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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on:11.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on:16.07.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 16.07.2026
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
M/S PRISM JOHNSON LIMITED
.....Appellant
Through: Ms. Nimisha Sharma, Adv.
versus
M/S MASTER NIHAL SINGH MEMORIAL EDUCATION
SOCIETY
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. P.K. Agrawal, Mr. Akshay
Chitkara, Ms. Sanjoli Gupta
and Mr. Rishabh Tomar, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
INTRODUCTION
1.
Through the present appeal, preferred under Section 96 read
with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter,
“the CPC”] and Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
[hereinafter, “the Commercial Courts Act”], the Appellant assails the
correctness of the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2024 [hereinafter,
“the Impugned Judgment”] passed by the learned District Judge,
Commercial Court–05, South District, Saket Courts, Delhi. By the
Impugned Judgment, the learned Trial Court allowed the application
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moved by the Respondent under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section
151 of the CPC and consequently rejected the plaint in CS (COMM)
576/2023 as barred by limitation.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.
The Appellant, M/s Prism Johnson Limited (previously Prism
Cement Limited), is a public limited company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 2013, engaged inter alia in the business of
manufacturing, marketing and trading in cement, ready–mix concrete
[hereinafter, “RMC”], tiles, sanitaryware and bath products. The
supplies forming the subject matter of the suit were effected through
its RMC (India) Division.
3.
The Respondent, M/s Master Nihal Singh Memorial Education
Society (also described as a Trust), is an educational society which
approached the Appellant for the supply of various grades of concrete
for the construction of a school at Sector–43, Gurugram, Haryana.
4.
Pursuant to negotiations between the parties, the Respondent
placed a purchase order dated 02.03.2017, the material terms whereof
read as under:
“This has reference to your quotation and further discussion we had
with you. We are pleased to award the work for supply of various
grades of concrete for our school project at Sector–43, Gurgaon. The
details and terms & condition are given below:–
……
7. Delivery will commence from Today, as per site requirement.
8. Payment Terms: 60 days credit and weekly billing.
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….”
5.
It is thus common ground that the parties contracted upon a
fixed period of credit, billing being weekly and payment falling due
sixty days thereafter.
6.
In pursuance of the said purchase order, the Appellant effected
supplies from time to time. The Appellant’s case is that the RMC
supplies conformed in all respects to the agreed specifications; that the
Respondent accepted every delivery without any contemporaneous
protest as to quality; and that the Appellant maintained a running
account in the name of the Respondent reflecting the accumulated
dues.
7.
The Respondent, per contra, contends that the material supplied
was sub–standard, that a majority of the lots were rejected at site, and
that by a letter dated 02.03.2017 it had drawn attention to the defects
in the material and called upon the Appellant to furnish laboratory test
reports, which the Appellant failed to furnish.
8.
The Appellant asserts that a principal sum of Rs.69,72,422/-
remains outstanding, together with interest at the contractual rate of
18% per annum from the respective due dates. The Respondent denies
the claim in its entirety.
9.
According to the Respondent, it has paid in full for all goods
which conformed to the agreed specifications. It relies upon a
payment of Rs. 21,19,596/– made vide cheque no. 265934 drawn on
the Oriental Bank of Commerce (now Punjab National Bank) on
06.03.2018, and a further payment of Rs. 8,00,000/– vide cheque no.
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305339 dated 24.02.2021 drawn on the same bank, as constituting full
and final settlement of all supplies made until that date. It is not in
dispute that the payment of 06.03.2018 is the last entry pertaining to
the supplies reflected in the running account maintained by the
Appellant.
10.
On 18.12.2021, the Appellant caused a legal notice to be issued
to the Respondent calling upon it to clear the outstanding amount. The
Respondent replied by a communication dated 30.12.2021. It is the
Appellant’s case that it was by this reply, and for the first time, that
the Respondent raised a dispute alleging that the material supplied
was of inferior quality or poor grade.
11.
Thereafter, in conformity with Section 12A of the Commercial
Courts Act, the Appellant approached the District State Legal Services
Authority, South District, Delhi, and initiated pre–institution
mediation on 21.12.2021. Despite due service of notice, the
Respondent failed to appear in the said proceeding, resulting in the
issuance of a Non–Starter Report dated 14.02.2022.
12.
The Appellant instituted a commercial suit by way of e–filing
on 13.10.2023, registered as CS (COMM) 576/2023. Notice was
issued to the Respondent on 20.10.2023. The Respondent filed its
written statement within the period prescribed. Thereafter, on
04.04.2024, the Respondent moved an application under Order VII
Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC before the learned Trial
Court.
