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C.R.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 11335 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S SHEEN GOLDEN JEWELS (INDIA) PVT LTD
XXI/1016(2), COLLEGE ROAD, PATHANAMTHITTA,
REPRESENTED BY M.P.AHAMMED BASHEER, DIRECTOR.
BY ADVS.
SRI. VENKITARAMAN
SMT.SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
SMT.T.ARCHANA
SRI.K.P.ABDUL AZEES
RESPONDENTS:
THE STATE TAX OFFICER(IB)-1,
INVESTIGATION BRANCH, STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX
DEPARTMENT, TAX TOWERS,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
THE STATE TAX OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE SQUAD NO.1)
STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX DEPARTMENT,
PATHANAMTHITTA - 689 645.
THE COMMISSIONER
STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX DEPARTMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
SECRETARY
TAXES DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE CUSTOMS
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI - 110001.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH, ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
OTHER PRESENT:
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
ADDL. SOLICITOR GENERAL SRI.K.M. NATRAJ.,
CGC., JAISHANKAR V. NAIR.,
SR. SC. SRI. SREELAL N. WARRIER
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).15523/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018, WP(C).40646/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 15523 of 2018
PETITIONER:
S.K. AGENCIES,DOOR NO.XIX/744, OLD MARKET ROAD,
ALUVA - 683101,REPRESENTED BY MANAGING PARTNER
SRI.ASHIK S.H.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.S.HARIHARAN NAIR
SRI.P.T.JOSEPH (PANJIKARAN)
RESPONDENTS:
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX,
STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX DEPARTMENT,
SPECIAL CIRCLE, MATTANCHERY AT ALUVA-683 101.
THE STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT,TAXES DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE,ROOM NO.46, NORTH
BLOCK, NEW DELHI - 110 001.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.VAIDYANATHAN, CGC
SRI.S.VAIDYANATHAN CGC
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL SRI.K.M. NATRAJ.,
CGC., JAISHANKAR V. NAIR.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 15851 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S. LEISURE STAYS, AKKARAKALOM MEMOIRS,
CHENNAMKARY P.O., ALAPPUZHA, KERALA 688501, REP. BY
ITS PARTNER JOBIN JOSEPH
BY ADVS.
SRI.SUKUMAR NAINAN OOMMEN
SRI.ASHER REVI JOB
SRI.RAHUL IPE PRASAD
SRI.SHERRY SAMUEL OOMMEN
RESPONDENTS:
STATE OF KERALA, REP.BY CHIEF SESCRETARY,
GOVT. SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 008.
STATE TAX OFFICER (LT), OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX, KALLUPALAM, ALAPPUZHA688012.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH, ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
GOVERNMENT PLEADER
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 15879 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S. JOSCO JEWELLERS PVT. LTD.
RAJIV GANDHI SHOPPING COMPLEX,KOTTAYAM,REPRESENTED
BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER SRI.SABU THOMAS.
BY ADVS.
SRI.A.KUMAR
SMTG.MINI(1748)
SRI.JACOB JOHN (TRIVANDRUM)
SRI.P.J.ANILKUMAR
SRI.P.S.SREE PRASAD
SRI.R.ARUN
RESPONDENT/S:
STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY,GOVERNMENT OF
KERALA, GOVERNMENT SECREATARIAT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
-695001.
THE COMMISSIONER
STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX
DEPARTMENT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
SPECIAL CIRCLE, STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX
DEPARTMENT,KOTTAYAM-686001.
BY ADV. SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH, ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 15898 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S.JOSCO FASHION JEWELLERS
RAJIV GANDHI SHOPPING CENTER, KOTTAYAM, REPRESENTED
BY ITS PROPRIETOR SRI.P.A.JOSE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.A.KUMAR
SMTG.MINI(1748)
SRI.P.J.ANILKUMAR
SRI.P.S.SREE PRASAD
RESPONDENT/S:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF
KERALA, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM695 001.
THE COMMISSIONER
STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX
DEPARTMENT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER SPECIAL CIRCLE
STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX DEPARTMENT, KOTTAYAM686 001.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH, ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
GOVERNMENT PLEADER
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 18326 of 2018
PETITIONERS:
ALAPPAT GOLD DEN PRIVATE LIMITED
A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY HAVING ITS REGISTERED
OFFICEAT P.T. ANTONY MEMORIAL BUILDING,BROADWAY,
KOCHI 682035,REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING
DIRECTOR,BABU ALAPPAT @ BABU ANTONY
BABU ANTONY @ BABU ALAPATT
AGED 60 YEARS, S/O.P.T ANTONY,MANAGING DIRECTOR,
ALAPAT GOLD DEN PRIVATE LIMITED,P.T. ANTONY
MEMORIAL BUILDING,BROADWAY, ERNAKULAM
682035,RESIDING AT 64/642, BELHAVEN,RAJAJI ROAD,
KOCHI 682035.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.T.DINESH
SRI.M.A.SHAJI
RESPONDENT/S:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT,DEPARTMENT OF TAXES, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN 695001
THE COMMISSIONER OF KERALA STATE GST,
KERALA STATE GST DEPARTMENT,9TH FLOOR, TAX TOWER,
KILLIPALAM,KARAMANA PO, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, 695002
THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
SQUAD NO. III, COMMERCIAL TAXES,ERNAKULAM AT THE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
(INT), ERNAKULAM 682015
THE STATE TAX OFFICER
FORMERLY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, SQUAD NO. III,
COMMERCIAL TAXES,ERNAKULAM AT THE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (INT),ERNAKULAM
682015
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
THE INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
COMMERCIAL TAXES, KAKKANAD, ERNAKULAM 682030
THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER
REVENUE RECOVERY, ERNAKULAM AT KAKKANADU,ERNAKULAM
682030
THE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX COUNCIL
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL
SECRETARY,OFFICE OF THE GST COUNCIL SECRETARIAT,
5TH FLOOR, TOWER II,JEEVAN BHARTI BUILDING, JANPATH
ROAD,CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI 110001
BY ADVS.
GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SRI.K.K.RAVINDRANATH, ADDL.ADVOCATE GENERAL
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL SRI.K.M. NATRAJ.
CGC., JAISHANKAR V. NAIR.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 25768 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S. PRABHUS PHARMA DISTRIBUTORS
39/1528, KOLATHERI SHOPING COMPLEX, CHITTOOR ROAD,
VALANJAMBALAM,ERNAKULAM SOUTH - 682016.
BY ADVS.
SRI.SUKUMAR NAINAN OOMMEN
SRI.RAHUL IPE PRASAD
SRI.SHERRY SAMUEL OOMMEN
RESPONDENTS:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTEDBY CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695008.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SQAD NO.111 ERNAKULAM
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
(INT.) DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, ERNAKULAM 682015.
COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER
KVAT CIRCLE-IV, ERNAKULAM, OFFICE OF THE STATE TAX
OFFICER, IS PRESS ROAD, ERNAKULAM - 682018.
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 40543 of 2018
PETITIONER:
G.GOPAKUMAR,AGED 40 YEARS
PROPRIETOR, M/S GREATWAY SOLUTIONS, TC 39/1560(7),
KILLIPPALAM BYE PASS ROAD, ATTAKULANGARA, MANACAUD
P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.S.SOMAN
SRI.B.PRABHAKARAN
SMT.T.RADHAMANY
RESPONDENTS:
STATE TAX OFFICER,2ND CIRCLE, STATE GOODS AND
SERVICE TAX DEPARTMENT, TAX TOWER, KARAMANA P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695002.
THE COMMISSIONER,
STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX DEPARTMENT, TAX TOWER,
KARAMANA P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695002.
THE SECRETARY,TAXES DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695001.
CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI- 110001.
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
SR. SC. SRI. SREELAL N. WARRIER
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 40545 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S. INDRAPURI JEWELLERY, THRIPRAYAR P.O., NATTIKA,
THRISSUR DIST., REP.BY ITS PARTNER SANJAY KUMAR.
BY ADV. SMT.S.K.DEVI
RESPONDENTS:
THE STATE TAX OFFICER, DEPT. OF COMMERCIAL TAXES,
CHAVAKKAD 680 307.
THE COMMISSIONER, STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX
DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 001.
THE SECRETARY, TAXES DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF KERALA,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 001.
UNION OF INDIA, REP.BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
ROOM NO.46, NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI 110 001.
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.
ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL SRI.K.M. NATRAJ.
CGC. JAISHANKAR V. NAIR.
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 40561 of 2018
PETITIONER:
M/S K.S.E. LIMITED,
SOLVENT ROAD, IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT,
REPRESENTED BY R. SANKARANARAYANAN, CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER AND COMPANY SECRETARY.
BY ADVS.
SRI.HARISANKAR V. MENON
SMT.K.KRISHNA
SMT.MEERA V.MENON
RESPONDENTS:
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (ASSESSMENT),
STATE GOODS AND SERVICES TAX DEPARTMENT SPECIAL
CIRCLE, THRISSUR-680001.
THE COMMISSIONER,
STATE GOODS AND SERVICE TAX DEPARTMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
SECRETARY,
TAXES DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40646/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
FRIDAY ,THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2019 / 21ST POUSHA, 1940
WP(C).No. 40646 of 2018
PETITIONER:
SAMUEL KUTTY,AGED 45 YEARS
PROPRIETOR, M/S.KRIPA ELECTRICALS, NEAR ESI
HOSPITAL KOTTIYAM, KOLLAM - 691 571.
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.JAYAPRADEEP
SMT.ANISHA EMERSON
SMT.ANN SUSAN GEORGE
SMT.O.A.NURIYA
SRI.ALAN PRIYADARSHI DEV
SRI.D.S.LOKANATHAN
RESPONDENTS:
THE STATE TAX OFFICER
WORKS CONTRACT, KOLLAM - 691 001.
THE STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO TAXES, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
THE CENTRAL BOARD OF INDIRECT TAXES AND CUSTOMS
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI - 110 001.
THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, NORTH BLOCK, NEW
DELHI -110 001.
ADDL. AG K.K. RAVINDRANATH.,
SPL. G.P. SRI. C.E. UNNIKRISHNAN.,
GP DR. THUSHARA JAMES.,
ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL SRI.K.M. NATRAJ.,
CGC., JAISHANKAR V. NAIR.,
SR. SC. SRI. SREELAL N. WARRIER
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.01.2019,
ALONG
WITH
WP(C).40561/2018,
WP(C).40545/2018,
WP(C).40543/2018,
WP(C).25768/2018,
WP(C).18326/2018,
WP(C).15898/2018,
WP(C).15879/2018,
WP(C).15851/2018,
WP(C).15523/2018, WP(C).11335/2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
JUDGMENT
[ WP(C) 11335/2018 ,WP(C).15523/2018 ,WP(C).15851/2018
,WP(C).15879/2018 ,WP(C).15898/2018 ,WP(C).18326/2018
,WP(C).25768/2018 ,WP(C).40543/2018 ,WP(C).40545/2018
,WP(C).40561/2018 ,WP(C).40646/2018 ]
Introduction:
The lure of lucre and the power of purse are too seductive to
be resisted—be it for an individual, or an institution, or even a
nation. Internationally, the rhetoric of freedom, fraternity, comity,
and human rights apart, the nations are guided by naked economic
compulsions. The latter part of the last century dedicated itself to
dismantling walls around the nations; this century has begun, it
seems, determined to raise a few. At the national level, this clamour
for economic hegemony is felt acutely, at least, institutionally.
2. Granted, federalism is the pinnacle of a democracy’s political
maturity; sharing the power signifies its wisdom. But there, too, fiscal
discipline demands a watertight division. Our Constitution has, as a
case in point, kept the fiscal legislative powers in water-tight divisions
—either in List I or in List II. None in List III. In a federal polity,
good legislative fences make good political neighbours. A vigilant
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
policeman always guards a thief’s virtue, anywhere; as the constitution
prevents federal fiscal turf wars.
3. To be explicit, constitutionally, fiscal powers between the
Centre and the States stand demarcated. The legislative scheme admits
of almost no overlap between the respective domains. The Centre has
the powers to levy a tax on the manufacture of goods (except
alcoholic liquor for human consumption, opium, narcotics, and so
on); the States, on the other hand, have the powers to levy a tax on
the sale of goods. With inter-state sales, the Centre has the powers to
levy a tax (the Central Sales Tax). But the tax is collected and retained
entirely by the originating States. As for services, it is the Centre alone
that is empowered to levy Service Tax.
4. Since the States had the legislative competence to impose a
sales tax, under Entry 54, List II, indiscriminate tax rates were applied
by the respective States resulting in tax wars, tax holidays, deferrals,
incentives, and concessions. Each State started to offer attractive
schemes to invite investments into its States. When the Central levies
such as the Customs Duty and the Excise Duties remained the same
throughout the Country, Sales Tax rates varied among States.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
5. To avoid a lopsided or imbalanced growth, the Union
Government took steps, beginning with constituting Empowered
Committees, to usher in further tax reforms. Besides that, then the
Sales Tax, in its original form, was invariably a single tax levy,
imposed at the first stage of the sale. The subsequent resale and its
value addition were not captured to tax. This and other shortcomings
made the Sales Tax give way to the Value Added Tax; the sale at every
stage till the point of consumption got taxed, and the taxes paid in
the previous stages were subsumed as Input Tax Credit.
The Scope:
6. Earlier, as we have noted, the taxing powers of the Union
and the States had been well-demarcated. Recently, with the 101st
Constitutional Amendment, the Goods and Services Tax regime has
been ushered in. The Constitutional Amendment Act (the “CA Act”)
has led to a federal fiscal experiment by engendering a host of
enactments: the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the
Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the Goods and Services Tax
(Compensation to States) Act, 2017; The “X” State Goods and
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Services Act, 2017 (State specific).
7. For the first time, in the taxation sphere, both the Union
and the States have come to enjoy simultaneous powers, thus putting
paid to the repugnancy doctrine, at least, in particular areas of
taxation. With the insertion, amendment, and deletion of a few
constitutional provisions—particularly with the insertion of Article
246A of the Constitution and deletion of Entry 52 of List II in
Seventh Schedule— there has been a realignment of legislative powers
of the Union and the States. Now, Entry 54 stands modified. In its
attenuated form, it denudes, according to the petitioners, from
16.09.2016, the State’s legislative power to tax on those items now
removed from that Entry. They insist that Section 19 of the CA Act
allows “interim or temporary continuation” of all the Acts made
earlier under the unamended Entry 54 only up to 16.09.2017. As a
case in point, the petitioners assert that the Kerala Value Added Tax
Act has become a dead letter from 16.09.2017.
8. Section 174 of the Kerala Goods and Services Act, 2017, is a
saving provision brought about by the State Legislature to save the
transactions under the State's various pre-GST enactments, including
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the KVAT Act. About that provision, the petitioners, first, maintain
that Section 19 of the CA Act has repealed all the State laws
inconsistent with the GST Laws. And they also, second, insist that
the States have been denuded of the legislative power to enact
Section 174 because of the amendment to Entry 54 of List II.
9. So the question, the Core Question as the petitioners put it,
is does the State have the legislative competence to enact section 174
and save the past taxation events—comprising levy, assessment, and
recovery—when Entry 54, List II, which is the field of legislation
empowering the State, stood omitted permanently with effect from
16.09.2017? Of course, this core question engenders a few collateral
questions. We will answer them all.
Facts:
WP (C) No.15879 of 2018:
10. The petitioner, a Private Limited Company, is a dealer
under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act. It
has opted to pay the tax at the compounded rates under Section 8 of
the KVAT Act. So for the assessment years (AY) 2010-2011 and 20112012 and thereafter, too, the petitioner filed returns in terms of the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
compounding scheme—in Form 10DA.
