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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on:30.01.2026
Pronounced on:13.03.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
CRP. Nos.6203 & 6211 of 2025
and CMP. Nos.30579, 30580, 30613 & 30616 of 2025
M/s.Prema Engineering,
Door No.737/1, Thottipalayam Road,
Civil Aerodrome Post, Coimbatore.
For the Company, Rep. by its Proprietor K.S.Nirmal,
W/o.Sampathkumar
... Petitioner in both CRPs
Vs
1.V.Vengidathi
...1st respondent in CRP. No.6203 of 2025
1.Vasanthakumar
...1st respondent in CRP. No.6211 of 2025
2.Radhakrishan
3.Krishanveni
4.Muthammal
5.Neelavathi
6.M/s.Safvolt Switchgears Private Limited,
Door No.7/174, Vellaipatti Village,
Kalapatti Way, Annur Taluk,
Coimbatore District.
For the Company, Rep. by its
Managing Director Vijaykumar,
S/o.Ganapathiyappan.
7.M/s.Sharp Liqtech,
Door No.2/79, Naduthottam,
Mayilampatti, Coimbatore.
For the Company, Rep. by its
Shareholder Velumanibabu,
S/o.Govindarajulu.
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8.M/s.Sharp Liqtech,
Door No.2/79, Naduthottam,
Mayilampatti, Coimbatore.
For the Company, Rep. by its shareholder
Rajesh, S/o.Vengidupathi
9.M/s.Poongodhai Textile Mills,
Survey No.13/2, West Palladam Road,
Pa.Vadugapalayam, Palladam Taluk,
Tiruppur District.
For the Company, Rep. by its shareholder
Authorized person, P.Tamilselvan
10.M/s.Allied Foundry,
Survey No.51/C, Arasoor Boundary Park,
Coimbatore District.
Rep. by its Partner for a partnership Firm,
Sathishkumar, S/o.Rajendiran
11.M/s.MJP. Enterprises Private Limited,
Door No.19D/1, Survey No.7/2,
Koilpalayam, S.S.Kulam Town Panchayath,
Coimbatore District,
For the Company, Rep. by its Full-time
Managing Director, K.B.Jegathishraj.
12.M/s. Bright Foundries Coimbatore Private Limited,
Survey No.281/1, Kattampatti Village,
Sakthi Road, Ganesapuram, Coimbatore District.
For the Company, Rep. by its Managing Director,
S.Paulraj, S/o.Subbaiyan.
13.M/s.Ferromax Foundries India Private Limited,
Door No.95/A1, Kluster Park-1,
Kashmafan Boundary, Coimbatore.
For the Company, Rep. by its Managing Director,
Sathishkumar, S/o.Rajendiran.
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14.M/s.Shri Santhosh Meenakshi Textiles Private
Limited, Door No.15,Sethurama Kantharesa Iyer
Lay out, Trichy Road, Coimbatore.
For the Company, Rep. by its Director,
Santhosh Kumar, S/o.Udhayasankar.
15.Sub Registrar,
Sub Registrar Office, Udumalpet,
Tiruppur District.
16.District Registrar,
District Registrar Office,
Tiruppur District.
17.The District Collector,
District Collector Office,
Tiruppur District.
Respondents 2 to 17 in both CRPs.
COMMON PRAYER: This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227
of the Constitution of India, to set aside the decree and judgment passed in O.S.
No.101 of 2022 & 102 of 2022 dated 11.12.2024 on the file of IV Additional
District Court, Udumalpet.
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For Petitioners
: Mr.Avinash Wadhwani for
Mr.M.Mahamani
For Respondent
: Mr.K.Selvaraj for R1
Mr.PA.Sai Govindaraja for
Mr.G.Murugan, R2 to R5
Mr.Naveen Kumar Murthi for
Mr.G.V.Mohan Kumar for R6
Mr.A.Anandan,
Government Advocate for R15 to R17
No Appearance for R7 to R14.
**********
COMMON ORDER
These revision petitions have been filed to set aside the judgment and
decree in O.S. Nos.101 & 102 of 2022 dated 11.12.2024 on the file of the IV
Additional District Court, Udumalpet.
2.
