated to the
petitioner on 4.4.2022. However, petitioner preferred the appeal
before the appellate authority on 16.8.2022 with delay of one
month and 11 days and application for condonation of delay was
also moved. It is admitted position that the appeal was not filed by
the petitioner before the Commissioner (Appeals) within 60 days
of the order of the Assessing Authority. It was further not filed
within the additional 30 days for which power of condonation has
been vested in the Commissioner (Appeals) in terms of the
proviso of Section 35(1) of Central Excise Act. Beyond those
period of 30 days, the statute does not permit any kind of
condonation to be allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
Therefore, if the appeal of the petitioner herein was presented
after the 30th day i.e. beyond the extended period of limitation it
was not condonable. The Commissioner (Appeals) was forced by
law to dismiss the appeal as being time barred.
10.
The afore-stated pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
also makes it clear that when a tax statute provides a strict, nonextendable outer limitation period for filing an appeal, the High
Court under Article 226 cannot do what the statutory appellate
authority cannot do. Furthermore, providing an opportunity to the
petitioner to explain the causes of delay before the appellate
authority would be a mere ritual or a futile exercise as the
outcome would have been the same anyway since under Section
35(1) of the Central Excise Act, the statutory limit is 60 days, plus
an outer condonable cap of 30 days (total 90 days) and if an
appeal is filed after 90 days, the appellate authority loses
jurisdiction to condone the delay.
11.
Keeping in view the aforesaid settled legal position coupled with
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion,
Commissioner (Appeals) rightly dismissed the appeal on the
ground of delay and no case is made for interference.
12.
In result, this writ petition is dismissed.
13.
14.
15.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
Ajinkya/Preeti
AJINKYA PANSARE
Date: 2026.07.24
11:02:56 +0530
Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
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