11. But the Intelligence Officer (IB)-II, Thiruvananthapuram,
issued to the petitioner notices under Sec 67 in the KVAT Act for the
assessment years 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. The grounds
of the notices are not germane here, though the petitioner’s
objections to the notices are. Succinctly stated, the petitioner is
accused of not maintaining the true and correct accounts, and that
has led to evasion of tax. So the Intelligence Officer proposed penalty
under Sec 67(1)(b) and (d) of the KVAT Act. The petitioner replied to
the notices for AYs 2010-2011 and 2011-12 and produced material in
defence. Yet the Intelligence Officer confirmed the proposal for
imposing a penalty. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the penalty
orders before this Court in W. P.(c) No.12648 of 2016. This Court
admitted the Writ Petition and stayed the recovery of the penalty.
12. On parallel lines, the Assessing Authority sought the
Deputy
Commissioner’s
prior
approval
for
cancelling
the
“compounding permission” granted to the petitioner, as mandated
under the proviso to Section 8(f)(iv). After securing the permission
under Section 8(f)(iv) of the KVAT Act pending W.P. No.12648 of
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
2016, now the Assessment Officer, the 3rd Respondent, has issued a
notice for a best-judgment assessment under Section 25, read with
Section 42(3), of the KVAT Act. The notice concerns the AYs 20102011 and 2011-2012 and proposes to cancel the compounding under
Section 8(1)(iv). To be explicit, the notice proposes to revise the
compounded tax for 2010-11 and 2011-2012, based on the alleged
escapement of tax for the previous year. The petitioner did reply to
the notice. The notice, as the petitioner contends, is a composite one;
it proposes to cancel the compounding, besides undertaking a best
judgment assessment—simultaneously. The composite notice, the
petitioner asserts, is a fait accompli.
13. So the petitioner has filed this writ petition questioning the
notices under Section 25, read with Section 42(3) and Section 8(1)(iv),
of the KVAT Act.
WP (C) No.11335 of 2018:
14. The Petitioner, a jeweler, is a dealer under the Kerala Value
Added Tax Act. The State Tax Officer, the second respondent,
inspected the petitioner’s business premises in November 2012,
seized some records and, later, issued a notice. He directed the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
petitioner to produce books of accounts. The petitioner, instead,
asked for the return of the seized records. But they were not returned.
So the petitioner filed WP (C) No.25376 of 2012. The Court stayed
further proceedings.
15. When the stay was in force, in March 2013, the second
respondent issued a penalty Notice under section 67 (1) of the KVAT
Act,
proposing
to
impose
penalties
of
Rs.88,22,948/-
and
Rs.40,99,06,936/- for the years 2010-11 and 2011-12 respectively.
Reminded of the Court’s restraint order in WP (C) No.25376 of
2012, the second respondent recalled those notices. Finally, in June
2013, the WP (C) No.25376 of 2012 was disposed of. And as nothing
was heard until 12.05.2016, the second respondent asked the
petitioner to produce the books of accounts. The petitioner complied
with that direction: it supplied the required information in May 2016
and October 2017. Then in December 2017, the second respondent
issued a “common notice” proposing to impose penalties of over
seven crores and eight crores for the years 2010-11 and 2011-12
respectively.
16. Eventually, in February 2018, the first respondent passed an
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
order under Section 67 (1) of the KVAT Act for AY 2010-11. He
imposed a penalty of Rs.7,17,630/-. In March 2018, through another
order, for the next assessment year, he imposed a penalty of
Rs.8,12,56,734/-.
17. The petitioner challenges these orders as ultra vires of the
authorities—constitutionally invalid.
WP (C) No.40646 of 2018:
18. The petitioner, a registered dealer under the KVAT Act, is a
Government Electrical Contractor. He filed all returns and remitted
tax under the KVAT Act for the AYs 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, 201516 and 2016-17. The Assessing Officer accepted all the returns filed
and the tax paid, with no demur. So the assessments for the years are
deemed to have been completed under Section 21 of the KVAT Act.
19. But recently, on 23.11.2018, the Assessing Officer served on
the petitioner the pre-assessment notices under Section 25(1) of the
KVAT Act 2003, proposing to assess an alleged escapement of
turnover for all the above years. So the petitioner challenges those
notices on the premise that the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction
to invoke the KVAT Act, for it stood repealed with the 101st
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Constitutional Amendment (“the CA Act”).
WP (C) No. 40561 of 2018:
20. The petitioner, an assessee, claims to have been filing
“proper returns” periodically, besides paying tax. But on 05.12.2018
he received a notice for AY 2012-13 under Section 25(1) of the KVAT
Act 2003. The petitioner, in this writ petition, maintains that as per
the Amendment Act, the provisions of the KVAT Act could be
enforced for one year after the CA Act, but not “indefinitely without
any limitation.”
WP (C) No.40543 of 2018:
21. The Petitioner, a registered dealer under the erstwhile KVAT
Act, claims to have filed all returns on time and paid the taxes due.
But, later, the Assessing Officer reopened the petitioner’s final
assessments for 2012-13 and 2013-14, under Section 25 (1) of the
KVAT Act by making huge additions.
22. The main reason for the Assessing Officer to resort to the
best judgment assessment is that after his verifying the petitioner’s
sales and purchases through the KVATIS module, he found certain
unaccounted transactions. The additional reason is that the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Intelligence Wing of the Department has imposed a penalty upon the
Petitioner under Section 47 (6) of the KVAT Act for the offence of
attempted evasion of tax while his transporting goods. So the
petitioner has assailed the Assessment Orders as unconstitutional and
without jurisdiction.
Submissions:
Petitioners’:
23. In the past one year, a rash of writ petitions has been filed.
Those writ petitions may count up to a few thousands. But only a
handful of advocates—about half a dozen—argued; the rest adopted
those arguments. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior
Counsel, instructed by Shri A. Kumar, the counsel on record, led the
arguments. He was admirably complemented by Shri N.Venkitaraman,
another learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Shri K.P.Abdul Azees
and Shri Akhil Suresh. Then they were ably supplemented by Sri K.
S. Hariharan, Sri Sukumar Nainan Oomen, and a few other counsel,
well-informed and determined to press forward their clients’ cause.
24. All argued on the same theme—the constitutional validity of
Section 174 of the KSGST Act. Then came the refutation, matching
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the petitioners’ counsel in erudition and expression, from Shri K.M.
Nataraj, the learned Additional Solicitor General, instructed by Shri
Jaishanker Nair, the learned Central Government Counsel; and Shri
Ravindranath, the learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by
Shri C.E. Unnikrishnan, the learned Senior Government Pleader and
Dr. Thushara James, the learned Government Pleader.
25. If I list out, even encapsulate, each counsel’s arguments,
they run into pages, besides sounding repetitive. So for brevity’s sake,
I will set out their arguments compendiously and, to the extent
possible, concisely, too. So the extracted arguments are party-specific,
not counsel-specific.
The Summary of the Petitioners’ Submissions:
About the 101st Constitution Amendment Act:
On and from 16.09.2016, Article 246 yielded legislative ground
to the newly engrafted Article 246A. Thus, Article 246 stood
amended and modified in its operation. Consequently, a few items in
both List I and List II suffered significant schematic changes. Article
246A, an enabling legislative provision, contains no concomitant
schedule or iteration.
Entry 54 of List II stands substituted by 16.09.2016; the
Constitutional Amendment does not save it. So the pre-amended
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Entry 54 of List II has ceased to exist. Instead, what reigns is the
substituted Entry 54.
Section 19 of the Amendment Act is the transitional provision,
besides being the saving provision. Nothing from the pre-existing
legislative regime saves itself from or transits across what is set out in
Section 19—a sunset clause.
First, Entry 54 abrogated, from 16.09.2016 the States have been
denuded of the power of taxation. Second, the interim or transitional
existence of the unamended Entry 54, if ever, could have survived
only up to 16.09.2017, as per Section 19.
Any judicial effort to save or resurrect the erstwhile Entry 54
beyond 16.09.2017 renders Section 19 of the Amendment Act otiose,
meaningless, and insignificant.
Section 19 of the Amendment Act itself provides for the repeal,
for the savings, and for the consequences, too. So there remains no
more power or authority for the State to have a further repeal and
saving, as provided—erroneously though—in Section 174 of the SGST
Act. Pithily put, Section 174 of the SGST Act cannot travel beyond
Section 19 of the Amendment Act.
A law under Article 246A cannot be the source of power to save
legislation under List II of Entry 54 at all.
Article 367 & General Clauses Act:
Article 367, too, does not apply, as the constitutional command
of repeal is explicit.
Neither KSGST nor CGST provides for repeal or re-enactment.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
So, primarily, the General Clauses Act cannot resurrect or
rescue the repealed enactments, even if its Sections 6 and Section 24
are invoked.
The State stands protected for the Centre undertakes to
reimburse its losses.
The clear and unequivocal legislative intent of Section 19 of the
Amendment Act is to stop the operation of KVAT, 2003, from
16.09.2017.
A Statutory saving-provision, such as Section 174 of KSGST,
emanating from the State’s legislative power, cannot nullify the
constitutional mandate of Section 19 of the Amendment Act,
emanating from the Parliament’s constituent power.
Section 174 – Absence of Legislative Power:
Article 367 does not apply because repealing enactment itself
provides explicitly for transition and saving. In other words, only in
the absence of the repeal or saving is the General Clauses Act
attracted.
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act saves the subordinate
legislation and applies if there are repeals and re-enactments. Here
neither is present. So machinery provisions are not saved. Then
follows the well-accepted proposition: there is no tax without
machinery provisions.
Respondents’:
By the CA Act, the Parliament never intended that dealers or
assessees should escape the tax network, letting the society or
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
exchequer suffer.
The Parliament has enacted the Goods and Services Tax
(Compensation to States) Act, 2017, empowered by Section 18 of the
Amendment Act, on the recommendation of the GST Council,
though. This enactment is, however, does not derive its legitimacy
from any legislative entry or field of legislation enumerated in the
Central List.
Similarly, Section 19 of the Amendment Act empowers the
State Legislature to amend or repeal provisions of any existing law
which are inconstant with the Constitution as amended by the
amending Act.
The non-obstante Clause in Section 19 mandates that such
legislation can be made notwithstanding anything contained in the
Amendment Act. So the Entry 54, as it originally stood before the
Amendment Act, remains available for the State, under Article 246 of
the Constitution.
In the alternative, without Entry 54 as it originally stood, the
newly introduced Article 246-A as per Section 2 of the Amending Act
read with Section 19 of the amending Act, by itself gives power to the
state legislature to enact the impugned provisions in the State GST
Act.
A transitional provision in a Constitution Amendment Act has
a higher status and better legal impact than a transitional provision
in ordinary legislation. So Section 19 of the CA Act, read with Article
246-A, without any doubt, empowers the State Legislature to enact
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Section 174(b) and (c) of the KSGST Act, 2017.
The Legislature does not derive its power to legislate from the
Entries in the three lists of the 7 th Schedule; therefore, the
substitution of an entry in any List of the 7 th Schedule does not
affect the State’s lawmaking power.
The Amendment Act is only prospective, and the constitutional
amendment does not in any way deal with the past transactions or
any rights and liabilities accrued.
The provisions contained in Sections 173 and 174 of the State
Act are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the
Amendment Act.
On the General Clauses Act and Its Application:
Every latter enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts
an end to a previous state of the law is presumed to intend the
continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the
superseded enactment.
This interpretative presumption could be negated only if there
were sufficient indications express or implied in the later enactment
designed to obliterate the earlier state of the law.
If the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is the basis
upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded, there could be
no incongruity in attributing to the later legislation the same intent
which Section 6 presumes where the word ‘repeal’ is expressly used.
Where an intention to effect repeal is attributed to a legislature,
then the same would attract the incidence of the saving found in
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
The power to make a law regarding a tax comprehends, within
its power, how to levy that tax and determine the persons who are
liable to pay such tax, the rate at which such tax is to be paid, and
the event which will attract the liability regarding such tax.
The liability to pay the tax was not dependent upon assessment
or demand but was an obligation to pay the tax either annually,
quarterly, or monthly as the case may be.
DISCUSSION:
GST – Introduction:
26. In a federal constitutional set up, coordination rather than
subordination as the guiding spirit, the States and the Centre as the
constituents have demarcated spheres of legislation and governance.
With clearly delineated legislative fields, neither can trespass upon
the other's legislative territory—the residuary powers lying with the
Centre, though. The division of powers is zealously guarded in no
other sphere than fiscal. Taxation as the backbone of a welfare
nation, which India is; the legislative fields are as distinct, yet
interconnected, as the spinal segments are.
27. That said, 101st Constitutional Amendment is the epochmaking federal feat unparalleled in constitutional democracies—
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
almost. It is, I may say, a constitutional coup de grâce delivered
against the fiscal confusion compounded by conflicting taxation
regimes. This amendment, perhaps, marks the crest of cooperative
federalism. It has created even a constitutional institution—GST
Council.
28. As constitutional democracies have gained experience,
Utopian vision of justice has given way to utilitarian view. Material
comfort or upliftment has become the hallmark of good governance.
So economic analysis of law substitutes the notion of simple justice
with that of economic efficiency and wealth maximisation. True,
nations like France successfully embraced GST regimes in the 1950s.
Even federal polities like Canada replaced MST (Manufacturer’s Sales
Tax) with GST (Goods and Services Tax) in the 1980s. India joined
the fiscal reform bandwagon a little late. Tentative it was to begin
with, but determined it is in this new federal fiscal path.
29. To put the concept in perspective, GST is a single tax on the
supply of goods and services, right from the manufacturer to the
consumer. Credits of input taxes paid at each stage will be available
in the later stage of value addition. This process makes GST a tax on
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
value addition at each stage. The consumer will thus bear only the
GST charged by the last dealer in the supply chain, with set-off
benefits at all the previous stages.
30. In other words, the focus was shifted from taxable event to
destination-based taxation. It avoids the evil of cascading taxation or
tax on tax trouble. So goes the motto: One Nation-One Market-One
Tax.
31. A nascent enactment in a nebulous field of taxation will
have many teething troubles. GST is no exception. In its path to
perfection, GST has much dust to settle—legislatively and judicially.
These are the days of confusion and cacophony: many views, many
interpretations, and many jurisprudential mumblings.
GST: The Origins:
32. Before its advent as a revolutionary indirect tax regime,
Goods and Services Tax (GST) had been on the parliamentary anvil
for more than a decade.
Its need as a harmonised indirect tax,
encompassing all goods and services was documented as early as in
2004. That year the Task Force on Implementation of the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management in its Report stressed the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
need. The first official announcement for a transition to GST,
though, was made by the Government of India in 2006-07 (the
Budget Speech). The Government’s commitment stood reiterated in
the Budget Speech of 2008–09, too. But the Government of India
took the first step towards the transition to GST when it announced
certain policy changes in the 2009–10 budget.
33. The next major landmark was the “First Discussion Paper
on Goods and Services Tax in India” released by the Empowered
Committee in November 2009. This was the first official document
publicly delineating the contours of the proposed reform and
nuances of the GST Model.[1]
34. The First Discussion Paper, in fact, explained the rationale
for a constitutional amendment to introduce GST. It noted that
while the Centre is empowered to tax services and goods up to the
production stage, the States have the power to tax sale of goods. The
States do not have the powers to levy a tax on the supply of services
while the Centre does not have the power to levy a tax on the sale.
Thus, it suggested for a constitutional amendment that would
1[] Tarun Jain’s Goods and Services Tax, Constitutional Law & Policy, ST, EBC, Ed.2018, p.59 (e-book)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
contain a mechanism for a harmonious structure of GST that would
not affect the federal fabric.