I
have
heard
Mr.Avinash
Wadhwani,
learned
counsel
for
Mr.M.Mahamani, learned counsel for the revision petitioner in both these
revision petitions, Mr.K.Selvaraj, learned counsel for R1,
Mr.PA.Sai
Govindaraja for Mr.G.Murugan, learned counsel for R2 to R5,
Mr.Naveen
Kumar Murthi for Mr.G.V.Mohan Kumar, learned counsel for R6,
Mr.A.Anandan, learned Government Advocate for R15 to R17.
3. Brief facts that are necessary to decide the present revision petitions are
as follows:An extent of 116 acres originally belonged to one Muthusamy Naicker.
The said Muthusamy Naicker was blessed with two sons and three daughters.
In or about 1988, the three sons, leaving out the two daughters, however, with
their mother entered into a registered partition deed.
There was a family
arrangement in the year 1989 to which the sons are signatories. One of the
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daughters filed a suit for partition in the year 2010, claiming 1/3 rd share in the
mother's share that was allotted under the 1988 partition deed. The Trial Court
dismissed the suit, finding that the family arrangement had been acted upon in
the year 1989. However one of the three daughters got release of 2/3 rd share of
other two daughters and thereby, claimed the entire share share allotted to the
mother. Subsequently, the said daughter settled the property in favour of her
husband, Radhakrishnan, who in turn, sold the property to a third party, from
whom the present revision petitioner has purchased the same. One of the
daughters filed O.S. No.188 of 2004 for partition claiming that though the suit
for partition was dismissed, it had been agreed by the sons that insofar as the
property of mother, Rukmani Ammal, even during her lifetime, it was given to
her three daughters, the plaintiff and the defendants 3 and 4 in the said suit.
This was the stand in fact, taken by the two sons as well while contesting the
suit for partition.
4. While matters stood there, the two sons claiming that they had 1/5th
share in the property allotted to their mother, Rukmani Ammal, executed sale
deeds for 8 acres each, one in favour of brother in law of one of the sons and
one in favour of son in law of one of the sons, in all claiming 16 acres to be
their property.
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The purchasers viz., the brother in law and son in law filed
suits. There were also several criminal cases between the parties.
The first
respondent in these revision petitions filed O.S. Nos.101 and 102 of 2022
respectively, for declaring their right in the properties purchased by them from
the brothers together with consequential reliefs of permanent injunction.
5. The grievance of the revision petitioner is that the said suits filed by
the first respondent in these revision petitions respectively, were erroneously
decreed by the District Court, based on an alleged settlement terms produced by
the plaintiff's Counsel, without even verifying its genuineness and validity.
Accordingly, the present revision petitions have been filed challenging the
judgment and decree, recording the settlement and decreeing the suit.
Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel for the revision petitioner would
contend that even a casual perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the
Court below would evidence that excepting the learned counsel for the plaintiff,
none of the other parties or their respective Counsel were heard or put on notice
before recording the alleged settlement. He would further invite my attention to
the judgment and decree itself, which merely records the fact that a compromise
had been recorded in the Writ Petition and the suit is decreed based on the said
settlement recorded in W.P. Nos.3441 and 3445 of 2022 on 26.09.2022. It is
therefore, the contention of Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel for the
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petitioner that the said decree is not even in accordance with Order XXIII of
CPC and is unsustainable on the face of the record.
6. Further inviting my attention to the orders passed in W.P. Nos.3441
and 3445 of 2022 on 26.09.2022, Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel for
the petitioner would contend that this Court has only recorded the fact that the
learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners submitted that the matter has been
compromised between the writ petitioner and private respondent No.4 and
therefore, recording the said submissions, the writ petitions were closed.
Pointing out to the fact that no settlement memo or terms were even filed in the
Writ Court, Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, would vehemently contend that the Trial
Court, without any application of mind, has virtually given a seal of approval
unilaterally and arbitrarily to the settlement terms relied on by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff in the two suits.
7. Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel would further contend that the
sons, by their own conduct have clearly admitted to the entitlement of the
daughters alone to the share of the mother and having lost all right interest and
title to the lands allotted to the mother in the partition deed, and having taken
advantage of the other portions of valuable lands allotted to the sons, the sons
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have played fraud by alleging that they have a 1/5th share in the mother's
entitlement also and have created sale deeds, sham and nominal in favour of
their close relatives, to defeat the rights of the daughters.
Mr.Avinash
Wadhwani, learned counsel would therefore state that this is a classic case
where this Court can exercise the extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, to even straight away reject the plaints in O.S. Nos.101
and 102 of 2022.
8. Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel for the revision petitioner
would also rely on the following decisions in support of his contentions:(i) Gurpreet Singh Vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel, reported in (1988) 1 SCC 270;
(ii) Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi (Smt) Through Lrs) and Another,
reported in (1993) 1 SCC 581;
(iii) Ram Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in
(2023) 16 SCC 691;
(iv) District Collector, Collectorate, Chennai Vs. R.Vetri and Others,
reported in 2022 SCC Online Mad 9189;
(v) D.Harish and another Vs. Champalatha and another, in CRP.
Nos.2954 of 2021 dated 28.04.2023;
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(vi) R.Rajanna Vs. S.R.Vanataswamy and others, reported in (2014) 15
SCC 471;
(vi) A.V.Papayya Sastry and Others Vs. Government of A.P and others,
reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221;
(vii) K.Raghunandan and others Vs. Ali Hussain Sabir and others,
reported in (2008) 13 SCC 102;and
(viii) Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup and others, reported in (2009) 6 SCC
194.
9. Per contra, the contesting first respondent Mr.K.Selvaraj, would submit
that the first respondent has not played any fraud or abused the process of Court
as alleged by the revision petitioner.
He would state that the terms of
compromise between the petitioner and the fourth respondent have been acted
upon and the fourth respondent has also taken substantial benefit under the said
compromise and there has also been exchange of lands as agreed upon in Clause
4 of settlement agreement and therefore, it is not now open to the petitioner to
recall the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court. He would further
state that the contesting 4th respondent had voluntarily agreed with open eyes to
settle the matter and only in pursuance of the settlement reached, the same was
reported before the Writ Court and also before the Civil Court, which has
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recorded the settlement terms as well. Mr.Selvaraj, learned counsel would also
state that there was no error or infirmity in the judgment and decree warranting
interference, that too under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10. Mr.Selvaraj, learned counsel for the first respondent would further
state that the poor agriculturalists have lost all their lands and the 4 th respondent
has taken over the entire lands and the first respondents in the two revisions are
left with virtually nothing. He would also rely on several Board Resolutions
authorising the 4th respondent Vijayakumar, to represent the various Companies
which are only Sister Companies and the Power of Attorney as well, in and by
which, all the Sister Companies have executed a Power of Attorney on
01.06.2023, empowering the 4th respondent to represent them and deal with the
property. The learned counsel therefore states that there is no merit in these
revisions and he prays for dismissal of the revision petitions. In support of his
contentions, he has relied on the following decisions:
(i) Byram Pestonji Gariwala Vs. Union Bank of India and Others,
reported in (1992) 1 SCC 31;
(ii) Navratan Lal Sharma Vs. Radha Mohan Sharma and Ors, reported in
2024 INSC 970;and
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(iii) Deepa Bhargava and Another Vs. Mahesh Bhargava and others,
reported in (2009) 2 SCC 294.
11. Mr.Navin Kumar Murthi, learned counsel for the 6th respondent,
M/s.Safvolt Switchgears Private Limited, represented by Managing Director,
Vijaykumar, would contend that the 6th respondent was also not heard before the
decree came to be passed and adopting the arguments of Mr.Avinash Wadhwani,
learned counsel, he would also contend that there is a flagrant violation of the
mandate of Order XXIII CPC.
He would further contend that the Board
Resolution did not authorise Mr.Vijaykumar, to enter into any settlement with
regard to the suit properties in the first place and further, the power of attorney
was also an unregistered power of attorney and no rights can flow to the power
agent. Mr.Navin Kumar Murthi, would further contend that even the witnesses
to the alleged settlement agreement have signed in their individual capacity and
not as authorised representatives of the various Companies, whose substantial
interest is also involved in the suit properties.
12. It is also the further case of Mr.Navin Kumar Murthi, learned counsel
for the 6th respondent that the first respondent is indulging in speculative
litigation to extract money from the Companies, after having sold the lands to
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them. Mr.Navin Kumar Murthi, learned counsel would further contend that
there is absolutely no merit in the claim that the first respondent are poor
agriculturist as they have been indulging in several litigations, Civil and
Criminal and have even gone to the extent of seeking directions for issuing look
out circulars to the Managing Director of the 6 th respondent.
The learned
counsel would therefore prays for the revisions being allowed.