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13.
The Appellant states that on 19.04.2024, being the date fixed
for hearing of the said application, it was not afforded an opportunity
to file a reply thereto. By the Impugned Judgment of even date, the
learned Trial Court allowed the application and rejected the plaint as
being barred by limitation. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has
preferred the present appeal.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Contentions on behalf of the Appellant
14.
Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant, has assailed the
Impugned Judgment on the following grounds:
i.
Suit not barred by limitation - It is submitted that the
learned Trial Court proceeded in haste and erred in holding the
suit to be time–barred. The cause of action for the suit arose on
30.12.2021, when the Respondent, by its reply to the legal notice
dated 18.12.2021, refused for the first time to clear the
outstanding dues of the Appellant. Until that refusal, there was
no denial of liability and therefore no accrual of the right to sue.
ii.
Continuing cause of action - The supplies were made
under a running account. Non–payment of the sums standing to
the debit of that account is a continuing wrong which subsists
from day to day, and gives rise to a cause of action which
continues so long as the debt remains unpaid.
iii.
Protection under the COVID–19 orders - The Appellant
is in any event protected by the directions of the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation,
whereby the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 stands
excluded from the computation of limitation in all judicial and
quasi–judicial proceedings. If that period is excluded, the suit is
well within time.
iv.
Limitation is a mixed question of fact and law - Placing
reliance upon Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited v. Central
Bank of India1, it is urged that the question whether a suit is
barred by limitation ordinarily involves a mixed question of fact
and law which cannot be determined summarily at the threshold,
and that recourse to Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC was
therefore impermissible.
v.
Violation of natural justice - The learned Trial Court
decided the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on
the very date on which it was listed for hearing, without granting
the Appellant an opportunity to file a reply. The Impugned
Judgment is, on this ground alone, liable to be set aside and the
matter remanded.
Contentions on behalf of the Respondent
15.
Per contra, Respondent, supported the Impugned Judgment and
contended as follows:
i.
Suit barred by limitation - The suit is squarely governed
by Article 15 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963
(2020) 17 SCC 260
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[hereinafter, “the Limitation Act”]. On the Appellant’s own
documents, payment was to be made upon the expiry of a fixed
period of credit reckoned from delivery, and limitation
commenced from the due date of each such payment. The last
transaction between the parties referable to the supplies having
taken place on 06.03.2018, the claim stood barred long before the
institution of the suit on 13.10.2023.
ii.
No continuing wrong - Non–payment of an ascertained
debt is a completed wrong. What continues is the loss occasioned
by the wrong and not the wrong itself. At its highest, the
Appellant’s case discloses a series of recurring causes of action,
each of which was barred by the time the suit was instituted.
iii.
Notice does not revive a dead claim - A unilateral legal
notice issued years after the debt fell due cannot set the clock of
limitation running afresh, nor can a reply refusing to pay operate
as an acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the
Limitation Act, the said reply having in any event been issued
after the prescribed period had run out.
iv.
COVID–19 orders afford no assistance - Even upon
exclusion of the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, and
even upon the further indulgence of ninety days granted with
effect from 01.03.2022, the suit filed in October 2023 is beyond
time.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
16.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and
have perused the record, including the plaint, the documents filed
therewith and the Impugned Judgment.
17.
The integral question before this Court is whether the suit
instituted by the Appellant was within the prescribed period of
limitation, or whether it was barred thereby. That question resolves
itself into the following sub–issues:
i.
What is the true scope of the power conferred by Order
VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, and was its exercise warranted in the
present case?
ii.
Which Article of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
governs the Appellant’s claim, and when did limitation
commence to run?
iii.
Does the non–payment of contractual dues under a
running account constitute a continuing wrong, or does it give
rise to recurring causes of action?
iv.
Does the legal notice dated 18.12.2021, or the reply
thereto dated 30.12.2021, furnish a fresh point of commencement
for the period of limitation?
v.
Does the reply dated 30.12.2021 amount to an
acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18
of the Limitation Act?
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vi.
What is the effect of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court excluding the pandemic period, read with the exclusion
available in respect of pre–institution mediation under the
Commercial Courts Act?
We propose to address these questions in the order set out above.
I. The scope of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC
18.