35. Then, with the deliberations between the Centre and States,
aided by the Empowered Committee, the constitutional amendment
process to usher in GST began. It resulted in the “Constitution (One
Hundred and Fifteenth Amendment) Bill, 2011”. After that one got
lapsed, came the 2014 Amendment Bill (as passed by Parliament).
Passed on 8 September 2016, this Bill became “the Constitution (One
Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016”.
36. The GST Council, constituted in September 2016, is a
constitutional institution comprising as its members the Finance
Ministers of the Union and the States, including Union Territories
with Legislatures. It has the authority “to recommend to the Union
and the States on various facets of GST, including Model GST laws,
principles to determine the place of supply, levy of the tax, design of
GST, dispute settlement, special provisions for a special category of
States, and so forth.”[2]
37. Adopting the recommendation of the GST Council,
2[]
Id., p.69 (e-book)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Parliament has enacted these pieces of legislation: (1) The Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017: it levies a tax on intra-State
supplies of goods and services in all supplies within a State; (2) the
Integrated Goods and Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017: it levies a
tax on inter-State supplies of goods and services; (3) the Union
Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017: it levies a tax on intraState supplies of goods and service.
38. Tarun Jain’s Goods and Services Tax, already copiously
quoted, observes that in constitutional terms, GST is unique because
of these aspects of its design: 1. It provides for the concurrent
exercise of taxing powers by the Centre and the States on the same
subject—a unique and unprecedented measure. 2. Both the Centre and
the States are to act in tandem based on the GST Council’s
recommendations.
Salient features of GST:
39. The salient features of GST are these[3]:
(i)GST applies on ‘supply’ of goods or services as against the
present concept on the manufacture of goods, or on the sale of
goods, or on the provision of services.
3[]
http://gstcouncil.gov.in/brief-history-gst, accessed on 10th January 2019.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
(ii) GST is based on the principle of destination-based
consumption taxation, as against the present principle of
origin-based taxation.
(iii) It is a dual GST with the Centre and the States
simultaneously levying a tax on a common base. GST to be
levied by the Centre is called Central GST(CGST) and that to
be levied by the States called State GST (SGST).
(iv) An Integrated GST (IGST) is levied on inter-state supply
(including stock transfers) of goods or services. This shall be
levied and collected by the Government of India, and such tax
shall be apportioned between the Union and the States in the
manner as may be provided by Parliament by Law on the
recommendation of the GST Council.
(v) Import of goods or services is treated as inter-state supplies
and is subject to IGST, besides the applicable customs duties.
(vi) CGST, SGST & IGST are levied at rates to be mutually
agreed upon by the Centre and the States. The rates would be
notified on the recommendation of the GST Council. To begin
with, the GST Council has decided that GST would be levied at
four rates viz. 5%, 12%, 18% and 28%. The schedule or list of
items that would fall under each slab has been worked out.
Besides these rates, a cess would be imposed on “demerit”
goods to raise resources for compensating States as States may
lose revenue owing to the implementation of GST.
(ix) GST will apply to all goods and services except Alcohol for
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
human consumption.
(x) GST on five specified petroleum products (Crude, Petrol,
Diesel, ATF & Natural Gas) will be applicable from a date to be
recommended by the GSTC.
(xi) Tobacco and tobacco products would be subject to GST.
Besides, the Centre will have the power to levy Central Excise
duty on these products.
(xii) A common threshold exemption would apply to both
CGST and SGST. Taxpayers with an annual turnover not
exceeding Rs.20 lakh (Rs.10 Lakh for special category States)
would be exempted from GST. For small taxpayers with an
aggregate turnover up to 50 lakh in a financial year, a
composition scheme is available. Under the scheme, a taxpayer
shall pay tax as a percentage of his turnover in a State during
the year without the benefit of Input Tax Credit. This scheme
will be optional.
(xiii) The list of exempted goods and services would be kept to
a minimum, and it would be harmonized for the Centre and
the States and across States as far as possible.
(xiv) Exports would be zero-rated supplies. Thus, goods or
services that are exported would not suffer input taxes or taxes
on finished products.
(xv) The credit of CGST paid on inputs may be used only for
paying CGST on the output, and the credit of SGST paid on
inputs may be used only for paying SGST. Input Tax Credit
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
(ITC) of CGST cannot be used for payment of SGST and vice
versa. In other words, the two streams of ITC cannot be crossutilised, except in specified circumstances of inter-state supplies
for payment of IGST.
(xvi) Accounts would be settled periodically between the Centre
and the States to ensure that the credit of SGST used for
payment of IGST is transferred by the Exporting State to the
Centre. Similarly, IGST used for payment of SGST would be
transferred by the Centre to the Importing State. Further, the
SGST portion of IGST collected on B2C supplies would also be
transferred by the Centre to the destination State. The transfer
of funds would be carried out based on information contained
in the returns filed by the taxpayers.
(xvii) The laws, regulations, and procedures for levy and
collection of CGST and SGST would be harmonized to the
extent possible.
40. GST replaces these taxes currently levied and collected by
the Centre: (a) Central Excise Duty, (b) Duties of Excise (Medicinal
and Toilet Preparations), (c) Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
Special Importance), (d) Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and
Textile Products), (e) Additional Duties of Customs (commonly
known as CVD), (f) Special Additional Duty of Customs(SAD), (g)
Service Tax, (h) Cesses and surcharges, in so far as they relate to the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
supply of goods and services.
41. State taxes that get subsumed within the GST are: (a) State
VAT, (b) Central Sales Tax, (c) Purchase Tax, (d) Luxury Tax, (e) Entry
Tax (All forms), (f) Entertainment Tax and Amusement Tax (except
those levied by the local bodies), (g) Tax on advertisements, (h) Tax
on lotteries, betting and gambling, (i) State cesses and surcharges in
so far as they relate to the supply of goods and services,
42. To have the whole GST system backed by a robust IT
system, Parliament has set up the Goods and Services Tax Network
(GSTN). It will provide front end services and will also develop back
end IT modules for States who chose the same.
Constitutional Amendment Act, An Overview:
43. As we shall see, the CA Act inserts, repeals, and amends
certain parts of the Constitution. Repealed is the Article 268A,
inserted are the Articles 246A, 269A, and 279A; amended are Articles
248, 249, 250, 268, 269, 270, 271, 286, 366, and 279A. Besides that,
the Sixth and the Seventh Schedules, too, have been amended.
44. Article 246A, inserted through Section 2 of the Amendment
Act, is a marvel of the federal fiscal mechanism. By this Article, the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
State Legislatures now have the power to make laws regarding GST
tax imposed by the Union or by that State and to implement them
in intra-state trade. The Centre, of course, continues to have exclusive
power to make GST laws regarding inter-state trade. Both the Union
and States in India now have simultaneous powers to make law on
the goods and services.
45. Article 269A, inserted through Section 9 of the Act, deals
with levy and collection of goods and services tax in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce. That is, in case of inter-state trade, the
amount collected by the Centre is to be apportioned between the
Centre and the States as per the GST Council’s recommendations.
Under the GST, if the Centre collects the tax, it assigns State’s share
to the State concerned; on the other hand, if the State collects the
tax, it assigns the Centre’s share to the Centre. Those proceeds will
not form a part of the Consolidated Fund of India, so it avoids
having an Appropriation Bill passed every time a deposit is made.
46. And Article 279A provides for the constitution of a GST
Council, besides prescribing its powers and positions. Earlier, Article
268A dealt with the service tax levied by Union and collected and
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
appropriated by the Union and States. Now, this Article stands
repealed. As to the amended constitutional provisions, Article 248
confers residuary legislative powers on Parliament. Now this
provision is subject to Article 246A of the Constitution. Article 249,
amended through Section 4 of the Act, now stands changed: if Rajya
Sabha approves the resolution with 2/3rd majority, Parliament will
have powers to make necessary laws regarding GST, in the national
interest. So has Article 250 been amended; Parliament will have
powers to make laws on GST during the emergency period.
47. At a different plane are the other amendments. Article 268
has been amended so that excise duty on medicinal and toilet
preparation are omitted from the State List and are subsumed in
GST. And Article 269 would empower the Parliament to make GST
related laws for inter-state trade or commerce. Article 270 now
provides for collection and distribution of tax in terms of Article
246A. Then, under Article 271, GST has been exempted from being
part of the Consolidated Fund of India. The amended Article 286
includes the supply of goods and services under its ambit, rather
than just sale or purchase of goods; Article 366 now includes
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the definitions of Goods and Service Tax, Services and State. And
finally, Article 279A has also been brought under the ambit
of Article 368.[4]
48. As with the Schedules, the Sixth Schedule has been
amended to give power to the District Councils to levy and collect
taxes on entertainment and amusements. And the Seventh
Schedule has also been amended. In the Union List, petroleum crude,
high-speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, and aviation
turbine fuel, tobacco and tobacco products have been removed from
the ambit of GST and have been subjected to Union jurisdiction.
Newspapers, advertisements, and Service Tax have been brought
under GST (entries 84, 92, 92C). Similarly, in the State List,
petroleum crude, high-speed diesel, motor spirit (commonly known
as petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel, and alcoholic liquor for
the human consumption have been included, unless the sale is in the
course of inter-State or International trade and commerce. Entry tax
and Advertisement taxes have been removed. Taxes on entertainment
are only to be included to the extent of that imposed by local bodies.
4[] Examining the Effect of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, on
Federalism. http://racolblegal.com/examining-the-effect-of-the-constitution-one-hundred-andfirst-amendment-act-2016-on-federalism. Accessed on 10th January 2019.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
(entries 52, 54, 55, 62)[5]
49. To be explicit, in Article 366 of the Constitution, after
clause (12), clause (12A) was inserted: "goods and services tax" means
any tax on supply of goods, or services or both except taxes on the
supply of the alcoholic liquor for human consumption. After clause
(26), clauses (26A) and (26B) were inserted: "Services" means anything
other than goods; "State" with reference to Articles 246A, 268, 269,
269A and Article 279A includes a Union territory with Legislature.
50. Section 18 of the Amendment Act provides for
compensation to States for loss of revenue because of the
introduction of goods and services tax. Parliament shall, by law, on
the recommendation of the GST Council, provide for compensation
to the States for loss of revenue arising on account of
implementation of the goods and services tax for five years.
51. The overarching provision for our discussion is Section 19
of the Amendment Act.
Section 19 - Transitional provisions:
Notwithstanding anything in this Act, any provision of any
law relating to tax on goods or services or on both in force
in any State immediately before the commencement of this
5[] Id.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Act, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution as amended by this Act shall continue to be in
force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature
or other competent authority or until expiration of one year
from such commencement, whichever is earlier.
52. Until the Constitution suffered its 101st Amendment—that
is, The Constitution (One Hundred & First Amendment) Act, 2016—
the Union and the State Governments have been collecting, as is
relevant here, the indirect taxes under clearly demarcated legislative
fields as shown in the Seventh Schedule. Then, there were 97 Entries
in List-I, 66 in List-II, and 47 in List-III, not all those dealing with the
Legislature’s taxing power though. In List I, principal among the
Entries concerning taxes are Articles 41, 42, 83, 84, 87 to 92, 92A,
92B, 92C, 97; and in List II are Entries 26, 45, 47 to 61 and 63.
53. The CA Act has brought drastic changes in the federal
taxing powers of the State; it has introduced a couple of Articles,
amended a few, and done away with a few more. At a glance we can
appreciate the changes:
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Before Amendment
After
Amendment
Impact
246A
Not existing
Introduced Special provision on goods
and services tax conferring
simultaneous
legislative
powers on both the Union
and the States.
Residuary power
Amended
The Union’s residuary
legislative
power
is
subjected to Article 246A.
Power of Parliament to Amended
legislate regarding a
matter in the State List
in the national interest
It gives power to the
Parliament to enact any
law applicable to states on
the matters mentioned
even in states list. GST, not
mentioned in States list, is
now explicitly mentioned.
Power of Parliament to Amended
legislate regarding any
matter in the State List
if a Proclamation of
Emergency is in
operation
It has a similar impact as
does the amended Article
Duties levied by the
Union but collected
and appropriated by
the States
Additional
Duties
of
Excise (Medicinal and
toilet preparations) stand
subsumed into GST.
268A
Service tax levied by
Amended
Omitted
Service
Tax
has
been
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Union and collected
and appropriated by
the Union and the
States:
subsumed into GST. So
Entry No. 92C of List-I
too stands omitted.
Taxes levied and
Amended
collected by the Union
but assigned to the
States
The arrangement under
Article 269 is subjected to
Article 269A, a new
provision.
269A
Not existing
Inserted
Levy and collection of
goods and services tax
during inter-State trade or
commerce.
The power to levy and
collect GST during interState trade or commerce is
vested
with
the
Government of India. The
taxes so collected will be
apportioned between the
Union & the States in a
manner prescribed.
Taxes levied and
distributed between
the Union and the
States.
Amended
Now Article 268A and
Entry No. 92C of List-I
stand omitted; so service
tax is subsumed under
GST. So in Article 270, a
reference to Article 268A
has been omitted, and a
new reference to Article
269A for levy of GST for
Inter-state transactions has
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
been introduced.
Surcharge on certain Amended
duties and taxes for
purposes of the Union
Parliament’s powers to
levy
an
additional
surcharge on Union taxes
under Article 271 now
stands
amended:
Parliament can levy no
additional surcharge on
GST.
279A
Not existing
Inserted
Provision for creating the
GST
Council,
a
constitutional body.
Restrictions on the
Amended
imposition of tax on
the sale or purchase of
goods
First, the word “sales” is
replaced with “supply”,
and the word “goods” is
replaced with “goods or
services or both”
States cannot legislate on
the supply of goods or
services if such supply is
outside their state or is in
the course of import or
export.
Originally, States could
not levy and collect tax on
specific
Inter-state
transactions.
With
omitting Clause (3), now
even
inter-state
transactions of that nature
would attract GST.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Definitions
Inserted
Three definitions have
been added
to
the
Constitution: (12A) Goods
and Services Tax; (26A)
Services; and (26B) State.
Power of Parliament to
amend the
Amended
Constitution and
procedure therefore
As regards provisions and
laws
regarding
GST
Council, Parliament has
been vested with the power
to
amend
the
Constitution.
Sixth
Provisions on the
Schedule. Administration of
Tribal Areas in the
States of Assam,
Meghalaya, Tripura,
and Mizoram
Amended
It concerns powers to
assess and collect land
revenue and to impose
taxes in the Tribal Areas of
a few States.
8. Powers to assess
and collect land
revenue and to impose
taxes.
Seventh Schedule
List I:
Barring those
Amended
Entry 84 excluded, the Union
could levy excise duty
on all other goods,
including tobacco,
manufactured or
Now excise duty is levied
only on the enumerated
items:
(a) petroleum crude;
(b) high-speed diesel;
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
produced in India. The
excluded ones are
these: (a) alcoholic
liquors for human
consumption;
(b) opium, Indian
hemp, and other
narcotic drugs and
narcotics, but
including medicinal
and toilet preparations
containing alcohol or
any substance in subparagraph (b).
(c) motor spirit
(commonly known as
petrol);
(d) natural gas;
(e) aviation turbine fuel;
and
(f) tobacco and tobacco
products.”
Omitted
Entry 92 Taxes on the sale or
purchase of
newspapers and on
advertisements
published.
Entry
92C
Taxes on services.
Now, taxes on the sale or
purchase of newspapers
and on advertisements
published therein have
been subsumed into GST.
Omitted
List II
Taxes on the entry of Omitted
Entry 52 goods into a local area
for consumption, use
or sale therein.
Entry
Taxes on the sale or Amended
purchase of goods
other than newspapers,
subject to the
provisions of entry
92A of List I.