13. Mr.P.A.Sai Govindaraja, learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 5,
would state that 41 acres of land were sold by one of the daughters who became
entitled to the same, pursuant to the release/settlement by the other two
daughters and the said 41 acres have already been sold by the 6th respondent to
the revision petitioner. The learned counsel arguments in fact supports the case
of the revision petitioner, though he contends that the entire sale consideration
has not been paid the respondents 2 to 5, however, it not being a matter to be
agitated in the present revision petitions. He would also pray for the revisions
being allowed.
14. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the parties. I have perused the records filed by way of typed-sets
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and voluminous documents. I have also carefully gone through the decisions on
which reliance has been placed on by the learned counsel on either side.
15. It is not in dispute that a large extent of 116 acres belonged to one
Muthu Samy Naicker, who was married to Rukmani Ammal. Muthu Samy
Naicker and Rukmani Ammal, were blessed with two sons, by name Rajagopal
and Loganathan and three daughters, viz., Krishnaveni, Muthammal and
Neelavathi. After the demise of Muthu Samy Naicker, admittedly, the two sons
and his wife Rukmani Ammal, entered into a deed of partition in the year 1988,
in and by which properties were allotted to both the sons and the mother,
Rukmani Ammal. One of the daughters, Krishnaveni, thereafter filed a suit in
O.S. No.188 of 2004 before the District Munsif Court, Udumalpet. The suit
was filed against her two brothers and two sisters, by which time, her mother,
Rukmani Ammal had also died. In the said suit, the A schedule property was
the property allotted to the mother in the 1988 partition deed. The plaintiff
claimed 1/3rd share in the said property and in the remaining property which was
allotted to the brothers under the 1988 partition deed, the plaintiff claimed that
these properties were also available for partition and that she is also entitled to a
share. In the said suit, the defendants viz., the predecessors in interest of the
first respondent in these revision petitioners, who were none else than the sons
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of Muthusamy Naicker and Rukmani Ammal filed a written statement
categorically admitting to the fact that under 21.11.1988 partition deed, A
Schedule thereto was allotted to the mother, Rukmani Ammal, B Schedule was
allotted to the first defendant, brother Rajagopal and C Schedule was allotted to
the second defendant, Loganathan, the other son. It has been further admitted
that even during the lifetime of Rukmani Ammal, the three daughters, viz.,
plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 were allotted the entire share of Rukmani
Ammal and after the demise of the mother, Rukmani Ammal, the three
daughters have become entitled to the share of Rukmani Ammal and that they
have been in possession of the same ever since.
16. The Trial Court took note of the admissions of the defendants' sons
that the property of Rukmani Ammal, viz., A Schedule to the partition deed was
allotted to the three daughters, viz., the plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4, but
however finding that the plaintiff was a signatory to the partition deed and had
also taken benefit of 1/3rd share of mother Rukmani Ammal, the plaintiff was
not entitled to seek any further partition and dismissed the suit. Admittedly, the
sons never staked any claim in the share allotted to the mother Rukmani Ammal
at the 1988 partition, subsequently, two of the daughters have given up their
respective 1/3rd share in favour of one of the daughters, who has subsequently
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conveyed the properties in favour of the 6 th respondent Company, who in turn,
has sold the same to the revision petitioner herein.
17. In the interregnum period, the two sons with self-serving claims that
they had a right of 1/5th each in the share of the mother, Rukmani Ammal's
entitlement in the 1988 partition deed, proceeded to execute sale deeds in
respect of the first respondents herein admittedly. Both the first respondents are
their close relatives, being brother in law and son in law. In view of the specific
stand taken by the predecessors in interest of the first respondent herein viz., the
two sons of Muthu Samy Naicker and Rukmani Ammal, that they had no right
in the property allotted to Rukmani Ammal, it is not known how they could go
back on the same, especially having made a solemn pleading before a
Competent Civil Court in that regard, and alienate an alleged non-existing 1/5th
undivided share in the properties allotted to the mother Rukmani Ammal. Much
needs to be said about the conduct of the predecessor in interest of the first
respondents. Equally, the first respondents cannot also claim to be bona fide
purchasers, for the simple reason that they are close relatives of the two sons of
Rukmani Ammal and further, it is seen from the documents as well, that despite
the claim of their vendors being 1/5th undivided share, specific earmarked
portions have been purchased by the first respondent, certainly at their risk and
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peril. Therefore, I do not find any bonafides whatsoever in the claims and
contentions of the first respondent.