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC mandates that the plaint shall
be rejected where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to
be barred by any law. It is settled beyond controversy that the law of
limitation is a “law” within the meaning of the said provision. In
Shakti Bhog (supra)- a decision pressed into service by the Appellant
– the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself observed that Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC confers ample power upon the Court to reject a plaint if,
from the averments therein, it is evident that the suit is barred by any
law including the law of limitation, and that this position is no more
res integra.
19.
Equally settled are the limits of the power. For the purposes of
an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11, it is the
averments in the plaint and the documents filed therewith that are
germane; the pleas taken in the written statement are wholly irrelevant
at that stage (Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra2). The plaint must
be read as a whole and in a meaningful manner, and the power must
(2003) 1 SCC 557
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be exercised strictly within the four corners of the Rule (Dahiben v.
Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali3).
20.
The Appellant’s reliance upon Shakti Bhog (supra) for the
broader proposition that limitation is invariably a mixed question of
fact and law, and can therefore never be determined under Order VII
Rule 11, is misplaced. We say so for two reasons.
21.
First, Shakti Bhog (supra) was a suit for rendition of accounts
governed by Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act – the
residuary Article – under which limitation runs from the date on
which “the right to sue accrues”. That Article fixes no objective
trigger. It was precisely because the point of accrual there depended
upon when the Bank’s response hardened into a firm denial – a matter
incapable of determination without evidence – that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held the plaint to have been prematurely rejected. The
present case, is governed by Article 15, which fixes the starting point
by reference to an event stipulated in the contract itself. Where the
parties have themselves fixed the trigger, there is nothing left to be
discovered at trial.
22.
Secondly, the observation that limitation is “ordinarily” a mixed
question of fact and law is not a talisman. Where the plaint and the
documents annexed to it disclose an unimpeachable chronology from
which the bar of limitation is manifest, the Court is not obliged to put
the parties through the expense and delay of a trial which can have but
one outcome (see Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna
(2020) 7 SCC 366
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Singh4). The principle in Shakti Bhog (supra) protects a plaintiff
whose starting point is genuinely in dispute; it does not arm a plaintiff
whose own pleading discloses the fatal dates. Clever drafting cannot
create an illusion of a cause of action where none survives.
23.
In the present case, every date material to the question of
limitation is drawn from the Appellant’s own plaint and the
documents filed therewith: the purchase order dated 02.03.2017
stipulating a sixty–day credit period; the last transaction referable to
the supplies, dated 06.03.2018; the legal notice dated 18.12.2021; the
reply dated 30.12.2021; and the institution of the suit on 13.10.2023.
Not one of these dates is in dispute, and none of them requires
evidence to establish. The question of limitation is therefore capable
of being answered, and was rightly answered, upon a demurrer.
II. Article 15 of the Schedule and the commencement of limitation
24.
Article 15 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a
period of three years for a suit “for the price of goods sold and
delivered to be paid for after the expiry of a fixed period of credit”,
the time from which the period begins to run being the date on which
the period of credit expires. The Article is attracted in terms. The
parties agreed by clause 8 of the purchase order dated 02.03.2017
upon “60 days credit and weekly billing”. The learned counsel for the
Respondent placed some reliance upon a stipulation of forty–five days
appearing in the Appellant’s own documents; whether the credit
period be reckoned at forty–five days or sixty days is, on the facts of
(2020) 16 SCC 601
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this case, wholly immaterial, and we proceed on the basis of the sixty–
day period pleaded in the plaint, that being the reckoning most
favourable to the Appellant.
25.
The consequence of Article 15 is that limitation does not await
a demand, a denial, or a quarrel. It runs from the expiry of the credit
period referable to each delivery. The right to sue arises upon the
accrual of a cause of action, and every cause of action carries its own
period of limitation attached to it. Where a claim does not fall within
that period, it cannot be instituted, however meritorious it may be in
substance.
26.
The expression “cause of action”, though not amenable to
exhaustive definition, is well settled in law. In its most comprehensive
sense it denotes the bundle of essential facts which a plaintiff must
prove in order to entitle itself to a judgment of the Court. In a suit of
the present description, that bundle consists of the supply, the invoice,
the expiry of the credit period and the failure to pay. The bundle is
complete on the sixty–first day. Nothing further is required to enable
the seller to sue.
III. Continuing wrong or recurring cause of action
27.
The Appellant’s principal answer to the bar of limitation is that
non–payment of the dues under a running account is a continuing
wrong, so that a fresh cause of action arises with every passing day for
so long as the debt remains unpaid. The submission requires us to
distinguish between a continuing cause of action and a recurring one,
a distinction of the first importance in the computation of limitation.
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28.