(Entry 92A of List I
Service tax has also been
subsumed into GST.
Purchase tax, too, has been
subsumed into GST.
Now
the
taxes
are
confined to the sale of
petroleum crude, highspeed diesel, motor spirit
(petrol),
natural
gas,
aviation turbine fuel, and
alcoholic
liquor
for
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
concerns inter-State
trade or commerce.)
human consumption. But
excluded is the sale in the
course of inter-State trade
or commerce.
(Now the sale or purchase
of goods stands subsumed
by GST)
Entry 55 Taxes on
Omitted
advertisements other
than advertisements
published in the
newspapers and
advertisements
broadcast by radio or
television.
Taxes on advertisements
other than advertisements
broadcast by radio or
television has also been
subsumed into GST.
Entry 62 Taxes on luxuries,
Amended
including taxes on
entertainments,
amusements, betting,
and gambling.
(a) Taxes on Luxury,
betting, and gambling
have been subsumed into
GST.
(b) Right to levy Tax on
entertainments and
amusements has been
restricted to Panchayats,
Municipalities, Regional
Councils, and District
Councils.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
The State Enactments:
54. In the above background, the States have enacted the
respective State Goods and Services Tax Acts. These laws, among
other things, (i) carry out the transition to GST; (ii) provide for the
levy of GST on intra-State supplies within the State; and also (iii)
modify/repeal the earlier State enactments which have to be
modified/repealed because of transition to GST. Notable is the repeal
of the VAT/Entry Tax/Luxury Tax, and so on, which earlier provided
for levy of these taxes within the States.[6]
Kerala Enactment:
55. Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (Act 20 of
2017) received the Governor’s assent on the 16th day of September
2017. It provides for, as the preamble suggests, levy and collection of
tax on intra-State supply of goods or services, or both by the State of
Kerala. As it is in pari materia with the Central Goods and Services
Tax Act, it needs no much elaboration, but for one provision: Section
174, the customary ‘repeal and saving’ provision.
174. Repeal and saving.— (1) Save as otherwise provided in this
[]
Tarun Jain's Goods and Services Tax, Constitutional Law & Policy, ST, EBC, Ed.2018, p.70 (e-book)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Act, on and from the date of commencement of this Act,—
(i) the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (30 of 2004) except in
respect of goods included in entry 54 of the State List of the
Seventh schedule to the Constitution including the Goods to
which the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (15 of 1963) is
applicable as per the provisions of the Kerala Value Added Tax
Act, 2003 (30 of 2004);
(ii) the Kerala Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act,
1994 (15 of 1994);
(iii) the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976 (32 of 1976); and
(iv) the Kerala Tax on Paper Lotteries Act, 2005 (20 of 2005)
(hereinafter referred to as the repealed Acts) are hereby repealed.
(2) The repeal of the said Acts and the amendment of the Acts
specified in section 173 (“such amendment” or “amended Act”,
as the case may be) to the extent mentioned in sub-section (1)
or section 173 shall not,—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time of such
amendment or repeal; or
(b) affect the previous operation of the amended Acts or
repealed Acts and orders or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under the amended Acts or repealed Acts
or orders under such repealed or amended Acts:
Provided that any tax exemption granted as an incentive against
investment through a notification shall not continue as
privilege if the said notification is rescinded on or after the
appointed day; or
(d) affect any tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest as are due or
may become due or any forfeiture or punishment incurred or
inflicted in respect of any offence or violation committed
against the provisions of the amended Acts or repealed Acts; or
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
(e) affect any investigation, inquiry, verification (including
scrutiny and audit), assessment proceedings, adjudication and
any other legal proceedings or recovery of arrears or remedy in
respect of any such tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest, right,
privilege, obligation, liability, forfeiture or punishment, as
aforesaid, and any such investigation, inquiry, verification
(including scrutiny and audit), assessment proceedings,
adjudication and other legal proceedings or recovery of arrears
or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any
such tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest, forfeiture or
punishment may be levied or imposed as if these Acts had not
been so amended or repealed.
(3) The mention of the particular matters referred to in section
173 and sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not be held to prejudice
or affect the general application of section 4 of the
Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (Act VII of 1125)
with regard to the effect of repeal.
(4) The Kerala Goods and Services Tax Ordinance, 2017 (11 of
2017) is hereby repealed.
(5) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Kerala Goods and
Services Tax Ordinance, 2017 (11 of 2017) anything done or
any action taken under the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to
have been done or taken under this Act.
(f) affect any proceedings including that relating to an appeal,
revision, review or reference, instituted before, on or after the
appointed day under the said amended Acts or repealed Acts
and such proceedings shall be continued under the said
amended Acts or repealed Acts as if this Act had not come into
force and the said Acts had not been amended or repealed.
(italics supplied)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Constitutional Invalidity:
56. This Court is called upon to examine the constitutional
validity of Section 174 of the KSGST Act. Its invalidity is set up in
the face of Section 19 of the CA Act. The petitioners argue, among
other things, the State has no legislative power to override Section 19
of the CA Act.
57. A statute may be unconstitutional if it is enacted in the
absence of legislative competence, in violation of Fundamental
Rights guaranteed to the citizens of India, or in contravention of
other constitutional constraints. For the Constitution is the
fundamental or basic law to which all the laws must conform. It is
superior even to the will of the legislature. Dr. C. D. Jha in his
illuminating Judicial Review of Legislative Acts[7] enumerates five
forms of unconstitutionality:
(i) Legislative incompetence arising out of the distribution of
powers;
(ii) a delegation of essential legislative functions by the
Legislature to the Executive;
(iii) violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III
of the Constitution;
7[]
Lexis-Nexis, 2009 Ed., p.311
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
(iv) violation of other constitutional restrictions, prohibitions,
and the limitations affecting legislative competence and jurisdiction,
and
(v) infringement of the principles of natural justice.
While determining the constitutionality of a provision or an
Act, the Court looks at these aspects:
(a) Has the Legislature been constitutionally empowered to pass
the legislative Act?
(b) Has the legislative act got the territorial nexus?
(c) Are there any other connotational constraints or limitations
which put fetters on the power of the Legislature?[8]
58. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd,[9] the Supreme
Court has laid down certain principles on how to judge the
constitutionality of an enactment: the Court should (a) try to sustain
the validity of the impugned law to the extent possible; (b) should
not approach the enactment with a view to picking holes or to
ferreting out defects of drafting or for the language employed; (c)
should consider that the Act made by the legislature represents the
will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with; (d) can
strike down the Act only when the unconstitutionality is plainly and
8[] Id. Pp.312, 313
9[] JT 1996 (10) SC 854
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
clearly established; (e) and may recognize the fundamental nature
and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and
deference to it.
59. Here, it is a plain case of legislative competence. Let us see
how Section 174 of the KSGST Act fares vis-a-vis the Amendment Act
in general and Section 19 of it in particular. As it is a matter of vires
and legislative competence, we must trace the source of power.
How to judge the constitutionality of an enactment?
60. When faced with a challenge to interpret laws, Courts have
to discharge a duty. The Judge cannot act, holds the Supreme Court
in Bhanumati v. State of UP[10], like a phonographic recorder, but he
must act as an interpreter of the social context articulated in the legal
text. The Judge must be, in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer,
"animated by a goal-oriented approach" because the judiciary is not a
"mere umpire, as some assume, but an active catalyst in the
Constitutional scheme". Then, referring to Bihar Distillery Ltd., the
Court invokes Lord Denning’s observations in Seaford Court Estates
Ltd Vs. Asher[11]: the job of a Judge in construing a statute must
10[] AIR 2010 SC 3796
11[] [1949 (2) KB 481]
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
proceed on the constructive task of finding the intention of
Parliament and this must be done (a) not only from the language
of the Statute but also (b) upon consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it, (c) and also of the mischief to
remedy which the statute was passed; and if necessary, (d) the
Judge must supplement the written word to give ‘force and life’ to
the intention of the legislature.
Constitution was prospective in its operation:
61. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [12] the
Supreme Court was concerned with the legality of the prosecution
of the appellant for contravention of the Indian Press (Emergency
Powers) Act, 1931.
The offence had been committed before the
Constitution came into force, and prosecution launched earlier was
pending after January 26, 1950.
The enactment which created the
offence was held to be void under Art.19 (1) (a) read with Art. 13,
as contradicting one of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by
Part III of the Constitution. Then, the question was whether the
prosecution could be continued after the enactment became
void. The majority held that the Constitution
12[]
1951 CriLJ 680
was prospective
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
in its operation and that Art. 13(1) would not affect the validity of
these proceedings commenced under pre-Constitution laws which
were valid up to the date of the Constitution coming into force. For
to hold that these proceedings were affected would amount to
treating the Constitution as retrospective.
62. State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. [13], after quoting
Keshavan Madhava Menon, elaborates on the doctrine of
repugnancy: the test of two enactments containing contradictory
provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy. If a
competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly
evinces its legislative intention to cover the whole field, the
enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after
would be overturned on the ground of repugnance.
63. Every statute is, according to Kesavan v. State of Bombay[14],
prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary
implications made to have retrospective operation.
There is no
reason why this rule of interpretation should not be applied for
interpreting our Constitution, and a constitutional amendment, too.
13[]
AIR 1964 SC 1284,
14[] AIR 1951 SC 128
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Presumption in favour of constitutionality:
64. To reiterate the well-known judicial assertion, I may refer to
the Supreme Court’s observations in Karnataka Bank Ltd v. State of
A.P[15]. The rules that guide the Constitutional Courts in discharging
their solemn duty to declare laws passed by a legislature
unconstitutional are well-known. There is always a presumption in
favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared
unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt;
‘to doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its
validity. Where the validity of a statute is questioned, and there are
two interpretations one of which would make the law valid and the
other void, the former must be preferred and the validity of law
upheld”.
65. Even otherwise, the question of repugnancy would arise
only when both the laws are enacted on the same entry, as is held in
Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector.[16]
Federal Features:
Article 246A - A Unique Federal Feat:
15[] (2008) 2 SCC 254
16[] (2007) 5 SCC 447
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
66. The first illustration to this effect is Article 246-A which
makes a special provision for GST. By way of Article 246-A, the
Constitution Amendment Act creates (a) a new legislative field
conferring, (b) outside the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule, (c)
concurrent powers on both Parliament and the State Legislatures to
enact on the same subject matter at the same time. Thus, there is a
fundamental change to the scheme of “legislative relations” between
the Union and the States by the CA Act: Article 246-A. [17]
67. To exemplify, Article 246-A does change the legislative
distribution of powers; however, it does not upset the delicate
balance between the Union and the States. Instead, it carries out the
function of cross-empowerment. On the one hand, it enables the
Union, according to Tarun Jain, to legislate and collect taxes on
certain subjects which hitherto remained within the exclusive fold of
the States—such as the taxes on sale and purchase of goods, luxury
taxes, advertisement taxes, and so on. While doing this, however, the
Union has not lost the legislative rights it possessed by then—such as
taxes on manufacturing, taxes on services, and so on, except that
17 [] Tarun Jain's Goods and Services Tax, Constitutional Law & Policy, ST, EBC, Ed.2018, pg.89-90
(e-book)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
these taxes are subsumed in a larger legislative field (that is, GST) and
would be levied under that caption. Further still, Article 246-A
expands the legislative landscape of the States to bring within their
fold the Westminster model of Governance which is the core
principle governing the functioning of the Executive wing of the
Union and of the States.
Entries in the Lists:
68. The power to legislate is engrafted under Article 246 of the
Constitution, and the various entries for the three lists of the Seventh
Schedule are the “fields of legislation”. The different entries as
legislative heads, points out the Supreme Court in Bimolangshu Roy
(Dead) v. State Assam,[18] are designed to define and delimit the
respective legislative areas of the Union and the State Legislatures.
Bimolangshu Roy emphasises that “they neither impose any
restrictions on the legislative power nor prescribe any duty for the
exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner.” In the
context of that case, it holds that the language of the entries should
be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable. Yet
it also cautions that the rule of widest construction would not enable
18[] AIR 2017 SC 3552
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the legislature to make a law relating to a matter which has no
rational connection with the subject-matter of an entry.
69. When the vires of enactment are challenged, the court
primarily presumes, notes Bimolangshu Roy, the constitutionality of
the statute, by putting the most liberal construction upon the
relevant legislative entry so that it may have the widest amplitude.
And for this, the substance of the legislation will have to be looked
into. But it also cautions against the court’s interpretative bendingover-backward attitude to extend the meaning of the words beyond
their reasonable connotation, anxious to preserve the power of the
legislature. The Court is no legislative or executive guardian angel; it
is a constitutional sentinel. Period.
70. For our purpose, immensely important is the Bimolangshu
Roy’s observation that the authority to make law flows from various
sources: (1) express text of the Constitution; (2) by implication from
the scheme of the Constitution; and (3) as an incident of sovereignty.
Bimolangshu Roy, in fact, invokes the doctrine of inherent powers.
Thus, it felicitously observes:
21. The authority to make law flows not only from an
express grant of power by the Constitution to a legislative
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
body but also by implications flowing from the context of
the Constitution is well settled by the various decisions of
the Supreme Court of America in the context of American
Constitution. A principle which is too well settled in all
the jurisdictions where a written Constitution exists. The
US Supreme Court also recognised that the Congress
would have the authority to legislate with reference to
certain matters because such authority is inherent in the
nature of the sovereignty. The doctrine of inherent powers
was propounded by Justice Sutherland in the context of
the role of the American Government in handling foreign
affairs and the limitations thereon. In substance, the
power to make the legislation flows from various sources:
(1) express text of the Constitution; (2) by implication
from the scheme of the Constitution; and (3) as an
incident of sovereignty.
71. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P.,[19]
the Supreme Court has held that the power to legislate does not
flow from a single Article of the Constitution. To articulate this
assertion and to elaborate on it, Bimolangshu Roy observes that
besides the declaration in Article 246, there are various other
Articles in the Constitution which confer authority on the
Parliament or on a State legislature to legislate, under various
circumstances. Illustratively, Article 3 authorises the Parliament
to make a law either creating a new State or extinguishing an
existing State. Such power is exclusively conferred on the
19[]
(1990) 1 SCC 109
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Parliament. As further instances of legislative repositories,
Bimolangshu Roy enumerates Articles 2, 3, 11, 15(5), 22(7),
32(3), 33, 34, 59(3), 70, 71(3), 98(2) and 326.
72. Indeed the State legislatures are assigned only specified
fields of legislation, the Residuary legislative powers lying with
the Parliament. But taxing entries are distinct from the general
entries, and List III contains no taxing entry. So comes a federal
constitutional experiment in the fiscal field: the 101 st
Constitutional Amendment.
73. Article 246 generally stipulates the competence of the
Parliament and the state legislatures on the various fields of
legislation. Articles 249, 250 and 252 contain provisions which
enable the Parliament to legislate regarding any matter
enumerated in List II in the exigencies specified in those
Articles. The Scheme of Entries, such as 52 and 54 and the
corresponding Entries in the List-II, Bimolangshu Roy
underlines, is nothing but another instance of special
arrangement akin to the one made in Articles 249, 250 and 252.
To conclude, Bimolangshu Roy reminds us that a great deal of
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
schematic examination of the entire Constitution is essential for
us to interpret the scope of each Entry in the three Lists of the
Seventh Schedule. And no rule with a universal application on
interpreting all entries in the 7th Schedule can be postulated.