18. Be that as it may, the manner in which the judgment and decree came
to be passed in O.S. Nos. 101 and 102 of 2022, equally shocks the conscience of
the Court. For a further elaboration, the identical judgment and decree passed
in the suits is extracted hereunder:
"This Suit is coming on this day for final hearing before
me in the presence of Thiru.D.Prabhakaran, Advocate for
Plaintiff and Plaintiff side produced the compromise deed
recorded in W.P. Nos.3441 & 3445 of 2022 dated 26.09.2022,
doth order and decree as follows:
DECREE
1.that the suit be and the same is hereby decreed based
on the Settlement deed recorded in W.P. No.3441 & 3445 of
2022 dated 26.09.2022, Hon'ble High Court. The terms of
settlement annexed with the decree
2. that there will be no cost."
19. There were as many as 17 defendants in both the suits, the learned
District Judge merely records that the suit has come up before him for final
hearing in the presence of the plaintiff's Counsel alone. The District Court has
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not even cares to put the Counsel appearing for the various defendants on
notice, in order to ascertain the claim of the plaintiff that compromise deed has
been entered into and recorded in W.P. Nos.3441 and 3445 of 2022 on
26.09.2022. Further the learned District Court has not even applied its mind to
the order passed by the Writ Court while disposing of W.P. Nos.3441 and 3445
of 2022 by order dated 26.09.2022. For the sake of convenience and reference,
the order passed in the said Writ Petitions on 26.09.2022 by the Writ Court is
extracted hereunder:
"COMMON ORDER
Both the Writ Petitions have been filed seeking to issue a Writ of
Mandamus, directing the respondents 1 to 3 to provide adequate police
protection to the petitioners and their land to an extent of 8.27 acres comprised
in S.F.No.521/3 in Andiyagoundanur Village, Udumalpet Taluk, Tiruppur
District, by forthwith considering the representation of the petitioner dated
08.02.2022.
2. The facts and circumstances of the case and the issues involved in both
the writ petitions are one and the same and hence this Court passes the common
order.
3. When the matters are taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that the matter has been compromised between them and
the private respondent/fourth respondent and hence, the issue is now settled.
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4. Recording the submission made by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, the Writ Petitions in W.P.Nos.3441, 3445 of 2002 are closed. No
costs."
20. It is thus clear that the writ petitions were disposed of merely
recording the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though the
fourth respondent in the Writ Petition viz., 6 th respondent in these revision
petitions was a party to the writ petitions, the 4 th respondent was not heard
before the orders were passed in the Writ Petitions. The order does not even
records the fact that the 4th respondent was served or represented by any
Counsel in the Writ Petitions. Appearance was recorded only on behalf of the
statutory respondents viz., respondents 1 to 3. The learned counsel for the Writ
Petitioner has not even furnished any copy of the compromise memo to the Writ
Court. In the light of the said common order passed by this Court, I am at wits
end as to how the Trial Court can pass a decree to the effect that based on the
settlement recorded in W.P. Nos.3441 and 3445 of 2022 dated 26.09.2022, the
terms of settlement are annexed in the decree and decree is passed accordingly.
Order XXIII of CPC, contemplates the manner in which a settlement reached
can be recorded. For better appreciation, Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC, is extracted
hereunder:
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" Order XXIII, Rule (3) Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by
any lawful agreement or compromise 1 [in writing and signed by the parties]
or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any
part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement,
compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in
accordance therewith 2 [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether
or not the subjectmatter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the
same as the subject-matter of the suit:
[Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that
an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the
question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding
the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant
such adjournment.]
[Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable
under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not he deemed to be
lawful within the meaning of this rule.]
3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the
compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.
3B. No agreement or compromise to be entered in a representative suit
without leave of Court.—(1) No agreement or compromise in a representative
suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in
the proceedings; and any such agreement or compromise entered into without
the leave of the Court as recorded shall be void.