The distinction was drawn with precision by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh5:
“A „continuing wrong‟ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a
continuing injury. „Recurring/successive wrongs‟ are those which
occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate
cause of action.”
29.
To the same effect is the classic exposition in Balakrishna
Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan6, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which
creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act
responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the
wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no
continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the
injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a
continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a
distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said injury.”
30.
The test propounded in Balakrishna Waghmare (supra) is
decisive of the Appellant’s submission. The wrongful act complained
of is the failure to pay a sum which fell due upon the expiry of a
defined credit period. That failure is complete on the day the credit
period expires. What persists thereafter is not the injury but its effect –
the Appellant remains out of its money, and its books continue to
reflect a debit. The Appellant confuses the wound with the scar. A
litmus test of a continuing wrong is whether the wrongful act itself
(2008) 8 SCC 648
AIR 1959 SC 798
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continues from day to day; the withholding of a debt already due does
not answer that description.
31.
The point is placed beyond doubt by M.R. Gupta v. Union of
India7, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered whether the
incorrect fixation of pay gave rise to a continuing or a recurring cause
of action, and observed:
“The appellant‟s grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance
with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him
which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a
salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long
as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every
month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
computation made contrary to rules.”
32.
It is instructive that even in that case, where the underlying
grievance was described as a continuing wrong, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held the cause of action to recur, and expressly recorded that
arrears falling outside the period of limitation would not be
recoverable. The violation of the legal right occurred once a month;
the cause of action was correspondingly confined to once a month, as
opposed to an indefinite and uninterrupted violation of the kind
exemplified by a trespass.
33.
We may add that Section 22 of the Limitation Act, which
provides that in the case of a continuing breach of contract a fresh
period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during
which the breach continues, affords the Appellant no assistance. That
provision postulates a breach which is itself continuous. The
(1995) 5 SCC 628
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obligation to pay for goods delivered is discharged, if at all, once and
for all. Its non–discharge on the appointed day is a single and
completed breach, not a breach renewed from hour to hour.
34.
Applying these principles, the transactions between the parties,
and the defaults in payment arising thereunder, give rise to recurring
and not continuing causes of action. Under the payment terms agreed
in the purchase order, every supply carried its own sixty–day credit
period, and every expiry of that period without payment was a fresh
strike upon the clock of limitation, complete and separate in itself.
35.
The consequence follows inexorably. On the Appellant’s own
pleading, the last transaction referable to the supplies reflected in the
running account is dated 06.03.2018, being the date on which the
Respondent paid a sum of Rs. 21,19,596/–. No supply, invoice or
billing subsequent to that date is pleaded. The latest date, therefore,
upon which any credit period referable to any supply could have
expired is 05.05.2018. The period of three years prescribed by Article
15 expired, at the latest, on 05.05.2021 – nearly two and a half years
before the suit was instituted.
IV. Whether a unilateral legal notice extends the period of limitation
36.
The Appellant’s alternative case is that the cause of action arose
only on 30.12.2021, when the Respondent, by its reply to the legal
notice dated 18.12.2021, refused for the first time to pay. The
submission is that limitation must be computed from the date of that
refusal.
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37.
The proposition is untenable. In M/s J.M. Construction Pvt.
Ltd. v. Smt. Krishna Sachdev & Ors8, a Coordinate Bench of this
Court held as follows:
“The issuance of repeated legal notices/public notices does not extend
the period of limitation. The effort of the Plaintiff to bring the present
suit within the period of limitation on the basis of its legal notice dated
8th July, 2005 and the reply by the Defendant Nos.1 to 9 dated 20th
July, 2005 is totally untenable under law, unlawful and the same does
not lead to the extension of limitation period under Article 54 of the
Limitation Act, as once the suit is already barred by limitation in the
year 2002, either by the service of notice or any admission in reply
after the expiry of limitation, no benefit can be derived by the Plaintiff
under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.”
38.
The Appellant sought to rely upon the decision of a learned
Single Judge of this Court in Fortune Builders (P) Ltd. v. Blue Star
Ltd.9, wherein the legal notice and the reply thereto were held to
constitute the “breaking point”, and therefore the point of
commencement of limitation. That decision is distinguishable, and
was so distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in Greatech
Fashions v. S.K. Industries10, decided on 27.05.2025. In Fortune
Builders (supra), the work from which the dispute arose was still
pending; the project stood abandoned and unfinished; and the parties
had raised competing claims through their respective notices and
replies. It was in that setting that the notice was held to have
crystallised a dispute which had not previously assumed definite
shape.