74. If legislation purporting to be under a particular
legislative entry is assailed for lack of legislative-competence, the
State can seek to support it based on any other entry within the
legislative competence of the legislature. It is unnecessary for
the State, notes the Supreme Court in Ujagar Prints v. Union of
India[20], to show that the legislature, in enacting the law,
consciously applied its mind to the source of its own
competence. Competence to legislate flows from Articles 245,
246 and the other Articles falling in Part XI of the
Constitution. In defending the validity of a law questioned on
the ground of legislative incompetence, the state can always
show that the law was supported under any other entry within
the competence of the legislature.
Indeed, in supporting
legislation, sustenance could be drawn from many entries. The
legislation could be composite legislation drawing upon several
20[]
AIR 1989 SC 516
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
entries such as ‘rag-bag’ legislation, particularly familiar in
taxation.
75. In State of AP v. National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd .,
[21]
the Supreme Court has observed that the power of the State
Legislature to enact a law to levy tax by reference to List II of
the Seventh Schedule has two limitations: one, arising out of
the entry itself, and the other, flowing from the restriction
embodied in the Constitution.
Temporary Statutes:
76. Statutes, as we know, are of two types: perpetual and
temporary. By default, mostly the statutes are perpetual, and a
very few are temporary. A temporary statute will have its
duration specified or fixed. In other words, it ceases to exist by
efflux of time; it has thus a shelf life, so to say. Of course, a
statute can be transitory or transitional. One ends the legislative
mandate by a particular date, and the other lets that mandate
move from one state of affairs to another. But once a later
statute repeals the earlier one, the one repealed cannot be treated
as a temporary statute merely because it has a transitional
21[] AIR 2002 SC 1895
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
provision with a time-frame.
77. Often the legislature itself enacts a saving provision in
the temporary Act, on the lines of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897. The usual presumption is that if such a
saving provision is not present, then the proceedings began
under the repealed Act ipso facto terminate as soon as the
statute expires. Indeed, the expiry does not make the statute
dead for all purposes even in the absence of a saving clause. The
nature of the right or obligation emanating from the temporary
Act may determine whether that right or obligation is enduring.
So held the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v Bhupinder
Kumar[22].
78. A temporary statute can be repealed before its specified
period. That said, I may add that merely because the statutory
purpose is temporal, the very statute cannot be regarded as
temporary unless the legislature has specified a fixed period for
its duration. Indeed, unless it contains some special provision
to the contrary; after a temporary Act has expired, no
proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any
22[] AIR 1962 S.C. 945
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
further effect.
79. The difference between the effect of the expiration of a
temporary Act and the repeal of a perpetual Act is pointed out
by Parke B. in Steavenson v. Oliver:[23] “There is a difference
between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the
latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already
completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but
with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions
imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of
constructions.’’ And Lord Abinger C.B., in a concurrent
judgment, said: “It is by no means a consequence of an Act of
Parliament expiring that rights acquired under it should
likewise expire.’’
80. If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in
force only for a certain specified time, it is, according to
Craies[24], a temporary Act. According to the same learned
author, Temporary Acts have these peculiarities:
Commencement: If an Act is in the first instance
23[]
24[]
(1841) 151 E. R. 1024
Craies On Legislation, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010, p.407
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
temporary and is continued from time to time by
subsequent Acts, it is considered as a statute passed in the
session when it was first passed, and not as a statute
passed in the session in which the Act which continues
its operation was passed.
Expiration: As a general rule, and unless it contains some
special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act
has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it
ceases to have any further effect.
81. Another celebrated commentary—G. P. Singh’s
Principles of Statutory Interpretation [25]—notes that a statute is
either perpetual or temporary. It is perpetual when no time is
fixed for its duration, and such a statute remains in force until
its repeal, which may be express or implied. A perpetual statute
is not perpetual in the sense it cannot be repealed; it is
perpetual in the sense it is not abrogated by efflux of time or
by non-user.
82. A statute, on the other hand, is temporary when its
duration is only for a specified time, and such a statue expires
on the expiry of the specified time unless it is repealed earlier.
Simply because the purpose of a statute, as mentioned in its
preamble, is temporary, the statute cannot be regarded as
temporary when no fixed period is specified for its duration.
25[]
Lexis-Nexis, 14th Ed., Pp.717, 718
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
The duration of a temporary statue may be extended by a fresh
statute or by power conferred under the original statute.
83. G.P. Singh also observes that when a temporary Act
expires, section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1879, which in
terms is limited to repeals, has no application. The effect of
expiry, therefore, depends upon the construction of the Act
itself. The leading authority on the point, according to the
learned author, is the dicta of Park B in Steavenson. G. P.
Singh’s view accords with Craies’.
84. I must acknowledge that the petitioners’ counsel have
laid much emphasis on the sunset clause and nuanced their
arguments to drive home their contention that Section 19 is a
sunset clause and, so, the General Clauses Act does not apply. So
the concept of sunset clause, I reckon, needs more elaboration.
Sunset Clauses:
85. Sunset clauses are statutory provisions providing that
a particular law will expire automatically on a particular date
unless it is re-authorised by the legislature. The use of a sunset
clause, observes A.E. Kouroutakis in The Constitutional Value
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
of Sunset Clauses: An historical and normative analysis [26], was
expected to create an incentive for the periodic and
comprehensive executive and legislative evaluation of agencies.
Sunset clauses— as temporary laws—have the potential, from the
perspective of separation of powers, to enhance the role of the
legislature and support its monitoring task over the
administration[27].
86. Sunset clauses have, A.E. Kouroutakis further
observes, two major legal effects. First, unless re-authorised by
the legislature, it brings about the expiration of a law on a
prescribed date. Expiration, as brought about by a sunset
clause, differs from repeal. Second, if a clause prescribes that a
statute should expire from a certain date, then it is reasonable
to assume that it is not valid unless re-enacted. But in practice,
there are exceptions in each instance.
To begin with, the
expiration, or ‘sunset’, of an act has the same consequences as
if it were repealed.
Yet,
as Broom remarks, there is a
difference between statutes which expire and statutes which are
26[]
27[]
Taylor and Francis, 2016. Kindle edition., p.4, location 559
Id. p.6, location 624
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
repealed. Although ‘the latter become as if they had never
existed (except so far as they relate to transactions already
completed under them), yet with respect to the former, the
extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the
provisions, are matters of construction’[28].
87. Indeed, there are many sunset clauses, such as the
‘entire’ sunset clause compared to the ‘sectional’; the
‘conditional’ compared to the ‘unconditional’; the ‘direct’
compared to the ‘indirect’. Confining our discussion to the
issue on hand, we may note that a sunset clause is direct when
it prescribes the termination of the whole or part of the act
which is embodied, indirect where it refers to a different act.
Here, I reckon, if we accept the petitioners’ contention, then
Section 19 of the CA Act amounts to an indirect sunset clause
—at best.
88. In this context, A.E. Kouroutakis observes that while
a plethora of direct sunset clauses is recorded in the statute
books, indirect sunset clauses are mainly recorded in
constitutional documents. Therefore, the common utility of
28[] Id. p.7, location 646-653
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
indirect sunset clauses is recorded in constitutional orders with
codified constitutions and a hierarchy of norms. Sunset clauses
do not obliterate legislation as if it never existed. That said, the
legal effect of automatic expiration due to a sunset clause,
emphasises the learned author, is not identical to the repeal of
an act. Furthermore, “although the reasonable expectation is
that an act will sunset after a certain period, in practice the
construction of a clause, and therefore the expiration of an act,
depends on various factors which influence its interpretation.
These marginal differences make such clause a distinctive tool
in the legislative drafting process.”[29]
89. Under the heading “Rule of Law and Sunset Clauses”,
A.E. Kouroutakis observes, there are two distinct categories of
temporary laws in times of normality. First, laws adopted in
times of crisis; their force is extended in times beyond the
exigency. And second are laws enacted in times of normality.
Considering Justice Holmes’s dicta, Vermeule characterised the
invalidation of legislation with sunset clauses before the expiry
date as ‘ex post sunsetting’, in contrast to the ‘ex ante
29[] Id. p.16, location 881
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
sunsetting’ of legislation, which occurs when legislation sunsets
due to the lapse of time.[30]
(a) Interim Constitutions:
90. In the constitutional context, affirmative action
policies aim to regulate and correct a given deficiency; as soon
as the deficiency is eliminated, such policies have no reason to
stay in force. Thus a sunset clause is desirable to make them
expire. Jackson, as quoted in The Constitutional Value of
Sunset Clauses, discussing constitution making, explores the
idea of ‘transitional constitution making’ by adding a sunset
clause and points out that they may shed new light on the
advantages and disadvantages of constitutional ‘sunset’ clauses–
that is, “requirement of reconsideration in plenary form after a
set period of years, far enough into the future to allow time for
developing some authoritative institutions of politics and
governance”.
91. There are several constitutional documents that are
recorded
as
temporary.
These
constitutions
are
often
categorised as transitional and are commonly created because
30[] Id. pp. 155-157, location 5578-5637
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
of a major national crisis: for example, (after the War of
American Independence), the Constitution of South Carolina
and the Constitution of New Hampshire. In the more modern
era, the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa in 1993, described it as the ‘Interim Constitution’. It has
a two-year sunset clause.
(b) Sunset Clauses and Constitutional Design:
92. A.E. Kouroutakis, in the chapter named as above,
quotes a very interesting stance Jefferson has taken. The third
American President, regarded as the US progenitor of sunset
laws, in the pre-constitutional days, was concerned with the
perpetuity of the constitution. He suggested to Madison about
sunsetting on any statute after nineteen years. According to
him, “no society can make a perpetual constitution or even a
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living
generation. […] Every constitution, then, and every law,
naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer,
it is an act of force and not of right.”[31]
(c) Pragmatic Injustice and Sunset Clauses:
31[] Id. pp.163-164, location 5767-5792
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
93. Finally, we may consider the sunset clauses in the
context of pragmatic injustice. Pragmatic injustice, according to
Roscoe Pound[32], exists when the reality is far from the ideal,
which is prescribed in the law books. Currently, although
equality is the default rule and it is emphatically recognised in
constitutional and international documents, the law in action
is far from the ideal. So the nations take recourse to affirmative
action policies to regulate and correct a given deficiency. Once
the deficiency is eliminated, the policies, introduced out of
turn, have no reason to stay in force. Thus, a sunset clause is
desirable to make them expire.
94. Indeed, sunset clauses have been frequently used in
India in fiscal and tax laws. Tax holidays and exchange control
regulations are the best examples. The Constitution itself
provides for a 10-year sunset for reservations to Parliament and
legislative assembly seats (Article 334).
95. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not apply to
temporary statutes. For this proposition, the petitioners have
32[] Law in books and law in action (1910) 44 American Law Review 12, as quoted by
A. E. Kouroutakis, Page 161, location 5723
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
relied on District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. [33],
and State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh [34]. Section 6 of the General
Clause Act, according to them, applies only to repeals and not
to omissions. It is a well-settled principle, according to them,
that invocation of Section 6 of the General Clause Act is
available only with repeal and not with omissions.
Transitional Provisions:
96. When one legislative system ends and another begins,
it is commonly necessary to enact special rules for actual cases
that straddle the transaction. Sometimes the old law is
continued for transitional cases, and sometimes the new law is
applied; in either event, modifications may be necessary. In
other words, as Craies observes in his treatise On Legislation,[35]
legislation does not necessarily have effect as law immediately
after being passed or made. It may take effect under these
circumstances: (1) immediately upon being passed or made; (2)
at a point in the future that is specified upon the legislation
being passed or made, or that can be determined under criteria
33[]AIR 2001 SC 3134
34[]AIR 1955 SC 84
35[]
Sweet & Maxwell, South Asian Ed. 2010, p.399
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
specified upon the legislation being passed or made; (3) only if
some future event occurs (which may be a real-world event or
an event such as making an order-designed to commence the
legislation); (4) with retrospective effect from a past time; or (5)
“not at a particular point in time, but in relation to things
done or events occurring during a period specified upon the
legislation being passed or made, with it being possible to
specify either a single period for all purposes or different
period for different purposes.”
97. Transitional provisions, the learned author continues
to observe, may be relatively unimportant, in that by definition
they affect relatively few cases, but they are extremely
complicated; and they can be important to the cases affected[36].
Thornton in his Legislative Drafting[37] acknowledges the
difficulty in describing what constitutes a transitional
provision. According to him, the function of a savings
provision in the legislation is to preserve or ‘save’ a law, a right,
a privilege, or an obligation otherwise repealed or ceased to
36[]
37[]
Id., 417
Prof. Dr. Helen Xanthaki, Bloomsbury Professional, 5th Ed., 2013, p.473
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
have an effect.
98. The function of a transitional provision, Thornton [38]
adds, is to make special provisions for applying legislation to
the circumstances which exist when that legislation comes into
force. Both terms are loosely used with overlapping meanings;
there is little or no advantage in seeking to pursue a water-tight
distinction between them. But the distinguishing criterion is
the focus of the intent of the drafter: if time is the focus, then
the drafter must title and express the provision as transitional;
if the focus is on exception, then the drafter must title and
express the provision as a saving. At the end of the day, the
drafter’s pen will identify the nature of the provisions, and
there is a great benefit in doing so clearly and accurately.
Lumping transitional and savings provisions in a single section
is never a good idea.
99. The learned author finally notes that the necessity for
savings and transitional provisions is a consequence of a
change in the law, whether the change is caused by new statute
law or by the repeal, repeal and substitution, or modification,
38[]
Id. P.474
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
of existing statute law. Consideration of whether special savings
or transitional provisions are necessary is an important part of
every drafting exercise.
Saving Clause:
100. A saving clause is used to preserve what already
exists; it cannot create new rights or obligations. Such a
provision has no application to transactions complete at the
time the savings provision comes into force. A savings
provision is frequently included in legislation to establish
beyond doubt that the provisions of that legislation are to be
construed as additional to and not in derogation of existing
law. The possibility of repeal by implication is thus excluded.
And the operation of the common law is saved.[39]
101. Thornton gives this as an example of transitional
provision:
In so far as an instrument made or having effect as
if made, or any other thing done or having effect as
if done, under any enactment repealed by this
section, could have been made or done under a
corresponding provision of this Act, it shall, if
effective immediately before the coming into force
of this Act, have effect subsequently as if it had
39[]
Id. 479
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
been made or done under that corresponding
provisions.
Saving Clause & Legal Proceedings Under an Expired Statute:
102. A question often arises, as it does here, about the
legal proceedings about matters connected with a temporary
Act: whether they can be continued or initiated after the Act
has expired. The answer to such a question, G. P. Singh
observes, again depends upon constructing the Act as a whole.
The Legislature very often enacts in the temporary Act a saving
provision similar in effect to section 6 of the general Clause
Act, 1897.[40]
103. The question before the Supreme Court in Tata Iron
and Steel Co. was whether because of the Validation Act the
State could retain only the cess and taxes already collected
before the date of validation or whether they also could collect
the cess and taxes due till that date of validation. Tata Iron and
Steel has held that the Validation Act did not enable the State
to collect the cess and taxes not collected till the date of
validation. One of the reasons it assigned was that the
40[]
Id., p.719
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Validation Act contained no saving clause and section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, too, would not affect a temporary statute.
So there could be no recovery and collection of cess and taxes
which may have become due but had not been collected till the
date of validation.
104. That said, Tata Iron and Steel has gone on to observe
that a temporary statute on its expiry is not dead for all
purposes, even in the absence of a saving provision like section
6 of the General Clauses Act. The question is, as stressed earlier,
essentially one of construction of the Act. The nature of the
right and obligation resulting from the provisions of the
temporary Act and their character may have to be regarded as
determinative of whether the said right or obligation is
enduring or not.
105. We have, first, considered what a temporary statute
is, amply aided by Craies’s and G. P. Singh’s commentaries.