(2) Below granting such leave, the Court shall give notice in such manner as
it may think fit to such persons is as may appear to it to be interested in the
suit. Explanation.—In this rule, “representative suit” means,—
(a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92,
(b) a suit under rule 8 of Order I,
(c) a suit in which the manager of an undivided Hindu family sues or is sued
as representing the other members of the family,
(d) any other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the provisions
of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force, bind any person
who is not named as party to the suit.] "
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21. The learned District Court has not even satisfied itself with regard to
there being a valid lawful agreement of compromise in writing and signed by
the parties in the first place. Unfortunately, the District Court has been carried
away by the disposal of the Writ Petitions which was only the strength of a mere
submission that the writ petitioner has settled the matter with the private
respondent viz., 6th respondent in this revision petition. The District Court
ought to have atleast called upon the 6 th defendant to affirm the settlement terms
before passing a decree, which exercise was also not been done. Therefore, the
judgment and decree passed in both the suits is wholly unsustainable and liable
to be set aside.
22. Even though Mr.Selvaraj, learned counsel for the first respondent has
contended that the compromise is only between the first respondents
respectively in these revision petitions and the Company, 6 th respondent
represented by its Managing Director and that the Managing Director of the 6 th
respondent has been issued with Board Resolutions from all Sister Companies
as well, besides also a power of attorney and he was fully competent to enter
into the compromise, I am unable to countenance the said submission, for the
following reasons:
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(i) The first respondents did not have any right in the first place to convey
1/5th share from and out of the mother's entitlement allotted to her separately in
the 1988 partition. Therefore, the very alienation made by them in favour of
their close relatives being brother in law and son in law is brought about only to
make unlawful enrichment and gain, at the expense of the rights of their sisters
viz., the three daughters of Muthu Samy Naicker and Rukmani Ammal
(ii) Further, as already noticed, if at all the sons did have any share, leave
alone a 1/5th share what all they could have conveyed was an undivided share.
However, on the contrary, they have conveyed definite demarcated portions in
favour of the respective first respondents herein.
Therefore, the first
respondents are also parties to the game plan of fraud played by the two sons of
Muthu Samy Naicker and Rukmani Ammal and they cannot claim to be
innocent or bonafide purchasers. Therefore, any compromise that is entered
into defeating the rights of the daughters and their successors in interest is
clearly invalid in the eye of law. Merely, because there has been exchange of
properties as alleged, even assuming it is true, the same will not in any manner
bind the revision petitioner who is a purchaser of rightful entitlement of the
daughters which has been consistently admitted to by the predecessors-ininterest of the respective first respondents themselves, at various points on time.
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(iii) The power of attorneys that have been relied on by the learned
counsel for the first respondent are unregistered and it only entitles the
Managing Director of the 6th respondent herein, Vijaykumar to represent the
Sister Companies before the various Government Authorities. The power of
attorney does not empower the said Vijaykumar to even enter into any
compromise in the first place. Equally, the Board of Resolutions that have been
relied on also do not empower Vijaykumar, to enter into any compromise
involving the suit properties. Therefore, no amount of reliance on the said
power of attorney and Board Resolution would come to the aid of the first
respondent.
23. Now coming to the decisions that have been relied on by the learned
counsel for the parties:
Mr.Avinash Wadhwani, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh's case (referred herein
supra), referring to Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC, held that the word 'satisfied'
employed in Rule 3 of Order XXIII CPC, denotes satisfaction of the claim of
the plaintiff, wholly or in part, for which there is no need for any agreement in
writing and signed by the parties and it would be sufficient for the defendant to
prove such satisfaction by production of the receipt of payment through Bank or
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otherwise, tendering of acceptable evidence being sufficient and satisfactory to
establish the same. However, insofar as the first part, the Court is required to be
satisfied that the suit claim has been either wholly or partly adjusted by a lawful
agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties.
24. In Banwarilal's case (referred herein supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, deprecated the recording of the compromise by the Court in a casual
manner holding that Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC, does not require just a seal of
approval of the Court to an alleged agreement of compromise entered into
between the parties, but the Code requires the Court to be first satisfied that the
agreement of compromise which has been entered between the parties is lawful
before accepting the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the
Court has to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of settlement
before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the
parties.
25. In Ramkumar's case (referred herein supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court following the ratio laid down in S.P.Chengalvaraya
Naidu Vs.
Jegannath, reported in (1994) 1 SCC page 1, held that non disclosure of
relevant and material documents, with a view to obtain any undue advantage
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would amount to fraud and any judgment or decree obtained by fraud is to be
treated as a nullity. In D.Harish's case (referred herein supra) this Court held
that absence of fairness is a ground to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India and when substantial rights of a party stands victimised
by breach of doctrine of fairness as it would result in serious miscarriage of
justice.