CS(OS) 1409/2007
2022 SCC OnLine Del 975
RFA(COMM) 323/2025
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39.
No such situation obtains here. The supplies had long since
ceased. The invoices had been raised. The credit periods had expired.
The dues, on the Appellant’s own case, stood ascertained in a running
account. The legal notice of 18.12.2021 crystallised nothing; it merely
reiterated a claim that had matured, and become actionable, years
earlier. It was not a “point of no return” in the dealings between the
parties, for the parties had long since passed that point.
40.
The position was authoritatively restated by the Division Bench
in Greatech Fashions (supra) in the following terms:
“The period of limitation can be extended only under certain
circumstances as mentioned in the Limitation Act, 1963, one of them
being a written acknowledgment of the debt or a part payment made
within the period of limitation. None of those circumstances are made
out by the appellant in the present case. Equally, the issuance of a
legal notice does not lead to the commencement of a fresh period of
limitation.”
41.
If a legal notice could dictate the commencement of limitation,
a plaintiff could indefinitely postpone the institution of a suit by the
simple expedient of waiting several years and then despatching a
notice. Such a result would defeat the very purpose of the Limitation
Act, which is founded on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus
jura subveniunt – the law assists the vigilant, and not those who
slumber over their rights. Once a plaintiff knows, whether through
conduct, conversation or a prior document, that the defendant will not
perform, the clock begins to run. A fresh notice for the same breach,
despatched years later, does not reset it. Indeed, Section 9 of the
Limitation Act embodies the same principle in statutory form: where
once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to
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institute a suit stops it. Still less can it be stopped by the unilateral act
of the party in whose favour it is running out.
42.
It is true, and well trodden, that limitation is ordinarily a mixed
question of fact and law. But that principle cannot be pressed into
service to circumvent the mandate of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
where the facts are stark and the delay is manifest. The mere issuance
of a legal notice does not, by some process of legal alchemy,
transmute a time–barred claim into a live one.
V. Whether the reply dated 30.12.2021 constitutes an
acknowledgement under Section 18
43.
Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides that where, before the
expiration of the prescribed period for a suit, an acknowledgement of
liability in respect of the right claimed has been made in writing,
signed by the party against whom such right is claimed, a fresh period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when the
acknowledgement was so signed. The provision therefore admits of
four requisites: (i) an acknowledgement of liability in respect of the
right claimed; (ii) in writing; (iii) signed by the party against whom
the right is claimed; and (iv) made before the expiration of the
prescribed period.
44.
The fourth requisite is a condition precedent, and it is fatal to
the Appellant. We have held above that the prescribed period expired,
at the latest, on 05.05.2021. The Respondent’s reply is dated
30.12.2021. An acknowledgement made after the period of limitation
has run out cannot resurrect a claim which has already died. Section
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18 renews a subsisting debt; it does not exhume a barred one. That is
precisely what was held in J.M. Construction (supra), where the
Coordinate Bench recorded that once the suit is already barred, no
benefit can be derived under Section 18 from any admission contained
in a reply issued after the expiry of limitation.
45.
Even assuming, without accepting, that the reply had been
issued within the prescribed period, it would not answer the
description of an acknowledgement. In Khan Bahadur Shapoor
Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria11, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court explained the requirements of an acknowledgement thus:
“The statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must
relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the
specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words.
Words used in the acknowledgment must, however, indicate the
existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of
debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with
the intention to admit such jural relationship.”
46.
It is no doubt correct, as Shapoor Fredoom Mazda (supra)
itself records, that an acknowledgement is not vitiated merely because
it is accompanied by a refusal to pay, or is coupled with a claim to a
set–off. But that indulgence presupposes an admitted jural relationship
of debtor and creditor, to which the refusal or the set–off is
superadded. The Respondent’s reply dated 30.12.2021 is of an entirely
different character. It asserts that the goods supplied were of inferior
quality and poor grade, that the majority of the lots were rejected, and
that the amounts already paid constituted full and final settlement.
That is not a conditional acknowledgement co–existing with an
AIR 1961 SC 1236
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admitted debt. It is a denial, at the root, of the payment obligation
itself. No intention to admit a subsisting liability can be inferred from
a document whose whole burden is that nothing is owed.
VI. The effect of the pandemic exclusion and of pre–institution
mediation
47.