The next question is, which is the temporary statute here? The
Constitutional Amendment Act has affected a few central
enactments, as well as a few state enactments. Then, can we call
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
them all —that is, the repealed ones or those getting repealed—
temporary statutes? For “any provision of any law relating to
tax on goods or services or on both” inconsistent with the
Amendment Act cannot last beyond one year? Of course,
before that one year, those inconsistent laws can be amended to
render them compatible or altogether repealed. I am afraid the
answer is a “No”.
106. We will also examine a converse situation.
Sometimes, a repealing statute, the latter one, can be a
temporary one. Again, Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act
does not apply on the expiry of the “temporary” repealing
statute; so held the Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. State of
U.P[41]. Then, can we call the Constitutional Amendment Act a
temporary one? I am afraid this question, too, gets the same
answer: No. Section 19 of the Amendment Act, at best, is a
transitional provision.
107. Here the petitioners have argued that the enactments
—Central or State—inconsistent with the Amendment Act have
rendered themselves temporary statutes and perished on the
41[] AIR 1957 SC 458
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
temporal altar of one year. If this logic is accepted, every
succeeding act renders the previous act a temporary one,
obliterates its impact beyond a specified date, and avoids
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act from applying itself. One
enactment will not, rather cannot, make another enactment a
temporary one; the same enactment can, for various reasons,
render itself a temporary one. So a later enactment,
inconsistent with the previous one, repeals that previous one
either expressly or impliedly. Now, it is time we examined what
repeal is and how it affects these cases before us.
Repeal of Statutes:
108. We must acknowledge that a total repeal obliterates
statutes, “except as to transactions past and closed.” “When an
Act of Parliament is repealed,” said Lord Tenterden in Surtees
v. Ellison, “it must be considered (except as to transactions past
and closed) as if it had never existed. That is the general rule.’’
Tindal C.J. stated the exception more widely. He said, “The
effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it as completely
from the records of the Parliament as if it had never been
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed
except for the purpose of those actions which were
commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an
existing law”.
109. To decide whether any particular transaction is
affected by the repeal of an Act, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the transaction in question was completed when the
Act was repealed. Thus, if an Act gives a right to do anything,
the thing to be done, if only commenced but not completed
before the Act is repealed, must upon the repeal of the Act be
left in status quo. So, under some statute, if a right becomes
vested upon the completion of some certain transaction but
not before, no right whatever will have been acquired if the
statute in question is repealed before the transaction is
completed.
110. Repeal of statute results in nullification of the
subordinate legislation the repealed statute has engendered.
That is, when a statute is repealed, any by-law or statutory
instrument made under that statue ceases to be operative unless
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
there is a saving clause in the new statute preserving the old bylaw or statutory instrument.
111. We may acknowledge there lies a difference between
the repealing of an entire Act and that of, say, a single clause in
an Act. A statute repealed, we must reckon as if it had never
been enacted. Partial repeal, however, does not entail such
drastic consequences as we would have on the total repeal. In
fact, we need to look at the repealed portion of an Act to see
what remains of the Act and what it means. For “an Act of
Parliament, which at one time had one meaning, would by the
repeal of some clause in it have some other meaning.’’
112. That said, we must also acknowledge that if a right
has once been acquired under some statute, that right will not
be taken away by the repeal of the statute under which it was
acquired.
113. Therefore, more often than not, when an Act is
repealed, a clause is expressly engrafted in the repealing Act
that “this repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired,
accrued, or incurred.’’ But the rule of law has been well
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
entrenched on this point; so such a clause is apparently
unnecessary, and only inserted ex abundanti cautela.
114. Succinctly stated, repeal is not a matter of mere form
but one of substance, depending upon the legislative intent. If
the intention indicated expressly or by necessary implication in
the subsequent statute was to abrogate or wipe off the former
enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total
or pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to modify the
former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an
exemption, or by super-adding conditions, or by restricting,
intercepting or suspending its operation, such modification
would not amount to repeal. After referring to many standard
commentaries on statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court
in Udai Singh Dagar v. Union of India ,[42] reemphasises that
the principal object of a repealing and amending Act is to
‘excise dead matter, prune off superfluities, and reject clearly
inconsistent enactments’.
Application of the General Clauses Act:
115. Resounding is the judicial assertion: it is emphatically
42[]
(2007) 10 SCC 306
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity,
expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. That is
the assertion of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.
Again he famously declared in McCulloch v. Maryland, “We
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”
116. To begin with, generally, the predominant approach
of the Indian Judiciary, according to M.P. Jain [43], was positivist;
that is, to interpret the Constitution literally and to apply to it
more or less the same restrictive canons of interpretation as are
usually applied to interpreting ordinary statutes. To some
extent, the Constitution itself incorporates the principle of
statutory construction. Article 367 provides that the General
Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply for interpreting the Constitution
as it applies for interpreting legislative enactments. The courts
have held that not only the ‘general definitions’ in the General
Clauses Act, but also the “general rules of construction” in the
Act, apply to the Constitution.
43[]
Indian Constitutional Law, VII Ed., P.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
117. The General Clauses Act can be amended by
Parliament. Article 367 thus means that interpretation of many
words and phrases used in the Constitution can be modified by
Parliamentary legislation without amending the Constitution.
From its initial days of literal, restrictive interpretation, the
Constitutional Courts have shifted towards liberal, purposive
interpretation. The liberal approach is designed to give a
creative and purposive interpretation to the Constitution “with
insight into social values, and with the suppleness of
adaptation to changing needs.”
118. Since the General Clause Act is an Act of
Parliament, it is competent for Parliament to control or
modify the view taken by the highest Court, by simply
amending the General Clause Act. After observing thus, D. D.
Basu[44] notes “it is for this reason that judicial review cannot
have that free play in India as in the USA”. In India, the
Constitution has to be interpreted, the learned author observes,
like a statute. Indeed, he acknowledges that since 1973 the
Supreme Court has been struggling to shatter the shackles of
44[]
Constitution of India, 9th Ed., Vol.14, pp.15360-01
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
statutory interpretation to jump into the freedom of ‘purposive
interpretation’. For this interpretative freedom, the Supreme
Court has invoked the doctrine that the Constitution is a
statute of a special kind—that is, to govern the country—and
should therefore be liberally interpreted, having regard to its
object.
119. The petitioners’ counsel have quoted a profusion of
precedents on the interpretative impact of General Clauses Act
vis-a-vis the constitutional provisions. The Constitution (One
Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 could have adopted
the language, they contend, similar to Section 174 KSGST Act,
2017, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. But it has
deliberately and consciously not done so because it has not
intended the KVAT Act to operate beyond 16.09.2017.
120. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and Section 4
of the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act are
analogous. Here, as we consider the State enactments, Section 4
of the State Act may have to be considered. And it reads:
4. Effect of repeal. — Where any Act repeals any enactment
hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
different intention appears, the repeal shall not —
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the
time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so
repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so
repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment
incurred in respect of any offence committed against
any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment
as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act
had not been passed.
121. Indeed, we can refer to the precedents on Section 6
of the General Clauses Act to appreciate how the repeal of an
enactment affects the pending cases or proceedings under that
repealed enactment. In Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v.
Amrit Lal & Co.,[45] the Supreme Court has observed that as a
general rule, in view of Section 6, the repeal of a statute, which
is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the
pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed
45[] (2001) 8 SCC 397
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
enactment were still in force. In other words, such repeal does
not affect the pending cases which would be decided as if the
enactment were not repealed. In fact, when a lis commences, all
rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised on that
date. The mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is
simply to leave unaffected the pending proceedings which
commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless a contrary
intention is expressed. Clause (c) of Section 6 refers to the
words “any right, privilege, obligation … acquired or accrued”;
accordingly, the repealing statute would not affect those rights,
privileges, obligations. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises, however,
hastens to clarify that mere existence of a right not being
“acquired” or “accrued” on the date of the repeal would not get
the protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
122. The principle encapsulated, the effect of repeal
without
a
saving clause and
without
Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act applying is that the repealed provision
is obliterated as completely from the records as if it had never
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
existed except for those actions which were commenced,
prosecuted, and concluded while it still existed in law. There is,
indeed, no question of any principle in common law or
otherwise applying on the lines incorporated in Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act. So holds the Supreme Court in
Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. v. Union Of India.[46]
In Perspective:
123. Most cases concern the Kerala Value Added Tax Act
(KVAT); so we will examine the chronology of statutory events
in the backdrop of that Act. With effect from 01.04. 2005 came
KVAT Act into force. Then, on 08.09.2016 the CA Act was
enacted. But it came into effect only from 16.09.2016. Section
19 of the CA Act saved a host of statutes holding field by then;
those enactments include the KVAT Act. And the saving was
for one year: 16.09.2017.
124. On 22.06.2017, the State of Kerala issued the Kerala
State Goods and Services Tax Ordinance; it has heralded the
new State GST regime. On 16.09.2017 came the Kerala State
46[]
1986 (24) ELT 205 Del.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“KSGST Act”). It has
replaced the KSGST Ordinance. On the same day, however, the
saving period prescribed under Section 19 of the CA Act, too,
ended.
125. But, as a way out, the KSGST Act has its own Saving
Clause: Section 174. So we must examine the relative,
sometimes overlapping, concepts of transition and saving,
besides those of repeal, sunset, amendment, omission, and
substitution.
126. A bill may contain provisions that limit, modify, or
destroy individual rights and privileges. Then, on the Bill’s
enforcement as an Act, the Legislature may desire to consider a
saving clause, to protect those who have acted as per the law till
then existing. The means for providing this protection is the
saving clause. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Saving Clause”
in a statute as an exception of a special thing out of the general
things mentioned in that statute; it is ordinarily a restriction in
a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending
proceedings, penalties, and so on, from annihilation that
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
would result from an unrestricted repeal. In other words, “a
saving clause is generally used in a repealing act to preserve
rights and claims that would otherwise be lost.”
127. Benion in his Statutory Interpretation[47] defines a
saving as a provision “the intention of which narrows the effect
of the enactment to which it refers so as to preserve some
existing legal rule or right from its operation”. According to
the learned author, a saving resembles a proviso, except that it
has no particular form. A saving often begins with the words
‘Nothing in this [Act shall … .’ A saving may be qualified or
conditional. Indeed, a saving is taken not to be intended to
confer any right which did not exist already.
128. The saving clause, according to Crawford [48], is used
to exempt something from immediate interference or
destruction. It is generally used in repealing statues to prevent
them from affecting rights accrued, penalties incurred, duties
imposed, or proceedings started under the statute sought to be
repealed. Its position or verbal form is unimportant. But if it
47[]
48[]
Benion on Statutory Interpretation, LexisNexis, 5th Ed., p.724
Crawford’s Statutory Construction, 1998 Ed., p.612-13
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
conflicts with the body of the statute of which it is a part, it is
ineffective, or void. And whether the saving clause should
receive a strict or liberal construction, is a matter upon which
there seems to be some conflict of opinion. Perhaps the best
rule would make, Crawford continues,
the nature of
constructing the saving clause depend upon the nature of the
statute involved for example whether it was remedial, penal, or
procedural.
129. If the saving clause is a general one, that is,
applicable to all repealing acts, it is merely declaratory of a rule
of construction, notes Crawford. But whether they are general
or not, they are regarded as much a part of every repealing act
as if written therein. Nevertheless, they are, Crawford stresses,
subject to repeal by subsequent acts; that is, they will not save
from repeal any provision whose repeal is clearly intended by
the legislature by the later act. To hold otherwise would abridge
or limit the legislative power of the various late legislatures, by
the enactment of irrepealable legislation.
130. A saving, to me, is a device that preserves accrued,
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
acquired rights and incurred liabilities under a statute that no
longer exists. If the new statute that repeals an old one contains
no saving clause, General Clauses Act steps in; Section 6 plays
the role of a protector of the rights and liabilities under the
repealed act.
131. Here I must observe that Section 19 is not a saving
clause; any saving clause starts to operate from the day the
previous Act is dead. Here, the CA Act has allowed various
enactments—those that contradict it—to coexist. Here, the repeal
did not take place on 16.09.2016, when th e CA Act came into
force, but on 16.09.2017, when the one-year period ended. Saving
Clause, in fact, if available, was needed from then on, not before.
Indeed, Section 19 of the CA Act saves nothing beyond
16.09.2017.
132. Legislative power, to begin with, inheres in and vests
with Parliament. If it is unitary, the division or demarcation of
those powers does not arise; but in a federal polity, the
Constitution usually demarcates the legislative boundaries. Thus,
as to the division of legislative powers, Article 246, and now
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Article 246A too, of our Constitution holds the key.
Inherent Legislative Power:
133. Article 246 of the Constitution deals with the
distribution of legislative powers. Under Clause (1) of that
Article, Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws on
any of the matters enumerated in List I (Union List) in the
Seventh Schedule. Under Clause (2) both Parliament and the
State Legislature have concurrent powers to make laws on any
matter enumerated in List III (the Concurrent List) of the
Seventh Schedule. But the State Legislature’s power to legislate
over the matters in the Concurrent List is subject to
Parliament’s power under the Union List. Then, of course,
subject to Parliament’s powers under List I and List III, the
State Legislature has the exclusive power to make laws on any
matter enumerated in List II (State List). Besides, under Article
245(4) of the Constitution, Parliament has the power on any
matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a
State.
134. The CA Act examined, we can notice that from
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
16.09.2016, Article 246 stood amended and modified in its
operation; Article 246A was introduced. Section 2 of the CA
Act signifies a drastic constitutional shift in the division of
legislative powers: instead of division, it fosters amalgamation.
Article 246A has no schedules.
135. And the scheme of the CA Act further examined,
Entry 54 of List II stands substituted. So comes the assertion
from the petitioners that Entry 54 abrogated (it is not, though),
the States have been denuded of the power of taxation from
16.9.2016 on the items that stand deleted. For them, the
interim or temporary continuation is only up to 16.09.2017, as
per Section19 of the CA Act. They also argue that if the State
wants to sustain “taxes under Entry 54, then there is no
necessity to abrogate the erstwhile Entry 54 on 16.09.2016.
Read otherwise, Section 19 would be rendered otiose,
meaningless, and would have no significant purpose at all.”
136. Unfortunately, the whole argument is sought to be
erected on a slippery slope. There is no denudation of
legislative power, no obliteration of Entry 54 of List II. An
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
entry’s abrogation, as it were, would not ipso facto lead to the
legislative denudation. I will elaborate on that, later.
137. Then follows from the petitioners the collateral
attack: Section 173 is “merely a manifestation of the repeal of
the laws under the Entries already occurred. It only excises and
prunes out the dead matter.” This assertion, too, must fail. The
GST (Compensation to States) Act, recompenses the States; so,
they argue, “no difficulty needs to be perceived by the State” on
the financial front.
138. If we examine Section 173 of the KSGST Act, the
State has amended a few taxing statutes that now stand affected
by the CA Act. It has brought them in harmony with the
Goods and Services Tax regime. On the other hand, Section
174 repealed and saved certain statutes. Let us see which have
been amended and which repealed:
Amended U/S.173
Repealed through S.174
1. Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 1. Kerala Value Added Tax Act,
2. Kerala Finance Act, 2011
2. Kerala Tax on Entry of Goods
3. Kerala Finance Act, 2013
into Local Areas Act, 1994
4. Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 3. Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act,
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
5. Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 4. Kerala Tax on Paper Lotteries
Act
6. Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994
7. Kerala Municipality Act, 1994
139. We can see the KVAT Act, the focal enactment for
our discussion, finds a place in the table on both sides:
amendment and repeal. The same enactment could not have
been amended and repealed simultaneously; if so, it proves the
idiom “have the cake and eat it too.” We can either keep the
cake or eat it; so is the case with an enactment: it can either be
amended or repealed. For the amendment and repeal are
mutually exclusive. Yet, paradoxical as it may sound, the
distinction between amendment and repeal, notes Vepa P.