26. In A.V.Papaya Sastry's case, (referred herein supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, held that fraud avoids all judicial acts and any judgment
obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity or non est in the eye of law
and has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior and that it
can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in
collateral proceedings.
27. In Sneh Gupta's case (referred herein supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court again referring to Order XXIII, Rule 3 of CPC, held that a compromise
decree would not be binding on such defendants who were not parties thereto
and the Court has a duty to prevent injustice to any of the parties to litigation
and cannot exercise jurisdiction to allow the proceedings to be used to work
substantial injustice to some of the parties.
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28. Mr.K.Selvaraj, learned counsel for the first respondents has relied on
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala's case
(referred herein supra), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to Order
XXIII, Rule 3 CPC, held that even a Counsel represented by the parties is
competent to sign the compromise on an implied authority of the parties, but
however cautioned that Counsel should not ordinarily act on implied authority,
except when warranted by exigency of circumstances.
29. He has also relied on Deepa Bhargava's case (referred herein supra),
where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when a consent decree was passed,
the defendants having not challenged the validity of the consent decree and
having acted upon and taken advantage of a part of the decree, could not rescind
from the terms of the decree. I do not see how this decision would apply to the
facts of the present case. The plaintiffs viz., the first respondents have come to
Court as if they have a valid and enforcible 1/5th right in the properties,
originally allotted to the share of the Rukmani Ammal. They as vendors of the
respective first respondents have themselves acknowledged and admitted the
fact that they have no right in the properties allotted to the mother, Rukmani
Ammal.
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Therefore, the very sale made by the two sons in favour of the first
respondents herein is a void document and therefore, the question of enforcing a
compromise between the plaintiff and one of the defendants, that too, not in
accordance with the Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC, as in the present case, clearly
distinguishes the principle laid down in the in Deepa Bhargava's case.
30. The other decision that has been relied on by Mr.K.Selvaraj, learned
counsel that in Navarathan Lal Sharma's case (referred herein supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once there is a compromise, neither an appeal
against the consent decree nor a fresh suit can be brought for setting aside such
decree and the only remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach
the Court that recorded the compromise under proviso to Order XXIII, Rule 3
CPC. There is no quarrel with regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in these decisions. However, for all the reasons that I have
elaborately discussed herein above and also conscious of the fact that when
fraud is played upon the Court and also the parties, this Court can certainly
exercise its supervisory powers and ensure that justice is rendered to the
aggrieved parties, I see no lack of power to interfere to do substantial justice to
the aggrieved parties.
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31. The respective first respondents, as already found, are not bonafide or
innocent purchasers. Their vendors were their close relatives, who themselves
did not have any subsisting right in the properties conveyed to them. There is
no answer to the categorical admissions made in the solemn pleadings before
the Competent Civil Court in O. S. No.188 of 2004 where the vendors/
predecessor's in interest of the 1st respondents/plaintiffs have admitted that they
do not have any right in the suit properties which is subject matter of O.S.
Nos.101 and 102 of 2022.
32. In the light of the above, it would be a travesty of justice to even
allow the parties to go for at trial. I see absolutely no merit in the request of the
learned counsel for the first respondents/plaintiffs that they being agriculturists
and they are being sought to be deprived of their valuable agricultural lands,
their interest should be safeguarded and protected.
On the contrary, the
respondents/plaintiffs, as borne out of records, have played with the process of
the Court only to enrich themselves unlawfully at the expense of innocent third
party buyers, especially the revision petitioners herein. Therefore, it is a fit case
where, I am entitled to invoke the extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to strike of the plaints in O.S. No.101 and 102 of 2022 and
not merely set aside the judgment and decree passed by the District Court which
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have been passed in flagrant violation of the mandate of Order XXIII, Rule 3
CPC.
33. For all the above reasons, the revisions are allowed and suits in O.S.
Nos.101 and 102 of 2022 and hereby ordered to be struck of from file.
Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs.
13.03.2026
rkp
Internet: Yes
Index
: Yes
Note: The Registry is directed to return the original Power
of Attorney to the first respondent that was handed over to
the Court during the course of argument by the learned
counsel Mr.Selvaraj.
To:
The IV Additional District Judge, Udumalpet.
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P.B.BALAJI, J.,
rkp
Pre-delivery order in
CRP. Nos.6203 & 6211 of 2025
and CMP. Nos.30579, 30580, 30613 & 30616 of 2025
13.03.2026
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