The Appellant lastly invokes the directions issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of
Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020. By its order
dated 10.01.2022, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the period
from 15.03.2020 until 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded in computing
the period of limitation prescribed under any general or special law in
respect of all judicial and quasi–judicial proceedings; that the balance
period of limitation remaining, if any, shall become available with
effect from 01.03.2022; and that where such balance period was less
than ninety days, a period of ninety days from 01.03.2022 would be
available to the litigant.
48.
Applying that dispensation at its most generous, the Appellant’s
position is as follows. The period of three years under Article 15
would have expired on 05.05.2021, which date falls within the
excluded window. The balance of limitation available to the Appellant
as on 01.03.2022 was therefore nil, and it became entitled to the
benefit of the outer limit of ninety days reckoned from 01.03.2022.
The Appellant was thus required to institute its suit by the end of May
2022. The suit was instituted on 13.10.2023, nearly seventeen months
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
16:22:40
thereafter, and more than five years after the accrual of the last cause
of action.
49.
Nor does the pre–institution mediation under Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act carry the Appellant any further. The proviso
to Section 12A(3) directs that the period during which the parties
remained occupied with the pre–institution mediation shall not be
computed for the purpose of limitation under the Limitation Act.
Here, mediation was initiated on 21.12.2021 and culminated in a
Non–Starter Report dated 14.02.2022. That entire period lies within
the window already excluded by the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, and no further exclusion can be claimed in respect of it. Time
cannot be excluded twice over.
50.
We may observe, in passing, that the Appellant’s recourse to
the pandemic orders sits uneasily with its own case on the merits of
limitation. If, as the Appellant contends, its cause of action arose only
on 30.12.2021, it needed no exclusion at all. That the Appellant
should invoke the exclusion is itself an implicit recognition that its
claim had matured, and its limitation had commenced, well before the
pandemic.
VII. The grievance regarding the opportunity to file a reply
51.
There remains the Appellant’s procedural grievance that the
learned Trial Court decided the application under Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC on 19.04.2024 without granting it an opportunity to file a
reply. We are unable to accept that the Impugned Judgment is vitiated
on that account.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
16:22:40
52.
An application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC is
decided upon a demurrer. As held in Saleem Bhai (supra), the only
relevant material is the averments in the plaint and the documents
filed with it. A reply to such an application could not have introduced
new facts, nor could it have altered the dates disclosed by the
Appellant’s own pleading. Significantly, the Appellant has not
indicated, either before the learned Trial Court or before us, what
material it would have placed on record in such a reply which was
capable of displacing the chronology set out in the plaint. The
Appellant has, moreover, been heard at length before us upon every
aspect of the question of limitation.
53.
Procedural irregularity unaccompanied by prejudice does not
vitiate a decision. A remand in these circumstances would be an
empty formality, prolonging litigation which the law of limitation is
designed to bring to an end. We accordingly decline to interfere on
this ground.
CONCLUSION
54.
To summarise our conclusions:
i.
The suit is governed by Article 15 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, which fixes the commencement of limitation at
the expiry of the stipulated period of credit. The starting point
being fixed by the contract itself, no question of fact arose which
required the matter to be sent to trial.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
16:22:40
ii.
The non–payment of contractual dues gives rise to
recurring, and not continuing, causes of action. The last such
cause of action accrued, at the latest, on 05.05.2018, and the
period of three years expired on 05.05.2021.
iii.
Neither the legal notice dated 18.12.2021 nor the reply
dated 30.12.2021 furnishes a fresh point of commencement. A
unilateral notice cannot set the clock of limitation running afresh.
iv.
The reply dated 30.12.2021 is not an acknowledgement
of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, both because
it postdates the expiry of the prescribed period and because it
denies the debt at its root.
v.
Upon the fullest application of the orders of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court excluding the pandemic period, together with the
exclusion available in respect of pre–institution mediation, the
suit ought to have been instituted by the end of May 2022. It was
instituted on 13.10.2023.
vi.
The learned Trial Court committed no error in deciding
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC upon the
averments in the plaint, and no prejudice has been demonstrated
to have resulted from the absence of a written reply.
55.
Considering the above, we find that the learned Trial Court has
not erred in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation. The
incorrect computation of the period of limitation, coupled with the
Appellant’s failure to institute the suit within the outer limit fixed by
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
16:22:40
the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, necessitates the dismissal of
this appeal.
56.
Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the Impugned
Judgment and decree dated 19.04.2024 is upheld. Pending
applications, if any, stand disposed of.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
JULY 16, 2026
sp/kb
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
RFA(COMM) 383/2024
16:22:40
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