Sarathi in his Interpretation of Statutes[49] is one of degree.
140. In fact, the KVAT Act stands repealed “except in
respect of goods included in entry 54 of the State List of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, including the Goods to
which the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963” applies as per
49[]
Eastern Book Company, 5th Ed., p.354
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the KVAT Act.
141. Now, let us examine both Section 19 of the CA Act
and Section 174 of the KSGST Act. Section 19 mandates that
any inconsistent law relating to tax on goods and services in
force in any State before 16.09.2016 (the commencement of the
CA Act) shall continue to be in force “until amended or
repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent
authority”. So the States were, first, required to amend the
inconsistent laws to bring them in harmony with the CA Act.
Otherwise, the States must repeal them. And they were given
one year for achieving this. If the States do neither, those
inconsistent acts stand repealed.
142. Here, the States acted; they amended a few
inconsistent Acts. They also repealed a few more. As with the
KVAT Act, the repeal, if it were, has not resulted in its
abrogation or annihilation. So the operation of the so-called
sunset clause (as provided in Section 19) has not denuded the
State’s power to enforce the KVAT Act in its amended form.
The Act remained, with its remit reduced, though. Thus goes
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
out of reckoning the petitioners’ another assertion: that with
the repeal of the enactments, the procedural mechanism has
disappeared. It has not. The prospectivity of the amendment
undisputed, what remains to be examined is the State’s power
to save what had happened before the CA Act came into force
or, more precisely, until one year after that Act came into force.
Indeed, the CA Act allowed the State Acts in the same
legislative field to coexist for one year: the window period.
143. So I must hold that Section 19 of the CA Act is—
transitional as it may have been—a repealing clause simpliciter,
not a saving clause. Nothing more. That job of saving is done
by Section 174 of the KSGST Act. Well and truly. So the repeal
has not, as Section 174 elaborates, affected “the previous
operation of the amended Acts or repealed Acts and orders or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder.” In other words,
the repeal has not affected “any right, privilege, obligation, or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the amended Acts
or repealed Acts or orders under such repealed or amended
Acts.” Nor has it affected “any tax, surcharge, penalty, fine,
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
interest as are due or may become due or any forfeiture or
punishment incurred or inflicted in respect of any offence or
violation committed against the provisions of the amended
Acts or repealed Acts”.
144. In other words, the repeal has not affected “any
investigation, inquiry, verification (including scrutiny and
audit), assessment proceedings, adjudication, and any other
legal proceedings or recovery arrears or remedy in respect of
any such tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest, right, privilege,
obligation, liability, forfeiture or punishment, as aforesaid, and
any such investigation, inquiry, verification (including scrutiny
and audit), assessment proceedings, adjudication and other
legal proceedings or recovery of arrears or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced, and any such tax, surcharge,
penalty, fine, interest, forfeiture or punishment may be levied
or imposed as if these Acts had not been so amended or
repealed.”
145. Collaterally it follows that all the judicial and quasijudicial proceedings arising from the above contingencies, too,
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
stand saved.
146. Of course, in most cases, the question is, as the
petitioners put it, whether Section 174 (2) (a) “revives” the
KVAT Act, 2003 for the authorities to issue notices under that
Act beyond 16.09.2017. The petitioners contend that revival
presupposes the pre-existence of something valid. For them, the
KVAT Act had ceased to operate completely on 16.09.2017.
Legally it died that day, they assert. To support this contention,
they have relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises.
147. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises examined, pending a
tenancy
dispute
before
a
rent-control
court,
through
amendment, its jurisdiction is taken away because of the
changed threshold limit of the rent. Then, among other things,
the Court had to answer these questions: (a) can a ground of
eviction, say illegal subletting, be claimed by a landlord as a
vested right? And (b) if “protection given to a tenant under the
Rent Act is said to be not a vested right and if that protection
is withdrawn, can a landlord claim any ground of eviction
under the Rent Act to be his vested right?”
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
148. The Supreme Court, on facts, has first held that
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply. Second, as it
is the landlord's accrued right, he can take advantage of subsection (c) of Section 6. That sub-section, holds Ambalal
Sarabhai Enterprises, refers to "any right", which need not be a
vested right, but can be a mere accrued right. To be explicit,
the words 'any right accrued' in Section 6(c) is wide enough to
include landlord's right to evict a tenant in case proceeding was
pending when repeal came in. I am afraid Ambalal Sarabhai
Enterprises does not help the petitioners.
Statutory Changes: the Impact on Taxation—a Sovereign Power:
(a) Levy, Assessment, and Collection:
149. Time and again, Courts have held that tax
imposition will encompass all the three elements: levy,
assessment, and collection. A mere Legislation to tax cannot
result in fructifying a tax imposition. In other words, for a tax
to be imposed, it requires a taxable event to trigger the levy and
a taxable person to discharge it.
150. Lord Dunedin pointed out in Whitney v. Inland
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Revenue Commissioners[50] that there are three stages in the
imposition of a tax: (1) there is the declaration of liability, that
is the part of the statute which determines what persons in
respect of what property are liable. (2) Next, there is the
assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, ex
hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises
the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. And (3) lastly
comes the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not
voluntarily pay.
151. Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of
Sales Tax and Ors,[51] approves of this view. Moreover, the
Constitutional Bench endorses it in Mathuram Agarwal v.
State of MP[52]. Section 17 of the CA Act has substituted Entry
54 with effect from16.09.2016, and Section 19, the petitioners
argue, extended its transitional life by one year. That extended
period ended on 15.09.2017. It is, therefore, mandatory for
levy, assessment, and collection, the petitioners assert, to have
been completed before 15.09.2017, for any VAT issues under the
50[]
[1926] A.C. 37
[]
51 AIR 1985 SC 1041
52[](1999) 8 SCC 667
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
pre-GST regime lost their relevance beyond 30.06.2017.
152. In Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. and Ors. vs. State
of UP[53], the case concerns U.P. Excise Act, 1910. The question
to be considered was this: the vend fee, though levied under an
appropriate state enactment, was not collected when that
enactment was in force. It was prospectively declared ultra vires.
Once the source of power disappeared, can the authorities
collect the vend fee levied when the act was in force? The
Supreme Court has held that the vend fee levied but not
collected previously cannot be collected then.
153. In Manattitillah Krishnan Thangal v. State of
Kerala,[54] this Court has held that the content of a valid law
under Article 265 is that it should provide for the levy,
assessment, and collection of tax. The words "levied or
collected" in Article 265 are of comprehensive to include all the
three stages in imposing a tax. The word 'levied" in Article
265 of the Constitution is therefore used to include the first
two stages: the levy or the declaration of the liability and the
53[]AIR 2001 SC 1723
54[] AIR 1971 Ker 65 (FB)
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
assessment or the determination of the amount of the tax. The
Full Bench relies on the dictum in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh
v Sate of U.P.[55].
"If a taxing statute makes no specific provision about the
machinery to recover tax and the procedure to make the
assessment of the tax and leaves it entirely to the
executive to devise such machinery as it thinks fit and to
prescribe such procedure as appears to it to be fair, an
occasion may arise for the Courts to consider whether the
failure to provide for a machinery and to prescribe a
procedure does not tend to make the imposition of the
tax an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of
Article 19(5). An imposition of tax which in the absence
of prescribed machinery and the prescribed procedure
would partake of the character of a purely administrative
affair can, in a proper sense, be challenged as
contravening Article 19(1) (f).”
154.In Supreme-Court-Advocates-on-Record Association
v. Union of India[56], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court has held that the word substitution necessarily or always
connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and
another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps.
Indeed, the natural meaning of the word substitution is to
indicate that the process cannot be split up into two pieces like
this. If the process described as substitution fails, it is totally
55 [] AIR 1962 SC 1563
56 [] (2016) 5 SCC 1
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
ineffective to leave intact what was sought to be displaced. That
seems to be the ordinary and natural meaning of the words
shall be substituted.
155. On facts, the Court has held that there is no
intention to repeal without a substitution was deducible. In
other words, there could be no repeal if substitution failed. The
two were part and parcel of a single indivisible process and not
bits of a disjointed operation.
156. The Court also observes that repeal is not a matter
of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the
intention of the Legislature. If the intention, indicated
expressly or by necessary implication in the subsequent statute,
were to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment, wholly or
in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal. On
the other hand, if the intention were merely to modify the
former enactment by engrafting an exception or granting an
exemption, or by super-adding conditions, or by restricting,
intercepting or suspending its operation, such modification
would not amount to repeal.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
157. Because of Art. 265, if every tax has to be imposed
by "law" it would appear, observes the Supreme Court in
Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. Union of India [57], to
follow that it could only be imposed by a law which is valid.
The law should be (1) within the legislative competence of the
legislature; (2) the law should not be prohibited by any
particular provision of the Constitution such as, for example,
Arts. 276(2), 286 and so on; and (3) the law or its relevant
portion should not be invalid under Art.13 being repugnant to
those freedoms which are guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution.
158. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhopal vs. Shelly
Products[58], the Tribunal nullified the assessment orders on the
ground of jurisdiction. On facts, it was found that the
authorities could not frame a fresh assessment. Then the
question was whether the respondents could have the refund of
income tax paid by them by way of advance tax and selfassessment tax. The Court, first, has held that liability to pay
57[]
58[]
AIR 1962 SC 1006
(2003 )5SCC 461
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
income-tax does not depend on the assessment being made. As
soon as the Finance Act prescribes the rate or rates for any
assessment year, the liability to pay the tax arises. It has, then,
observed that in the face of a nullified assessment if the
assessing authority cannot make a fresh assessment in
accordance with the law, it amounts to deemed acceptance of
the assessee’s return of income. In such a case, the assessing
authority is denuded of its authority to verify the correctness
and completeness of the return. Even if the tax paid is found
to be less than that payable, no further demand can be made
for recovery of the balance amount since a fresh assessment is
barred.
159. To sum up, for any tax to be imposed, it requires a
taxable event triggering the levy and a taxable person to
discharge it. So the petitioners contend that the levy,
assessment, and collection must have been completed before
15.09.2017 under any tax regime which has been “subsumed”
by the GST regime. Then, the question is, have GST laws under
the CA Act subsumed all the State tax enactments, which
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
earlier drew their legitimacy from the unamended Entry 54?
(b) Repeal and Omission:
160. Clause 17 of the Constitution (One Hundred and
First Amendment) Act has omitted, the petitioners maintain,
Entries 92, 92C of List I and Entries 52, 55of List II and
substituted Entry 84 of List I and Entries 54 and 62 of List II.
161. In Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. and Ors., v.
Director of Enforcement, New Delhi[59], the Supreme Court has
held that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to
omissions. Granted, Rayala Corporation, a Constitution Bench
decision, has not elaborated on how “repeal” and “omission”
differ, but it has, nevertheless, laid down the law that “repeal”
differs from “omission” and Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act would apply only for “repeal” and not “omissions”.
Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India [60], another
Constitution
Bench
decision,
has
followed
Rayala
Corporation. This decision, too, has elaborated on neither the
semantic significance nor the supposedly distinct legal impact
59[]
60[]
(1969) 2 SCC 412
(2000) 2 SCC 536
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
of these two expressions.
162. But Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works stresses that at
common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or
deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as
completely as if it had never been passed. To this rule, an
exception is engrafted by Section 6(1) of the General Clauses
Act. If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted
without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all
actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final
relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect,
it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature
contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the
position.
163. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the
future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable.
Sometimes, a particular provision in a statute may be omitted,
and in its place another provision dealing with the same
contingency is introduced. Moreover, that can be without a
saving clause in favour of pending proceedings. Then, as can
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
reasonably be inferred, the legislative intention is that the
pending proceedings shall not continue, but fresh proceedings
for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.
164. Indeed, in Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v.
CCE[61], a two-Judge Bench though, has elaborated on not only
on “deletion” and “omission” but also on “repeal”. It has cited
Halsbury's Laws of England the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe
Edition) by William C. Burton to unearth semantic
distinctions, if any, of those expressions. Then, Shree Bhagwati
Steel Rolling Mills has held that on a conjoint reading of the
three expressions “delete”, “omit”, and “repeal”, it becomes
clear that “delete” and “omit” are used interchangeably, so that
when the expression “repeal” refers to “delete”, it would
necessarily take within its ken an omission as well. It finds no
substance in the argument that a “repeal” amounts to an
obliteration from the very beginning, whereas an “omission” is
only in futuro.
165. If the expression “delete” would amount, Shree
Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills further holds, to a “repeal”, it is
61[]
(2016) 3 SCC 643
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
clear that a conjoint reading of Halsbury's Laws of England
and the Legal Thesaurus leads to the same result: an
“omission”, a form of repeal, is tantamount to a “deletion”.
Interpreting Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT[62], in the statutory
backdrop of Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, Shree
Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills affirms that repeal would include
repeal by way of an express omission. Indeed, it declares, after
elaborate
reasoning,
that
the
observations
in
Rayala
Corporation on “repeal” and “omission” are obiter.
166. The precedential force of an avalanche of authorities
cited at the Bar remains undisputed. That said, I must add, on
facts, that the petitioners’ contention that the State has lost
legislative power to enact a saving clause—Section 174—in the
KSGST Act does not stand the judicial gaze. That power
preserved, the concept of repeal, the scope of Section 19 of the
CA Act, and the relevance of Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act or Section 4 of the Kerala Interpretation and General
Clauses Act pale into insignificance. And any discussion, as we
have already undertaken, turns out to be an academic exercise.
62[]
(2015) 10 SCC 333
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Limitation:
167. The petitioner in one writ petition has argued that
on the date when the first ever Show Cause Notice, dated
15.03.2018, under Section 8 (f) (iv), read with Section 25, of
KVAT Act was issued, KSGST, 2017 had been in operation for
almost six months. And the KVAT, 2003 stood expired.
168. The impugned Notices have been issued for the
alleged assessment of the escaped turnover. All the notices, the
petitioners have maintained, pertain to the AYs 2010-2011 and
2011-2012, but were issued in March 2018 and beyond. The
time for an assessment under Section 25 is five years for the
relevant assessment years; so the notices are barred by time.
Section 42(3) of the KVAT Act, according to them, does not
save the limitation under Section 25 of the Act. They have also
contended that composite notices are illegal and impermissible.
169. To sustain their plea, the petitioners, among other
things, have argued that on the assessees’ filing the returns
under Section 20, the assessment stands completed on “the selfassessment” basis, by the mandate of Section 21. Therefore, the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
assessments are deemed to have been completed.
170. The authorities had done nothing, the petitioners have
asserted, before the repeal or at any time after 16.09.2016, to assess
the petitioners; no proceedings were initiated to claim that they
“proceeded to determine” the turnover. Nor were any proceedings
pending when the repeal was effected. Hence nothing remains
saved. The mere right, they conclude, to conduct an assessment is
not a vested or an accrued right. They have cited a few authorities
to support these contentions. But limitation is not an issue that
deserves a decision under Article 226.
171. To summarise, they have argued thus:
(a) The Constitution Amendment Act is in itself an
amending act as well as a repealing enactment. Of that Act,
Section 19 is the transitional provision, as also the saving
one. But Article 367 does not apply because repealing
enactment itself specifically provides for transition and
savings. Only in the absence of the repeal or saving, is the
General Clauses is attracted; here the General Clauses Act
does not apply;
(b) Article 367 does not apply to constitutional
amendments; the General Clauses Act is only for
understanding and for interpreting words not defined
and specifically available in the Constitution including
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Article 366 (12);
(c) Specific repeal and saving under KSGST and also
the application of the General Clauses Act as per S.174
(3) is self-contradicting. In any view, S.174 (2) and 174 (3)
are by themselves self-contradicting;
(d) Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is the saving of
subordinate legislation and applies when there are repeal and
re-enactment. The present is not a case of repeal and reenactment. So Section 24 is not attracted. In other words,
machinery provisions are not saved. Then,
there can be no
tax without machinery provisions.
Fallacy:
172. Indeed, on most counts, the petitioners’ assertions
can be accepted. Done so, does that mean the adjudication
results or stands resolved in their favour?
173. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply
to sunset clauses or temporary statutes. Agreed. Repeal and
Omission are different. They are not. Shree Bhagwati Steel
Rolling Mills dispels this myth. Yet, even if we accept it to be
so, still that does not alter the outcome in any way.
174. First, we must acknowledge one thing: none of the
provisions repealed through the CA Act is central legislation.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Each one is state legislation. And the General Clauses Act does
not apply to the State Legislation. But, perhaps, Section 4 of
the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act could be
roped in, if ever we need anything to be saved under a repealed
enactment. We can, however, also accept here that neither act
needs to be invoked.
175. Though the General Clauses Act applies to repeals, it
does not apply to repeals occasioned by a Constitutional
Amendment. This proposition, too, needs no contradiction.
176. What does Section 19 of the CA Act do? It repeals or
omits, for instance, a congeries of state statutes. And, indeed,
the whole Amendment Act is prospective. So these repealed
state acts failed to survive beyond the date mentioned in
Section 19. They perished. First, prospectively, no State
Legislature could trifle with the constitutional mandate under
the Amendment Act. But, prospective as the Amendment Act
is, could the State have saved the causes and the consequences
flowing from the past enactments—enactments once legitimate
and living.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
177. We have found that the General Clauses Act is
unavailable; and that is unavailable on more than one ground:
(a) Omission; (b) repeal by a Constitutional Act; (c) the
alternative theory of sunset clause, if it were; (d) the
inapplicability of the General Clauses Act to the State
enactments.
178. We have noted that the States could do nothing to
affect the Constitutional Act prospectively. But could it have
done—as it has actually done—anything in its legislative scope
only to save the events of taxation that emanated from the
repealed statutes to run their full course and culminate?
179. No aid forthcoming from Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, there could be no saving or transition beyond, to
repeat, the date mentioned in Section 19. To have a saving
clause of its own, the State Government needed legislative
power. Does it have the power?
180. The petitioners argue that the CA Act has disrupted
the federal demarcations; the State’s legislative fields under
Entry 54 of the Second Schedule have been truncated. Thus,
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the State has no longer the power to legislate on the files that
have been taken away from it. Have the State’s legislative power
on the items once available for it under the Entry 52 taken
away? We will see.
181. First, the State’s legislative powers have not been
taken away; they have been, on the contrary, constitutionally
permitted to be shared with the Union Government. What is
gone is the State’s exclusivity. To the legislative fields of
exclusivity and concurrency, what has been added is the
simultaneity—novel as it may sound.
182. To encapsulate, I may observe that all the petitioners
have advanced one common argument: the State has been
denuded of its legislative power to enact Section 174 of the
Kerala State Goods and Services Act, 2017. The obvious prop
for this assertion comes from the 101st Constitutional
Amendment—that is, the attenuated or modified Entry 54 of
the List II, the State List.
183. All the petitioners contend that the KSGST Act
came into being because of the Constitutional Amendment.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
And that very Constitutional Amendment has put paid to
many other enactments—for example, the Kerala Value Added
Tax Act, 2003. So with the Entry 54 of List II unavailable for
the State to incorporate Section 174 of the KSGST Act, the
whole
saving
mechanism
vis-à-vis
transactions
before
16.09.2017 crumbles.
184. I am afraid it is a fallacy on the petitioners’ part to
contend that the State lacks the legislative power to enact
Section 174 of the KSGST Act. Article 246A is the special
provision (if it can be called a provision) on the Goods and
Services Tax. It empowers, as rightly contended by the learned
Senior Counsel Shri Venkataraman, both the Union and the
State, for the first time, to have simultaneous—not concurrent—
powers to legislate on certain items. Indeed, concurrency yields
to the doctrine of repugnancy, but simultaneous legislative
power does not. That is, both the legislatures, say one from the
Union and the other from the State, coexist—operate in the
same sphere, subject to other constitutional safeguards.
185. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
Court has held that the power to legislate does not flow from a
single Article of the Constitution. To articulate this assertion
and to elaborate on it, Bimolangshu Roy observes that besides
the declaration in Article 246, there are various other Articles
in the Constitution which confer authority on the Parliament
or on a State legislature to legislate, under various
circumstances.
186. Indeed the State legislatures are assigned only
specified fields of legislation, the residuary legislative powers
lying with the Parliament. But taxing entries are distinct from
the general entries. So comes a federal constitutional
experiment in the fiscal field: the 101 st Constitutional
Amendment.
187. Article 246 generally stipulates the competence of
the Parliament and the state legislatures on the various fields of
legislation. But Articles 249, 250 and 252 contain provisions
which enable the Parliament to legislate on any matter
enumerated in List II in the exigencies specified in those
Articles. The Scheme of Entries, such as 52 and 54 and the
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
corresponding Entries in the List-II, Bimolangshu Roy
underlines, is nothing but another instance of special
arrangement akin to the one made in Articles 249, 250 and
252. To conclude, Bimolangshu Roy reminds us that a great
deal of schematic examination of the entire Constitution is
essential for us to interpret each Entry in the three Lists of the
Seventh Schedule. And no Rule with a universal application on
interpreting all entries in the 7th Schedule can be postulated.
188. So I reject the petitioners’ plea that the State lacks
the vires to engraft Section 174 into Kerala State Goods and
Services Act, 2017. I have already rejected as inapplicable the
petitioners’ other propositions: the survival of the sunset
clause, the impact of a temporary statute, and inapplicability of
Section 6 of the General Clause Act vis-à-vis a repealed
enactment. They need neither repetition nor reiteration.
Result:
189. I find no merit in the writ petitions; accordingly, I
dismiss all the writ petitions.
190. Yet I clarify: In all these writ petitions various issues
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
arise—constitutionality is only one of them. Even a single issue
has many shades of a challenge. I have touched none save the
constitutional question. And I answered that in the negative.
All other issues—including limitation—remain untouched. After
all, the limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. I reckon,
in that context, that the petitioners have efficacious alternative
remedies under the relevant statutes.
191. Granted, the petitioners have bona fide pursued
these writ petitions; so, now, in a few cases, the petitioners may
face the question of limitation. To adjust equities, I observe
that if any petitioner approaches a statutory authority on an
issue arising out of a writ petition which now stands disposed
of in this batch, the authority will exclude for limitation the
period it has spent before this Court.
192. If any petitioner files in thirty days after its receiving
a copy of the judgment, a statutory appeal or takes out any
other legally sustainable proceedings against the orders under
challenge, the statutory authority will entertain the appeal or
the proceedings as having been filed in time. And to enable
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
the petitioners to approach the appellate authorities, the
Department will defer coercive steps by thirty days, from the
date of their receiving a copy of the judgment. If the appeals
involve limitation, the assessee concerned may place before the
appellate authority all its defences, including the judgment of
this Court in W.A.No.230 of 2017.
193. In the cases of mere notices which ought to be
replied to, the petitioners will have 15 days to do so. The 15
days' time, too, must be reckoned from the day the petitioners
received a copy of the judgment.
No order on costs.
Sd/DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU
JUDGE
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 11335/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
THE TRUE COPY OF SHOP INSPECTION
REPORT DATED 10.11.2011 PREPARED BY
THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERM SQUAD NO.1,
COMMERCIAL TAXES, PATHANAMTHITTA.
EXHIBIT P2
THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.
48/2012-13 DATED 21.03.2013,
RECALLING THE PENALTY NOTICES BY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, SQUAD NO. 1,
COMMERCIAL TAXES, PATHANAMTHITTA.
EXHIBIT P3
THE TRUE COPY OF THE PENALTY
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE YEAR 2010-11 NO.
CR 10/15-16(10-11)A1/IO(IB)1 DATED
24.02.2018 BY THE STATE TAX OFFICER
(IB)-1, STATE GST DEPT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
EXHIBIT P4
THE TRUE COPY OF THE PENALTY
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE YEAR 2011-12 NO.
CR 10/15-16(2011-12) A1/STO(IB)1/TVM
DATED 12.03.2018 BY THE STATE TAX
OFFICER (IB)-1, STATE GST DEPT.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 15523/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT-P1:
COPY OF ANNUAL RETURN FOR THE YEAR 201213 DATED 03.07.2013.
EXHIBIT-P2:
COPY OF NOTICE DATED 10.01.2018 ISSUED
BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT FOR THE YEAR 201213.
EXHIBIT-P3:
COPY OF REPLY DATED 02.02.2018 FILED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 1ST
RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT-P4:
COPY OF ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED
03.04.2018 ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
FOR THE YEAR 2012-13.
EXHIBIT-P5:
COPY OF INTERIM ORDER DATED 13.04.2018
ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN W.P.(C)
NO.13552 OF 2018.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 15851/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXT.P1
COPY OF LICENSE NO.CA 36/2014-15 DATED 15.10.2014
ISSUED BY THE NEDUMUDI GRAMA PANCHAYAT
EXT.P2
COPY OF THE REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE NO.1/TCHA/SEC
107/2015 DATED 19.8.2015 FOR THE PERIOD 2015-2016, ISSUED BY THE
NEDUMUDI GRAMA PANCHAYAT.
EXT.P3
COPY OF THE REGISTRATION CERTIFICATION NO.5/TCHA/SEC
107/2016 DATED 28.3.2017 FOR THE PERIOD 2016-2017 ISSUED BY THE
NEDUMUDI GRAMA PANCHAYAT
EXT.P4
COPY OF THE HOMESTAY CLASSIFICATION ORDER NOHSC-ALPY2007/D11 DATED 8.3.2010 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM,
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA
EXT.P5
COPY OF THE HOMESTAY CLASSIFICATION ORDER NO.P7
1900/14 DATED 4.8.2014 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM,
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA.
EXT.P6
COPY OF THE REGISTRATION DETAILS WITH THE LUXURY TAX
OFFICE, ALAPPUZHA.
EXT.P7
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE NO.32042543027/2014-15, 201516 & 2016-17 DATED 26.04.2018.
EXT.P8
TRUE COPY OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED INTERIM ORDER OF WPC
No.11335/2018.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 15879/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1:
TRUE COPY OF THE COMPOUNDING ORDER FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011.
EXHIBIT P2:
TRUE COPY OF THE COMPOUNDING ORDER FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012.
EXHIBIT P3:
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN WRIT PETITION
NO.12648/2016 DATED 19.08.2016.
EXHIBIT P4:
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 15/3/2018
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011.
EXHIBIT P5:
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 15/3/2018
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012.
EXHIBIT P6:
TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY FILED BY THE
PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P7:
TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL REPLY (WITHOUT
ANNEXURE) FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011
DATED 25/04/2018.
EXHIBIT P8:
TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL REPLY (WITHOUT
ANNEXURE) FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012
DATED 25/04/2018.
EXHIBIT P9:
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 20102011 DATED 14.03.2018.
EXHIBIT P10:
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 20112012 DATED 14.03.2018.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 15898/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
TRUE COPY OF THE COMPOUNDING ORDER FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011.
EXHIBIT P2
TRUE COPY OF THE COMPOUNDING ORDER FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012.
EXHIBIT P3
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN WRIT PETITION
NO.12648/2016 DATED 19-08-2016.
EXHIBIT P4
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 15-03-2018
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011.
EXHIBIT P5
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 15-03-2018
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT FOR THE
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012.
EXHIBIT P6
TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY FILED BY THE
PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P7
TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL REPLY (WITHOUT
ANNEXURE) FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010-2011
DATED 25-04-2018.
EXHIBIT P8
TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL REPLY (WITHOUT
ANNEXURE) FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012
DATED 25-04-2018.
EXHIBIT P9
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 201011 DATED 14-03-2018
EXHIBIT P10
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 201112 DATED 14-03-2018.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 18326/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. ISE.III.35/201314 DATED 11.12.2017 ISSUED BY THE 3RD
RESPONDENT TO THE 1ST PETITIONER
EXHIBIT P2
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. ISE.III.35/201317 DATED 11.12.2017 ISSUED BY THE 3RD
RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P3
TRUE COPY OF ORDER NO. ISE.III. 35/2013-14
DATED 19.03.2018 ISSUED BY THE 4TH
RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P4
TRUE COPY OF THE FORM NO.1 DEMAND NOTICE
U./S.7 ISSUED BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT DATED
04.05.2018
EXHIBIT P5
TRUE COPY OF THE S.O. 2986(E) DATED
16.09.2016 BY THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
EXHIBIT P6
TRUE COPY OF NOTIFICATION NO. 10017/LEG.
A2/2017/LAW DATED 16.09.2017 BY THE LAW
SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, LAW
(LEGISLATION A), DEPARTMENT
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 25768/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1:
TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT' NOTICE NO.OR III
900/2014-2015 DATED 29/11/2014'
EXHIBIT P2:
TRUE COPY OF THE SAID REPLY DATED
29/11/2014.
EXHIBIT P3:
TRUE COPY OF NOTICE NO.OR III/990/14-15
DATED 09/05/2017.
EXHIBIT P4:
TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 17/05/2017.
EXHIBIT P5:
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.III/990/14-15
DATED 07/12/2017.
EXHIBIT P6:
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE U/S 25(1) DATED
30/05/2018.
EXHIBIT P7:
TRUE COPY OF THE 'NOTICE' DATED 05/07/2018
CONFIRMING THE DATE OF HEARING.
EXHIBIT P8:
TRUE COPY OF THE PETITIONER'S REGISTER FOR
THE PERIOD 01/11/2014 TO 30/11/2014.
EXHIBIT P9:
TRUE COPY OF THE PURCHASE INVOICES ALONG
WITH FORM NO.10 FOR THE PERIOD 01/11/2014
TO 30/11/2014.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 40543/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER
NO.32010783805/2012-13 DATED 30.10.2018
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT FOR THE YEAR
2012-13.
EXHIBIT P1 A
TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER
NO.32010783805/2013-14 DATED 30.10.2018
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT FOR THE YEAR
2013-14.
EXHIBIT P2
TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY
THIS HON'BLE COURT IN W.P(C)NO.11335/2018
DATED 04.04.2018.
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WPC NO.40545 OF 2018
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
EXT.P1
DTD.31.8.2018
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.32081146762/2013-14
EXT.P2
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.32081146762/2014-15
DATED 31.8.2018
EXT.P3
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.32081146762/2015-16
DATED 31.8.2018
EXT.P4
TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.32081146762/2016-17
DATED 31.8.2018
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 40561/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
COPY OF NOTICE ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
FOR THE YEAR 2012-13 DATED 5.12.2018
WPC No.11335/2018 & conn.cases
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 40646/2018
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1
COPY OF THE NOTICE FOR THE YEAR 2012-13 DTD
23.11.18.
EXHIBIT P1 A
COPY OF THE NOTICE FOR THE YER 2013-14 DTD
23.11.18.
EXHIBIT P1 B
COPY OF THE NOTICE FOR THE YEAR 2014-15
DTD.23.11.2018.
EXHIBIT P1 C
COPY OF THE NOTICE FOR THE YEAR 2015-16 DTD
23.11.18.
EXHIBIT P1 D
COPY OF THE NOTICE FOR THE YEAR 2016-17 DTD
23.11.18.
EXHIBIT P2
COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER IN W.P.(C)
39245/18 DTD.04.12.18.
Css/
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